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REVOCABLE TRUSTS UNDER THE FLORIDA TRUST CODE
DONNA LITMAN*
SYNOPSIS: Revocable trusts are a special type of inter vivos trust
under Florida law that can be used effectively for some clients and some
assets. This article explores revocable trusts under the Florida Trust Code,
considering the important provisions and elements of a trust in general and of
revocable trusts in particular. This article compares the provisions of Florida
law and the Uniform Trust Code, as well as legislative history, and raises
questions that have not been addressed by the Florida Trust Code. It consid-
ers which assets are appropriate for revocable trusts. The article also dis-
cusses important provisions for planning and drafting revocable trusts to
administer and marshal assets during lifetime, to provide an alternative to
guardianship, and to dispose of assets on or after death in conjunction with a
will.
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A revocable trust is a special type of inter vivos trust under Florida law
that provides a useful estate planning tool for some clients and some assets.
The laws involving revocable trusts have evolved over time, and there are
similarities between wills and revocable trusts. Generally, wills and trusts
are governed by different laws, with wills being governed by the Florida
Probate Code' and trusts being governed by the Florida Trust Code2 (FTC)
1. The Florida Probate Code is the short title for chapters 731-35 of the Florida Stat-
utes. FLA. STAT. § 731.005 (2009). Most of the will provisions are in chapters 732 and 733 of
the Florida Statutes. In addition, Florida Statutes section 73 1.201 contains general definitions
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and, by default, the common law of trusts and principles of equity. 3 A revo-
cable trust is a conceptual hybrid of a will and a trust, and there are many
trust laws governing revocable trusts that parallel will laws. This article will
consider revocable trusts under Florida law, with particular emphasis on
private trusts under the Florida Trust Code and the similarities and differ-
ences between revocable trusts and other trusts and wills.
I. INTRODUCTION
A revocable trust is a recognized form of an inter vivos trust that has
developed over the years. Historically, revocable trusts were challenged in
Florida on the basis that they were illusory or attempted testamentary dispo-
sitions and that they operated as a fraud against the surviving spouse, partic-
ularly when the settlor retained day-to-day control over the trust property and
retained the right to revoke all of the provisions of the trust during the set-
tlor's lifetime.4 In 1969, the Florida Legislature preempted these arguments
for written trust instruments, providing that a trust which is otherwise valid
and "which has been created by a written instrument shall not be held invalid
or an attempted testamentary disposition for any" one or more of a number of
2. The Florida Trust Code is the short title for chapter 736 of the Florida Statutes. FLA.
STAT. § 736.0101. The general effective date of the Florida Trust Code was July 1, 2007, and
prior to that, chapter 737 of the Florida Statutes governed selective aspects of trust law. See
FLA. STAT. § 736.1303; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(4).
3. FLA. STAT. § 736.0106. The FTC does not address all issues of trust law, and "[tihe
common law of trusts and principles of equity" apply to the extent that they have not been
modified by the FTC. Id. The common law of trusts can be found in the case law of Florida
as well as the Restatement of Trusts, such as the provisions of the Second and Third Restate-
ments. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 106 cmt. (amended 2005). Whether Florida courts will look
to the draft provisions of the Third Restatement or final provisions when adopted is unclear.
The substance of Florida Statutes section 736.0106 and Uniform Trust Code (UTC) section
106 are the same, and the comments to that section provide:
To determine the common law and principles of equity in a particular state, a court should look
first to prior case law in the state and then to more general sources, such as the Restatement of
Trusts, Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, and the Restate-
ment of Restitution. The common law of trusts is not static but includes the contemporary and
evolving rules of decision developed by the courts in exercise of their power to adapt the law
to new situations and changing conditions. It also includes the traditional and broad equitable
jurisdiction of the court, which the Code in no way restricts. The statutory text of the Uniform
Trust Code is also supplemented by these Comments, which, like the Comments to any Uni-
form Act, may be relied on as a guide for interpretation.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 106 cmt.
4. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 100 So. 2d 378, 383-84 (Fla. 1956) (holding trust
provisions on settlor's death to be invalid as testamentary provisions and illusory because the
cumulative effect of the powers reserved by the settlor "divested the settlor of virtually none
of her day-to-day control over the property or the power to dispose of it on her death"), rev'd
on jurisdictional grounds, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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reasons specified in the statute, such as the retention by the settlor of the
power to revoke the trust, or remove or control the trustee, or the right to
withdraw property from it, or receive the income from the trust. 5
In some regards, a revocable trust goes against type and has developed
as an exception to the general rules of trusts and wills. To understand revo-
cable trusts, it is important to consider the general rules of trusts and, in some
cases, wills, as well as the special exceptions that apply to revocable trusts.
Further, it helps to consider the differences between revocable and irrevo-
cable inter vivos trusts, as well as to contrast revocable trusts with wills and
testamentary trusts. In general, revocable trusts differ from testamentary
trusts with respect to the timing of their creation, their funding, and their
termination. In general, revocable trusts differ from irrevocable trusts with
respect to their amendment or modification, or their revocation or termina-
tion.
A revocable trust is one of several tools that an attorney can use to
effectuate a client's estate plan. The client's intent is key in determining
whether to transfer property during lifetime or upon death, outright or in
trust, and whether to use a will or an inter vivos or testamentary trust. For
example, an inter vivos trust can be used when the owner of property wants
to make an irrevocable gift of the property, but does not want the donee to
have complete access to the property or control over it. In such a case, the
donor could create an irrevocable trust, selecting a person, other than the
donor or the donee, to serve as trustee and to hold the trust property for the
benefit of the designated donee as the beneficiary of the trust. By contrast, a
will can be used when the owner wants to retain complete control over
property during lifetime, with the testator executing a will that does not
become effective until the testator's death-a will that the testator may
amend or revoke during lifetime. Further, a will can provide for outright
devises, or it can provide for devises in trust, so that after the testator's death
the property can be held in trust-a testamentary trust-for the benefit of one
or more persons.
Ideologically, a revocable trust falls between an irrevocable outright gift
and a testamentary gift in trust. A revocable trust allows a settlor to make a
transfer during lifetime that can be changed or revoked.6 Further, it allows
the settlor to be the beneficiary of the trust during the settlor's lifetime and to
serve as the trustee if the settlor desires.7 It also allows the settlor to provide
in the trust who will be the trustees and beneficiaries after the settlor's death.
5. Act effective July 1, 1969, Ch. 69-192, §1, 1969 Fla. Laws 767-68 (amending FLA.
STAT. ch. 689).
6. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(1).
7. See FLA. STAT. § 689.075(1)(f)-(g).
[Vol. 34
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A revocable trust requires a transfer of ownership or declaration of trust
during lifetime as would an irrevocable trust; however, it differs from an
irrevocable trust because the settlor can amend or revoke the trust and recall
the transfer or the declaration during lifetime. Further, a revocable trust
differs from a will in this regard because the trust requires a transfer or
declaration during lifetime that would not be required if the property were
devised by will.
8
Creating a revocable trust does not avoid the need for probate; however,
it can accelerate the process and substitute a trust process for the assets that
will be held in the revocable trust. Creating the revocable trust for certain
assets involves the process of marshalling and transferring those assets
during lifetime instead of upon death. Creating a revocable trust also can
provide the settlor with an alternative to a guardianship in the event the
settlor becomes incapacitated during lifetime. Further, creating a revocable
trust can provide a repository to which an attorney-in-fact under a durable
power of attorney can transfer assets in the event the principal becomes
unable to manage his or her property. 9 In addition, creating a revocable trust
can dispose of assets when the settlor dies by means of the trust rather than
the settlor's will. Thus, the provisions of the trust may substitute for outright
devises or devises with testamentary trusts.
As the use of revocable trusts has expanded in ways usually reserved for
wills, Florida trust law has expanded to include provisions that parallel rules
applicable to wills. Nevertheless, not all of the will provisions or default
rules have parallel components in trust law. Florida did not adopt the general
provision of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) that interprets trusts and their
dispositive provisions by reference to the rules that govern wills and their
dispositive provisions.' 0 Instead, the legislature chose which specific will
rules to codify as trust rules, so that drafting a revocable trust may require
8. Some might argue that the change of ownership is one of form rather than substance
when the settlor is the sole trustee and the sole beneficiary during lifetime. Nevertheless,
there is a difference between (1) making a transfer during lifetime that may be revoked, and
(2) signing a will while retaining complete ownership until death.
9. See FLA. STAT. § 709.08(7)(b)5.
10. Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 736.1102-.1108, with UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112 ("The rules
of construction that apply in this State to the interpretation of and disposition of property by
will also apply as appropriate to the interpretation of the terms of a trust and the disposition of
the trust property."). The UTC does not provide that the rules of construction for testamentary
trusts apply to trusts, but instead provides that the rules of construction for wills apply to
trusts. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 112 cmt. See also UNIF. TRUST CODE Prefatory Note
(amended 2005) ("The UPC, in Article II, Part 7, extends certain of the rules on the construc-
tion of wills to trusts and other nonprobate instruments. The Uniform Trust Code similarly
extends to trusts the rules on the construction of wills.").
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more provisions than would be needed in a will because there are fewer
default rules for trusts. Further, revocable trusts require inter vivos transfers
or declarations as well as administration during lifetime that would not be
required for wills. Revocable trusts have more potential pitfalls and less
statutory default provisions and safeguards than wills and can be a trap for
the unwary, especially when a lay person attempts to create a revocable trust
without the benefit of competent legal counsel. Thus, it is important that an
estate planning attorney be involved to help the client decide if a revocable
trust is appropriate, and if so, to draft the necessary documents and facilitate
the proper funding of the trust."
When designing a revocable trust, it is important to make sure that the
trust contains all of the necessary elements of a trust and complies with the
formalities required by law. In some cases, the revocable trust must satisfy
the same requirements for an irrevocable trust and a testamentary trust. In
other cases, a revocable trust will qualify for an exception or contain special
provisions that would not be allowed or required in an irrevocable trust or a
will.
This article focuses on private trusts created under Florida law for indi-
viduals as opposed to charitable trusts created for charitable uses. Special
rules apply to out of state trusts created by a person who is domiciled in
Florida or trust instruments executed in another state. 12
11. See, e.g., Fla. Bar re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of Living Trusts,
613 So. 2d 426, 427-28 (Fla. 1992) (finding that "the assembly, drafting, execution, and
funding of a living trust document constitute the practice of law" and agreeing "that a lawyer
must make the determination as to the client's need for a living trust and identify the type of
living trust most appropriate for the client."). The opinion also notes that "gathering the
necessary information for the living trust does not constitute the practice of law, and nonlaw-
yers may properly perform this activity." Id. at 428; see also Fla. Bar v. Am. Senior Citizens
Alliance, Inc., 689 So. 2d 255, 259 (Fla. 1997) (enjoining the unauthorized practice of law
with respect to preparation of revocable trusts).
The referee found that ASCA improperly solicited customers for the purchase of legal instru-
ments; made repeated misrepresentations; shared fees with nonlawyers; commingled advance
fee payments with operating funds; restricted the exercise of independent professional judg-
ment of corporate lawyers; made repeated advertising violations; failed or refused to commu-
nicate with clients; and disclosed confidences for profit ... conclud[ing] that a lawyer partici-
pating in these same activities would be subject to sanction by The Florida Bar.
Am. Senior Citizens Alliance, Inc., 689 So. 2d at 257. Further, "[l]ife insurance agents may
properly sell life insurance that will fund a living trust and may offer advice on funding the
trust from a financial standpoint." Fla. Bar re Advisory Opinion, 613 So. 2d at 428.
12. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(1). The FTC recognizes inter vivos trusts created by a settlor
who is not domiciled in Florida when the trust is created if the "trust complies with the law[s]
of the jurisdiction . . . [where] the settlor was domiciled" at the time of the creation of the
trust. Id. The laws with which the settlor must comply would govern the requirements for
creating the trust, including any formalities. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b). Further, the FTC
recognizes the validity of a trust instrument, executed outside of Florida, if the creation of the
[Vol. 34
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The general requirements for trusts are discussed in Section H. The
application of these requirements to revocable trusts and any exceptions or
additional rules for revocable trusts are considered in Section I1. Then the
important provisions of a revocable trust are explored in Section V.
II. PARTIES AND REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF EXPRESS TRUSTS
GENERAL RULES
Generally, an express private trust involves several parties and required
elements regarding:
1) the settlor,
2) the res or trust property,
3) the trustee, and
4) the beneficiaries. 13
In general: 1) the settlor is the person who creates and funds the trust
for a valid purpose; 2) the res is the specific property set aside to be held in
trust; 3) the trustee is the individual or corporation that holds legal title to the
trust property and has the obligations and powers of ownership as well as
fiduciary duties; and 4) the beneficiaries are the persons who benefit from
the trust property presently, or will benefit in the future.' 4 Florida law also
allows the creation of certain trusts, such as charitable trusts, without indi-
vidual beneficiaries.' 5
In general, a private trust can be created under Florida law when a set-
tlor, with the capacity and intent to create a trust, creates a trust for a lawful,
attainable purpose if that trust has a res, a trustee with fiduciary duties, and
definite beneficiaries. The FTC has codified the general requirements to
create a trust,' 6 as well as the manner in which a trust can be created, under
Florida law. 17 For purposes of this article, these requirements are presented
under three basic categories, regarding:
trust complies with the laws of the jurisdiction where it was executed; provided that if the
settlor was domiciled in Florida at that time, and the trust is a revocable trust with testamen-
tary aspects, the instrument must be executed with the same formalities required for a will in
Florida in order for the testamentary aspects to be valid. See id.
13. See generally FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(4), (16), for general definitions of the terms,
beneficiary and settlor; and id. § 736.0103(13), (21 ) for the general use of the terms, property
and trustee, in the FTC.
14. See id.
15. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0402(l)(c)1, 736.0405(1), (2).
16. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402 (addressing the creation of the trust but not the continuing
validity of the trust). Once the trust is created, what happens if one of these requirements is
no longer met? See also FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0404-.0405 (regarding the purpose requirement).
17. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0401.
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1) the settlor and the settlor's capacity, intent, and purpose;
2) the trust res and the formalities for creating the trust; and
3) the trustee and the beneficiaries and their relationship.
These three topics are discussed in general in this section regarding all
trusts and then again in section III with respect to revocable trusts.
A. Settlor-Capacity, Intent, and Purpose
In order for a trust to be created, the person who creates the trust-the
settlor-must have the capacity and the intent to create the trust and must
indicate that intent.18 Thus, there must be a settlor and that settlor must have
the capacity to create a trust and must evidence that intent to create one.
Further, the trust must be created for a valid purpose.9
1. Settlor-Definition and Alternative Terminology
The FIC defines the term "settlor" to mean:
a person, including a testator, who creates or contributes property
to a trust. If more than one person creates or contributes property
to a trust, each person is a settlor of the portion of the trust prop-
erty attributable to that person's contribution except to the extent
another person has the power to revoke or withdraw that portion.
20
Thus, the FTC uses the term "settlor" to refer to the creator of an inter
vivos trust as well as the creator of a testamentary trust. When the trust is
created by will, i.e., a testamentary trust, the settlor of the trust is the testator.
In the case of trusts created during lifetime, i.e., inter vivos trusts, some
documents and Florida statutes have or still refer to the creator of a trust as
the grantor.2 1 Further, a person who contributes property to a trust, even
though he or she did not create the trust or sign the trust instrument, also is a
settlor of a trust.2
2
18. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(1)(a), (b).
19. FLA. STAT. § 736.0404.
20. FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(16).
21. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.4015(2)(a), (b); however, id § 731.201(19) defines the
term "grantor" to include the term "settlor." Kunce v. Robinson, 469 So. 2d 874, 875 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (discussed in infra note 110). The settlor or grantor also can be referred
to as the trustor; however, this is rarely done. See FLA. STAT. § 731.201(19).
22. FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(16).
[Vol. 34
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A trust may have more than one settlor when the trust is created, or at a
later date.23 For example, two individuals may create a trust together (a joint
trust), or one individual may create a trust and a second individual may add
property to that trust at a later date.
2. Capacity to Create Trust
With respect to capacity, the FTC addresses the capacity that is required
to create a revocable trust, i.e., the capacity to make a will.24 The FTC does
not specifically address the capacity required to create an irrevocable trust or
a testamentary trust-thus, this capacity is derived from the common law of
trusts, including the Restatement, and principles of equity. 25 Further, the
comments to the uniform laws are helpful.
To place the issue in context, it is important to realize that the creation
of an irrevocable trust includes an irrevocable gift, while the creation of a
testamentary trust requires the execution of a valid will. In order to make an
irrevocable gift, the donor must have the capacity to make an inter vivos
gift,26 and in order to make a will, the testator must have testamentary capac-
ity. 27 Thus, at a minimum, a settlor who creates an irrevocable trust must
have the capacity to make an inter vivos gift, and a testator who creates a
testamentary trust must have the capacity to make a will. The question, then,
is whether trust law requires a settlor to have any additional capacity in order
to create an irrevocable gift in trust, or a will containing a testamentary trust.
Further, since the FTC adopts the capacity requirement from the UTC, the
comments to the UTC are instrumental. The UTC comments rely on the
authority of the Second Restatement of Trusts as well as the tentative draft of
the Third Restatement of Trusts, noting:
To create a trust, a settlor must have the requisite mental capacity.
To create a revocable or testamentary trust, the settlor must have
the capacity to make a will. To create an irrevocable trust, the set-
23. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 736.0417(1).
24. FLA. STAT. § 736.0601.
25. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0106; Freeman v. Lane, 504 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1987) (regarding the capacity to revoke a trust, holding that "[in order to revoke a
trust, one merely needs to have the capacity to understand the nature of the transaction, not
necessarily an aptitude in dealing with financial matters").
26. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (THIRD): WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(c)
(2003) (to make an irrevocable gift the donor must have testamentary capacity and "must also
be capable of understanding the effect that the gift may have on the future financial security of
the donor and of anyone who may be dependent on the donor"); Saliba v. James, 196 So. 832,
835 (Fla. 1940) (discussing capacity to gift and invalidity of gifts by insane donor).
27. See FLA. STAT. § 732.501.
11
: Nova Law Review 34, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAW REVIEW
tior must have capacity during lifetime to transfer the property free
of trust.
28
Thus, the drafters of the UTC did not impose any additional capacity
requirements to make an irrevocable gift in trust or a devise in trust.
From a planning standpoint, a settlor who creates a trust or a testator
whose will includes a trust should have a greater capacity than the capacity
to make an irrevocable gift or a devise by will. The settlor or testator should
understand what a trust is and should participate in the process of determin-
ing the essential provisions of the trust, including who will serve as the
trustee, who will be designated as the beneficiaries, what distributions will be
authorized, and whether distributions will be within the discretion of the
trustee or mandatory. Thus, the settlor or testator should understand the
difference between making a gift or devise outright and making a gift or
devise in trust. By contrast, from a litigation standpoint, if there is an issue
regarding capacity, it is arguable that the settlor merely needed the capacity
to make an outright gift or devise in order to create a trust. For further
discussion regarding the issue of the capacity to create a revocable trust, see
section III.A.
3. Intent to Create Trust
In order to create a trust, the settlor must indicate an intention to create
it.29 This requirement is what distinguishes an express trust from an implied
trust, such as a constructive trust or a resulting trust. 30 In general, a construc-
tive trust is created by a court as a remedy in order to prevent a person who
owns property that belongs to another from retaining ownership, while a
resulting trust arises when a person transfers property, but does not intend for
the transferee to have beneficial ownership of the property.31 In the case of
an express trust, the settlor's intent usually is evidenced by a written trust
document such as a will or a trust agreement that designates a trustee and
indicates that the trustee is to hold the trust property in trust and designates
the beneficial interests of the trust. The FTC refers to this document as a
"trust instrument," meaning "an instrument executed by a settlor that con-
28. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402 cmt. (amended 2005) ("See Section 601 (capacity of settlor
to create revocable trust), and see generally Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 11 (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1, approved 1996; Restatement (Second) of Trusts Sections 18-22 (1959); and
Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers Section 8.1 (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 2001).").
29. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(l)(b).
30. See Wadlington v. Edwards, 92 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1957); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
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tains terms of the trust, including any amendments to the trust. '32 The FTC's
definition of the "terms of a trust" reflects the intent requirement, providing
that the "'[tierms of a trust' means the manifestation of the settlor's intent
regarding a trust's provisions as expressed in the trust instrument or as may
be established by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial pro-
ceeding. 33  Although some trust instruments are styled or named as trust
agreements, they evidence a form of ownership between the trustee and
beneficiaries that is created by the settlor rather than a contractual agreement
between the settlor and the trustee. Thus, the term "trust instrument" is more
appropriate.
When creating an express trust, precatory language evidencing a mere
wish or desire that a person hold property in trust for another should not be
used.34 The creation of the trust should be mandatory; however, the trustee
may be granted discretion to exercise fiduciary powers regarding the admin-
istration or distribution of the trust.35
4. Purpose of Trust
In order for a trust to be created, the trust must have a lawful purpose,
whether private or charitable, that does not contravene public policy and that
is possible to achieve, and the trust and its terms must be for the benefit of its
beneficiaries.36 The comments to the Uniform Trust Code provide the
following additional guidance:
37
32. FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(20).
33. FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(19).
34. See, e.g., Magnant v. Peacock, 25 So. 2d 566, 566-67 (Fla. 1946) (explaining that the
testator's "wish that the sons surviving him should 'form a Board of Arbitration' to accom-
plish a peaceable distribution of the estate and the 'desire' that his 'beloved granddaughter
[appellant] be provided for in such manner' as to the executors and the members of the so-
called board of arbitration should seem meet" was insufficient to create a trust). In order for a
trust based on precatory language to be valid, the language that appears to be precatory must
be construed as being obligatory. Some courts refer to this as a "precatory trust." See id. at
567, In re DeRoche's Estate, 330 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976); however, in neither
case was the precatory language sufficient to create a trust. Because the term '"'precatory
trust" is a misnomer or an oxymoron, it should be avoided.
35. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0103(3), 736.0814 (regarding discretionary powers, such
as a trustee's power to make distributions for a beneficiary's health, education, support, and
maintenance).
36. FLA. STAT. § 736.0404. It is unclear how the latter requirement applies to a charitable
trust.
37. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt. (amended 2005) ("For an explication of the require-
ment that a trust must not have a purpose that is unlawful or against public policy, see Re-
statement (Third) of Trusts §§ 27-30 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement
(Second) of Trusts §§ 59-65 (1959).").
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A trust with a purpose that is unlawful or against public policy is
invalid. Depending on when the violation occurred, the trust may
be invalid at its inception or it may become invalid at a later date.
The invalidity may also affect only particular provisions. General-
ly, a trust has a purpose which is illegal if (1) its performance
involves the commission of a criminal or tortious act by the trus-
tee; (2) the settlor's purpose in creating the trust was to defraud
creditors or others; or (3) the consideration for the creation of the
trust was illegal.38
"Purposes violative of public policy include those that tend to encourage
criminal or tortious conduct, that interfere with freedom to marry or encour-
age divorce, that limit religious freedom, or which are frivolous or capri-
cious.
' 39
When a settlor decides to create a trust rather than make an outright
transfer, the settlor has one or more reasons for creating the trust. These
reasons may translate into the purposes of the trust. For example, the settlor
may create a testamentary trust to provide first for the support of his or her
spouse and then, after the spouse's death, to provide for the support and
education of their children. Ancillary reasons may be to save taxes, such as
through the use of a marital trust or a creditor shelter trust,40 or to protect
beneficiaries from creditors through the use of a spendthrift provision.
Usually the trust purposes are discerned from the trust distribution pro-
visions.4' Some trusts may contain provisions that further explain the set-
tlor's intent and purpose in creating the trust and that affect the trustee's
duties, such as a provision that the primary purpose of the trust is to care for
the income beneficiary and that fiduciary decisions can be made that benefit
the income beneficiary rather than remainder beneficiaries.42  Settlors also
38. Id. ("See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 28 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved
1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 60 cmt. a (1959).").
39. Id. ("See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 29 cmts. d-h (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999);
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 62 (1959).").
40. See I.R.C. §§ 1022, 2056, 2010 and infra notes 355-59 and accompanying text.
41. In the pre-FTC case of Schwarzkopf v. American Heart Ass'n of Greater Miami, Inc.,
541 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989), the court held that a trust established to
distribute income to four charities for ten years, with the remainder payable to those four
charities, was an active trust, and "the ownership and investment of its assets, the temporary
preservation of capital, the postponement but eventual delivery of the corpus-constitute
perhaps the most essential and common purposes of a trust entity." Schwarzkopf, 541 So. 2d
at 1350.
42. See FLA. STAT. § 738.103(2) (regarding the trustee's fiduciary duty of impartiality
with respect to income and principal decisions "except to the extent the terms of the trust or
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may add provisions that express a purpose of the trust, such as the material
purpose to aid a court when determining whether to permit a modification of
the trust, or the dominant charitable purpose and the means to accomplish
that purpose when a court is applying the cy pres doctrine.4 3
B. Trust Res and Formalities for Trust Creation
A trust requires a res (trust property) an and the type of res affects
whether a written trust instrument is required.45 The FTC addresses the res
requirement as well as the formalities and standard of proof for oral trusts. 46
1. Res and Funding of Trust
The FTC addresses the res element under the "methods of creating" a
trust rather than as one of the specific "requirements for creation" of a trust.
47
48Nevertheless, a trust cannot be created without a trust res.
A settlor who owns property can create a trust during his or her lifetime
by transferring that property to another person as trustee or by declaring that
he or she holds that property as trustee.49 A testator can create a trust by will
by devising that property in trust. 50 In addition, a settlor can create a trust by
another disposition taking effect on death.5' Further, a person who holds a
power of appointment exercisable during lifetime or by will, may exercise
the power in favor of a trustee, thereby funding an inter vivos or testamen-
43. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 736.04113(l)(a), (c) (regarding judicial modification of a trust
when "[t]he purposes of the trust have been fulfilled or have become illegal, impossible,
wasteful, or impracticable to fulfill" or when "[a] material purpose of the trust no longer
exists"); see FLA. STAT. § 736.0413 (regarding cy pres and the trust's charitable purposes).
With respect to other reasons that the trust's purposes are important, see, for example, sections
736.0405 and 736.0409 of the Florida Statutes, regarding charitable and noncharitable trusts
and purposes, and section 736.0108(4), regarding a trustee's "continuing duty to administer
the trust at a place appropriate to its purposes."
44. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0401.
45. See FLA. STAT. §§ 689.05, 736.0403(2)(a).
46. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0401, .0403, .0407.
47. FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0401, .0402.
48. Generally inter vivos trusts are created and funded during lifetime; however, sections
732.513 and 689.075 of the Florida Statutes provide an exception that allows an inter vivos
trust instrument to be executed in writing during lifetime and created and funded upon the
settlor's death by a pour-over devise under the settlor's will.
49. FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(l)-(2). In the case of a declaration of trust, the statute
requires the declaration to be "that the owner holds identifiable property as trustee." FLA.
STAT. § 736.0401(2) (emphasis added).
50. FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(1).
51. FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(1).
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tary trust.52 Thus, there are a number of different methods authorized by the
FTC for funding a trust.
The general definition of property under the FFC is "anything that may
be the subject of ownership, real or personal, legal or equitable, or any inter-
est therein. 53 Thus, there are many different types of property that can be
placed in trust. Most, but not all, property may be held in trust,54 but not all
property that can be held in trust should be.
2. Written and Oral Trusts-Formalities and Burden of Proof
The FFC addresses the formalities required for the terms of a written
trust instrument5 5 and the standard of proof for establishing the terms of an
oral trust under Florida law. 56 In addition to the formalities or standard of
proof required for trusts, other laws may apply with respect to how trusts are
funded. Thus, there may be additional formalities required to transfer an
asset to the trustee or to declare that the owner is holding the property as
trustee. For example, in order to transfer shares of stock in a publicly held
corporation, the stock certificate and a duly executed assignment of the
shares may need to be delivered to the corporation's transfer agent for trans-
fer on the stock record books.
An express trust created during lifetime that contains Florida real estate,
such as "any messuages, lands, tenements, or hereditaments," must comply
with the Florida statute of frauds for land;57 thus, the trust instrument must be
in writing and it must be "signed by the party authorized by law to declare or
52. FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(3).
53. FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(13).
54. See, e.g., Professional Service Corporation and Limited Liability Company Act, FLA.
STAT. ch. 621. Florida Statutes section 621.09(l) provides:
No corporation organized under the provisions of this act may issue any of its capital stock to
anyone other than a professional corporation, a professional limited liability company, or an
individual who is duly licensed or otherwise legally authorized to render the same specific pro-
fessional services as those for which the corporation was incorporated.
FLA. STAT. § 621.09(1). Although the term "property" includes an equitable interest, the
provisions of one trust may prevent the beneficiary from transferring its beneficial interest in
the first trust to a second trust. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(13); see also FLA. STAT. §
736.0502(2).
55. FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0403,689.05.
56. FLA. STAT. § 736.0407.
57. FLA. STAT. §§ 689.05, 736.0403(2)(a). Special rules apply to Florida land trusts
under Florida Statutes section 689.071, which are not subject to the provisions of the FFC
except as provided in Florida Statutes section 689.071(7). FLA. STAT. § 736.0102. It is
unclear why Florida Statutes section 689.071 (9)(a) expressly states the provisions of Florida
Statutes section 763.0705 do not apply.
[Vol. 34
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create such trust or confidence." 58 Further, the interest in land should be
transferred to the trustee-identifying the trust by name or date-by a deed
signed by the grantor/settlor or by his or her lawfully authorized attorney or
agent "in the presence of two subscribing witnesses., 59 A trust created by a
will, i.e., a testamentary trust, requires a validly executed will.
60
If a settlor domiciled in Florida creates a revocable trust and the trust
has testamentary aspects-"provisions of the trust instrument that dispose of
the trust property on or after the death of the settlor other than to settlor's
estate"-then the trust must be executed with the formalities required for a
will in Florida in order for those trust provisions to be valid when the settlor
dies.61 If the trust is not executed like a will, then the invalidity of the testa-
mentary aspects will not affect the validity of the provisions of the trust that
apply during the settlor's lifetime. When the settlor dies, however, those
trust provisions disposing of the trust property after the settlor's death will
not be effective. Instead, the trust will revert to the settlor's estate when the
settlor dies and the trust assets will be subject to administration and pass
pursuant to the provisions of the settlor's will or the laws of intestacy.
Generally, other trusts and provisions may be created by oral statements
of the settlor, provided that "the creation of an oral trust and its terms may be
established only by clear and convincing evidence." 62  This standard is
greater than the general civil standard of the greater weight or preponderance
of the evidence, but less than the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt. A settlor may orally create an irrevocable trust funded with personal
property, whether tangible or intangible.63 Further, a settlor may orally
58. FLA. STAT. § 689.05.
59. FLA. STAT. § 689.06. Although the deed is not required to be recorded, a notary is
recommended so that the deed is recordable. FLA. STAT. § 695.03; see also FLA. STAT. §
689.07(1) (to determine appropriate language to identify the trust by title, date, beneficiaries,
nature, or purpose so that the trustee will not be treated as the fee simple owner); Raborn v.
Menotte, 974 So. 2d 328, 331 (Fla. 2008); Charlie Nash, Various Courts Weigh in on Florida
Homestead and Transfers of Real Estate to Trusts, 29 ACTIONLINE 26-27 (Fla. Bar Real
Prop., Prob. & Tr. L. Sec., Spring, 2008). But see Flinn v. Van Devere, 502 So. 2d 454, 455
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (where real estate passed pursuant to the settlor's will rather than
her trust because title to the real estate was not deeded to the trustee).
60. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.502, .504. A self-proof affidavit is optional. FLA. STAT. §
732.503; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 689.05, .06 (with respect to a testamentary trust for real
estate). The will must contain a valid devise of the real estate. That devise might be a specific
devise of real estate. Alternatively, it might be a residuary devise that includes real estate as
part of the residuary estate.
61. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b).
62. FLA. STAT. § 736.0407.
63. FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0403(2)(a), .0407; see also Rosen v. Rosen, 167 So. 2d 70, 72
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (a pre-FTC case).
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create a revocable trust funded with personal property if the property is to be
distributed to the settlor's estate upon death.64 Although oral trusts can be
created during the settlor's lifetime for personalty if proven by clear and
convincing evidence, they are not recommended. Instead, written trust
instruments are preferred in order to provide a written record of the settlor's
intent identifying the beneficiaries and delineating the distributive duties and
powers of the trustees.65
Alternatively, if an inter vivos trust is executed in a jurisdiction outside
of Florida, it will be valid if it complies with the formalities of that jurisdic-
tion.66 Further, if the inter vivos trust is created by a settlor who is domiciled
in a jurisdiction other than Florida, the creation of the trust will be valid if its
creation complies with the laws of that jurisdiction-which should include
the formalities and all other requirements for creating a trust.67
Florida law also authorizes a trustee to provide a certification of trust
containing information regarding the trust and the trustees and settlor, in-
cluding whether the trust is revocable, or the name of any person who holds a
power of revocation. 68  The FTC does not require any formalities for the
certification, although it provides that it "may be signed or otherwise authen-
ticated by any trustee.969
C. Trustee and Beneficiaries
In order for a trust to be created, the trustee must have duties to
perform.70 Further, in order to create a trust, the trust must have a definite
beneficiary, i.e., a beneficiary who "can be ascertained now or in the future,
subject to any applicable rule against perpetuities" or the trust must be a
64. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0403(2)(a), (b), .0407.
65. See, e.g., Rosen, 167 So. 2d at 71-72 (a pre-FTC case requiring appellate litigation to
determine that $35,000 of life insurance proceeds paid to the insured's father were to be held
in trust by him for the benefit of his grandchildren pursuant to an oral trust created by his son;
however, it is unclear from the opinion as to what distributions the trustee had the discretion to
make or was required to make for the benefit of the grandchildren and when the trust was to
terminate).
66. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(1).
67. See id.
68. FLA. STAT. § 736.1017(1).
69. FLA. STAT. § 736.1017(2). A statutory form certificate of trust-or a judicial form
like a probate form--would be helpful, with a space to add additional information, regarding
special powers or other provisions. See FLA. STAT. §765.203. See also id. §§ 709.08(4),
732.503.
70. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(1)(d).
[Vol. 34
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charitable trust7' with a charitable purpose.72 In the case of a private trust, if
there is a sole trustee who is a beneficiary of the trust, that sole trustee must
not be the sole beneficiary.73
1. Trustee with Duties to Perform
The requirement that a trustee must have duties to perform has two ele-
ments. The first is implicit-that the trust must have a trustee, and the gen-
eral maxim that a trust will not fail for lack of a trustee should apply.74 The
second is expressed-that the trustee must have duties to perform.75
The FTC does not define the term "trustee" except to clarify that the
FTC uses the term "trustee" to mean "the original trustee and includes any
additional trustee, any successor trustee, and any cotrustee. ' ' 7 6 Nor does the
FTC address who may serve as a trustee or restrict who may serve as a
trustee in the manner that personal representatives are restricted. 77  The
comments to the UTC provide: "[a]ny natural person, including a settlor or
beneficiary, has capacity to act as trustee if the person has capacity to hold
title to property free of trust. '78 Nevertheless, a person who lacks the capac-
ity to exercise powers of ownership because of age or mental capacity should
not be able to serve as a trustee.
Generally, corporations may serve as trustees; 79 and some corporations
are permitted to serve as trustees, but are precluded from serving as personal
71. FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0402(l)(c), .0103(5) ("'Charitable trust' means a trust, or portion
of a trust, created for a charitable purpose as described in s[ection] 736.0405(1).").
72. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(l)(c)(I); § .0103(5) ("'Charitable trust' means a trust, or
portion of a trust, created for a charitable purpose as described in s[ection] 736.0405(1)."); §
.0405. Alternatively, a trust may be created to care for an animal or for a noncharitable
purpose pursuant to Florida Statutes sections 736.0408 and 736.0409.
73. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(1)(e).
74. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0106 ("The common law of trusts and principles of equity
supplement this code, except to the extent modified by this code .... ); see also UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 401 cmt. (amended 2005) ("While this section refers to transfer of property to a
trustee, a trust can be created even though for a period of time no trustee is in office. See
Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 2 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. i, approved 1996);
Restatement (Second of Trusts Section 2 cmt. i (1959). A trust can also be created without
notice to or acceptance by a trustee or beneficiary."). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 31, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS §§ 32-33.
75. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(l)(d).
76. FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(21).
77. See FLA. STAT. §§ 733.302-.305 (establishing who may or may not serve as a
personal representative).
78. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 cmt. (amended 2005). "State banking statutes normally
impose additional requirements before a corporation can act as trustee." Id.
79. FLA. STAT. § 617.2101; see Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980)
(affirming a judgment declaring Florida Statutes section 659.141(1) (1972) unconstitutional
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representatives of estates. 80 Nevertheless, when a settlor chooses a corporate
fiduciary, the settlor generally chooses a corporation with fiduciary expertise
and generally does not choose a general business corporation with limited
liability. Further, most general business corporations without fiduciary
expertise choose not to serve as trustees because of the fiduciary duties and
liabilities that would be imposed on them.
A Florida not-for-profit corporation may serve as a trustee of a trust
when the corporation is the beneficiary of the trust."' In addition, a Florida
nonprofit corporation may serve as a trustee of a trust when "any other
eleemosynary institution or nonprofit corporation or fraternal, benevolent,
charitable, or religious society or association" has a beneficial interest in the
trust property.82
Florida regulates the conduct of trust business by certain corporate fidu-
ciaries,83 requiring "every trust company and every state or national bank or
state or federal association having trust powers" to provide "satisfactory
security" before "transacting any trust business" in Florida.84 A trust com-
because it "directly burdens interstate commerce in a manner that contravenes the Commerce
Clause's implicit limitation on state power"). The statute provided:
[N]o bank, trust company, or holding company, the operations of which are principally con-
ducted outside this state, shall acquire, [or] retain, or own, directly or indirectly, all, or sub-
stantially all the assets of, or control over, any bank or trust company having a place of busi-
ness in this state where the business of banking or trust business or functions are conducted, or
acquire, [or] retain, or own all, or substantially all, of the assets of, or control over, any busi-
ness organization having a place of business in this state where or from which it furnishes in-
vestment advisory services [to trust companies or banks] in this state.
Lewis, 447 U.S. at 32 n.2.
80. FLA. STAT. § 660.41. This statute, entitled "Corporations; certain fiduciary functions
prohibited," provides:
All corporations are prohibited from exercising any of the powers or duties and from acting in
any of the capacities, within this state, as follows:
(1) As personal representative of the estate of any decedent, whether such decedent was a resi-
dent of this state or not, and whether the administration of the estate of such decedent is origi-
nal or ancillary; however, if the personal representative of the estate of a nonresident decedent
is a corporation duly authorized, qualified, and acting as such personal representative in the
jurisdiction of the domicile of the decedent, it may as a foreign personal representative perform
such duties and exercise such powers and privileges as are required, authorized, or permitted
by s[ection] 734.101 .... This section does not apply to banks or associations and trust compa-
nies incorporated under the laws of this state and having trust powers, banks or associations
and trust companies resulting from an interstate merger transaction with a Florida bank pur-
suant to s[ection] 658.2953 and having trust powers, or national banking associations or fed-
eral associations authorized and qualified to exercise trust powers in Florida.
Id.
81. FLA. STAT. § 617.2101.
82. Id.
83. See FLA. STAT. § 658.12(20)--(23); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 658.16, .23(4), .25,
.2953(14), .30, .33; FLA. STAT. §§ 660.27, .28, .30, .34.
84. FLA. STAT. § 660.27(1).
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pany is defined as "any business organization, other than a bank or state or
federal association, which is authorized by lawful authority to engage in trust
business '85 and "'[t]rust business' means the business of acting as a fiduciary
when such business is conducted by a bank, state or federal association, or a
trust company, and also when conducted by any other business organization
as its sole or principal business. '"86
Generally, the settlor designates the trustee and the successor trustees or
may authorize a trustee or a beneficiary to appoint the successors; however,
if there is a vacancy, qualified beneficiaries or the court will appoint a trustee
to fill a vacancy.87 A vacancy may arise in the event the trustee is unable or
unwilling to serve for any number of reasons, including the trustee's inca-
pacity, resignation, removal, or death.88  Florida law also restricts which
corporations may serve as a "receiver or trustee under appointment of any
court in this state;" 89 however, it is unclear whether this restriction applies
when a court fills a vacancy in an express trust.
90
If the trustee designated by the settlor refuses to accept the appointment,
the trust should not be invalid and a successor trustee should be appointed
pursuant to the trust provisions or pursuant to the statutory provisions for
filling a vacancy.91 Further, if the settlor transferred assets to that trustee, the
transfer should be construed as a transfer to the trustee rather than to the
individual who failed to accept the trusteeship.
The legislative history for the FTC recites the general definition of a
trust as "a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the
person by whom the title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal
with the property for the benefit of another person, which arises as a result of
a manifestation of an intention to create it"'92 and states that "[t]he trustee is
the person who holds the legal title to the property held in trust, for the
benefit of the beneficiary. 93  Designating someone as trustee usually in-
volves the creation of a fiduciary relationship and includes the creation of
85. FLA. STAT. § 658.12(21).
86. FLA. STAT. § 658.12(20).
87. FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0201(4)(b), .0704(2)-(3); see FLA. STAT. § 736.0704(4) (providing
rules for filling trustee vacancies in a charitable trust).
88. FLA. STAT. § 736.0704(1).
89. FLA. STAT. § 660.41(2).
90. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0704(3)(c)-(4)(c) (providing when a vacancy is filled "[b]y a
person appointed by the court").
91. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0704(2)-(4).
92. Fla. S. Comm. on Banking & Ins., CS for SB 1170 (2006) Staff Analysis 3 (Mar. 21,
2006) [hereinafter CS for SB 1170 Staff Analysis] (quoting 55A FLA. JUR. 2D Trusts § 1
(2007)). This is the Restatement definition of an express trust.
93. Id. at 3 (quoting 55A FLA. JUR. 2D Trusts § i).
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beneficial interests as well; however, merely designating someone as trustee
on a deed or opening a bank account in trust for an individual may be insuf-
ficient to create an express trust. The trustee's duties usually involve both
administrative and distributive duties that are expressed in the trust instru-
ment as well as provided by trust law.
The statutory requirement that the trustee must have duties in order to
create a trust is a requirement of the UTC.94 The comments to the UTC
indicate that this requirement "recites standard doctrine that a trust is created
only if the trustee has duties to perform. 95  Further, the UTC comments
state:
Trustee duties are usually active, but a validating duty may also be
passive, implying only that the trustee has an obligation not to
interfere with the beneficiary's enjoyment of the trust property.
Such passive trusts, while valid under this Code, may be termi-
nable under the enacting jurisdiction's Statute of Uses.96
Thus, the intent of the uniform law was to codify the general require-
ment that a trustee must have duties, but to allow such duties to be passive
for purposes of creating a trust. This general requirement would be in addi-
tion to any other requirement that a trust containing real property have an
active use in order to avoid application of the Statute of Uses.
The Florida legislative history is less clear. It states: "The trust must
not be passive, meaning that the trustee must have enforceable duties to
perform." 97 Further, it states in a footnote: "The requirement that the trus-
tee's duties be enforceable means that the same person may not be the sole
trustee and sole beneficiary of the trust. '98  This analysis combines the
requirement that a trustee have duties with the requirement that the sole
trustee cannot be the sole beneficiary. This analysis raises the concept of an
active or passive use-which arises under the Florida Statute of Uses-as
well as the doctrine of merger-which involves the separation of legal and
94. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a)(4).
95. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a)(4) cmt. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2
(2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959)).
96. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402 cmt. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 6;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 67-72).
97. CS for SB 1170 Staff Analysis, supra note 92, at 13-14 (citing FLA. STAT. §
736.0402(l)(d); accord Elvins v. Seestedt, 193 So. 54, 57 (Fla. 1940) (quoting Newcomb v.
Masters, 122 N.E. 85, 87 (111. 919)); Baum v. Corn, 167 So. 2d 740, 744 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1964); Watson v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 146 So. 2d 383, 384-85 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1962)).
98. CS for SB 1170 Staff Analysis, supra note 92, at 14 n.124 (citing FLA. STAT. §
736.0402(1)(e)); accord Wiley v. W.J. Hoggson Corp., 106 So. 408, 412 (Fla. 1925).
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equitable title. Under the Statute of Uses, a trust for real estate will be
executed when the trustee has no active duties, and by operation of law the
beneficiary will become the sole owner of the trust property.99 Under the
merger doctrine, there must be a separation of legal and equitable title for a
trust to exist or continue, so that if there is a sole trustee and that trustee is
the sole beneficiary of the trust, the legal and equitable titles will merge and
the beneficiary will become the outright owner.'0° The result can be the
same in a passive real estate trust and under the merger doctrine in that the
trust terminates and the beneficiary becomes the outright owner; however, a
passive trust and merger generally arise under different factual situations. In
the case of a passive trust, legal and equitable title may be separate-for
example, the trustee and the beneficiaries may be different and there may be
more than one trustee or more than one beneficiary under a passive trust.' 0'
In the case of the merger doctrine, the trustee may have active duties, but the
only trustee is the only beneficiary thereby merging the legal title with the
equitable title.'
0 2
The Florida legislative history implies the requirement that the trustee
have enforceable, active duties in order for a trust to be created. 0 3 This may
extend the requirement that a trust have an active use beyond real estate
trusts; however, the end result under the FTC may differ from that under the
Statute of Uses when the settlor attempts to create a passive trust. If the FTC
is interpreted to require active duties for the creation of a trust and if the
settlor transfers property to a trustee for the benefit of beneficiaries without
imposing any active duties, the trust will not be created.1°4 If the settlor has
not created a trust, what is the effect of the transfer? If the property trans-
99. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 689.09; Clement v. Charlotte Hosp. Ass'n, 137 So. 2d 615,
616 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
100. See Contella v. Contella, 559 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (pre-FTC
case stating: "[M]erger applies only when the legal and equitable interests are held by one
person and are coextensive and commensurate-i.e., the legal estate and the equitable estate
are the same.... This may occur where, by operation of law, the entire beneficial interest
passes to the trustee, or the legal title passes to a sole beneficiary."). See also Hansen v.
Bothe, 10 So. 3d 213, 216 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (pre-FTC facts).
An example of a trust to which the doctrine of merger would apply is a trust of which the set-
tlor is sole trustee, sole beneficiary for life, and with the remainder payable to the settlor's pro-
bate estate. On the doctrine of merger generally, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 69
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 341 (1959).
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402 cmt.
101. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 689.09; Clement, 137 So. 2d at 615 (passive trust involving
individual co-trustees and sole corporate beneficiary).
102. See supra note 100.
103. See CS for SB 1170 Staff Analysis, supra note 92, at 13, 14 & n. 124.
104. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(l)(d) ("A trust is created only if: ... (d) The trustee has
duties to perform.").
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ferred were real estate, would Florida's Statute of Uses apply to execute the
use and thus transfer title to the beneficiaries?'0 5 If the property transferred
were personal property, such as an intangible, would this mean that the
settlor is still the owner of the property or would it mean that the transfer is
valid and the beneficiaries are the owners? The answer may depend on
whether the attempted trust was revocable or irrevocable; however, the FTC
does not provide the answer.
Presumably, the requirement that a trustee have duties is in addition to
the duties imposed on all trustees by statute and common law, such as the
duty of loyalty and the duty to account, and could be satisfied even if the
trustee has only one duty.1°6 Arguably, these duties are the types of duties
that would prevent the Florida Statute of Uses from terminating an active
trust holding real estate. 0 7  From a planning standpoint, express trusts
drafted by attorneys should not have this deficiency because the distributive
and administrative provisions of the trust should result in the trustee having
significant, active fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries with respect to the
income and the principal of the trust. Nevertheless, it would be helpful to
have more legislative or judicial clarification on this requirement.
2. Definite Beneficiary or Special Purpose
In order for a trust to be created, the trust must have a definite benefi-
ciary, i.e., a "beneficiary [who] can be ascertained now or in the future,
subject to any applicable rule against perpetuities,"'' 0 8 or the trust must be a
charitable trust with a charitable purpose.'°9 Alternatively, the settlor may
105. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 736.0801 (duty to administer trust); FLA. STAT. § 736.0802
(duty of loyalty); FLA. STAT. § 736.0803 (duty of impartiality); FLA. STAT. § 736.0813 (duty to
inform and account). It should be noted, however, that one of a trustee's statutory duties is to
administer the trust "in accordance with its terms." FLA. STAT. § 736.0801.
107. See, e.g., Elvins v. Seestedt, 193 So. 54, 57 (Fla. 1940) (conveyance of real property
to a trustee followed by execution of a trust agreement by trustee and the beneficiaries was "a
mere naked or passive trust," when the "naked trustee [was] to hold the title for the cestui que
trustent and the only obligations assumed by the trustee were to pay over to the cestui que
trust any proceeds coming into his hands from the property and to convey the same if and
when the beneficial owners should agree upon and request such conveyances"); Clement, 137
So. 2d at 616 (trust of real estate created in 1945 for the active purpose of forming a corpora-
tion and constructing a hospital, did not contain "any language which impose[d] active duties
and responsibilities upon the trustees after the construction of the hospital," which was
completed in 1947, and was "a dry and passive trust ... executed by the Florida Statute of
Uses," Florida Statutes section 689.09, resulting in the beneficiary of the trust owning full
title to the trust property).
108. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(1)(c), (2).
109. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(1)(c)(!); see FLA. STAT. § 736.0405(2).
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give the trustee the power "to select a beneficiary from an indefinite class,"
provided that power is exercised within a reasonable period of time." ° This
power merges the concept of a fiduciary power with a general power of
appointment, raising questions as to what fiduciary standards apply to the
exercise of such a power. If this power is used, the trust should include
provisions for takers in default in the event the fiduciary does not exercise
the power, and the settlor may want to specify a time period for its exer-
cise-to avoid litigation over what constitutes a reasonable period of time.
The FTC defines the term "beneficiary" to mean "a person who has a
present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent," and also
includes a person "who holds a power of appointment over trust property in a
capacity other than that of trustee.""' Further, the FTC defines the term
"'[i]nterests of the beneficiaries"' to mean "the beneficial interests provided
in the terms of the trust."'1 2 Usually, a private trust will have more than one
beneficiary, and usually it has present and future beneficiaries who may
receive either mandatory or discretionary distributions of income or prin-
cipal, or both. Further, the trustee may be required to accumulate rather than
distribute income for some period of time. Although, the trustee may be
granted significant discretion whether to make distributions and the discre-
tion may be absolute or limited by standards, the trustee of a private trust will
have a mandatory duty to distribute the trust assets when the trust termi-
nates." 13 By contrast, a charitable trust may continue in perpetuity.
3. Separation of Legal and Equitable Interests-
Co-Trustees or Beneficiaries
In order for a trust to be created, the same person must not be the sole
trustee and the sole beneficiary; i.e. there must be some separation of the
legal and equitable interests so that they are not identical. 14 Thus, the trust
must either have more than one trustee or more than one beneficiary-
110. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(3). This reverses the result in Kunce v. Robinson, 469 So. 2d
874 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985). The trust in Kunce provided:
After Grantor's death, the Trustee shall manage the trust property and shall make distributions
of income and principal in accord with the provisions of this Trust for the benefit of Grantor's
children and the natural born children of Grantor's children, and others as the Trustee in his
discretion may deem appropriate.
Kunce, 469 So. 2d at 876.
11l. FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(4).
112. FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(10).
113. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0817 (with respect to the trustee's duty to act expeditiously
when making terminating distributions and the trustee's common law rights with respect to the
final trust distribution).
114. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(l)(e).
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whether present or future beneficiaries. The sole trustee may be the sole
beneficiary for a period of time, provided that there is at least one other
beneficiary who may receive a trust distribution in the future.
A trust would serve no purpose if it were created with the sole trustee
being the sole beneficiary; however, that situation may arise after the trust is
created. For example, a settlor would not create a trust with income payable
to one beneficiary for a term of years and with the principal payable to that
beneficiary, or the beneficiary's estate at the expiration of the term of years,
and also appoint that same beneficiary to serve as the sole trustee. If the
settlor were to do that, the transfer by the settlor to the trustee would be
valid; however, legal title would merge with the equitable title and the bene-
ficiary would be the outright owner of the property free of the trust." 5 If the
settlor wanted to create such a trust for that beneficiary, the settlor would
appoint a different person as the trustee or would appoint the beneficiary and
another person as co-trustees. Instead, the merger doctrine may apply after
the creation of the trust in the event that the only trustee also becomes the
only beneficiary." 16 For example, the settlor could create a trust with the
settlor's children as the trustees, with income payable to the settlor's spouse
for life and with the remainder distributable to the settlor's surviving chil-
dren. If the spouse and all of the children except one should die, then that
surviving child would be the sole trustee and the sole beneficiary. In such
case, the trust would terminate under the merger doctrine as well as under the
terms of the trust, and the question would be whether this occurs by opera-
tion of law immediately upon the death of the spouse, or occurs by reason of
the terms of the trust, with the trustee having a reasonable period of time to
wind up the trust and distribute the trust assets.
Although the settlor may want some of the beneficiaries to be trustees,
the settlor usually does not want the only trustee to be the only present
beneficiary of a trust. For example, in creating a marital trust, 17 the testator
might designate the surviving spouse to serve as a co-trustee of the marital
trust but would not want the spouse to serve as the only trustee for a number
of reasons, including income tax reasons." 18 One exception is that when a
settlor creates a revocable trust, the settlor may choose to be the sole trustee
and the sole beneficiary, during the settlor's lifetime.
115. See supra note 100.
116. See id.
117. A marital trust could be created to qualify for the marital deduction for a year in
which the federal estate tax applies or to qualify for the spousal property basis increase if there
is no federal estate tax. See I.R.C. §§ 2056, 1022(c).
118. See, e.g., 1.R.C. § 678.
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III. PARTIES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR REVOCABLE TRUSTS
The general statutory requirements for an express trust apply to revo-
cable trusts; however, because of the special nature of a revocable trust, there
are some exceptions and additional rules for revocable trusts. A revocable
trust, as defined by the FIC, is a trust that is "revocable by the settlor with-
out the consent of the trustee or a person holding an adverse interest. ''j 9
The exceptions and rules for revocable trusts are particularly important
because the lines between the parties can blur in a revocable trust, such as
when the settlor serves as the trustee or when the settlor is the only benefi-
ciary during the settlor's lifetime. In the case of a revocable trust, fiduciary
duties under trust law and under the provisions of a revocable trust only
apply to the settlor during his or her lifetime.1 20 A spendthrift provision in a
revocable trust generally will not protect the settlor's interest in a revocable
trust from the reach of the settlor's creditors during the settlor's lifetime but
will protect beneficial interests after the settlor's death.' 2  Further, certain
aspects of revocable trusts may require additional formalities. 22
Section 689.075 of the Florida Statutes provides additional exceptions
when a trust, that is otherwise valid, will not be invalid because the settlor or
another person, or both, possess any of the following powers:
(a) "the power to revoke, amend, alter, or modify the trust in whole
or in part;"
(b) "the power to appoint by deed or will the persons and organiza-
tions to whom the income shall be paid or the principal distrib-
uted;"
(c) "the power to add to, or withdraw from, the trust all or any part
of the principal or income at one time or at different times;"
(d) "the power to remove the trustee or trustees and appoint a suc-
cessor trustee or trustees;" and
(e) "the power to control the trustee or trustees in the administra-
tion of the trust."'
2 3
In addition, if a trust is otherwise valid, it will not be held invalid because:
119. FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(15).
120. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0603(1), .0813(4).
121. Compare FLA. STAT. § 736.0502(1), (3) (spendthrift provisions), with FLA. STAT. §
736.0505(I)(a) (creditors' claims against settlor).
122. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b) (formalities for testamentary aspects).
123. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(I)(a)-(e).
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(f) "the settlor has retained the right to receive all or part of the
income of the trust during her or his life or for any part thereof;" or
(g) "the settlor is, at the time of the execution of the instrument, or
thereafter becomes, sole trustee."'
' 24
Section Il discusses the requirements for creating a revocable trust,
including the application of these general rules and the special exceptions
under the FTC and the Florida Statutes, including section 689.075.
A. Settlor-Capacity, Intent, and Purpose for Revocable Trusts
In order to create a revocable trust during the settlor's lifetime, the set-
tlor must have the capacity and intent to create the trust and must indicate
that intention. 2 5 Further, the trust must have a valid purpose. 126 These are
the same requirements that apply for all trusts; however, the FTC specifically
addresses the capacity requirement for revocable trusts. The FTC provides
that the capacity that the settlor must have to create "a revocable trust, is the
same as that required to make a will.' 27 In addition, in order for the settlor
to "amend, revoke, or add property to a revocable trust, or to direct the
actions of the trustee," the settlor needs the same capacity as "that required to
make a will.'
' 28
1. Capacity to Create Revocable Trust
Florida adopted the same test that is recommended by the UTC, and the
comments indicate that the UTC included "a capacity standard for creation of
a revocable trust because of the uncertainty in the case law and the impor-
tance of the issue in modem estate planning."'' 29 Part of this uncertainty was
because the Second Restatement of Trusts from 1959 provided "A person has
capacity to create a trust by transferring property inter vivos in trust to the
extent that he has capacity to transfer the property inter vivos free of trust. '"'3
The comment states:
124. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(1)(f), (g).
125. FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0402(1)(a), (b), .0601.
126. FLA. STAT. § 736.0404.
127. FLA. STAT. § 736.0601.
128. Id.
129. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 601 cmt. ("No such uncertainty exists with respect to the
capacity standard for other types of trusts. To create a testamentary trust, the settlor must
have the capacity to make a will. To create an irrevocable trust, the settlor must have the
capacity that would be needed to transfer the property free of trust."). See FLA. STAT. §
736.0601.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 19 (1959).
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If, but only if, the owner of property has capacity to transfer the
property inter vivos to another person to be held by him for his
own benefit, he has capacity to transfer it inter vivos to be held by
the transferee in trust. The rules as to capacity to transfer property
inter vivos are not peculiar to the law of Trusts and a statement of
the rules is not within the scope of the Restatement of this Sub-
ject. 131
The FTC and the UTC chose to align revocable trusts with wills rather
than irrevocable trusts for purposes of the capacity required to create revo-
cable trusts, instead of creating a separate capacity in between the capacity to
create a will and the higher capacity to create an irrevocable trust. This is
true even though the creation of a revocable trust requires more than the
execution of a will.'32 In order to create a revocable trust, the settlor must
fund it during lifetime by transfer, declaration, or designation; whereas, a
testator when making a will does not need to transfer any assets or create any
beneficial interests during lifetime. Further, a settlor can create a revocable
trust that grants the trustee the power to make irrevocable gifts during the
settlor's lifetime or incapacity. 33
The reason given in the uniform act for choosing the capacity to make a
will is:
The revocable trust is used primarily as a will substitute, with its
key provision being the determination of the persons to receive the
trust property upon the settlor's death. To solidify the use of the
revocable trust as a device for transferring property at death, the
settlor usually also executes a pourover will. The use of a pour-
over will assures that property not transferred to the trust during
life will be combined with the property the settlor did manage to
convey. Given this primary use of the revocable trust as a device
for disposing of property at death, the capacity standard for wills
rather than that for lifetime gifts should apply.'
In order to make a will under Florida law, the testator must be of "sound
mind" and have attained the age of eighteen or be an emancipated minor."'
131. Id. at cmt. a.
132. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0401.
133. A settlor may grant the trustee the discretion to make distributions to other beneficia-
ries, such as the settlor's children, during the settlor's lifetime. See also I.R.C. § 2035(e).
134. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 601 cmt. (amended 2005).
135. FLA. STAT. § 732.501. Further, funding a trust during lifetime requires the applica-
tion of non-trust law, such as corporate and securities law when transferring stocks, real estate
law when transferring real estate, and those laws may require additional capacity to effectuate
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Thus, in order for a settlor to create a revocable trust, the settlor must be an
adult or an emancipated minor, who is of sound mind. Generally, for wills:
[b]y "sound mind" is meant the ability of the testator to "to men-
tally understand in a general way the nature and extent of the
property to be disposed of, and the testator's relation to those who
would naturally claim a substantial benefit from the will, as well as
a general understanding of the practical effect of the will as
executed."1
36
This definition must be adapted to a revocable trust. One possible way
to adapt the definition would be to require the settlor to mentally understand
in a general way the nature and extent of the property that the settlor could
dispose of by will or trust and the settlor's relation to those who would
naturally claim a substantial benefit from his or her estate by will or intes-
tacy, as well as a general understanding of the practical effect of the will-or
intestacy-and the trust as executed. 137
In most cases, when a settlor creates a revocable trust, he or she is also
executing a pourover will-a will that devises the residuary estate to the
those transfers; unless section 736.0601 of the Florida Statutes is construed as superseding
any other capacity requirement for transfers of property in trust.
136. In re Wilmott's Estate, 66 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 1953) (quoting Newman v. Smith, 82
So. 236, 241 (Fla. 1918)). In deciding the test for capacity, the Supreme Court of Florida also
quoted a New York opinion that used an expanded definition of testamentary capacity-
"sound mind and memory":
We have held that it is essential that the testator has sufficient capacity to comprehend
perfectly the condition of his property, his relations to the persons who were, or should, or
might have been the objects of his bounty, and the scope and bearing of the provisions of his
will. He must, in the language of the cases, have sufficient active memory to collect in his
mind, without prompting, the particulars or elements of the business to be transacted, and to
hold them in his mind a sufficient length of time to perceive at least their obvious relations to
each other, and be able to form some rational judgment in relation to them. A testator who has
sufficient mental power to do these things is, within the meaning and intent of the statute of
wills, a person of sound mind and memory, and is competent to dispose of his estate by will.
Newman, 82 So. at 248 (quoting Delafield v. Parish, 25 N.Y. 9, 29 (1862)); see also Hamilton
v. Morgan, 112 So. 80, 82 (Fla. 1927) stating:
If the testator comprehends perfectly the condition of his property, his relation to those who
would, should, or might have been the objects of his bounty, the scope and effect of his will,
which comprehends sufficient active memory to collect voluntarily in his mind the complexi-
ties of the business to be transacted and keep them in mind long enough to perceive their rela-
tion to each other, and to form a rational judgment in relation to them, he is said to have mental
capacity.
Hamilton, 112 So. at 82.
137. See In re Wilmott's Estate, 66 So. 2d at 467 (quoting Newman, 82 So. at 241). See
also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY (THIRD): WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8. 1 (b) (2003).
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trustees of the revocable trust.138 In order for the testator to have the requisite
capacity to execute the pourover will, the testator must have a general under-
standing that his or her estate will be distributed pursuant to the provisions of
his or her will and revocable trust-which would include the testamentary
aspects of the revocable trust. Thus, the capacity required to create a revo-
cable trust should be the same as the capacity to execute a will that contains a
devise that pours over to that revocable trust, and the testator should have a
general understanding of who will receive the estate and trust assets when
the settlor dies. In some cases, the beneficiaries of the settlor's will are
different from the beneficiaries of the settlor's revocable trust; so that in
order for the settlor to have the capacity to create the revocable trust, the
settlor should understand in a general way who will receive the trust assets
when the settlor dies. In other cases, the settlor may add property to an
existing revocable trust that the settlor created, or may withdraw property
from it without revoking or changing his or her will. In such cases, being of
sound mind should include the settlor having a general understanding of the
effect on such property.
When a settlor creates a revocable trust and acts as the sole trustee and
the sole beneficiary during his or her lifetime, the effect of the trust is the
same as a will-no one else really benefits from the trust until the settlor's
death. Thus, it is not as important that the settlor have a capacity greater than
testamentary capacity. 3 9 If however, the settlor is creating the trust so that a
third party trustee will be responsible for managing the assets and making
distributions for the benefit of the settlor or others, then it is important that
the settlor understand the provisions of the trust during his or her lifetime,
including whether the trustee can make irrevocable gifts from the trust.
Further, if the settlor includes provisions in the event of the settlor's inca-
pacity as an alternative to guardianship, regarding who will serve as trustee
and the trustee's administrative and distributive powers during the settlor's
lifetime, it is important that the settlor understand the choices he or she is
making. This would require a capacity greater than testamentary capacity. If
the settlor lacks this additional capacity, the revocable trust would not be
invalid; however, it might require the appointment of a guardian to review
the actions of the trustee and determine whether to exercise the settlor's
138. See FLA. STAT. § 732.513. See also supra text accompanying note 134. A pourover
will is a misnomer because the will may contain other devises and provisions in addition to
the residuary, pourover devise. Alternatively, a will could contain a specific, demonstrative,
or general devise that pours over to a revocable trust, with a residuary devise to another
devisee.
139. This raises a question as to the capacity required to serve as trustee: What capacity
does one need to serve as trustee?
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powers of amendment for the benefit of the settlor. If the settlor becomes
incapacitated, and a guardian is appointed for the settlor's property, the
guardian may petition to amend the trust for the settlor's benefit during the
settlor's lifetime in the event the guardian believes that the existing provi-
sions are not in the best interest of the settlor; and the settlor's capacity at the
time of the creation of the trust may factor into whether a court will authorize
the amendment. 40
It is clear that the settlor should have the capacity to make a will in
order for the testamentary aspects of the trust to be valid, because these
provisions substitute for provisions in a will. On the other hand, it is argu-
able that to protect settlors, the legislature should require a higher standard of
capacity in order for the settlor to be able to transfer assets to a revocable
trust during the settlor's lifetime, and for the provisions of the trust to be
effective during the settlor's lifetime.
2. Intent to Create Revocable Trust
In order to create a revocable trust, the settlor must have the intent to
create the trust and must indicate that intent.' 41 This requirement is the same
for all types of trusts, with no special requirements for revocable trusts. In
most cases, the intent to create a revocable trust will be expressed in a writ-
ten trust instrument.
3. Purpose of Revocable Trust
In order to create a revocable trust, the trust must have a lawful purpose
that is possible to achieve and not contrary to public policy. 42 This lawful
purpose may be a private or a charitable purpose. 143 Most revocable trusts
are private trusts, benefitting the settlor exclusively during the settlor's
140. See FLA. STAT. § 744.441(19) (granting the power to "[c]reate or amend revocable
trusts" but not mentioning revocation); see also FLA. STAT. § 744.441(2) (granting a guardian
the power to exercise "any powers as trustee ... that the ward might have lawfully exercised.
. if not incapacitated, if the best interest of the ward requires such ... exercise"). However,
it is difficult to understand how an incapacitated ward could have the power to act as trustee or
how the ward's guardian would be able to exercise the ward's power as trustee. Generally,
the trust would provide for a different trustee in the event the settlor becomes incapacitated.
See also FLA. STAT. § 736.0704(1)(f) (regarding the vacancy that occurs when a "trustee is
adjudicated to be incapacitated"). See also text accompanying infra notes 311-14 regarding
these powers.
141. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(1)(b).
142. FLA. STAT. § 736.0404; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 736.0409(1); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 (2003).
143. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0405(l).
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lifetime and then providing for other individuals after the settlor's death;
however, the settlor may also provide for distributions to charitable benefi-
ciaries or for charitable purposes. In some cases, the trust instrument will
state its purpose; however, the purposes of a revocable trust may be dis-
cerned from the administrative and distribution provisions of the trust."4 A
revocable trust can be created for a number of different purposes. For exam-
ple, 1) it may be created to provide for distribution of trust assets upon the
settlor's death as a substitute for a devise by will, with potentially more
privacy than may be provided by a will; 2) it may be created to provide for
fiduciary management of the settlor's assets when the settlor designates a
trustee other than the settlor to serve for this purpose; 3) it may be created to
provide for the settlor in the event of the settlor's incapacity and provide a
viable alternative to a guardian, appointing a trustee to administer the trust
assets and distribute them for the benefit of the settlor; or 4) it may be used
in lieu of a testamentary trust, with the trust continuing after the settlor's
death. Thus, a revocable trust may be created for asset management during
lifetime or incapacity and as a substitute for a devise by will, providing an
alternative to a guardianship and providing for trust administration rather
than probate of assets. It also may be created to hold non-Florida real prop-
erty and avoid the need for an ancillary administration in another state or
jurisdiction.
In order to create a trust, the "trust and its terms must be for the benefit
of its beneficiaries. '' 45 Although this requirement applies on its face to all
trusts, and thus to revocable trusts, it should be qualified by the fact the terms
of the trust are subject to the settlor's right to amend or revoke the trust and
any other rights retained by the settlor.1 46 Further, it should be qualified by
the law that during the settlor's lifetime, the trustee of a revocable trust only
owes duties to the settlor.
1 47
B. Trust Res and Formalities for Creation of Revocable Trust
The general rule that a trust requires a res-trust property-applies to
revocable trusts with certain liberal exceptions.148 The formalities required
144. See, e.g., Schwarzkopf v. Am. Heart Ass'n of Greater Miami, Inc., 541 So. 2d 1348,
1349-50 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
145. FLA. STAT. § 736.0404.
146. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 689.075(1)(a), (f).
147. FLA. STAT. § 736.0603(l).
148. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0401,689.075(1), 732.513(1)(c).
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for the creation and implementation of a revocable trust depend on the type
of property being held in trust and the distributive provisions of the trust. 149
1. Res and Funding of Revocable Trusts
The creation of a revocable trust requires a res.150 That res may consist
of real property, tangible personal property, or intangible personal prop-
erty; 15 ' and the res may include the right to receive life insurance proceeds
payable on the settlor's death. 52 If a revocable trust has a res, the validity of
the trust will not be affected by the fact that the settlor has "the power to add
to, or withdraw from, the trust all or any part of the principal or income at
one time or at different times.' 53
Funding a revocable trust may be accomplished by a transfer, declara-
tion, or designation. 154 The settlor may transfer the property to the trustee of
the revocable trust during the settlor's lifetime;5 5 or if the settlor is the sole
trustee of the revocable trust, the settlor may declare that he or she holds the
property in trust.' 56 Alternatively, the settlor may fund a revocable trust by
exercising a power of appointment during the settlor's lifetime.'57 In addi-
tion, the settlor may fund a revocable trust by designating the trustee as a
beneficiary to receive life insurance proceeds or other assets or benefits
payable on the death of the settlor.158 Further, a statutory exception allows a
testator to fund a revocable trust instrument at death by devising property to
the trustees if the trust instrument is in writing and was in existence when the
will was executed, or was subscribed concurrently with the execution of the
will. 159 A settlor also may fund a revocable trust by exercising a power of
appointment by will. 160
Florida adopted the rules from the UTC regarding the manner by which
a trust can be created.' 6' The comments to the UTC acknowledge that
149. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0403(2), 736.0407.
150. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0401.
151. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(1).
152. FLA. STAT. § 733.808(1).
153. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(1)(c).
154. FLA. STAT. § 736.0401.
155. FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(1).
156. FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(2).
157. FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(3).
158. FLA. STAT. §§ 689.075(1), 733.808(1).
159. FLA. STAT. § 732.513(1).
160. FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(3).
161. See CS for SB 1170 Staff Analysis, supra note 92, at 1. Compare FLA. STAT. §
736.0401 with UNIF. TRUST. CODE § 401.
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"[u]nder the methods specified for creating a trust in this section, a trust is
not created until it receives property. 162 Further the comments state:
A revocable designation of the trustee as beneficiary of a life
insurance policy or employee benefit plan has long been under-
stood to be a property interest sufficient to create a trust .... Fur-
thermore, the property interest need not be transferred contempo-
raneously with the signing of the trust instrument. A trust instru-
ment signed during the settlor's lifetime is not rendered invalid
simply because the trust was not created until property was trans-
ferred to the trustee at a much later date, including by contract
after the settlor's death. A pourover devise to a previously un-
funded trust is also valid and may constitute the property interest
creating the trust.' 
63
When the settlor wants to serve as the sole trustee, the settlor does not
need to transfer the title to the settlor as trustee because the settlor already
owns the property. Instead, the settlor can declare that he or she is serving as
trustee, 64 and this declaration can result in the settlor transferring the benefi-
cial interests in the property, retaining only the legal title. In the case of a
revocable trust where the settlor is the sole beneficiary and trustee during the
settlor's lifetime, this results in the settlor transferring only the future equi-
table interests, and that transfer is subject to the settlor's right of revocation.
Although a settlor who is the trustee may create the trust by declaration
rather than transfer, it is better to change the title to the name of the settlor as
trustee in order to avoid a dispute when the settlor dies as to whether these
assets are part of the probate estate or are trust assets. 65 The comments to
the UTC note:
A trust created by self-declaration is best created by reregister-
ing each of the assets that comprise the trust into the settlor's name
as trustee. However, such reregistration is not necessary to create
162. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 401 cmt. (amended 2005) ("For what constitutes an adequate
property interest, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts Sections 40-41 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Sections 74-86 (1959).").
163. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 401 cmt.. (internal citation omitted) ("See Unif. Testamentary
Additions to Trusts Act Section 1 (1991), codified at Uniform Probate Code Section 2-511
(pourover devise to trust valid regardless of existence, size, or character of trust corpus). See
also Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 19 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996).").
164. FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(2).
165. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pearce, 481 So. 2d 69, 70-71 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(where settlor declared herself trustee of stock; however, title to the stock was not transferred
to her name as trustee).
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the trust. A declaration of trust can be funded merely by attaching
a schedule listing the assets that are to be subject to the trust with-
out executing separate instruments of transfer. But such practice
can make it difficult to later confirm title with third party transfer-
ees and, for this reason, is not recommended.
166
Not all assets may be transferred to a trust, and not all assets that can be
held in trust should be held in a revocable trust. Some laws or agreements
prohibit certain types of assets from being held in trust. For example, inter-
ests in professional service corporations may only be owned by licensed
professionals and may not be held in trust. 167 Further, the owners of interests
in other entities, such as corporations, limited liability companies, or partner-
ships, may have entered into agreements that restrict the ownership or trans-
fer of the interests, prohibiting them from being held in trust. Alternatively,
they may have entered into agreements that allow a transfer on an interest
only with the prior consent of the other owners, and the other owners may be
unwilling to consent to a transfer in trust.
Some assets may have special exemptions, benefits, restrictions, or uses
that make it inadvisable to transfer them to a trust because it may limit the
settlor's planning opportunities or it may jeopardize the exemption or com-
plicate the process of claiming it. Assets that require special consideration
include homestead real property and tangible personal property, including
exempt personal property. 68 These special types of property are discussed in
Section lII.B.2. The settlor also may want to retain certain assets in his or
her individual name for psychological reasons. The settlor might not want to
be reminded of the settlor's mortality or potential for incapacity on a
frequent basis, and this might occur if the settlor is the trustee and holds
assets in trust, such as a bank account that is used frequently.
A settlor may choose to keep funds in a bank account in the settlor's
name so that the settlor has ready access to those funds without making any
request of the trustee, or if the settlor is the trustee, without complying with
any trust formalities. In addition, the settlor may choose to own his or her
car, furniture, jewelry, and other tangible personal property in his or her sole
name, outside of the trust. The settlor also may choose to own his or her
home outright, or if married, in a tenancy by the entirety. Further, the settlor
166. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 401 cmt. (internal citation omitted) (amended 2005) ("See, e.g.,
In re Estate of Heggstad, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433 (Ct. App. 1993); Restatement (Third) of Trusts
Section 10 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts
Section 17 cmt. a (1959).").
167. See FLA. STAT. § 621.09(1) (quoted in supra note 54).
168. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a); FLA. STAT. § 732.402.
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may choose to own life insurance policies in his or her own name and desig-
nate the trustee as the beneficiary of the policy, if the trust is to continue after
the settlor's death. In addition, the settlor may choose to own his or her
business outright and not transfer business interests to a revocable trust,
especially when the settlor actively and materially participates in that busi-
ness. This then leaves the settlor with investment assets, usually intangibles
(e.g., stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit, treasury instruments), that the
settlor may choose to transfer into a revocable trust.
2. Special Types of Property
a. Homestead Real Property
Homestead ownership in Florida has many advantages and certain
restrictions. It is questionable whether transferring homestead property to
the trustee of a revocable trust creates any additional advantages, and in
some cases, it may create problems.
A homestead that is owned by a natural person consisting of real estate
that does not exceed certain acreage requirements is exempt from the
owner's creditors' claims because liens may not attach to the homestead, and
the property may not be subject to forced sale by judicial process. 69
Notwithstanding, the homestead can be subject to forced sale and liens, such
as mechanics liens, that can attach with respect to: 1) property taxes and
assessments on the homestead; 2) "obligations contracted for the purchase,
improvement, or repair thereof"; 3) "obligations contracted for house, field,
or other labor performed on the realty;" and 4) federal taxes.17° Further, a
homestead may be subject to foreclosure in the event of a default when there
is a validly executed mortgage-joined by the owner's spouse if married.'
The Florida Constitution does not provide any dollar limitation on the
exemption for homestead realty; however, Congress has attempted to impose
a dollar limitation on the Florida constitutional exemption in bankruptcy
when the debtor has not satisfied a sufficient period of residency in Florida
prior to acquiring the interest in the homestead. 72 The Florida Constitution
169. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
170. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a). See Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963); United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983)
(regarding federal liens against Texas homestead).
171. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
172. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1) (2006); see also In re Landahl, 338 B.R. 920 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2006). There is, however, a constitutional objection to this provision of the Bankrupty
Code.
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does limit the exemption by acreage. 173 The exemption is limited to a maxi-
mum of one-half an acre within a municipality and a maximum of 160
contiguous acres outside a municipality. 174  While an urban homestead is
"limited to 'the residence of the owner or the owner's family,"' a rural home-
stead may include improvements used in a business, such as a working
farm. 1
75
The Florida Constitution provides restrictions on the owner's right to
alienate or devise homestead property. 76 A married owner may not mort-
gage, sell, give, or otherwise alienate the homestead without the joinder of
the spouse. 177  An owner may not devise the homestead if survived by a
minor child; 178 and if the owner is married, the surviving spouse will receive
a life estate in the home and the owner's descendants will receive a vested
remainder, per stirpes. 179 If the owner is not married but is survived by a
minor child, all of the owner's descendants will receive the homestead, per
stirpes.180 A married owner who is not survived by a minor child may devise
all of the owner's interest in the homestead to his or her surviving spouse by
the use of a specific or residuary devise.' 8' When the owner dies, if the
homestead is devised or passes by law to the deceased owner's spouse or
heirs, i.e. any person within the class of persons who could inherit under
173. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1).
174. Id.
175. Davis v. Davis, 864 So. 2d 458, 458, 460 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (the dece-
dent's homestead included acreage, outside a municipality, that did not exceed 160 acres and
that included his residence and contiguous land on which the decedent operated a mobile
home park for rental income).
176. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. FLA. STAT. § 732.401(1). Proposed legislation would allow the spouse to elect to
receive an undivided one-half interest in the homestead, as a tenant in common with the lineal
descendants, in lieu of the life estate. See Fla. SB 1544 (2010) (identical to HB 1237).
180. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.401(1), .103(1).
181. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c); see In re Estate of Finch, 401 So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Fla.
1981) (holding a married testator with two adult daughters could devise the homestead to his
spouse or allow his spouse to receive a life estate with the testator's daughters receiving the
vested remainder, but could not devise a life estate to his spouse and the vested remainder to
only one of the daughters); see also Estate of Murphy, 340 So. 2d 107, 108-09 (Fla. 1976)
(holding a testator survived by a spouse and an adult son could devise his homestead, acquired
after the execution of his will, to his spouse by a specific or a residuary devise). In Murphy,
the court stated: "Unquestionably a specific devise is to be preferred, but in the absence of a
specific devise, we conclude that the general language of a residuary clause is a sufficiently
precise indicator of testamentary intent." Murphy, 340 So. 2d at 109.
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intestacy, 182 then the exemption-from the deceased owner's creditors-
inures to those persons. 83  Under such circumstances, the homestead is
considered a "protected homestead" for purposes of the Florida Probate
Code.' 84 By contrast, if the homestead is lawfully devised to a friend or
other person who could not inherit from the decedent under any circum-
stances, then the homestead is not protected from the decedent's creditors
because the exemption does not inure to the benefit of the devisee. 
85
When the homestead is a protected homestead, the personal representa-
tive does not take possession or control of it, 186 and the protected homestead
is exempt from the apportionment of any estate taxes.' 87 The probate court
has jurisdiction to determine if property is a protected homestead, and there
are procedures and forms to petition the court for this determination.'
88
Further, the probate court has jurisdiction to apportion the tax on the home-
stead. 189  When a person owns property outright, the probate process is
available to establish homestead status so that the benefit of the exemption
can inure to the surviving spouse and heirs.' 90 Thus, although protected
homestead is not subject to probate, it can benefit from the process. By
contrast, when ownership of the homestead is transferred to the trustee of a
revocable trust, an action would be required in the general division of the
circuit court rather than in the probate division to determine the homestead
status of the property when the settlor dies.' 9' Further, the general rules of
182. Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1000, 1003 (Fla. 1997) (applying the "class defini-
tion" rather than the "entitlement definition," holding that: "the word 'heirs,' when deter-
mining entitlement to the homestead protections against creditors, is not limited to only the
person or persons who would actually take the homestead by law in intestacy on the death of
the decedent," and that instead, "the constitution must be construed to mean that a testator,
when drafting a will prior to death, may devise the homestead (if there is no surviving spouse
or minor children) to any of that class of persons categorized in section 732.103 (the intestacy
statute)").
183. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(b); Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1000.
184. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(33).
185. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(b). The exemption would inure to the decedent's heirs;
however, they would not benefit from the exemption because they did not also receive the
property.
186. FLA. STAT. § 733.607(1).
187. FLA. STAT. § 733.817(2); see also FLA. STAT. § 733.817(5)(c). If the owner dies in a
year when there is no federal or Florida estate tax, the issue of tax apportionment is moot.
188. See FLA. PROB. R. 5.405. See generally, FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 5, 7. See also In re
Noble's Estate, 73 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1954).
189. FLA. STAT. § 733.817(7)(b).
190. See FLA. PROB. R. 5.405(c).
191. The rules of the Florida Probate Court regarding protected homestead apply to
"homestead real property owned by the decedent." FLA. PROB. R. 5.405(a).
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civil procedure would apply rather than the probate rules and probate
forms.
192
A homestead may be owned by a husband and wife as tenants by the
entireties and qualify for the homestead exemption from creditors during
their lifetimes in addition to the exemption provided by entireties ownership.
Further, when the first spouse dies, the surviving spouse will be the surviving
sole owner, even if the deceased spouse had a minor child. Many married
couples choose entireties ownership for homestead. Entireties ownership
allows the spouse to avoid the effect of the prohibition against devise when
there is a minor child. 193 By contrast, if one spouse owned the homestead
and transferred it to a revocable trust, the surviving spouse would not be
entitled to the entire homestead if the settlor died survived by a minor child.
Further, if both spouses owned the homestead and transferred it to a joint
revocable trust, they would no longer own the homestead by the entireties
even if they were both settlors and trustees of the trust and even if they were
the only beneficiaries during their lifetime.
If the settlor transfers his or her homestead to a revocable trust, it makes
it more complicated to identify the settlor's interests in the homestead and to
determine whether those interests qualify for the exemption from the settlor's
creditors during lifetime. To the extent the settlor has created a remainder
interest in the homestead, even though the interest is contingent on the set-
tlor's death and subject to revocation by the settlor, that equitable future
interest is not the settlor's homestead;194 however, it can be protected from
creditors of the remainder beneficiaries by a spendthrift provision. 95 To the
extent the settlor retains rights and interests as the settlor or the beneficiary
of the trust and the home is the residence of the settlor or the settlor's family,
those equitable interests should qualify for the homestead creditor exemption
and the Florida courts and most bankruptcy courts agree. 96 One bankruptcy
192. FLA. STAT. § 736.0201(1).
193. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c); FLA. STAT. § 732.401(2).
194. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaGasse, 223 So. 2d 727, 729 (1969) ("By great weight of
precedent a claim of homestead may not attach to either vested or contingent future estates or
interests in land, because a remainder expectant upon cessation of a preceding estate creates
no present right to possession .... (quoting Anemaet v. Martin-Senour Co, 114 So. 2d 23, 27
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959))). Generally, the remainder interests in a revocable trust are
disregarded for purposes of determining if the homestead is exempt from the settlor's creditors
during the settlor's lifetime or if the settlor is subject to the constitutional restriction on devise
upon death. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.401(1), (2); Johns v. Bowden, 66 So. 155, 159 (Fla.
1914); Engelke v. Estate of Engelke, 921 So. 2d 693, 696-97 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006); In
re Estate of Johnson, 397 So. 2d 970, 973 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
195. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0501-.0504.
196. See, e.g., Engelke, 921 So. 2d at 696-97; see also In re Edwards, 356 B.R. 807, 810-
11 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006); In re Alexander, 346 B.R. 546, 550-51 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
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opinion even allowed the exemption for homestead real estate transferred to
the trustee of a revocable trust when the trust instrument contained land trust
language that the beneficial interests in the trust were personal property;'
97
however, this is not advisable to do because the unlimited homestead ex-
emption only applies to real estate. Another bankruptcy opinion held that a
homestead in a revocable trust did not qualify for the Florida exemption from
creditors because it was not owned by a natural person. 98 Thus, the transfer
of homestead property to a revocable trust creates a risk in bankruptcy that
the exemption may be questioned and that an appeal may be required in
order to gain the benefit of the exemption.
If a settlor transfers his or her homestead to the trustee of a revocable
trust, the homestead will be subject to the restrictions on inter vivos aliena-
tion and devise, so that the trustee cannot alienate it without joinder of the
beneficial owner's spouse, if married. 199 Further, if the owner is survived by
a minor child, the owner cannot devise the homestead. 200 The provisions of a
revocable trust cannot provide for the distribution of the homestead when the
settlor dies survived by a minor child, and the homestead will pass by statute
rather than by will or trust provision .2°  The owner's descendants-includ-
ing adult and minor children-will receive a vested remainder in the home-
stead, per stirpes, if the owner's spouse survives, or all of the homestead by
intestacy if there is no surviving spouse.2 °2
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that an owner of homestead
cannot use a revocable trust to avoid the constitutional restrictions on
devise,20 3 and the Florida Legislature has enacted legislation that assumes the
converse-that a settlor can dispose of homestead as and to the extent per-
mitted by the constitution through the testamentary aspects of a revocable
197. See In re Cocke, 371 B.R. 554, 557-58 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (following Engelke
even though the trust agreement provided that the beneficial interests in the trust were per-
sonal property).
198. Crews v. Bosonetto (In re Bosonetto), 271 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001). It
is unclear from the opinion whether the trustee was an individual or a corporate fiduciary;
however, the decision used entity language for a trust rather than looking at the beneficial or
equitable ownership of the homestead stating: "This Court finds that the Trust does own the
Florida property by the express terms of the Trust or, alternatively, under a resulting trust and
because a trust is not a natural person, Defendant Bosonetto may not claim the Florida
property is covered by the homestead exemption." Id.
199. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c); see also FLA. STAT. § 732.4015.
200. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
201. See FLA. STAT. § 732.4015(1)-(2). The will or trust provisions disposing of the
homestead at death will be void if the Florida Constitution prohibits devise of the homestead.
202. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c); FLA. STAT. §§ 732.401(1),.103(1).
203. See Johns v. Bowden, 66 So. 155, 159 (Fla. 1914); see also In re Estate of Johnson,
397 So. 2d 970, 973 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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trust.204 The Florida Constitution permits a married testator to devise his or
her homestead to his or her surviving spouse if the testator is not survived by
a minor child. 05 The Florida Probate Code provides that a married testator
can "devise" homestead to a surviving spouse by reason of a provision in a
revocable trust, defining a devise to include "a disposition by trust of that
portion of the trust estate which, if titled in the name of the grantor of the
trust, would be the grantor's homestead. 20 6 The usual meaning of the term
"devise" refers to a disposition by will, not by inter vivos trust;2°7 however,
the general definition of the term "devise" has been expanded under the
Florida Probate Code to mean "to dispose of real or personal property by will
or trust" when the term is "used as a verb. 20 8 Thus, the term "devise" under
the Florida Probate Code would include the testamentary aspects of a revo-
cable trust. Whether the legislature has the authority to expand the definition
of a devise for purposes of the Florida Constitution is a separate question;
however, it would appear that the persons who would contest the
constitutionality of these provisions of the Florida Probate Code would be
adult children of the testator or descendants of deceased children who would
be entitled to a vested remainder in the homestead if the testator did not
devise the homestead to the spouse as permitted by the constitution. 209
Given the fact that a settlor must have testamentary capacity to create a
revocable trust and that the testamentary aspects of a revocable trust must be
executed with the formalities required for a will, the Supreme Court of
Florida might agree that the disposition of the settlor's homestead to the
settlor's surviving spouse should be considered a devise within the meaning
of the constitution when the homestead is to pass to the surviving spouse by
a specific or residuary distribution from the trust. 210 If the trust disposition
were held to be invalid, the homestead would pass by statute, with the spouse
receiving a life estate and the descendants receiving a vested remainder,
204. FLA. STAT. § 732.4015(1)-(2).
205. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c).
206. FLA. STAT. § 732.4015(2)(b).
207. Compare FLA. STAT. § 733.805 (regarding the order of abatement for intestacy and
devises under wills), with FLA. STAT. § 736.05053(2)-(3) (regarding the order of abatement for
trust distributions).
208. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(10).
209. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c); FLA. STAT. §§ 732.401(1), .103(1).
210. See Estate of Murphy, 340 So. 2d 107, 109 (Fla. 1976) (permitting a married testator
to devise homestead to the surviving spouse by a residuary devise in his will; although the
court noted that "a specific devise is to be preferred"); see also City Nat'l Bank of Fla.v.
Tescher, 578 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1991) (applying a state statute allowing a spouse to waive
homestead rights to determine whether a testator was treated as being survived by a spouse for
purposes of the constitution).
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unless the testator's will also devised any interest the settlor might have at
the time of death in his or her homestead to the testator's surviving spouse.211
The Florida Constitution provides a homestead tax exemption and dis-
count in addition to the creditor exemption, additional benefits for home-
steads that qualify for the tax exemption, such as the Save Our Homes (SOH)
amendment that limits annual increases for homestead property and portabil-
ity provisions. 212 Further, the Florida Legislature has expanded some of the
tax benefits for homesteads21 3 and provided the general law for determining
when a change in ownership requires assessment at just value and not at the
lower SOH amount.214 In many cases, the SOH limits on assessments and
the veterans' discounts and exemptions save much more in taxes than the
general homestead tax exemption." 5
The Florida Constitution provides a homestead tax exemption for a
"person who has the legal or equitable title to real estate and maintains
thereon the permanent residence of the owner, or another legally or naturally
dependent upon the owner, ' 216 and the Florida Legislature has declared that a
person has "'equitable title to real estate"' "where the person's possessory
right in such real property is based upon an instrument granting to him or her
a beneficial interest for life.
2 17
211. See FLA. STAT. § 732.4015(1); FLA. STAT. § 732.401(1). Thus a devise in the will
that parallels the trust distribution of the homestead could save an invalid trust provision.
212. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4(c), 6.
213. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 196.031 (entitled "Exemption of homesteads"); § 196.041
(entitled "Extent of homestead exemptions"); § 196.071 (entitled "Homestead exemptions;
claims by members of armed forces"); § 196.075 (entitled "Additional homestead exemption
for persons 65 and older"); § 196.081 (entitled "Exemption for certain permanently and totally
disabled veterans and for surviving spouses of veterans"); § 196.082 (entitled "Discounts for
disabled veterans"); § 196.091 (entitled "Exemption for disabled veterans confined to wheel-
chairs"); § 196.101 (entitled "Exemption for totally and permanently disabled persons").
214. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §193.155 (entitled "Homestead assessments").
215. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4(e), 6(c), and FLA. STAT. §§ 193.155, 196.071-
.091, .101, with FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a)-(d), and FLA. STAT. § 196.031.
216. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a) (emphasis added); see also FLA. CONST. art. VII, § (6)(d)
(authorizing counties and municipalities to provide an additional exemption up to $50,000 "to
any person who has the legal or equitable title to real estate and maintains thereon the perma-
nent residence of the owner and who has attained age sixty-five and whose household income,
as defined by general law, does not exceed twenty thousand dollars," subject to cost-of-living
adjustments).
217. FLA. STAT. § 196.041(2). The Florida Administrative Code provides:
[t]he beneficiary of a passive or active trust has equitable title to real property if he is entitled
to the use and occupancy of such property under the terms of trust; therefore, he has sufficient
title to claim homestead exemption.... Homestead tax exemption may not be based upon resi-
dence of a beneficiary under a trust instrument which vests no present possessory right in such
beneficiary.
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The Florida Constitution also grants a discount for a veteran "age 65 or
older who is partially or totally permanently disabled," for "homestead
property the veteran owns and resides in," with the discount based on the
percentage of his or her disability, without any reference to equitable or legal
title.218 Further, one of the legislative provisions exempting certain veterans
from taxation applies for "real estate that is owned and used as a homestead
by a veteran" and allows the exemption to carry over to the surviving spouse
who "holds the legal or beneficial title to the homestead and permanently
resides thereon., 2 9 Another provides that "real estate used and owned as a
homestead by an ex-servicemember . . . with a service-connected total dis-
ability ... requiring specially adapted housing and required to use a wheel-
chair for his or her transportation is exempt from taxation" and allows the
exemption to pass to the surviving spouse if the spouses owned the home-
stead "as an estate by the entirety. '220 Thus, a transfer in trust of homestead
property may jeopardize a disabled veteran's homestead tax exemption or
discount, and may affect the rights of certain surviving spouses. Further,
FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 12D-7.011 (1996); see also Robbins v. Welbaum, 664 So. 2d 1, 1 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (granting a homestead tax exemption when the homestead was held in
an irrevocable trust, a qualified personal residence trust-a QPRT, when the husband had a
fifteen year possessory right and the wife had a ten year possessory right). The Miami-Dade
County property appraisal department has sample trust language.
218. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 6(e) (applying the discount "if the disability was combat
related, the veteran was a resident of this state at the time of entering the military service of
the United States, and the veteran was honorably discharged upon separation from military
service" with the discount being "equal to the percentage of the veteran's permanent, service-
connected disability as determined by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs"); see
also FLA. STAT. § 196.082(1) (entitled "Discounts for disabled veterans;" providing: "[elach
veteran who is age 65 or older and is partially or totally permanently disabled shall receive a
discount from the amount of the ad valorem tax otherwise owed on homestead property that
the veteran owns and resides").
219. FLA. STAT. § 196.081(1) (entitled "Exemption for certain permanently and totally
disabled veterans and for surviving spouses of veterans" which exempts from taxation "[a]ny
real estate that is owned and used as a homestead by a veteran") (emphasis added); FLA. STAT.
§ 196.081(4)(c) (providing for carryover of exemption "as long as the spouse holds the legal
or beneficial title to the homestead") (emphasis added); see also FLA. STAT. § 196.081(3)
(granting the exemption to the surviving spouse who "holds the legal or beneficial title to the
homestead and permanently resides thereon") (emphasis added). Compare FLA. CONST. art.
VII, § 6(a), (d) (referring to "equitable title") (emphasis added), and FLA. STAT. § 196.041(2)
(declaring a possessory right of "a beneficial interest for life to be "equitable title to real
estate") (emphasis added), with FLA. STAT. § 196.081(3) (referring to "beneficial title")
(emphasis added). But see FLA. STAT. § 196.081(4)(a) (providing "[a]ny real estate that is
owned and used as a homestead by the surviving spouse of a veteran") (emphasis added).
220. FLA. STAT. § 196.091(1), (3) (emphasis added).
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changes in ownership may result in the assessed value of the homestead
increasing to just value.2
The Save Our Homes Amendment (SOH) and the Portability Amend-
ment save taxes when the homestead is assessed based on the value when
purchased--or when the amendment became effective-plus a maximum
percentage increase, rather than the just value when greater.222 The benefit of
the SOH amendment can be lost when there is a change in ownership,223
although the purpose of the Portability Amendment is to transfer some of
that benefit to a new homestead.22 4 The Florida Legislature has promulgated
laws with respect to what constitutes a change of ownership, which may
include "transfer of legal title or beneficial title in equity," and provides
which changes in ownership will not trigger reassessment of the homestead's
value for tax purposes.225 Generally, transfers between legal and equitable
title are allowed when the same person is entitled to the exemption before
and after the transfer, and transfers between spouses during life or on death
are allowed as well as some transfers by operation of law on death.226
221. See FLA. STAT. § 193.155(3).
222. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(d)(8); see also FLA. STAT. § 193.155(1), (8).
223. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(d)(8); FLA. STAT. § 193.155(3).
224. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(d)(8).
225. See FLA. STAT. § 193.155(3).
226. FLA. STAT. § 193.155(3). Reassessment at just value is not required if a change of
ownership does not occur. A change of ownership does not occur when the homestead is
transferred upon the owner's death to his or her surviving spouse. FLA. STAT. § 193.155(3)(b)
("There is no change of ownership if... [tihe transfer is between husband and wife, including
a transfer to a surviving spouse."). See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (allowing an owner to
devise to his or her spouse if there is no surviving minor child). A change of ownership also
does not occur if the homestead passes to the surviving spouse or descendants, or both, by
operation of law when the owner is prohibited from devising the homestead or failed to devise
it as permitted by law. FLA. STAT. § 193.155(3)(c) ("There is no change of ownership if...
[t]he transfer occurs by operation of law under [section] 732.4015."). Florida Statutes section
732.4015(1) prohibits devise as provided by the Florida Constitution when "the owner is
survived by a spouse or a minor child or minor children [with the limited exception that] the
homestead may be devised to the owner's spouse if there is no minor child or minor children."
When the owner is survived by a spouse or minor child, and the homestead cannot be devised
or is not devised to the spouse when permitted by law, it passes by operation of law, with a
life estate to the surviving spouse and a vested remainder to the descendants, or if both do not
survive, the homestead will pass to either surviving spouse or the descendants. FLA. STAT. §§
732.102-.103, .401(1), .4015. There is a proposal to make the operation of law exception a
constitutional one when the spouse, child, or grandchild inherits the homestead and makes it
his or her own homestead and a proposal to limit the exception so that it applies only when the
homestead passes by operation of law to the surviving spouse or a minor child or children.
See Florida Senate Joint Resolution 112 for a proposed amendment to Article VII, section 4 of
the Florida Constitution, and Florida Senate Bill 1884 for a proposed amendment to section
193.155 of the Florida Statutes. Fla. SJR 112 (2010); Fla. SB 1884 (2010).
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Because of these benefits, particularly the SOH amendment and port-
ability provisions, and the exemptions and discounts for disabled veterans
and their surviving spouses, ownership of homestead is very important. Not
all transfers in trust will qualify for these benefits. Before homestead prop-
erty is to be transferred to a revocable trust, these laws should be reviewed to
determine whether the transfer will affect the exemption, discount, or other
benefits.
Although homestead property may be transferred to the trustee of a
revocable trust, it may be better for the settlor to own the homestead outright
in order to preserve the full benefit of the creditor and tax exemptions, during
lifetime and upon death, and to take advantage of the probate process to
determine protected homestead status. 27 In addition, transfers of real prop-
erty may create title insurance issues that can be avoided by maintaining
outright ownership until death.
b. Tangible Personal Property, Including Exempt Property
Tangible personal property may be held in trust, but it may not be the
type of asset that adapts to ownership by a trustee for the use of beneficiaries,
even if the settlor is the sole trustee and sole beneficiary during lifetime.
From a practical perspective, it may be difficult to separate the legal and
equitable ownership of the property and impose the obligations of legal
ownership on a trustee in any meaningful way when the settlor or the benefi-
ciary has the physical possession and use of the property. Further, it is
unclear whether the transfer to the trust will have any positive benefits.
An individual may own tangible personal property that he or she wants
to give to different people when he or she dies, without having to list them in
a will and without having to make a codicil in order to change the list to add
or remove items or change beneficiaries. Florida law would allow the testa-
tor to own and use jewelry or other items or collections of tangible personal
property and to keep a list of the persons to receive them when the testator
dies.228
The Florida Probate Code allows an individual to keep a separate writ-
ten statement that disposes of items of tangible personal property without
complying with the formalities required for a will, provided the testator's
will refers to a written statement or list, the writing is signed by the testator
and describes "the items and the devisees with reasonable certainty," and the
227. See FLA. PROB. R. 5.405 (2009).
228. See FLA. STAT. § 732.515.
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property is not used in a trade or business.22 9 The list does not need to be in
existence when the will is made, nor must it be incorporated by reference,
and the testator can change the list after the will is made.230 The list need not
have any independent significance-"significance apart from its effect upon
the dispositions made by the will"-and it need not be witnessed like a
will. 23' If the testator kept more than one list, the most recent one prevails
"to the extent of any conflict."2 32 If the testator made a list, which conflicts
with the will because the will specifically devises property included in the
list, the will prevails even if the list was made after the will was executed.233
There is no statute for tangible personal property held in trust that is
comparable to section 732.515 of the Florida Statutes, and a settlor should
not rely on the probate statute in order to keep a list to dispose of tangible
personal property held in trust. If the settlor transfers items of tangible
personal property to the trustee or declares that the settlor is holding these
assets in trust, the trust instrument should contain provisions disposing of
these assets when the settlor dies, and the settlor should sign the trust instru-
ment with the formalities required for a will. 234 If the trust instrument refers
to a list made by the settlor disposing of these assets based on the assumption
that the trust can be drafted like a will, and the list is signed but not properly
witnessed, the list may be treated as an invalid testamentary aspect of the
trust and the assets may pass as part of the residuary disposition of the trust
or by will or intestacy, rather than to the persons in the list.235 If the list were
in existence when the trust instrument was executed, the settlor could attempt
to incorporate the provisions of the list into the trust instrument; however,
there is no specific incorporation by reference statute for trusts.
It would appear that a settlor who owns tangible personal property held
for personal use, such as jewelry, could transfer the property to the trustee of
a revocable trust, and the settlor could retain the use and enjoyment of them
during lifetime as the beneficiary of the trust. Title would need to be trans-
ferred to the trustee, or if the settlor were the trustee, the settlor could declare
that the settlor was holding them in trust.236 The trustee's normal duties
229. Id. Compare with Florida Statutes section 732.512 regarding documents incorpo-
rated by reference in a will and documents with independent significance.
230. FLA. STAT. § 732.515.
231. Id. Compare with Florida Statutes section 732.502 regarding the formalities for
executing a will.
232. FLA. STAT. § 732.515.
233. Id.
234. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b).
235. See id.
236. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(1), (2).
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would apply; however, they would be owed exclusively to the settlor.237
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to see how a trustee could protect the
assets while they were in the physical possession of the settlor. The trust
instrument could provide for the disposition of the assets upon death if the
trust were duly executed like a will. 238 Alternatively, the settlor could choose
to own items of tangible personal property and devise them by will, or dis-
pose of them pursuant to a list referred to in his or her will without involving
the formalities of a trust or subjecting a trustee to duties that are difficult to
fulfill or lack meaning in context.239 Thus, although a settlor can transfer
items of tangible personal property to a trust, it is generally better for the
settlor to maintain ownership and control during lifetime and dispose of them
by a will or a list. In the case of tangible personal property held by the
settlor for investment, rather than personal use, the settlor may choose to
transfer such property to a trust if the purpose of transferring them in trust is
for fiduciary investment and management of assets. Further, if the settlor has
a durable power of attorney, the attorney-in-fact may have the power to
transfer tangible personal property to the trustee in the event the settlor
becomes unable to manage his or her financial affairs.
If a settlor owns tangible personal property that could be exempt prop-
erty when that person dies, the settlor may want to own these assets and not
transfer them in trust to retain the potential exemption. Exempt property
includes up to $20,000 in net value of "[h]ousehold furniture, furnishings,
and appliances in the decedent's usual place of abode ... as of the date of
death."'24 It also includes "two motor vehicles," each of which does not
weigh more than 15,000 pounds, "held in the decedent's name and regularly
used by the decedent or members of the decedent's immediate family."24'
Also, there is no dollar limitation on automobiles as there is for furniture.2 42
The exemption applies if the decedent is survived by a spouse, or, if there is
no surviving spouse, then to the decedent's surviving children. 243 The
surviving spouse or children can claim the property as exempt if it is devised
to them, or if it is not specifically devised to someone else,244 provided they
237. FLA. STAT. § 736.0603(1).
238. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b).
239. See FLA. STAT. § 732.515.
240. FLA. STAT. § 732.402(2)(a).
241. FLA. STAT. § 732.402(2)(b). A motor vehicle is defined as "[a]ny self-propelled
vehicle not operated upon rails or guideway, but not including any bicycle, motorized scooter,
electric personal assistive mobility device, or moped." FLA. STAT. § 316.003(21).
242. FLA. STAT. § 732.402(2)(a), (b).
243. FLA. STAT. § 732.402(1).
244. FLA. STAT. § 732.402(5). Technically, the property could be demonstratively devised
to or away from the spouse or children. Id. Demonstrative devises are rarely used, but
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file a timely petition for determination of exempt property. za The exempt
property is exempt from all claims against the estate, except for debts
secured by a "perfected security interest" on the property. 246 Transferring
these assets, such as furniture and furnishings, to a revocable trust could
result in the loss of the exemption when the settlor dies. This is because the
trustee of a revocable trust has an obligation to contribute trust assets to the
personal representative in the event the residuary estate is insufficient.247 An
exception exempts certain trust assets from this obligation, and that
exception is for "property held or received by a trust to the extent that the
property would not have been subject to claims against the decedent's estate
if it had been paid directly to a trust created under the decedent's will or
other than to the decedent's estate. 248  This exception applies to life
insurance paid to the trustee of a revocable trust because the life insurance
proceeds would have been exempt if they had been paid to the trustees of a
testamentary trust, to the beneficiaries of the revocable trust, or to a
beneficiary other than the decedent's estate.249 It does not appear to apply to
property that would be exempt under section 732.402 of the Florida
Statutes.250 Further, there is a probate procedure for determining the items
and values of exempt property and ordering the personal representative to
surrender the exempt property to the entitled spouse or children.2 ' Thus, it is
beneficial to preserve this potential exemption and utilize the probate process
to claim the exemption and to determine what property is exempt and who is
entitled to it, rather than to transfer the property to a trust and risk the loss of
the exemption and the probate process.
3. Written and Oral Revocable Trusts-Formalities
and Burden of Proof
In order for a revocable trust or some of its provisions to be valid, cer-
tain formalities must be met.2 52 Which formalities apply depends on the
perhaps a devise of $20,000 of furniture to be selected by the spouse or children, first from the
testator's furniture owned at death and then to be purchased by the personal representative
using general estate assets would qualify. See FLA. STAT. § 732.402(2)(a), (5).
245. FLA. STAT. § 732.402(5), (6).
246. FLA. STAT. § 732.402(5); see FLA. STAT. § 731.201(4) (stating that the general
definition of claims includes funeral expenses but excludes expenses of administration and
estate taxes).
247. FLA. STAT. §§ 733.607(2), .707(3); FLA. STAT. § 736.05053(1).
248. FLA. STAT. § 733.707(3)(d).
249. See FLA. STAT. § 222.13(1); FLA. STAT. § 733.808(4).
250. Compare FLA. STAT. § 732.402 with FLA. STAT. § 733.707(3)(d).
251. FLA. PROB. R. 5.406 (2009).
252. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402.
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provisions of the trust and the trust assets.5 3 If the trust contains an interest
in real estate in Florida, or certain provisions effective after the settlor's
death, the trust must comply with certain statutory requirements . 4  If the
trust does not revert to the settlor's estate when the settlor dies, and instead
contains provisions for the disposition of those assets on or after the settlor's
death, those provisions-the testamentary aspects of the trust-must be
executed with the formalities required for a will. 255 If a settlor desires to
create a trust of personal property during lifetime, with title to the assets
reverting back to the settlor at death, and thus passing through the settlor's
estate, the settlor can create the trust orally.256
In general, a revocable trust should be executed to comply with the strict-
est statutory requirements-being in writing and signed by the settlor in the
presence of two witnesses, who sign in the presence of the settlor and each
other-in order to validate it for purposes of holding real estate in trust and to
validate the provisions of the trust effective after the testator's death. 57
Further, it should be notarized to facilitate recording, if desired, although it is
not required to be notarized or recorded. 8 Although exceptions permit oral
trusts of personalty during the settlor's lifetime and permit reversionary
interests payable to the settlor's estate on death to be created without a
writing executed like a will, such trusts are rarely used. Oral trusts, when
allowed, are problematic because the terms of the trust may be incomplete or
difficult to remember or prove and clear and convincing evidence may not be
available to establish the oral terms.2 9 Thus, revocable trusts should be in
writing, signed by the settlor in the presence of at least two witnesses who
sign in the presence of the settlor and each other, the settlor's signature
should be notarized, and the trustee also should sign. 260 There is no statutory
253. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b).
254. See FLA. STAT. § 689.05; FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(a)-(b).
255. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b).
256. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0403(2)(b), .0407.
257. See FLA. STAT. §§ 689.05, 736.0403(2)(a).
258. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b). With respect to real estate, usually the conveyance,
by deed, is separate from the trust provisions in the trust instrument. See FLA. STAT. § 689.01.
In the unusual case where the deed and trust provisions are in the same document, the docu-
ment would also need to be signed like a deed in accordance with sections 689.06 and 689.01
of the Florida Statutes.
259. See id.; Rosen v. Rosen, 167 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Had the trust in
Rosen been a revocable trust created under the FIC, the provisions after the settlor's death
would not have been valid because they are testamentary aspects that require a writing
executed with the formalities for a will. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b).
260. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.502, .504. If the settlor is unable to sign, the settlor can direct
another to sign for the settlor in the settlor's presence, and the settlor can acknowledge the
signing in the presence of the witnesses. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.502(I)(a)2, (1)(b)2b. If the trust
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self-proof affidavit for a revocable trust and no statutory provisions requiring
proof of the due execution of a trust as there are for wills; although some
attorneys attach an affidavit to a revocable trust that is adapted from the
statutory self-proof form for wills. 261 Alternatively, other laws may apply
with respect to the required formalities for trusts executed outside of Florida
or by non-Florida domiciliaries.262
When the settlor funds the revocable trust by transferring assets to the
trustee during the settlor's lifetime, the settlor also must comply with the
formalities required to effectuate those transfers. For example, when trans-
ferring funds from a checking account, a check can be written payable to the
trustee of the revocable trust. When transferring real property, a deed would
be required 263 and should be recorded; although recording is not required for
the validity of the conveyance. When transferring certificates of deposits,
the financial institution would provide the documents necessary to transfer
the accounts. When transferring treasury obligations owned by the settlor,
the Department of Treasury prescribes the forms and the procedures for
transferring such obligations. When transferring stocks or bonds, a written
assignment may be required, and in some cases, the original stock certificate
or bond must be sent to the transfer agent along with the assignment. When
transferring an account, such as a brokerage account-that holds securities in
the name of a nominee-the brokerage firm can provide the forms necessary
to change ownership of the account, and the transfer of that account would
transfer ownership to the assets held in that account, which could include a
number of different properties, including: cash, stock, bonds, certificates of
deposit, and treasury obligations. When designating the trustee as the bene-
ficiary of a life insurance policy, the insurance company or agent can provide
the necessary forms required to be filed with the company, along with sam-
ple or appropriate language acceptable to the insurance company.
When the settlor is the sole trustee, the settlor may transfer ownership
of the assets to be held in trust by transferring those assets to the settlor as
trustee of the revocable trust. Alternatively, the settlor can accomplish this
by declaration, declaring that he or she "holds identifiable property as
trustee. ' 2 4
In some cases, the settlor may choose to be the sole trustee and the sole
beneficiary during the settlor's lifetime. Although this type of revocable
includes real estate, see Florida Statutes section 689.05 as to whether the signature of an agent
or proxy would be allowed.
261. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.503, 733.201 (regarding self-proofs of wills).
262. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(1), (2)(b).
263. FLA. STAT. § 689.06; see also FLA. STAT. § 689.01.
264. FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(2).
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trust is a valid trust, during the settlor's lifetime, it is a trust in form more
than substance, with the settlor owing fiduciary duties only to himself or
herself. Nevertheless, it is a trust, and it is important for the settlor to respect
the form of the trust and comply with the formalities required for a trust, so
that the trust will be effective when the settlor dies.
C. Trustee and Beneficiaries of Revocable Trust
In order for a settlor to create a revocable trust, the general requirements
that there be a trustee with duties, that the trust have definite beneficiaries,
and that the sole trustee must not be the sole beneficiary of the trust apply.265
Although these general requirements apply, they may not be as meaningful
during the settlor's lifetime if the settlor is the sole trustee and sole benefi-
ciary during that time.
1. Trustee of Revocable Trust with Duties to Perform
In order to create a trust, such as a revocable trust, the trust must have a
trustee and that trustee must have duties; 266 however, while the trust is revo-
cable, "the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to the settlor., 267 If the
requirements necessary to create a trust, including the requirement of having
a trustee with duties, are met, the trust will not be invalid because the settlor
possesses the power to: 1) "revoke, amend, alter, or modify the trust in
whole or in part;" 2) "remove the trustee or trustees and appoint a successor
trustee or trustees;" or 3) "control the trustee or trustees in the administration
of the trust. ' 268 These powers would be powers exercisable by the settlor in
the settlor's individual capacity rather than in any fiduciary capacity.
If someone other than the settlor is the trustee, then the requirement that
the trustee have duties is significant; however, the significance of these
duties is qualified by the law that provides these duties "are owed exclu-
sively to the settlor," while the trust is revocable.269 One of the usual conse-
quences of the trustee having a duty is that the breach of the duty exposes the
trustee to liability to the beneficiaries, and the beneficiaries have standing to
apply to the court for relief.270 By contrast, in a revocable trust, the breach of
a duty exposes the trustee to liability to the settlor instead, so that the settlor
265. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(i)(c)-(e).
266. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(l)(d).
267. FLA. STAT. § 736.0603(l).
268. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(l)(a), (d), (e).
269. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0603(1).
270. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.1001(1), (2), .1002.
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would have standing in court. 27' Further, the settlor would have the power to
amend or revoke the trust, which would include the power to remove the
trustee and appoint another trustee. 2
In the context of a revocable trust, what duties must the trustee have to
the settlor when the trustee is not the settlor? Are these the same duties that
a trustee of any trust must have in order to create a trust and must these
duties be active, enforceable duties as envisioned by the FTC's legislative
history-to prevent passive trusts and to require the trustee to "have enforce-
able duties to perform? '273 It would seem that the settlor of a revocable trust
should expressly impose duties on a trustee-in addition to those imposed by
statute, such as the duty of loyalty-but that those duties imposed by the
settlor should be subject to the powers retained by the settlor. For example,
if the trust instrument provided that the trustee would distribute all income
and principal to the settlor, as and when directed by the settlor, then the
trustee would have the duty to comply with the settlor's direction.
The Florida Statutes provide that if the trust meets the requirements
necessary to create a trust, which would include the requirement of having a
trustee with duties, the trust will not be invalid "[b]ecause the settlor is, at the
time of the execution of the instrument, or thereafter becomes, [the] sole
trustee.274 If a settlor creates a revocable trust, with the settlor as the sole
trustee and the sole beneficiary during the settlor's lifetime, then the re-
quirement that the trustee have duties should only apply to require a trustee
with duties after the settlor's death-or when the settlor ceases to serve as
the sole trustee or the trust ceases to be revocable. The legislative history for
this requirement for the creation of a trust under the FTC notes that "[t]he
requirement that the trustee's duties be enforceable means that the same
person may not be the sole trustee and sole beneficiary of the trust; 2 75 how-
ever this rationale does not apply while a trust is revocable by the settlor
because during that time the trustee's duties are enforceable by the settlor not
the beneficiaries of the trust.
276
One general rule for trusts is that a trust will not fail for lack of a trus-
277tee.  The settlor of a revocable trust can expressly retain the power to fill
271. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0604(1).
272. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(1).
273. See supra note 97 and accompanying text and discussion supra Part III.C.1.
274. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(1)(g).
275. CS for SB 1170 Staff Analysis, supra note 92, at 14 n.124 (citing FLA. STAT. §
736.0402(1)(e); accord Willey v. W.J. Hoggson Corp., 106 So. 408, 412 (Fla. 1925)).
276. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0603(l).
277. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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any vacancy.278 Even if the power is not expressly retained, the settlor's
penumbral power to amend or revoke would encompass the power to amend
the trust to appoint a new trustee to fill a vacancy. If no person is "named or
designated pursuant to the terms of the trust to act as successor trustee," then
the FTC provides that the vacancy will be filled by a person selected by the
"unanimous agreement of the qualified beneficiaries," but if they do not
appoint one, then by the court. 279 The term "qualified beneficiary" includes
present beneficiaries, such as the settlor, but it also can include some future
beneficiaries.28° It would make sense that while the trust is revocable that the
settlor be treated as the only qualified beneficiary, particularly since the
trustee only owes duties to the settlor during that time. The general rules in
the FFC for filling a trust vacancy should be qualified when applied to a
revocable trust so that the vacancy is filled by the settlor unless the settlor
lacks the capacity to make that appointment. If the legislature amends the
law, the legislature also can address whether an attorney-in-fact could make
the appointment or, if there is a guardian of the settlor's property, whether
the appointment should be made by the guardian with the court's permission
under the guardian statutes or by the circuit court under the FIC.
2. Definite Beneficiary of Revocable Trust or
Charitable Purpose Requirement
A private trust must have a definite beneficiary or beneficiaries that
can be ascertained when the trust is created or in the future, with future
interests vesting or failing within the applicable period under the rule against
perpetuities.281 Alternatively, the trust must be a charitable trust with a
charitable purpose.282 If the revocable trust is otherwise valid, the trust will
not be invalid because: (a) "the settlor has retained the right to receive all or
part of the income of the trust during her or his life or for any part thereof;"
(b) the settlor possesses "the power to appoint by deed or will the persons
and organizations to whom the income shall be paid or the principal distrib-
278. See FLA. STAT. § 689.075(1)(d); see also id. § 736.0704(3)(a).
279. FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0201(4)(b),736.0704(3)(a)-(c).
280. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0103(14)(a)-(c).
281. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(I)(c), (2); see also FLA. STAT. § 689.225(2), (4) (containing
statement of Florida's statutory rule against perpetuities, with provisions for judicial reforma-
tion).
282. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(l)(c)!. Two other types of trusts may be created without a
definite beneficiary: a pet or animal trust under section 736.0408 of the Florida Statutes and a
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uted;" or (c) the settlor has the power to "withdraw from the trust all or any
part of the principal or income at one time or at different times. '283
The settlor may be a beneficiary of the trust and often is the sole benefi-
ciary of a revocable trust during the settlor's lifetime. The settlor could
provide that the trust assets will be paid to the settlor's estate upon death-a
"pour-up" trust; however, this is rarely done. Instead, the settlor usually
provides for the trust assets to be distributed outright when the settlor dies or
for the assets to continue to be held in trust for various beneficiaries. When
the trust provides for outright distributions when the settlor dies, these provi-
sions are comparable to the devises the settlor would make in a will if the
settlor owned the property in his or her own name. When the trust continues
after the settlor's death, these provisions are comparable to the provisions
that would be contained in a testamentary trust. Designating the settlor and
the settlor's estate or other beneficiaries after the settlor's death as beneficia-
ries of the trust would satisfy the requirement that the trust have definite
beneficiaries. 2 4
With respect to the contingent future interests in the revocable trusts,
the settlor's retention of the right to amend or revoke the trust prevents any
remainder interests from vesting while the trust is revocable.285 Further, the
period for the rule against perpetuities would begin to run on the settlor's
death-or when the settlor relinquishes the right to revoke or the trust other-
wise becomes irrevocable.286 If the trust provides for outright distributions
when the settlor dies, there will not be any perpetuities problem because the
trust interests will vest when the settlor dies. If the trust continues after the
settlor's death, then these trust provisions would need to comply with the
Florida rule against perpetuities. All of the settlor's children and grandchil-
dren living when the settlor dies would be lives-in-being, and the trust could
provide for distributions to them at any ages, or could provide for the trust to
continue after their deaths without a problem with the rule. For interests for
beneficiaries born after the settlor's death-such as after born grandchil-
dren-the trust could provide for distributions until age twenty-one, and
could provide for their interests to vest at age twenty-one in order to satisfy
the rule against perpetuities.287 Alternatively, the trust could use a term of up
283. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(1)(b), (c), (f).
284. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(1)(c).
285. See generally FLA. STAT. § 689.225.
286. See generally FLA. STAT. § 689.225(2).
287. See FLA. STAT. § 689.225(2)(a)1.
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to either ninety or 360 years after the settlor's death, with vesting required at
the termination of that period.288
3. Settlor as Sole Beneficiary and Trustee of
Revocable Trust During Lifetime
In order to create a valid trust, the settlor must not be the sole trustee
and the sole beneficiary. 289 This rule applies to a revocable trust, and the
settlor may serve as the sole trustee of a revocable trust.290 If the settlor is a
beneficiary of a revocable trust, there must be at least one other trustee or at
least one other beneficiary with a present or future interest in the trust for the
valid creation of the trust.29' In determining whether a trust has a sole benefi-
ciary, present as well as future beneficiaries count. In determining whether a
trust has a sole trustee, only the trustee then serving is counted. The fact that
there are successor trustees nominated to serve if a trustee is unable or un-
willing to serve does not prevent the present trustee from being the sole
trustee.
For purposes of this rule, there are two polar situations to consider: 1)
when the settlor is the sole trustee of the trust, and 2) when the settlor is the
sole beneficiary of the trust. In between these two are trusts where the settlor
is a beneficiary, but not the sole beneficiary, and trusts where the settlor is
not a trustee or is a co-trustee and thus not the sole trustee.
If the settlor wants to serve as the sole trustee, the trust would be re-
quired to have at least one beneficiary other than the settlor. This beneficiary
could be designated to receive the trust after the settlor dies and that benefi-
ciary's interest could be contingent on the beneficiary surviving the settlor
and subject to the settlor's power to change the beneficiary by amending or
revoking the trust. 292 This trust would allow the settlor to be the sole trustee
288. FLA. STAT. § 689.225(2)(a)2, (2)(f). The decision to use a term of the ninety or 360
years depends in part on whether the settlor wants the beneficiaries to be able to modify the
trust without approval of the court or wants the court to be able to modify the trust against the
settlor's expressed intent based on what is or is not in the best interests of the beneficiaries.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.04115, .0412. Further, if the settlor attempts to use a savings clause
based on the later of the twenty-one year rule or the ninety or 360 year rule, the twenty-one
year rule will apply. See FLA. STAT. § 689.225(2)(e)1-2.
289. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(1)(e).
290. See FLA. STAT. § 689.075()(g) (authorizing the settlor to serve as the sole trustee).
291. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
292. If that beneficiary's interest is contingent on surviving the settlor, the settlor should
add another contingent beneficiary in order to avoid a potential reversion to the settlor's estate
if the first contingent beneficiary fails to survive the settlor.
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and sole beneficiary during the settlor's lifetime but not the sole beneficiary
during the entire period of the trust.
If the settlor wants to be the sole beneficiary of the trust, with the set-
tior's estate receiving any remaining assets when the settlor dies,-a "pour-
up" trust-the settlor cannot be the sole trustee. In that case, the settlor
would need to appoint another person-whether an individual or a corpora-
tion-to serve as the sole trustee or to serve as a trustee along with the settlor
as a co-trustee. Thus, the settlor would be the sole beneficiary and could be a
co-trustee but could not be the sole trustee.
Revocable trusts rarely are created with a sole beneficiary during the
entire period of the trust. They usually have some contingent beneficiaries.
Thus, a settlor could create a revocable trust with the settlor being the sole
trustee and sole beneficiary during the settlor's lifetime, with contingent
beneficiaries receiving the trust property upon the settlor's death. The
primary purpose of this type of trust would be to provide for disposition of
the assets upon the settlor's death through the trust rather than a will. Or the
settlor could serve as a co-trustee, in which event the settlor would be neither
the sole trustee nor the sole beneficiary. The settlor might choose to serve
with a co-trustee to give the co-trustee the opportunity to become acquainted
with the settlor's affairs during the settlor's lifetime and so that the co-trustee
would be able to serve alone in the event of the settlor's incapacity or
death-or with a new co-trustee.
In the unusual case where the settlor creates a pour-up revocable trust
for the sole benefit of the settlor, with the assets passing as part of the set-
tlor's probate estate, the primary purpose of the trust would be to appoint a
trustee to administer the assets during the settlor's lifetime. More com-
monly, if a settlor creates a trust for fiduciary administration of assets during
his or her lifetime or in the event of incapacity, the settlor also wants to
provide for the distribution of those assets upon death by the provisions of
the trust rather than by will. Thus, pour-up trusts are rarely used.
It would not make sense for a settlor to create a trust where the settlor
was the sole trustee, if the settlor intended for distributions to be made only
to the settlor or the settlor's estate. Although it is possible that a settlor could
create a trust and at a later date become the sole beneficiary of the trust, this
possibility could be avoided by providing for contingent beneficiaries of the
trust in the event that none of the beneficiaries of the trust survive the settlor
and the termination of the trust. These contingent beneficiaries could be the
persons who would be the settlor's heirs if the settlor died intestate at that
time. Having a catch-all provision would avoid the possibility of the settlor
being the sole trustee and sole beneficiary and, thus, avoid the settlor be-
coming the sole owner by merger.
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IV. IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF A REVOCABLE TRUST
When designing a revocable trust it is important to consider: 1) the
provisions that will be effective during the settlor's lifetime; and 2) the
provisions that will be effective after the settlor's death. These provisions
include administrative and dispositive provisions. During the settlor's
lifetime, the trust may contain special provisions that are effective if the
settlor becomes incapacitated. In addition, the trust may contain provisions
applicable during the administration of the settlor's estate, regarding pay-
ment to the estate for the estate's obligations and administration expenses,
and the apportionment and payment of any estate taxes.293 Further, the trust
may provide for outright distributions after the settlor's death or may provide
for the trust to continue after the settlor's death. It is important to consider
how the provisions of the trust interrelate with the provisions of the will and
the laws and rules governing probate, as well as other documents and laws,
such as a durable power of attorney and the laws of guardianship.
A. Right to Revoke or Amend
An inter vivos trust created on or after July 1, 2007 may be revoked or
amended unless "the terms of [the] trust expressly provide that the trust is
irrevocable. 29 4 This rule applies to written trust instruments as well as oral
trusts.295 Under the FTC rule, both the right to revoke and the right to amend
are implied unless the trust expressly provides that the trust is irrevocable.296
By contrast, a trust created before then was irrevocable unless the right to
revoke was expressly retained,297 and if the right to revoke was expressly
retained, it should also have included the right to amend.298 Notwithstanding
293. See FLA. STAT. § 736.05053(2). The trust cannot change the trustee's obligation
under the Florida Probate Code and the FTC "to pay expenses and obligations of the settlor's
estate." FLA. STAT. § 736.0105(2)(m); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 733.607(2), .707(3), .805
(regarding this obligation). The will and trust, however, may contain other provisions that
relate to this obligation and the abatement of devises and trust distributions. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. §§ 733.805(1), 736.05053(2).
294. FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(1).
295. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0602(3), .0407.
296. FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(1).
297. See CS for SB 1170 Staff Analysis, supra note 92, at 25.
298. See, e.g., Preston v. City Nat'l Bank of Miami, 294 So. 2d I1, 14 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) ('The terms of a trust may be modified if the settlor and all the beneficiaries
consent. Having the power to terminate, they obviously have the power to create a new trust
or to modify or change the old. In Florida, this principle has long been recognized."). See
also CS for SB 1170 Staff Analysis, supra note 92, at 26-27. If the right to revoke did not
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this change in the default rule, the right to revoke and the right to amend
should be expressly stated in the trust instrument. The legislative history for
the FTC states: "The new rule assumes that most well drafted trust instru-
ments explicitly say whether they are revocable and when a trust instrument
does not clarify this, the omission was likely accidental. '299 A comment to
the UTC notes that the "[Uniform Trust] Code presumes revocability when
the instrument is silent because the instrument was likely drafted by a non-
professional, who intended the trust as a will substitute.'°
The settlor may choose to provide the manner for revocation or
amendment, such as by delivery of a written document to the trustee.30' If
the settlor specifies the manner of revocation or amendment in the trust
instrument or in the terms of an oral trust, that manner is exclusive; however,
the FTC only requires substantial compliance with the method so pro-
vided.3°2 If the settlor does not provide a method, then the trust can be
revoked or amended by the settlor in a "later will or codicil that expressly
refers to the trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise have
passed according to the terms of the trust" or by "[a]ny other method mani-
festing clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent."
30 3
To be cautious and to provide clear evidence of intent, the amendment
or revocation of the testamentary aspects of a trust should be in writing,
executed like a will in Florida,3°4 and the settlor should include directions
regarding the delivery of the trust assets-to the settlor or to others specified
by the settlor.30 5 If a joint trust is created, such as by a husband and wife, the
trust should address the right of revocation and amendment during the joint
lives of the settlors, as well as after the death of either settlor. In a joint trust,
generally each settlor has the power to unilaterally revoke the trust but only
include the right to amend, the settlor could revoke the trust and then create a new one to
accomplish the desired amendment.
299. CS for SB 1170 Staff Analysis, supra note 92, at 25-26. The legislative history also
notes: "If the assumptions underlying the revocable by default rule are wrong in a particular
case, it is easier to make a revocable trust irrevocable than it would be to reform an irrevo-
cable trust into a revocable one." Id. at 26 n.2 10.
300. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602 cmt.
301. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(3)(a).
302. Id.
303. FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(3)(b)1-2. Florida departs from the UTC in this regard. See
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(c)(2). The FTC allows the settlor to use alternate methods "[i]f the
terms of the trust do not provide a method," while the UTC allows the settlor to use alternate
methods "if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided in the terms
is not expressly made exclusive." FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(3)(b); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(c)(2)
(emphasis added).
304. See infra text accompanying notes 327-34.
305. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(4).
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with respect to "the portion of the trust property attributable to that settlor's
contribution," and if all of the settlors do not join in the revocation, the
trustee has an obligation to notify the other settlors of the partial revoca-
tion.30 6
The comments to the UTC note:
Revocation of a trust differs fundamentally from revocation of a
will. Revocation of a will, because a will is not effective until
death, cannot affect an existing fiduciary relationship. With a
trust, however, because a revocation will terminate an already
existing fiduciary relationship, there is a need to protect a trustee
who might act without knowledge that the trust has been revoked.
There is also a need to protect trustees against the risk that they
will misperceive the settlor's intent and mistakenly assume that an
informal document or communication constitutes a revocation
when that was not in fact the settlor's intent. To protect trustees
against these risks, drafters habitually insert provisions providing
that a revocable trust may be revoked only by delivery to the trus-
tee of a formal revoking document.307
While a trust cannot be created without funding, i.e. without a res,
Florida law separates the revocation of a trust from its "unfunding," provid-
ing that "[u]pon revocation of a revocable trust, the trustee shall deliver the
trust property as the settlor directs. 30 8  Thus, technically a trust can be
revoked even though assets are still titled in the name of the trustee. From a
planning standpoint, when deciding to revoke a trust, the settlor should
consider the reason for the revocation and the settlor's intent with respect to
the trust assets. The settlor might want the assets returned to the settlor's
name and control and subject to disposition by will, or the settlor might want
to make inter vivos gifts of the assets. The settlor can prepare the necessary
documents to effectuate the revocation and direct the trustee with respect to
the trust assets at the same time. In addition, when a settlor revokes a trust,
the settlor should also amend his or her will, if it contains a devise that pours
over to the trust, in order to avoid intestacy or partial intestacy.3°9
306. FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(2)(b). Presumably these rights may be changed by the trust
instrument. See, e.g., id. § 736.0602(1). There is a special rule for community property,
whereby either spouse may revoke "acting alone," but both spouses must join in an amend-
ment for it to be effective. FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(2)(a).
307. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602 cmt. (amended 2005).
308. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(4).
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The comments to the UTC address the settlor's incapacity, noting:
"The fact that the settlor becomes incapacitated does not convert a revocable
trust into an irrevocable trust. The trust remains revocable until the settlor's
death or the power of revocation is released. 3 °10 The settlor may want to
consider whether the settlor would want an agent or guardian to have the
power to revoke the trust, to amend the trust during the settlor's lifetime, or
to amend its testamentary aspects. The FTC notes that a "settlor's powers
with respect to revocation, amendment, or distribution of trust property" can
be exercised by a guardian of property, only as provided by the guardianship
statute, and by an attorney-in-fact, only as authorized by the durable power
of attorney statute.31  A plenary guardian of property and certain limited
guardians may "[c]reate or amend revocable trusts or create irrevocable
trusts of property of the ward's estate which may extend beyond the disabil-
ity or life of the ward in connection with estate, gift, income, or other tax
planning or in connection with estate planning," but only with court ap-
proval; however, the statute does not provide for the revocation of the
trust.31 2 An attorney-in-fact may not "[e]xecute or revoke any will or codicil
for the principal" and may not "[c]reate, amend, modify, or revoke any
document or other disposition effective at the principal's death or transfer
assets to an existing trust created by the principal unless expressly authorized
by the power of attorney."'3 13 Thus, if a revocable trust created by the settlor
is a "document or other disposition effective at the principal's death," the
durable power of attorney statute provides that a principal may expressly
authorize an attorney-in-fact to amend, modify or revoke it. Does this mean
that a guardian or agent can amend or revoke a revocable trust when the
settlor lacks testamentary capacity, or, that a guardian or agent may change
testamentary aspects without complying "with the formalities required for
the execution of a will?
314
310. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 cmt.; see also FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(3)(b) 1.
311. FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(5), (6).
312. FLA. STAT. § 744.441(19). Regarding inter vivos trusts, Florida Statutes section
744.441(19) applies to plenary guardians and to "a limited guardian of the property within the
powers granted by the order appointing the guardian or an approved annual or amended
guardianship report." Regarding wills, a guardian cannot make a will for a ward and can only
execute a codicil for a ward in order to obtain the maximum charitable deduction for a split
interest trust created by the principal under his or her will. FLA. STAT. § 744.441(18).
Regarding gifts, the right "to make any gift or disposition of property" may be removed from
the ward and delegated to the guardian, who with court approval may "[m]ake gifts of the
ward's property to members of the ward's family in estate and income tax planning proce-
dures." FLA. STAT. §§ 744.3215(3)(d), .441(17).
313. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(7)(b)4-5.
314. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0403(2)(b), .0601.
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It is not known how often these powers are exercised by an attorney-in-
fact, or by a guardian, with a court's approval, without any objection being
raised by family members or beneficiaries. There are a few Florida appellate
decisions that have discussed a guardian's powers, with the court's approval,
to make a gift to family members, to create or amend a trust, to designate a
beneficiary of a retirement account, and the guardian's limited power to
execute a codicil to reform a split interest trust for tax purposes.31 5 One case
specifically prevented a guardian from creating a trust with beneficiaries that
were different from the beneficiaries under the ward's estate planning docu-
ments when she was adjudicated incompetent.1 6
The right to devise property is one of an owner's basic property rights
"to acquire, possess, and protect property," which include the rights to devise
and dispose of property; however, those rights are subject to legislative
regulation that is reasonable and otherwise constitutional. 31 7 If an attorney-
in-fact or guardian is precluded from making a will, he or she should not be
permitted to create a trust that contains testamentary aspects or to amend the
testamentary aspects of an existing trust, even if the amendment would
315. See, e.g., Sherry v. Klevansky (In re Guardianship of Sherry), 668 So. 2d 659, 660-
61 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (considering power to create trust under Florida Statutes
section 744.441(19) and precluding guardian from creating trust for ward that would "pass on
her death to a beneficiary different from the ones who would receive her assets at death under
the estate planning documents existing on the date of her adjudication," noting that "[t]here is
no reason to believe that the legislature intended section 744.441(19) to negate the general
principle that a guardian cannot exercise a purely personal right of the ward"); Goeke v.
Goeke, 613 So. 2d 1345, 1346, 1348 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (considering power to make
gifts for estate planning and power to enter into contracts in ward's best interest under Florida
Statutes section 744.441(17), (19) and (21), remanding case for determination of whether
beneficiary of individual retirement account should remain the same as the old designation-
and benefit the guardian/son--or be changed to be consistent with the ward's will-to benefit
the guardian/son and his twin brother); In re Guardianship of Bohac, 380 So. 2d 550, 551, 553
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (considering power to make gifts under Florida Statutes section
744.441(17) and affirming lower court's decision not to authorize significant gifts to individu-
als who were not close relatives. The proposed gifts by seventy-six year old ward of $400,000
would have left her with $550,000 and could have saved $15,000 in income tax and poten-
tially $26,000 in estate tax).
316. Sherry, 668 So. 2d at 659-61.
317. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2. With respect to the right to devise and the legislative author-
ity to regulate the right to devise, see Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563
So. 2d 64, 68 (Fla. 1990), holding that the right to devise is a basic property right that is
"subject to the fair exercise of the power inherent in the State to promote the general welfare
of the people through regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety,
good order, [and] general welfare" (quoting Golden v. McCarty, 337 So. 2d 388, 390 (Fla.
1976). In Shriners, the court also found "that section 732.803 violate[d] the equal protection
guarantees of article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution." Id. at 69.
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conform the testamentary aspects to the dispositive provisions of an existing
will. 318  Extending this prohibition to trusts with testamentary aspects is
consistent with other extension of will law to such trusts, including the
requirement that a settlor of a revocable trust have the capacity to make a
will and that the testamentary aspects be executed with the formalities re-
quired for the execution of a will. 319 If a settlor has testamentary capacity-
even though he or she has a guardian, property, or an attorney-in-fact-the
settlor should amend or revoke the trust by signing or directing another to
sign for him or her;320 and if the settlor lacks capacity, neither the guardian
nor the attorney-in-fact should amend or revoke the testamentary aspects. If
the settlor is unable to manage his or her financial affairs, or has a guardian
of property and needs assets from the trust for the settlor's benefit, then the
attorney-in-fact or guardian should have the authority to act for the settlor to
make sure the trust assets are used for the settlor's benefit and, if necessary,
to exercise the settlor's power to withdraw trust property or revoke all or a
portion of the trust for this purpose-but not for the purpose or with the
effect of changing who will receive the assets when the settlor dies.32'
Florida law allows a will to be revoked by an act of revocation per-
formed by the testator or by another at the testator's direction and in the
testator's presence, if the testator intended to revoke the will.322 This would
include a will that devises real property. Acts of revocation include "burn-
ing, tearing, canceling, defacing, obliterating, or destroying" the will or
codicil "with the intent, and for the purpose, of revocation. 323 Further, will
law provides a presumption of revocation when the original will cannot be
found, 324 and also provides a process for proving the contents of a lost will
that was not revoked but cannot be found.3 25 These provisions for wills raise
questions concerning the permissible methods for revoking a revocable trust
318. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b) for the definition of testamentary aspects.
319. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0403(2)(b), .0601.
320. See FLA. STAT. § 732.502(1)(a).
321. See FLA. STAT. § 744.441(1), (2), (11), (19); Sherry v. Klevansky (In re Guardianship
of Sherry), 668 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1996). Others might argue that since a
guardian is permitted to make a gift to a member "of the ward's family in estate and income
tax planning procedures," with court approval, the guardian should be allowed to execute or
amend a will or a revocable trust to make transfers upon death to family members for the same
reasons. See FLA. STAT. § 744.441(17).
322. FLA. STAT. § 732.506.
323. Id.
324. See Upson v. Estate of Carville, 369 So. 2d 113, 114 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(citing In re Washington's Estate, 56 So. 2d 545, 545 (Fla. 1952)). See also Wider v. Wider
(In re Wider's Estate), 62 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1952) (Futch, J., dissenting).
325. FLA. STAT. § 733.207.
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and whether a presumption of revocation should apply if a revocable trust
cannot be found when the settlor dies.
With respect to revocation, the intent of the drafters of the UTC was to
allow, but not encourage, revocation by act.326 The FTC defers to the settlor
to express a method of revocation in the trust and then provides alternate
methods if the trust is silent; however, the FTC qualifies this by making all
these provisions "[s]ubject to s[ection] 736.0403(2)" of the Florida Stat-
utes.327 Specifically, section 736.0602(3) provides "[s]ubject to s[ection]
736.0403(2), the settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust [b]y substan-
tial compliance with a method provided in the terms of the trust '328 and when
"the terms of the trust do not provide a method, 3 29 by certain provisions of
the settlor's will or by "[a]ny other method manifesting clear and convincing
evidence of the settlor's intent. 33° Section 736.0403(2) provides that: 1)
"[n]o trust or confidence of or in any messuages, lands, tenements, or heredi-
taments shall arise or result unless the trust complies with the provisions of s.
689.05;" and 2) "[t]he testamentary aspects of a revocable trust, executed by
a settlor who is a domiciliary of this state at the time of execution, are invalid
unless the trust instrument is executed by the settlor with the formalities
required for the execution of a will in this state. '33' This raises the question
as to how the right to revoke or amend a trust is subject to the provisions of
section 736.0403(2), which pertain to the formalities required for a trust in
land to "arise" or for the testamentary aspects of a revocable trust to be valid.
Further, the Florida Probate Code provides that, with respect to a pour-over
devise to an inter vivos trust, the "entire revocation of the trust by an instru-
ment in writing before the testator's death shall invalidate the devise or
bequest. 332 The Florida Probate Code does not address other methods of
revocation for a revocable trust with testamentary aspects. It would be
helpful if sections 736.0403 and 736.0606 of the FTC and section 732.513 of
326. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602 cmt. (amended 2005).
While revocation of a trust will ordinarily continue to be accomplished by signing and
delivering a written document to the trustee, other methods, such as a physical act or an oral
statement coupled with a withdrawal of the property, might also demonstrate the necessary in-
tent. These less formal methods, because they provide less reliable indicia of intent, will often
be insufficient, however. The method specified in the terms of the trust is a reliable safe har-
bor and should be followed whenever possible.
Id.
327. FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(3).
328. FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(3)(a). Under certain circumstances, the settlor may communi-
cate the terms of the trust orally. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0103(19), .0407.
329. FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(3)(b).
330. FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(3)(b)2.
331. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(a)-(b).
332. FLA. STAT. § 732.513(4).
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the Florida Probate Code were clarified with respect to the formalities re-
quired for amendment 333 and revocation, particularly with respect to whether
a revocable trust with land or testamentary aspects may be revoked without a
writing, by act, oral communication or other means and, if so, the effect of
such revocation on a pour-over devise.3 4
B. Provisions for Settlor
For a revocable trust, the settlor will retain the right to revoke and may
retain other rights.335 These rights include the right to revoke a portion of the
trust, to amend the trust, to add more assets to the trust, or to withdraw assets
from the trust. 336  In addition, the settlor may retain other powers in a
nonfiduciary capacity, such as the power to appoint or remove trustees, the
power to control the trustee's administration of the trust, or the power to
direct distributions.
337
The settlor should consider the provisions of the trust that will apply in
the event the settlor personally loses the capacity to exercise the power of
revocation. If the settlor is a trustee, the settlor should include provisions
regarding succession of trustees and who will serve as trustee if the settlor
loses the capacity to serve, as well as provisions for the distribution of in-
come and principal, such as for the benefit of the settlor during the settlor's
incapacity. Further, the settlor may want to consider the use of a durable
power of attorney, granting the attorney-in-fact the power to transfer assets
from the settlor's name to the trust, as well as whether to designate a preneed
guardian in the event of the settlor's incapacity.338 In addition, the settlor
should consider whether an attorney-in-fact should have the power to amend
or revoke the trust and what statutory powers a guardian might have in the
333. The execution of an amendment to a revocable trust also should require the formali-
ties necessary to make a codicil to a will, which are the same as the requirements to make a
will. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.502, 736.0403(2)(b). Section 736.0103(20) of the Florida
Statutes defines the term "trust instrument" to include an amendment. Section 736.0403 of
the Florida Statutes refers to the testamentary aspects of a trust, which include provisions in
the original or amended trust instrument; however, the language of section 736.0403 of the
Florida Statutes is not as clear with respect to amendments as section 736.0601 of the Florida
Statutes, which addresses "[t]he capacity required to create, amend, revoke, or add property to
a revocable trust."
334. See FLA. STAT. § 732.513(4).
335. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 689.075.
336. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(l)(a), (c).
337. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(b), (d), (e).
338. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 709.08,744.3045.
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event the trust is not intended or viewed as a complete, viable alternative to a
guardianship.339
Some revocable trusts allow the settlor to direct that gifts be made from
the trust.34° Occasionally, a revocable trust also grants the trustee the power
to make distributions during the settlor's lifetime to beneficiaries other than
the settlor.
C. Provisions During Probate of Settlor's Estate
Many clients have heard that revocable trusts can be used to avoid pro-
bate. In general, the probate process involves: 1) finding and collecting the
assets owned by the decedent-marshalling the assets; 2) determining and
paying the claims against the estate-the claims process-and any estate
taxes, as well as paying the expenses of administering the estate; and 3)
determining the beneficiaries of the estate and distributing the assets to the
beneficiaries.
Technically, assets in a revocable trust are not subject to probate in that
they do not pass by will or intestacy, and they are not included in the inven-
tory of the probate estate.341 However, assets in a revocable trust may be
required to be paid to the personal representative of the settlor's probate
estate to pay the claims and expenses of administering the settlor's probate
estate.342 Further, assets in the revocable trust may be required to pay estate
taxes under state or federal law. 343 In addition, the trustee is required to file a
Notice of Trust with the court, providing certain information about the trust
and the settlor; however, failure to file the notice does not relieve the trustee
of its financial obligation to the estate.34 Thus, some of the process and
obligations associated with probate impact the revocable trust and who will
ultimately receive the trust assets. In addition, the probate process affects
when trust distributions can be made, and the trustee should not distribute
assets from the revocable trust until the probate is completed or the trustee is
clear of liability for the estate's obligations, administration expenses, and
taxes.
Creating a revocable trust involves the funding of a trust-determining
which assets are to be transferred to the revocable trust during the settlor's
339. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(5)-(6). See also FLA. STAT. §§ 744.441, .444.
340. For years in which there is a federal estate tax, see I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2), 2035(e).
341. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 731.201(14), 733.604(1), .607(I).
342. FLA. STAT. §§ 733.607(2), .707(3), 736.05053(l).
343. For years in which there is a Florida or federal estate tax, see FLA. STAT. §
733.817(5)(b), (c), (d).
344. FLA. STAT. § 736.05055(1), (2), (7).
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lifetime and effectuating those transfers during the settlor's lifetime. 345 This
process is similar to one of the first steps of probate-marshalling the pro-
bate assets. Thus, creating a revocable trust accelerates this process, requir-
ing the settlor to "marshall" the assets to be transferred to the trust and to
comply with the formalities required to transfer the assets. This process
requires the time and effort of the settlor, as well as time expended by the
settlor's attorney to make these transfers. The settlor can, however, partici-
pate in the process and reduce the attorney's time needed in this process.
Transferring assets to a trust during lifetime avoids the need for these assets
to be collected by the personal representative and inventoried as a probate
asset; however, it requires the settlor and the trustee to do similar acts under
trust law. 46 The settlor must transfer the assets during his or her lifetime to
the trustee, and the trustee, upon the settlor's death, must account to the
beneficiaries of the trust with respect to these assets.347
The creation of a revocable trust does not avoid the need for probate for
purposes of the claims process.3 8 The claims process provides a nonclaim
period after which claims will be barred-generally three months after a
notice to creditors is filed or thirty days after actual notice to a creditor is
given, whichever is later-with a maximum two year period of limitation.349
If there is no probate, the nonclaim period does not begin to run, but the two
year period of limitation applies. 350 Thus, probate may limit the exposure of
the trustee and accelerate the time period for distribution of the trust assets.
Further, the Florida Probate Code and the FTC provide rules whereby the
trustee is required to contribute trust assets to the probate estate if the residu-
ary estate is insufficient to pay the estate's claims and expenses. 351 In addi-
tion, the Florida Probate Code and the FTC contain provisions for the abate-
ment of devises as well as the "abatement" of trust distributions to pay these
amounts.352 In general, the provisions of the will and trust are treated as one
document for this purpose so that a specific devise of property, under the will
and a provision in the trust for a distribution of a specific asset, would be the
last to be sold to pay for the estate's claims and expenses.353 The Florida
345. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0401(1), (2).
346. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0401, .0810.
347. See FLA. STAT. §§ 736.08013, 738.08135.
348. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 733.701 - 705.
349. FLA. STAT. §§ 733.702(1)1 710; see May v. 111. Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So. 2d 1143, 1150
(Fla. 2000).
350. See FLA. STAT. § 733.710.
351. See FLA. STAT. §§ 733.607(2), .707(3), .805, 736.05053. In addition, the trust may
have expenses for administering the trust. FLA. STAT. § 736.05053(4)
352. See FLA. STAT. §§ 733.707, .805.
353. See id.
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Probate Code should be amended to clarify whether the residuary estate must
be exhausted before contributions from the trust are required, or whether the
residuary estate and the residuary dispositions are considered as one residu-
ary for purposes of abatement and contribution.354 Further, after the settlor's
death, the trust assets will either be required to be: 1) distributed outright to
the trust beneficiaries; 2) held in trust for the trust beneficiaries; or 3) paid to
the settlor's estate and distributed by the settlor's will (or intestacy). If the
assets are to be distributed outright, then the trust is a substitute for outright
devises in the will. If the assets are to be held in trust after the settlor's
death, then the trust is a substitute for a testamentary trust. If the assets are
to be paid to the settlor's estate, then the trust is not a substitute for any
provisions of a will. Thus, a revocable trust can be used to avoid some of the
probate process; however, to the extent it does, it generally substitutes a trust
process for the probate process.
354. See FLA. STAT. §§ 733.607(2), .805(4); FLA. STAT. 736.05053(2)(a). Does the right
of contribution under section 733.607(2) apply only if the probate residuary estate is insuffi-
cient, or does section 733.805 apply first to treat the residuary estate and the residue of the
trust as one? This would be important if the residuary beneficiaries of the will and trust are
different-i.e., the residuary does not pour over into the trust. There is a disconnect between
the trustee's obligation to contribute, which is conditioned on the insufficiency of the probate
residuary estate, and the order of abatement, which is determined as if the will and trust were
one common document. Consider the example where the probate residuary estate is
$400,000, the trust residue is $600,000, and the expenses of administration and claims are
$200,000. Under sections 733.606(2) and 733.707(3) of the Florida Statutes, the probate
residuary estate is sufficient to pay the $200,000; thus, the trustee has no obligation to pay
probate expenses and obligations; however, under section 733.805(4) of the Florida Statutes,
the will and trust are to be treated as one document, with the devises and trust distributions
abating in the statutory order in sections 733.805 and 736.05053 of the Florida Statutes. If the
will and trust have different beneficiaries, the probate residuary would abate to pay $80,000
(40% of the $200,000) and the trust residue would abate to pay $120,000 (60% of the
$200,000). The trustee should be obligated to contribute to the estate the abated portion of the
trust residue; however, that obligation only arises if the residuary of the probate estate is
insufficient. This issue also could be important if (1) the residuary estate pours over into the
trust, (2) the probate residuary estate is not liquid but the trust residue is liquid, and (3) the
trustee is not required to contribute the liquid assets because the probate residuary is suffi-
cient. Thus, the trustee's obligation to contribute should be tied to the abatement rules rather
than conditioned on the insufficiency of the probate residuary. Another issue is whether the
will and trust should be considered one document for other purposes, such as for satisfying
general devises and general trust distributions from general probate and trust assets.
See Florida House Bill 361 and Florida Senate Bill 998 for some proposed amend-
ments to Florida Statutes, sections 733.607(2), 733.707(3), and 736.05053 (adding subsection
5). Fla. CS for SB 998 (2010); Fla. CS for HB 361 (2010) (bills have identical provisions
except that SB 998 also contains new section 736.04114 regarding judicial construction of
language relating to the repealed federal estate tax). See also Fla. S. Comm. on Banking &
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If the settlor dies in a year in which there is a federal estate tax, then the
trust assets will be included in the settlor's gross estate for federal estate tax
purposes.355 Thus, a revocable trust will not avoid the federal estate tax;
however, a revocable trust can be used to minimize or eliminate estate taxes
in the same way that a will can be used. For example, a revocable trust can
provide for distributions to or for a spouse, or for distributions to a charity or
for a charitable purpose, and qualify for the marital or charitable deduc-
tion.356 Similarly, a revocable trust can contain provisions that take advan-
tage of the unified credit-the applicable exclusion amount-and reduce
estate taxes when the second spouse dies.357 If the settlor dies in a year in
which there is no federal estate tax but the carryover basis rules apply, assets
held in a revocable trust could qualify for the $1,300,000 basis increase. 8
Further a revocable trust could be drafted to qualify for the additional
$3,000,000 spousal property basis increase.359
The Florida Probate Code and the FTFC contain provisions for the
reasonable compensation of the attorneys, with respect to the administration
of the estate and the revocable trust, with the attorney's fees for the trust
being seventy-five percent of the attorney's fees for the estate.360 Thus, a
revocable trust can be used to try to limit the estate's attorney's fees; how-
ever, whether this results in a savings depends in part on the attorney's fees
and costs to create and fund the revocable trust and whether the estate or
trust has additional fees that are considered reasonable for "extraordinary
services. 36' In addition, the fees of the personal representative as well as the
fees of the trustee need to be considered to see if there is an overall savings.
Also, there may be intangibles to consider, including whether the settlor will
be burdened by the formalities of trust ownership.
D. Provisions for Distribution of Assets after Settlor's Death
When drafting the provisions for distribution of the trust assets after the
settlor's death, the drafter needs to consider the default rules applicable to
wills and whether there are similar default provisions for a trust. For exam-
ple, if the will provides for a devise of a specific asset when the settlor dies,
355. See l.R.C. §§ 2036(a), 2038(a)(1).
356. See generally 1.R.C. §§ 2056, 2055.
357. See I.R.C. § 2010.
358. See generally I.R.C. § 1022, including § 1022(b) for the general basis increase.
359. See generally I.R.C. § 1022, including § 1022(c) for qualified spousal property and
QTIP (qualified terminable interest property).
360. FLA. STAT. §§ 733.6171, 736.1007(2).
361. See FLA. STAT. §§ 733.6171(3), 736.1007(5).
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there are will statutes that address ademption and nonademption of the devise
as well as a provision for whether the devise is to be subject to any liability
secured by the devised assets.362 The FTC contains comparable provisions
for only some of these issues as exemplified in Appendix A. Further, if a
will contained a general devise, there is a will statute addressing ademption
by satisfaction and whether the devise will be reduced by gifts made during
lifetime.363 By contrast, the FTC does not contain a provision regarding
satisfaction. 3' The FTC contains a new provision authorizing judicial refor-
mation for mistakes of fact or law to conform a trust to the settlor's intent.365
By contrast, an ambiguous provision of a will may be judicially construed or
a will may be revoked by mistake in the execution; however, a will will not
be reformed to correct mistakes or effectuate intent.36 When drafting trust
provisions similar to will provisions, care must be taken to provide for these
situations and not to assume that the same will default rules apply to all trust
distributions.
V. CONCLUSION
Revocable trusts are a special type of inter vivos trust under Florida law
that are appropriate for some clients and some assets. They can be used to
marshall an individual's assets during lifetime, to provide for the contin-
gency of incapacity during lifetime, to preserve some privacy, and to provide
for the disposition of assets on death. Revocable trusts can be used to com-
plement a will and to provide parallel administration upon death. A revo-
cable trust can be used as one of the estate planning documents for a client,
but it is not a panacea for all clients or a substitute for probate. It should be
used in conjunction with a will and can be used with other estate planning
documents, such as a durable power of attorney and advanced directives. A
revocable trust can be used to streamline some of the aspects of probate and
as part of a plan to minimize or eliminate estate taxes or take advantage of
income tax basis increases. A revocable trust should be personalized for
each client and should not be used for every client or for all assets.
362. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 732.605-.606; FLA. STAT. § 733.803.
363. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.609. If a will contains a general devise, the testator and
settlor should provide whether the trustee will be required to use trust assets to pay the general
devises to the extent the general probate assets are insufficient.
364. See FLA. STAT. § 736.1107.
365. FLA. STAT. § 736.0415. See also FLA. STAT. § 689.225(4) (judicial reformation under
statutory rule against perpetuities); id. § 736.0413 (application of cy pres doctrine for chari-
table trusts).
366. See FLA. STAT. § 732.5165.
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APPENDIX A
Comparison of Selected Wills and Trust Statutes
Wills and Estates Trusts
Abatement FLA. STAT. § 733.805 FLA. STAT. § 733.805
FLA. STAT. § 733.607(2) FLA. STAT. § 733.607(2)
FLA. STAT. § 733.707(3) FLA. STAT. § 733.707(3)
FLA. STAT. § 736.05053
FLA. STAT. § 736.0105(2)(m)




Ademption by FLA. STAT. § 732.609
Satisfaction
Ademption by FLA. STAT. § 732.606
Extinction
Non-Ademption
Antilapse, FLA. STAT. § 732.603 FLA. STAT. § 736.1106
Lapse FLA. STAT. § 732.604
Agreements among FLA. STAT. § 733.815 FLA. STAT. § 736.0412
Beneficiaries FLA. STAT. § 736.0105(2)(k)
FLA. STAT. § 736.0111
Agreement FLA. STAT. § 732.701
Regarding Wills and
Devises, Joint Wills
Bond FLA. STAT. § 733.402 FLA. STAT. § 736.0702
Contests after Death FLA. STAT. § 732.518 FLA. STAT. § 736.0207
Dissolution of FLA. STAT. § 732.507 FLA. STAT. § 736.1105
Marriage
Distributions in FLA. STAT. § 733.810 FLA. STAT. § 733.810(2)
Kind FLA. STAT. § 736.0816(22)
Encumbered FLA. STAT. § 733.803
Property
(Exoneration)
Exculpation of FLA. STAT. § 733.710 FLA. STAT. § 736.1011
Fiduciary
Exempt property FLA. STAT. § 732.402 FLA. STAT. § 733.707(3)(d)
Generic Terms FLA. STAT. § 732.608 FLA. STAT. § 736.1102
Homestead FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4
FLA. STAT. § 732.401 FLA. STAT. § 732.401
FLA. STAT. § 732.4015 FLA. STAT. § 732.4015
FLA. STAT. § 731.201(32)
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Wills and Estates Trusts
Improper FLA. STAT. § 733.812 FLA. STAT. § 736.1018
Distribution
Intent FLA. STAT. § 732.6005(1) FLA. STAT. § 736.1101
FLA. STAT. § 736.0105(2)
Killer FLA. STAT. § 732.802 FLA. STAT. § 736.1104
Limitations on FLA. STAT. § 733.701 FLA. STAT. § 736.1014
Claims or FLA. STAT. § 733.7 10 FLA. STAT. § 733.710
Actions
List of Personal FLA. STAT. § 732.515
Property
Penalty Clause for FLA. STAT. § 732.518 FLA. STAT. § 736.1108
Contest FLA. STAT. §736.0105(2)(w)
(In Terrorem
Clause)
Per Stirpes FLA. STAT. § 732.611 FLA. STAT. § 736.1103
Fiduciary Powers FLA. STAT. § 733.612 FLA. STAT. § 736.0816
Power to Sell Real FLA. STAT. § 733.6121 FLA. STAT. § 736.0816(2)
Estate FLA. STAT. § 733.613 FLA. STAT. § 736.08163
Power of FLA. STAT. § 732.607
Appointment
Simultaneous Death FLA. STAT. § 732.601(1), FLA. STAT. § 732.601(1), (2)
(2)
Tax Apportionment FLA. STAT. § 733.817(b)1 FLA. STAT. § 733.817(b)2
Undue Influence; FLA. STAT. § 732.5165 FLA. STAT. § 736.0406
Fraud; Duress; FLA. STAT. § 733.103(2)
Mistake; Effect of
Probate
Undue Influence; FLA. STAT. § 733.107
Burden of Proof; FLA. STAT. § 90.301
Presumption FLA. STAT. § 90.302
FLA. STAT. § 90.303
FLA. STAT. § 90.304
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey does not deal with every case decided in the past twelve
months that might be said to be of interest to business owners, their advisors,
and others who follow business law developments. Cases of first impression,
decisions involving or identifying conflicts between the Florida District
Courts of Appeal, and questions certified to the Supreme Court of Florida as
being of great public importance are included. Cases that clarify or expand
upon existing principles of law are also included. This year's survey also
takes a look at a number of cases that, while procedural in nature, contain
concise analyses of some equitable principles and some unusual or not often
relied upon legal theories.
Many of these decisions address several areas of law. To the extent
possible, cases have been placed in the category that plays the most promi-
nent role in the court's discussion or decision.
I. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
As usual, there were many arbitration cases decided over the course of
the last year. Summaries of some of the more significant ones follow.
A. Arbitration: Forum Selection Clause
After litigation had been instituted in Florida, the defendant asked the
trial court to compel arbitration in accordance with the consulting agreement
between the defendant and the plaintiff, which "provided for arbitration in
Arizona."' The trial court so ordered, but its order required that the arbitra-
tion be held in Florida instead of Arizona.2 The defendant appealed the part
of the trial court's ruling that ordered that the arbitration take place in Flori-
da.3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, which was the applicable law in this case, it was not proper for the
trial judge to unilaterally modify part of the arbitration provision. 4 The ap-
I. Remington Fin. Group, Inc. v. Anchors Aweigh Marine, Inc., 12 So. 3d 1264, 1265
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The appellate court noted that the plaintiff had "not move[d] to strike the venue
provision," but the court did not discuss what impact, if any, such a motion by the plaintiff
might have had on the outcome of the appeal under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id.; see 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
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pellate court relied on its decision in BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee,5 where it
held that if an arbitration clause is "not unconscionable as a whole," it must
be enforced as written.6
B. Arbitration Agreement Enforced
Dorothy Stern (Resident) executed an arbitration agreement with Life
Care Center of New Port Richey (Life Care) upon her admission.7 The arbi-
tration clause directed that the arbitrator be the American Arbitration Associ-
ation (AAA) and the applicable AAA rules be used in any arbitration be-
tween the parties.8 Resident sued Life Care, and Life Care asked the trial
court to order arbitration. 9 It seems, however, that more than five years be-
fore the lawsuit-and several years before the arbitration agreement was
executed-AAA had announced that it would no longer arbitrate nursing
home disputes unless the parties agreed to AAA arbitration after the dispute
arose.' ° The parties had not so agreed." Resident argued that AAA's policy
left the parties with no valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate, and the
trial court agreed. 2 Life Care appealed, and the Second District Court of
Appeal reversed. 13 Under the circumstances presented, section 682.04 of the
Florida Statutes required that the trial court appoint an arbitrator. 14
5. 970 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
6. Remington Fin. Group, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 1265 (citing BDO Seidman, LLP v. Bee,
970 So. 2d 869, 877 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
7. New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC v. Stern, 14 So. 3d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2009).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1085-86. Among other claims, Resident alleged that her rights as a resident of
a nursing home had been violated. Id. at 1085.
10. See id. at 1085-86.
11. See New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC, 14 So. 3d at 1086.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1086-87.
14. Id at 1087. The Second District Court of Appeal noted first that neither of the parties
had offered any evidence regarding their intent with respect to choosing the AAA, despite
Resident's argument that this was a "material term" of the agreement, and that the trial court
could not modify the agreement. Id. at 1086. The appellate court then commented that Resi-
dent failed to present evidence that the choice of arbitrator was an "integral part of the agree-
ment to arbitrate." New Port Richey Med. Investors, LLC, 14 So. 3d at 1087. It is not clear,
however, that the result would have been different even if Resident had presented such evi-
dence, in light of the appellate court's statement immediately thereafter that "[wie also ob-
serve that the parties' arbitration agreement contains a severability clause." Id.
[Vol. 34
76
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss1/1
2009] SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW AFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS 75
C. Arbitration: Waiver of Right by Conduct
In the next two arbitration cases, the courts were asked to determine if
participation in litigation resulted in a waiver of a party's right to arbitrate.' 5
In Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. McLeod, Mr. McLeod bought a home and
entered into a Manufactured Home Retail Installment Contract and Security
Agreement, to which Green Tree Servicing, LLC (Green Tree) subsequently
became a party. 16 The agreement contained a binding arbitration clause.
17
Mr. McLeod died, and Ms. McLeod (Personal Representative), the surviving
spouse of Mr. McLeod, in her capacity as personal representative of the es-
tate of McLeod, became the plaintiff in a pending action that Mr. McLeod
had instituted against Green Tree.18 The complaint alleged that Green Tree
had violated the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act,' 9 and after Mr.
McLeod's death, Ms. McLeod added a wrongful death claim in what then
became the second amended complaint.20 Green Tree, which had previously
sought an order to compel arbitration, renewed its motion to compel arbitra-
21tion. ' Personal Representative then sought discovery in the lawsuit, and
Green Tree moved for protective orders with respect to discovery.22 After
much delay in the proceedings, the trial court ruled that Personal Representa-
tive could have ninety additional days of "arbitration related discovery. 23
Before the trial court ruled, however, counsel for both parties stipulated that
discovery beyond that related to arbitration, more specifically, discovery
going to the merits of the litigation, would constitute a waiver of Green
Tree's claim to arbitration.24  Green Tree then hired new counsel who
promptly made multiple discovery requests that went to the merits of the
action. 25 New counsel subsequently moved to compel that discovery and set
a hearing on its motion.26 However, Green Tree withdrew its requests for
discovery and its motion to compel, and it cancelled the scheduled hearing
15. See Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. McLeod, 15 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2009); DFC Homes of Fla. v. Lawrence, 8 So. 3d 1281 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
16. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 684.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 559.55 (2009).
20. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 684.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 685.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 685.
26. Id.
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on the discovery motion. When Green Tree's motion to compel arbitration
finally was heard, the trial court ruled that Green Tree had waived arbitration
because of the merits-related discovery.28 The Second District Court of Ap-
peal affirmed the trial court, aligning itself with decisions of the Third and
Fifth District Courts of Appeal. 29 In order to do so, however, the court con-
cluded that it was necessary to "recede from" its decision in Merrill Lynch
Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Adams30 "to the extent that it is inconsistent
with the rule that we now adopt."31 In Merrill Lynch, the court had ruled that
participation in discovery by the party seeking to compel arbitration did not
constitute a waiver.32 The Second District Court of Appeal in Green Tree
held:
[W]e now hold that a party's participation in discovery related to
the merits of pending litigation is activity that is generally incon-
sistent with arbitration. Such activity-considered under the to-
tality of the circumstances-will generally be sufficient to support
a finding of a waiver of a party's right to arbitration. 33
Even where a party has filed a timely motion to compel arbitration, the
party can waive any right to arbitration that the party has because of actions
that are inconsistent with the request for arbitration. 4 And once waived, the
27. Id.
28. Id. at 686.
29. Id. at 688. (citing Olson Elec. Co. v. Winter Park Redevelopment Agency, 987 So. 2d
178, 179 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Estate of Orlanis v. Oakwood Terrace Skilled Nursing
& Rehab. Ctr., 971 So. 2d 811, 812-13 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Coastal Sys. Dev., Inc.
v. Bunnell Found., Inc., 963 So. 2d 722, 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). The Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, after reviewing cases decided by the First and Fourth Districts, con-
cluded that those courts have not ruled on whether engaging in merits-related discovery, in
and of itself, without other conduct inconsistent with arbitration, is insufficient to waive arbi-
tration. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 688. The Second District also noted that in
one of its post Merrill Lynch opinions the court found a waiver of the right to arbitrate and
held, without referring to Merrill Lynch, that engaging in discovery was one of the factors that
led the court to find that there had been a waiver of the party's claim for arbitration. Id. at 693
(citing Mora v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 913 So. 2d 32, 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2005); Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Adams, 791 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 2d Dist. App.
2001)).
30. 791 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
31. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 694.
32. Merrill Lynch, 791 So. 2d at 26. The appellate court rejected the alternative of dis-
tinguishing the case before it from the facts in Merrill Lynch. See Green Tree Servicing, LLC,
15 So. 3d at 690.
33. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 694.
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right to arbitration cannot be revived without the opposing party's consent.
35
Propounding discovery on the merits of the case results in a waiver of arbi-
tration. 36 Green Tree's change of heart did not undo the actions previously
taken that were inconsistent with its claim that arbitration was required.37
Finally, the Second District Court of Appeal considered whether the dis-
avowal of its Merrill Lynch decision was unfair to Green Tree and should
have prospective application only. 38 The court decided that there was no
unfairness because of Green Tree's earlier stipulation regarding discovery.39
In the second waiver of arbitration by conduct case, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, in DFC Homes of Florida v. Lawrence,40 found that the
participation in litigation was limited and did not constitute a waiver of a
party's right to compel arbitration.4 ' The contract between DFC Homes of
Florida (DFC) and Lawrence contained an arbitration provision, and when a
dispute arose between them, it was arbitrated.4  The arbitrator found in
DFC's favor.43 Lawrence then filed an action against DFC in the circuit
court.44 In response, DFC filed a motion to compel further arbitration.45 The
trial court denied the motion observing that nothing required a second arbi-
tration.46 The appellate court noted that Lawrence had claimed that by pro-
ceeding in the court system and making settlement offers DFC had waived
its right to arbitrate. 47 The Fourth District Court of Appeal stated the general
rule that a party waives the contractual "right to arbitration by active partici-
pation ...before asserting that right., 48 However, to prove waiver, Law-
rence had to show that DFC had knowledge of the right to arbitrate but nev-
ertheless actively participated in litigation or took other action inconsistent
with arbitration. 49 Under the facts of DFC Homes, any of the alleged impro-
35. Id. (citing Williams v. Manor Care of Dunedin, Inc., 923 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
36. Id. at 688.
37. See id. at 690.
38. See Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 15 So. 3d at 694-95.
39. Id.
40. 8 So. 3d 1281 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
41. Id. at 1283-84.
42. Id. at 1282.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. DFC Homes, 8 So. 3d at 1282.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 1283.
48. Id. (citing Strominger v. AmSouth Bank, 991 So. 2d 1030, 1034 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2008)).
49. See id. (citing Marine Envtl. Partners, Inc. v. Johnson, 863 So. 2d 423, 426 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
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per participation took place after the arbitrator had rendered his decision
against Lawrence. ° It was then that Lawrence instituted the action against
DFC. 51 Lawrence alleged that DFC "actively engaged" in the action by par-
ticipating in depositions, making settlement offers, filing a motion to dismiss
the suit for lack of prosecution, answering interrogatories, and participating
in mediation.52 The appellate court disagreed.53 DFC's participation in the
litigation was limited and took place only after it had exercised its right to
arbitrate.54 It did not even file an answer or an affirmative defense to Law-
rence's complaint. Attempting to settle a dispute cannot be characterized as
other action inconsistent with the right to arbitrate.56 The appellate court
reversed the trial court's denial of DFC's motion to compel arbitration.57
D. Arbitration and Discharge of Contractor's Claim of Lien
Brookshire v. GP Construction of Palm Beach, Inc.58 involved the en-
forcement of a statutory construction lien in the face of a binding arbitration
clause in the parties' agreement. 59 GP Construction of Palm Beach, Inc.
(Contractor) recorded a lien on the real estate owned by the Brookshires
(Owners).6° Owners, pursuant to section 713.21(4) of the Florida Statutes,
filed a complaint seeking to have the lien discharged.61 The clerk of the
court issued a summons to Contractor at which point Contractor had "to
show cause within 20 days why [its] lien should not be enforced by action or
vacated and canceled. 62 Contractor filed a motion to compel arbitration
under its agreement with Owners and set the motion for hearing, but it did
not start an action to enforce the lien.63 On appeal, Contractor said that it
filed the motion to compel arbitration rather than starting an action during
the twenty-day period so that there would not be any claim that it had waived
its right to arbitration. 64 The trial court granted Contractor's motion to com-





55. DFC Homes, 8 So. 3d at 1283.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1284.
58. 993 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
59. See id. at 179-80.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 180.
62. Id.
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pel arbitration and did not discharge the lien.65 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed, directing that the lien be discharged by the trial court.66
The statutory twenty-day response period does not provide for extensions or
other exceptions, and there is no discretion left to the courts. 67 If the lienor
fails to take the statutorily required action within the required time, the court
must discharge the lien.68 Had Contractor filed a counterclaim to Owners'
complaint during the statutory period, the lien could have been preserved.69
The appellate court noted that "[t]he lien, however, and the dispute, are not
one and the same, [and] disposition of the lien would not" have resolved the
issue of liability on Contractor's claim. 70
Although the decision represents an interpretation of a party's obliga-
tion under one statutory lien statute, the strict rule enunciated here may be
more far reaching than it appears. Will the principles set out here apply
equally to other situations where judicial action may be the statutory mandate
for enforcing a party's right or defending against the statutory right but the
parties have agreed to arbitrate all disputes? The Fourth District Court of
Appeal's ruling in this case and the cases cited therein should be carefully
considered.7'
Unlike the situation in Brookshire, where apparently there was no ap-
plicable exception to arbitration contained in the arbitration agreement,72 in
Greenberg v. Sellers73 there was an exception.74 The arbitration clause of the
operating agreement between the parties provided in part that "the aggrieved
party shall be entitled to injunctive and/or equitable relief in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction" notwithstanding the mandatory arbitration provision.75
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Sturge v. LCS Dev. Corp., 643 So. 2d 53, 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1994)).
68. Brookshire, 993 So. 2d at 180 (citing Sturge v. LCS Dev. Corp., 643 So. 2d 53, 55
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
69. See id. (citing Mainlands Constr. Co. v. Wen-Dic Constr. Co., 482 So. 2d 1369, 1370
(Fla. 1986)).
70. Id.
71. In Brookshire, Contractor took the position that its underlying claim for payment
would have to be arbitrated. Id. However, had that not been the case, could Contractor, if it
had chosen to do so, have successfully alleged that the Brookshires waived their right to arbi-
tration by seeking relief from the court under section 713.21(4) of the Florida Statutes? Ap-
propriate language in an arbitration agreement may eliminate some of the waiver concerns
presented in Brookshire.
72. See id.
73. 2 So. 3d 381 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
74. See id. at 383.
75. Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that four out
of the five counts of the complaint were subject to arbitration.76 These
counts were for conversion, breach of contract and of fiduciary duty, and
violations under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.77
However, the appellate court reversed with respect to the first count, which
was for an accounting, since that was a request for equitable relief.78
E. Enforcement of Settlement Agreement
Disputes arose in connection with gas station leases between Petroleum
Realty I, LLC (Landlord) and Boca Petroco, Inc. (Tenant). 79 Landlord sued
for payment of rent and certain other amounts. 80 The oral settlement reached
just before trial addressed these issues, plus it required Tenant to file periodic
environmental reports with Landlord in accordance with the requirements of
the leases. 81 Tenant failed to make required payments in accordance with the
settlement agreement.82 Additional litigation ensued that included the fol-
lowing: the trial court enforced the settlement agreement; Tenant appealed;
the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed; Landlord obtained a writ of
possession with the trial court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
agreement; Tenant again appealed; and the Fourth District Court of Appeal
again affirmed.83  Although the lease had expired prior to the appellate
court's second decision, and Tenant had been ordered to pay more than
$14,000,000 in damages for failure to pay the amounts due in accordance
with the settlement agreement, the matter did not end after the second trip to
the appellate court.84 Landlord subsequently sent notice to Tenant that Te-
nant was in default under the environmental provisions of the lease, and
based on provisions in the lease that imposed on Tenant the obligation to
undertake environmental clean-up efforts, and the alleged failure to file re-
ports under the settlement agreement, Landlord asked the trial court to exer-
cise its continuing enforcement jurisdiction, which the court did, awarding
76. Id. at 382-83.
77. Id. Presumably, only damages were sought on these claims.
78. Greenberg, 2 So. 3d at 383.
79. Boca Petroco, Inc. v. Petroleum Realty I, LLC, 993 So. 2d 1092, 1093 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2008).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1094.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1093.
84. Boca Petroco, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 1093.
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Landlord an additional $1,901,000 as the environment clean-up cost.85 Te-
nant again appealed, and the appellate court reversed as to the environmental
clean-up damages. 86 The environmental report requirement was part of the
settlement agreement, 87 but the award of clean-up damages was not.88 Those
damages resulted from the alleged breach of the original lease agreement.
89
The clean-up damage award was not an enforcement of the settlement
agreement. 90 Therefore, the trial court did not have jurisdiction, and Lan-
dlord would have to file another lawsuit to claim clean-up damages. 91
III. ATrORNEYS' FEES
A. Prevailing Party: Construction Lien
In Trytek v. Gale Industries, Inc.,92 the Supreme Court of Florida was
called upon to determine what "prevailing party" means in construction lien
litigation.93 Gale Industries, Inc. (Gale) was hired by the Tryteks to install
insulation in the home they were building.94 There was no dispute that dur-
ing the insulation installation by employees of Gale, the electrical system
was inadvertently damaged.95 Mr. Trytek and Gale agreed on the electrical
company that would make repairs, which was a company owned by Mr. Try-
tek.96 After the repairs were made, and the Tryteks had calculated the cost of
the repairs at $1 1,770, the Tryteks tried to offset that amount against the
amount Gale claimed it was owed for its work.97 Gale refused a check ten-
dered by Mr. Trytek in the amount of $736, which represented the net
85. Id. at 1094. This environment clean-up damage award was then included in a final
judgment for unpaid rent and other charges due pursuant to the settlement agreement. Id. The
balance of the trial court's judgment was affirmed. Id. at 1095.
86. Id. at 1094. The Fourth District noted that the Supreme Court of Florida, in Paulucci
v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., explained that where a settlement agreement is incorporated into a
final judgment and jurisdiction is retained to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement,
the court can enforce terms included in the settlement agreement "even if the terms are outside
the scope of the remedy" that was requested in the complaint. Boca Petroco, Inc., 993 So. 2d
at 1094 (quoting Paulucci v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 842 So. 2d 797, 803 (Fla. 2003)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1095.
89. Id. at 1094.
90. Id.
91. Boca Petroco, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 1094-95 (citing Paulucci, 842 So. 2d at 803).
92. 3 So. 3d 1194 (Fla. 2009).




97. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1196-97.
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amount the Tryteks determined was due to Gale.98 Gale then recorded a
$12,725 construction lien-with no offset for any part of the cost of repair.99
Based on the stipulations of the parties prior to trial, the only issue to be de-
cided by the judge was the amount of the damages Gale owed to the Try-
teks.'0° The judge found that the repair damages were $11,200, and, in ac-
cordance with the parties' stipulations, offset this amount against the $12,725
amount agreed by the parties to be due Gale.' l The result was a judgment
for Gale in the amount of $1525.102 Then the parties filed motions under the
construction lien statute seeking attorneys' fees as well as costs, each party
claiming "prevailing party" status for purposes of section 713.29 of the Flor-
ida Statutes. 10 3 The trial court determined that the test set forth by the Su-
preme Court of Florida in Prosperi v. Code, Inc.1°4 was applicable.'0 5 The
trial court concluded that under the "significant issue" test of Prosperi, the
Tryteks had to be the prevailing party because the only "significant issues,"
in fact, "the only real issue" was the amount of the Tryteks' recovery on their
set-off counterclaim, "and the Tryteks primarily prevailed on their counter-
claim."' 6 Gale appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed,
concluding that the Prosperi "significant issues" determination is only appli-
cable if a "contractor is unsuccessful" in its action to foreclose on the lien.'17
The Fifth District Court of Appeal found that Gale was successful since it
recovered a net amount of $1525 against the Tryteks, and therefore Gale was
the prevailing party and the Prosperi test did not apply. 10 8 The appellate
court reversed and remanded for a determination of the fees and costs for
Gale, and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida. °9 The
Court rephrased the certified question as follows:
Where a lienor obtains a judgment against a property owner in an
action to enforce a construction lien brought pursuant to section
713.29, Florida Statutes (2005), are trial courts required to apply
the "significant issues" test articulated in Prosperi v. Code, Inc.,
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1197.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1197.
103. Id.
104. 626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
105. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1197.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1198.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1196,1198.
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626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993), in determining which party, if any, is
the "prevailing party" for the purpose of awarding attorneys'
fees?" 0
The Court summarized "the main issue" as a question of "what factors
enter into a determination of 'prevailing party' pursuant to section
713.29...1. The Court stated "the specific issue" as:
whether the trial court is vested with discretion, or is even required
to consider, which party prevailed on the significant issues; or
whether the trial court is bound by an inflexible bright-line rule
that a prevailing party must be determined and that the contractor
must be considered the prevailing party if it obtains a judgment on
its lien in any amount in excess of an asserted set-off or counter-
claim.' 12
The Court referred to its decision in Prosperi for the proposition that
when a trial court is called upon to determine the "prevailing party" in a con-
struction lien litigation, it should look to which party prevailed on the "sig-
nificant issues" before the court. 13 The Court held that the "significant is-
sues test" applies even if a contractor prevails in its lien action. 114 Just be-
cause a contractor obtains a judgment on its lien in excess of a claimed set-
off or counterclaim does not automatically make it the prevailing party.'
15
Thus, the fact that a contractor obtains a "net judgment" is not necessarily a
controlling factor in determining the prevailing party, even though it may be
"a significant factor."''16 The Court remanded the matter to the trial court.'
However, the Court, relying on its decision in C.U. Associates, Inc. v. R.B.
Grove, Inc.," 8 made it clear that there does not have to be a prevailing party
in a construction lien case." 9 In substance, the Court gave trial judges consi-
derable discretion to determine if there is a prevailing party in section 713.29
cases and, if so, which party prevailed on the significant issue or issues. 20
110. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1196 (alteration in original).
Ill. Id. at 1198.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1201.
114. Id. at1202.
115. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1202.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1204.
118. 472 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1985).
119. Trytek, 3 So. 3d at 1203--04.
120. See id. While many issues raised by, and the potential problems identified in, the
cases in this survey may be resolved contractually, the issues presented by the Court's deci-
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B. Prevailing Party: Breach of Lease Agreement Dispute
In Civix Sunrise, GC, LLC v. Sunrise Road Maintenance Ass'n,121 Civix
Sunrise, GC, LLC (Lessee) bought real estate subject to a ninety-nine year
lease made in 1972.122 The lease required Lessee to operate a golf course on
the property. 123 Lessee was to also sell golf or country club memberships to
people residing on property adjoining the Civix property.' 24 After making
the purchase, Civix stopped operating the golf course and announced it was
planning to develop the property. 25  Various associations (Associations)
representing adjacent property owners successfully sued Lessee and pre-
vented it from developing the property. 126 Specifically, Associations per-
suaded the trial court to declare "that the lease had not been extinguished by
merger and [remained as] an encumbrance on the property.' ' 27 Associations
were the intended beneficiaries of parts of the lease, including that part man-
dating the operation of a golf course.128 Associations then asked for attor-
ney's fees pursuant to paragraph twenty of the lease, which so provided to
the prevailing party. 2 9 The trial court awarded fees to Associations as in-
tended third-party beneficiaries of the lease. 30 The Second District Court of
Appeal reversed.'3 ' An agreement as to attorney's fees in a contract must be
"clear and specific" to be enforceable. 132 Applying this test, the appellate
court found that the term "party" in the lease's fee clause referred only to the
signatory parties to the lease. 133 In other words, the Second District Court of
Appeal refused to read into the lease that these third-party beneficiaries of a
sion in Trytek do not appear to readily lend themselves to that solution. See Barbara Landau,
2007-2008 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 33 NOVA L. REV. 81, 98-99
(2008) [hereinafter Landau, 2007-2008 Survey] for a discussion of the Fourth District Court
of Appeal's decision in Port-A-Weld, Inc. v. Padula & Wadsworth Constr., Inc., 984 So. 2d
564 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008), where the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the
"significant issue" test set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida in Prosperi may not be
changed by contract. See Port-A-Weld, Inc., 984 So. 2d at 570.
121. 997 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).









131. Civix Sunrise, GC, LLC, 997 So. 2d. at 435.
132. Id. (citing Sholkoff v. Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 693 So. 2d 1114, 1118 (Fla. 4th
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portion of the lease agreement were also beneficiaries of the attorney's fee
clause. 134
IV. BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS, ENTITIES, AND AGREEMENTS
A. Corporations: Special Law
The question presented to the Supreme Court of Florida in Lawnwood
Medical Center, Inc. v. Seeger,'35 was whether the St. Lucie County Hospital
Governance Law (HGL) 136 violated Florida's constitutional prohibition
against passing a law that includes the "'grant of [a] privilege to a private
corporation"' by special law or by a "'general law of local application."1
37
Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc. (Lawnwood), a for-profit corporation, owns
Lawnwood Regional Medical Center and Heart Institute in St. Lucie Coun-
ty.138 In 1993, Lawnwood's medical staff adopted Medical Staff Bylaws
(Bylaws). 139 The Bylaws were approved by Lawnwood's Board of Direc-
tors.' 4° Lawnwood needed to have the Bylaws to remain in good standing
with the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organiza-
tions.'4 ' There was no requirement that the Bylaws contain specific terms.
41
After the Bylaws were adopted, lawsuits were instituted as the result of
disputes that developed between the Lawnwood administration and the med-
ical staff. 14 3 Lawnwood turned to the legislature for help, which resulted in
the 2003 enactment of the HGL.' 44 The effect of the new law was to allow
Lawnwood's Board to trump virtually every decision made by the medical
staff pursuant to the Bylaws. 145 Lawnwood instituted suit to have the HGL
declared constitutional, but the trial court found the law to be unconstitution-
al. 46 The First District Court of Appeal agreed that the law was unconstitu-
134. Id.
135. 990 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2008).
136. Id. at 506.
137. Id. at 509 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I1l, § I I(a)(12)). Article Ill, section 1 (a) of the
Florida Constitution provides that "[t]here shall be no special law or general law of local
application pertaining to: ... (12) private incorporation or grant of privilege to a private cor-
poration." FLA. CONST. art. I11, § I l(a)(12).





143. Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc., 990 So. 2d at 507.
144. Id. at 507-08.
145. See id. at 508.
146. Id.
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tional. 47 Lawnwood appealed, and the Supreme Court of Florida concluded
that the law was a special law, as it was expressly "intended to affect only
those privately operated hospitals located in St. Lucie County."' 148 In this
case of first impression, the Court's decision turned on the meaning of the
word "privilege," as used in article 1I, section 11 (a)(] 2) of the Florida Con-
stitution, a phrase not previously construed by the Court. 49 The Court cited
City of Plattsmouth v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 50 where the Supreme Court
of Nebraska defined "special privilege," as used in its constitution, as "'a
right, power, franchise, immunity, or privilege granted to or vested in a per-
son or class of persons, to the exclusion of others and in derogation of com-
mon right.".''  The Supreme Court of Florida, applying principles of statuto-
ry construction, concluded that "privilege" is not limited to an economic
advantage and that a broad reading of the word "privilege" is consistent with
the 1968 addition of this provision to the Florida Constitution. 52 After so
concluding, the Court found that the HGL is a special law granting to a cor-
poration prohibited rights, benefits, and advantages amounting to a privi-
lege. 53 This special law "alter[ed] the balance of power" between Lawn-
wood and its medical staff. 154
B. Ultra Vires Doctrine
Cambridge Credit Counseling Corporation (Guarantor), a Massachu-
setts corporation, guaranteed the leasehold obligations of Brighton Credit
Corporation (Tenant) to 7100 Fairway, LLC (Landlord). 55  The guaranty
was made in connection with the assignment of the lease to Tenant by a third
party. 56 The assignment and the guaranty were both signed by John Puccio,
as president of Guarantor, and the guaranty provided that Guarantor was the
parent and owner of all of the shares of Tenant. 57 After Tenant defaulted on
147. Id.
148. Lawnwood Med. Ctr., Inc., 990 So. 2d at 510. It was undisputed that the new law
"affected only the two private hospitals in St. Lucie County," both owned by the same parent
corporation. Id. at 508.
149. Id.at510.
150. 114 N.W. 588 (Neb. 1908).





155. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp. v. 7100 Fairway, LLC, 993 So. 2d 86, 88 (Fla.
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the lease during the fifth year, Landlord sued Tenant under the lease and
Guarantor under the guaranty agreement. 5 8 Tenant defaulted in the action
and judgment was entered against it, but Guarantor filed an answer with af-
firmative defenses. 159 Landlord's motion for summary judgment as to the
defenses raised by Guarantor was granted, and Guarantor appealed.' 6° Gua-
rantor had alleged as an affirmative defense that its guaranty was ultra vires
under the law of Massachusetts, the state in which it was incorporated.16'
Guarantor argued that Massachusetts law should be applied, and that under
the law of Massachusetts, a public charity is prohibited from guaranteeing
the obligations of another. 62 Guarantor claimed that it was a public charity
under Massachusetts law. 163 Although Guarantor apparently qualified as a
charity under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,' 64 the appellate
court was not convinced of Guarantor's status as a public charity under Mas-
sachusetts law. 165 However, Guarantor's status under Massachusetts law did
not matter since Florida law applied. 166 Not only was performance under the
lease and guaranty to be in Florida, but both instruments had "Florida choice
of law" provisions. 167 Under section 617.0304(2) of the Florida Statutes, the
claim of ultra vires is available only to corporate shareholders in derivative
actions or to the attorney general. 68 A corporation cannot rely on the ultra
vires doctrine as a defense to an agreement with a third party voluntarily
entered into by the corporation, and the trial court was affirmed.' 69 Guaran-
tor also had alleged that Mr. Puccio, as its president, did not have the actual
or apparent authority to execute the guaranty. 70 The Fourth District likewise
did not disturb the trial court's finding that Mr. Puccio had apparent authority
to sign the guaranty.' 7' The appellate court, quoting Lensa Corp. v. Poincia-
158. Id.
159. Id.




164. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).




169. Id. at 90-91. The court distinguished Chatlos Found., Inc. v. D'Arata, a case relied
on by Guarantor, because that case involved organizational or internal matters governed by
the state of incorporation, whereas this case involved transactions between the Guarantor and
third parties. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 993 So. 2d at 90 (citing Chatlos Found.,
Inc. v. D'Arata, 882 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
170. Id. at 90.
171. Id.
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na Gardens Ass'n,7 2 listed the three elements necessary for there to be a
finding of apparent agency as follows: "'(1) a representation by the pur-
ported principal; (2) reliance on that representation by a third party; and (3) a
change in position by the third party in reliance [on the] representation.""1 73
Finding that the execution of the lease guaranty was an act done "in the ordi-
nary course of business," the Fourth District applied "the presumption of
authority" that has been "consistently recognized" by the courts with respect
to the acts of corporate presidents, finding that the first requirement was
met.'74 The reliance requirement was met because the guaranty itself said
that Landlord would not have agreed to the lease assignment without the
guaranty.175 The change of position requirement was met because Landlord
released the original tenant. 76 The appellate court concluded that there was
no remaining material question of fact. 177 But just in case there was still an
issue of fact regarding apparent authority, the Fourth District observed that
Guarantor was estopped from denying the validity of the guaranty five years
after signing it.'78 Therefore, the trial court correctly entered summary
judgment in favor of Landlord on this issue as well. 179
C. Piercing the Corporate Veil
IAT Group, Inc. (IAT) was the successful bidder for the purchase of
stock in two subsidiaries that were wholly owned by Grupo Empresarial
Agricola Mexicano, S.A. de C.V. (GEAM), a Mexican corporation, and Mr.
Abu-Ghazaleh was IAT's chairman.' 80 Mr. Bours was then the chairman of
GEAM.'8' The GEAM subsidiary involved in this appeal was Fresh Del
Monte Produce, NV (FDMP NV). 82 IAT formed a subsidiary, Fresh Del
Monte Produce, Inc. (FDMP Inc.) for the acquisition of the FDMP NV
stock. 83 Owners of a minority interest in GEAM, "identif[ying] themselves
as de facto shareholders of" FDMP NV (Plaintiffs), claimed that the pur-
172. 765 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).






178. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 993 So. 2d at 90.
179. See id. at 91.
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chase and sale of the FDMP NV stock was tainted by dishonesty and sued to
recover damages for the alleged fraud.I 84  They sued IAT, Mr. Abu-
Ghazaleh, GEAM, Mr. Bours, and FDMP Inc. (collectively referred to as
Defendants), alleging that GEAM "received inadequate consideration" for
the sale of FDMP NV as a result of GEAM's then chairman's breach of his
fiduciary duty. 85 Defendants alleged that Plaintiffs lacked standing, but De-
fendants' summary judgment motion based on this argument was denied. 86
The case went to trial, and the jury found for Defendants. 187 Plaintiffs ap-
pealed, and Defendants filed a cross-appeal from the trial court's denial of
their motion for summary judgment. 188 The Third District Court of Appeal
reversed, finding that the trial court should have granted Defendants' motion
for summary judgment.189 Plaintiffs' claims were derivative of their owner-
ship of stock in GEAM.' 90 They should have instituted "a shareholder deriv-
ative action. ' ' In addition, Plaintiffs could not get around the fact that their
claim was derivative by "invoking the alter ego doctrine."'' 92 They could
"not pierce their own corporate veil" to claim standing with respect to the
corporation's assets.' 93 A direct action by Plaintiffs would only have been
appropriate if the right Plaintiffs sought to enforce existed in them as stock-
holders of FDMP NV, which it did not.194 Plaintiffs also argued that the sale
of FDMP was a "de facto merger," but the appellate court did not agree. 9
5
D. Minority Shareholder Appraisal Rights
Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc. v. Sullivan,'96 while nominally about the
elements necessary to support injunctive relief, is instructive as to a minority
shareholder's stock appraisal rights under section 607.1 302(1)(d) of the Flor-
ida Statutes. 97 In Foreclosure Freesearch, Mr. Geisen (Majority Sharehold-
er) was the founder and majority shareholder of Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc.
184. Id. at 466-67. These shareholders held a total of direct and indirect ownership of 6.3
percent of the shares of GEAM. Chaul, 994 So. 2d at 467.
185. Id. at 466-67.
186. Id. at 466.
187. Id. at 467.
188. Id. at 466.
189. Chaul, 994 So. 2d at 466.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 467.
193. Id.
194. Chaul, 994 So. 2d at 467.
195. Id. at 467-68.
196. 12 So. 3d 771 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
197. Id. at 773.
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(Corporation), which in turn, was the defendant in an action instituted by the
minority shareholders, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Mutillo (Minority Shareholders)
over various corporate matters including whether Minority Shareholders
were in fact shareholders of Corporation. 198 Claims and counterclaims were
made.199 Seeking to bring the litigation to a close, Majority Shareholder
caused Corporation to initiate a reverse stock split.2°° In this instance, a re-
verse stock split meant that Minority Shareholders would each end up with
less than one share-a fractional share-of Corporation, and the fractional
share of each of them would be purchased by Corporation. 20' The reverse
stock split invoked Minority Shareholders' statutory appraisal rights under
section 607.1302(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes. 2 2 Minority Shareholders
asked the trial judge to temporarily enjoin the appraisal process, claiming
that once their corporate interests were purchased, they would no longer have
standing to pursue their counterclaims. 20 3 The judge agreed and enjoined the
appraisal process. 204 The concern was that Majority Shareholder may be
liable for improper actions that reduced the value of Corporation. 20 5 If so,
ending the litigation in this manner, that is by virtue of having the appraisal
proceed, would prevent the ascertainment of the "true" value of Corporation
and the minority shares. 2°6
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed,2 7 concluding that injunc-
tive relief is an equitable remedy, and Minority Shareholders had an ade-
quate remedy at law.20 8 The appellate court held that "the appraisal process
provides an adequate remedy at law" noting that "'[s]tatutory proceedings
are regarded as law action. ' '' 209 In reaching its decision that the appraisal
process was to proceed, the Fourth District Court of Appeal relied on Wil-





203. Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 774. This was the reason given by the
minority shareholder in Williams for what they called a "'conditional election of appraisal
rights"' which election was considered by the trial court to be "a nullity." Williams v. Stan-
ford, 977 So. 2d 722, 725 (Ha. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Hence the minority shareholders in
Williams were deemed by the trial court to have waived their appraisal rights, and they did not
appeal that ruling. Id.
204. Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 774.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 778.
208. Id.
209. Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 775-76 (quoting Adams v. Dade County,
202 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967)).
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liams v. Stanford,2 " a 2008 decision of the First District Court of Appeal
involving shareholder appraisal rights under section 607.1302(1)." The
First District there held that if certain requirements were met, minority
shareholders could make a claim under section 607.1302(4)(b) of the Florida
Statutes that wrongful acts by a majority shareholder adversely affected val-
ue.212 The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Foreclosure Freesearch stated
that if Minority Shareholders could support the claims, then, as held in Wil-
liams, they "'may be entitled to equitable remedies beyond an appraisal pro-
ceeding if the alleged acts have so besmirched the propriety of the chal-
lenged transaction that no appraisal could fairly compensate the aggrieved
minority shareholder.' 213 Minority Shareholders' counterclaim included a
count for breach of fiduciary duty by Majority Shareholder for misappropria-
tion of corporate funds and a count against Corporation for wrongfully with-
held distributions of profits. 2 4  Thus, although Majority Shareholder can
invoke the appraisal process to eliminate the rights of Minority Sharehold-
ers, 1 5 Minority Shareholders can challenge appraised value and, under the
Williams analysis, go beyond the appraisal pursuant to the fraud exception of
section 607.1302(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes, provided they meet the re-
quirements set forth in Williams.1 6 The Fourth District Court of Appeal said
that "[b]ecause [Minority Shareholders] are not deprived of their ability to
seek relief beyond the appraisal if they satisfy the Williams analysis, they
have an adequate remedy at law. 21 7
E. Shareholders' Agreements: Arbitrability
In Breakstone v. Breakstone Homes, Inc.,18 the Shareholders' Agree-
ment between Breakstone Homes, Inc. (Corporation) and its shareholders
provided in part that "'[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
210. 977 So. 2d 722 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
211. See id. at 726-27; Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 120, at 86-87. The ap-
praisal rights in Williams derived from subsection (c) rather than subsection (d) of section
607.1302(l).
212. Williams v. Stanford, 977 So. 2d 722, 730 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
213. Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 777 (citing Williams, 977 So. 2d at 730).
214. Id. at 773, 778.
215. Id. at 778. The appellate court extended the time within which Minority Shareholders
could exercise their appraisal rights to seven days after the date of the issuance of the court's
"mandate to exercise their rights in the appraisal process." Id.
216. Id. at 777.
217. Foreclosure Freesearch, Inc., 12 So. 3d at 778.
218. 999 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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this Agreement or a breach hereof shall be finally settled by arbitration.' 219
Corporation brought an action against Mr. Breakstone (Director), who was
one of three directors (and a shareholder), alleging breaches of fiduciary du-
ties as a director of Corporation. 220 Director sought an order compelling arbi-
tration, and in response, Corporation relied on Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp.,22I
where the Supreme Court of Florida set forth the three-pronged test that a
court must apply before it compels arbitration.222 Under the second prong of
the Seifert test, there must be "an arbitrable issue. 22 3 Corporation argued
that its claim was not arbitrable because it was "a tort claim 'unrelated to the
rights and obligations"' under the Shareholders' Agreement.224 The trial
court denied Director's motion to compel arbitration, and he appealed.225
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed. 226 The Shareholders' Agree-
ment here contemplated breach of fiduciary duty by a director and provided a
remedy.227 Corporation's claim was "significantly related to the rights and
obligations in the Agreement" and arbitration was required.228
F. Joint Venture
North Broward Hospital District (NBHD), having become a Trauma
Level 1[ hospital, needed general surgeons for its emergency room.229 NBHD
sought the services of several surgeons, asking them to form a corporation
that NBHD would deal with, rather than dealing with the surgeons indivi-
dually.2 30 Several surgeons, including Dr. Triana, decided that they would,
individually, through their own practices, as independent contractors, provide
surgical services to NBHD through contracts between NBHD and Fort Lau-
derdale Surgery Associates, P.A. (FLSA), a corporation newly formed for
219. Id. at 732 (emphasis omitted).
220. Id.
221. 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1999).
222. Breakstone, 999 So. 2d at 732. Under Seifert, the court must determine: (1) if there
is "a valid written agreement to arbitrate;" (2) if there is an arbitrable issue; and (3) if there
has been a waiver of the right to arbitrate. Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636.
223. Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636.
224. Breakstone, 999 So. 2d at 732.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 733.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Amko, 993 So. 2d 167, 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
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this purpose. 23' The surgeons' interests in FLSA would be based on the de-
gree of each surgeon's participation.232 When the corporation was formed,
the only stock issued was to Dr. O'Rourke.233 Four of the doctors other than
Dr. Triana were named the officers of FLSA.234 NBHD and FLSA then ex-
ecuted a written agreement that detailed the surgical services FLSA would
provide, specified standards to be met, and required Dr. O'Rourke to "over-
see" the other surgeons, including Dr. Triana.235 Dr. Triana and the other
surgeons signed agreements with FLSA that confirmed FLSA's arrangement
with NBHD and the surgeons' status as independent contractors for FLSA.236
Although these agreements were not signed by FLSA, the terms of the inde-
pendent contractor agreements were followed. 37 The surgeons subsequently
adopted "by-laws" which required that any decisions be by unanimous vote
of the surgeons.2 38 During the term of the various agreements, the other
surgeons voted to fire Dr. Triana.239 Dr. Triana sued FLSA and the three
doctors who were then the officers of FLSA. 240 Dr. Triana alleged that a
breach of fiduciary duty owed to him under their joint venture had occurred,
arising out of the absence of adherence to corporate formalities and by virtue
of firing him.24' The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, reasoning that even if there had been a joint venture, it termi-
nated when FLSA was formed, the purpose of the joint venture's creation
having been realized.242 The trial court ruled that under corporate law, the
decision to fire Dr. Triana was reasonable, and thus proper under "the busi-
ness judgment rule." 243 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the
law as to when there is a termination of a joint venture.24 The formation of a
corporation may not be the end of a joint venture if forming the corporation
231. Id. at 168-69.
232. Id. at 169.





238. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 169.
239. Id. Dr. Triana objected to the firing based on the absence of unanimous consent. Id.
He then learned that no FLSA stock had been issued to him. Id.
240. Id. One of the officers died before Dr. Triana was fired. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc.,
993 So. 2d at 168 n. 1.
241. Id. at 169-70.
242. Id. at 170. With respect to another count that was based upon the unsigned agree-
ment with FLSA, the appellate court found that there were material factual issues and sum-
mary judgment should not have been granted to FLSA on this count. Id. at 171.
243. Id. at 170.
244. See Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 170.
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was not the purpose of the joint venture, but rather was a means to an end.245
Here, there were material issues of fact remaining as to whether there was a
continuing joint venture.246 Joint venturers owe each other a fiduciary du-
ty.247 By failing to decide the factual issue of whether a joint venture existed
and its proper purpose, the trial court's application of the business judgment
rule was error.248
V. CONSUMER RIGHTS
Ocana v. Ford Motor Co.249 sets forth some important principles with
respect to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA)250 and its interaction
with state law. 1 Mr. Ocana leased a Land Rover from Warren Henry Au-
tomobiles, Inc. (Dealership). 2  The Land Rover was new and came with a
"New Vehicle Limited Warranty" from Ford Motor Company (Ford).253
Dealership assigned to Mr. Ocana all of Dealership's rights under the "stan-
dard manufacturer's new vehicle warranty. '254 The lease agreement stated
that Mr. Ocana was taking the Land Rover "AS IS" and the provision con-
tinued, also in capital letters, with the statement that "NO WARRANTIES
OR REPRESENTATIONS, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED" with respect
to any part of the Land Rover were being made.255 The provision included a
statement, still in capital letters, that there was "NO WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS ... FOR ANY PARTICULAR
PURPOSE., 256 Mr. Ocana then sued Ford and Dealership for breach of "ex-
press and implied warranties [under the MMWA]. 257 He alleged that the
vehicle had been taken back to Dealership at least four times for repairs in
the first year of the lease.258 The complaint was dismissed with prejudice,
245. Id. (citing Donahue v. Davis, 68 So. 2d 163, 171 (Fla. 1953)).
246. Id. at 17 i.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 992 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
250. See id. at 322; Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2006).
251. See Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 322-23; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 672.313 (2009).





257. Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 322. Mr. Ocana alleged that Ford and Dealership "fail[ed] to
repair the vehicle within a reasonable amount of time or reasonable number of repair at-
tempts" under the MMWA. Id. at 322-23.
258. Id. at 322.
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and Mr. Ocana appealed.2 19 The appellate court noted that Mr. Ocana was
trying to utilize a portion of the MMWA that applies only to full warran-
ties,260 and which allows a consumer to choose between taking a refund for
the defective product or a replacement free of charge if "a defect or malfunc-
tion" has not been remedied by the warrantor "after a reasonable number of
attempts. 26' Mr. Ocana's problem, according to the appellate court, was that
this option under the MMWA applies only to full warranties and not to li-
mited warranties.262 Ford had given a limited warranty.263 This meant that
Mr. Ocana was required to prove breach of Ford's limited warranty. 264 This
in turn required proof "that Ford refused or failed to adequately repair a cov-
",265 cn 266ered item. Mr. Ocana only proved the car was taken in four times.
Although the MMWA authorizes a federal cause of action for breach of im-
plied warranty, such a claim must be based on state law principles.267 In
Florida, privity of contract is required to support a claim of implied warranty,
and Mr. Ocana did not have privity of contract with Ford.26s He failed to
prove that Dealership was acting as Ford's agent in the lease transaction,
which was necessary to establish privity.269 As to Mr. Ocana's claim against
Dealership, the Third District Court of Appeal first noted that in an "as is"
contract, "'causation is generally negated as a matter of law.' 27" The con-
sumer assumes the risk.27' Dealership also clearly and conspicuously dis-
claimed any and all warranties and representations. 272 The court acknowl-
edged that Mr. Ocana relied on Gates v. Chrysler Corp. ,273 where the Fourth
District applied the Magnuson-Moss refund/replacement consumer option to
259. Id. at 323.
260. Id.; see Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 2303(a)(1), 2304(a) (2006).
261. Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 323 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4)).
262. See id. at 325.
263. Id. at 323.
264. Id. at 324.
265. Id.
266. Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 324.
267. See id. at 323-24.
268. Id. at 325-26.
269. Id. at 326.
270. Id. at 327 (quoting Owens v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 541 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871
(N.D. Tex. 2008)).
271. Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 327.
272. Id.
273. 397 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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limited warranties.274 The Third District described Gates as an "outlier," but
did not certify conflict with it to the Supreme Court of Florida.275
VI. CONTRACTS
A. Contract Reformation
The litigation in Goodall v. Whispering Woods Center LLC276 arose out
of a real estate purchase agreement that followed a deposit agreement.277
Buyer alleged that the deposit agreement required Seller, who was also the
developer, to raise the ceiling height of the purchased suites to twelve feet,
and that the purchase price as stated in the deposit agreement included the
price for the change in the height of the ceilings. 8 Buyer also alleged that
Seller promised that the purchase agreement would be drafted with terms
identical to those in the deposit agreement. 279 However, the purchase agree-
ment provided for a ceiling height of ten feet, not twelve feet.280 The pur-
chase agreement also contained a boilerplate clause, in capital letters, with
language to the effect that Buyer had read each and every provision, that the
purchase agreement constituted the entire agreement, and prior written or
oral agreements, representations, or statements not reflected or included in
the purchase agreement were without effect. 28' Seller refused to build out the
ceilings to twelve feet, and Buyer sued Seller.282 Buyer sought reformation
of the contract, alleged that Seller breached the reformed contract, sought
rescission, and also claimed unjust enrichment.283 The trial court found that
Buyer had not stated any cause of action and dismissed Buyer's complaint
with prejudice.284 Buyer appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the rescission and unjust enrichment
claims, but reversed the dismissal of the reformation and breach of the re-
274. Ocana, 992 So. 2d at 324.
275. Id. at 325.
276. 990 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
277. Id. at 697.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 697-98.
280. Id. at 698.
281. Goodall, 990 So. 2d at 698.
282. Id. at 697.
283. Id. at 698-99.
284. Id. at 699.
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formed contract claims.2 85 The appellate court reviewed the rules regarding
reformation.286
First addressed was the rule allowing the equitable remedy of reforma-
tion of a written instrument that does not accurately express the parties' in-
tent because of a mutual mistake.287 In such a case, the defective agreement
or instrument "is not altered;" it is just reformed so that it reflects the parties'
actual intent.28
8
Second, a mutual mistake may be the result of "scrivener's error or in-
advertence" so that what the parties agreed to is not what gets expressed in
the agreement when reduced to writing. 289 Third, reformation is also availa-
ble in the case of a mistake by only one of the parties where the other party
has engaged in inequitable conduct.290 The appellate court held that Buyer's
allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.2 9' Buyer had
sufficiently pled a claim for reformation on the ground of mutual mistake.292
Buyer had also sufficiently pled inequitable conduct on the part of Seller.293
Seller's argument that the boilerplate "merger and integration clause" in the
purchase agreement prevented Buyer from seeking reformation-an equita-
ble remedy-was rejected by the court.9 Also of no help to Seller was its
argument that the complaint should be dismissed because Buyer "was negli-
gent in failing to read the Agreement carefully" before signing it.295 Accord-
ing to the appellate court, signing an agreement "without reading it with
care" normally results in the signer being bound.296 However, the appellate
court found that the exception under section 157, comment b, of the Res-
tatement (Second) of Contracts was applicable since the parties had agreed
on the terms that were supposed to be included in the purchase agreement.
297
Thus, mere "negligence in failing to read the writing does not" prevent an
action for reformation of the agreement. 298 Gross negligence would need to

















See Goodall, 990 So. 2d at 699.
Id. (quoting Tobin v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 948 So. 2d 692, 696 (Fla. 2006) (per cu-
Id.
Id. (citing Providence Square Ass'n v. Biancardi, 507 So. 2d 1366, 1372 (Fla. 1987)).
Id. (citing Providence Square Ass'n, 507 So. 2d at 1372 n.3).





Goodall, 990 So. 2d at 700.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 cmt. b (1981)).
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 cmt. b).
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Landlord, as seller, and Tenant, as buyer, signed an instrument styled
"Affidavit." 3°° The instrument provided for sale and purchase of commercial
real estate described in the affidavit by street address and property folio
number.30 ' The purchase price was stated as $200,000 with an initial
$59,000 deposit and an additional $25,000 to be paid prior to closing. °2
Closing was not to be after December 31, 2004.303 Tenant alleged that the
parties verbally agreed to postpone the closing for almost a year and that
Landlord ultimately refused to proceed to closing.3° Tenant sued Landlord
seeking specific performance and damages for breach of contract.305 The
trial court dismissed Tenant's complaint, and Tenant appealed. 306 The Third
District Court of Appeal, relying on Rundel v. Gordon,30 7 agreed with the
trial court that the affidavit was not sufficiently definite to warrant specific
performance. 38 However, the trial court should not have dismissed the dam-
ages claim. 3°9 Landlord's argument that if the terms of the affidavit were not
specific enough to justify specific performance, then they were not specific
enough to warrant a damage award was rejected.3'0 The Third District Court
held that less certainty as to the terms of a contract is required in a suit for
damages than is required to obtain specific performance.3 1
299. Id. at 701 (citing Cont'l Cas. Co. v. City of Ocala, 149 So. 381,386 (Fla. 1933)).





305. Alzate, 992 So. 2d at 425. The trial court, in dismissing the second amended com-
plaint, granted leave to Tenant to again amend so as to seek a refund of the deposit. Id. at
425-26.
306. Id.
307. 11I So. 386 (Fla. 1927).
308. Alzate, 992 So. 2d at 426 (citing Fox v. Sails at Laguna Club Dev. Corp., 403 So. 2d
456, 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Socarras v. Claughton Hotels, Inc., 374 So. 2d 1057,
1060 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).
309. See id.
310. Id.
311. Id. The trial court also had dismissed plaintiff's fraud claim, and the appellate court
concurred. Alzate, 992 So. 2d at 427.
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C. Statute of Frauds
In Brace v. Comfort,312 Mr. and Mrs. Brace (Plaintiffs) sued Ms. Com-
fort (Comfort), as well as Steven King (King) and Stirling V. Realty, a Flori-
da Limited Partnership owned by King (King/Stirling), and Roy D. Boone
(Boone) (collectively referred to as the Other Defendants), in connection
with a business deal that involved real estate.313 There were some compli-
cated transactions between and among the parties, but the result was that
King/Sterling ultimately transferred the subject real property to Boone, who
was Comfort's father.3 14 Plaintiffs alleged that the property should have been
transferred to them by virtue of their written agreement with Comfort, which
agreement they further alleged had been ratified by King/Stirling.315 Plain-
tiffs filed a complaint against Comfort and the Other Defendants. 3 6 There
were counts that sought declaratory relief and specific performance.3 7 Other
counts alleged civil conspiracy, tortious interference with a contract, unjust
enrichment, and promissory estoppel.1 8 Citing Florida's statute of frauds,
section 725.01 of the Florida Statutes, the trial court dismissed most of the
counts against the Other Defendants, and Plaintiffs appealed.1 9 With respect
to the claim for declaratory relief, the Second District Court of Appeal re-
versed, ruling that the statute of frauds was not a bar.320 That claim was ac-
tually based on two written agreements and sought a declaration of Plaintiffs'
and Boone's respective rights under those agreements. 321 Therefore, because
the request for a declaratory judgment was based on written agreements, the
trial court should not have dismissed that count.322 The appellate court also
held that the statute of frauds was not a bar to the unjust enrichment and
promissory estoppel claims, and the appellate court reversed the trial court
with respect to these claims.32 3 However, with respect to the specific per-
formance claim, since there was no contract between Plaintiffs and Boone,
the party against whom Plaintiffs sought specific performance, the trial court
312. 2 So. 3d 1007 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
313. Id. at 1008-09.
314. See id. at 1009.
315. See id. at 1009, 1011-12.
316. Id. at 1009-10.
317. Brace, 2 So. 3d at 1009-12.
318. Id. at 1010.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1011.
321. Id. at 1010.
322. Brace, 2 So. 3d at 1011.
323. Id. at 1011, 1013.
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was affirmed on its dismissal of that claim.324 On the other hand, the claims
for civil conspiracy and for tortious interference with contract were not
barred by the statute of frauds.325 These claims were improperly dismissed
by the trial court because the claims were based on improper actions rather
than the contracts themselves.326
D. Third Party Beneficiary Contract and the Undertaker Doctrine
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Securitylink from Ameritech, Inc.,327 Secu-
ritylink from Ameritech, Inc. (Alarm Company) installed an alarm system
for Original Worldwide, Ltd. (Owner) pursuant to their agreement, which
also provided that Alarm Company was to monitor the alarm in Owner's
warehouse. 328 Alarm Company then hired Vanguard Security, Inc. (Security
Company) to inspect and investigate alarm signals from the warehouse when
notified by Alarm Company that the alarm had sounded.329 On the occasion
in question, the warehouse alarm sounded four times and Security Company
sent a guard to investigate the first three times, finding nothing suspicious.
3 °
When the alarm sounded for the fourth time, Alarm Company asked Owner
to have someone go to the warehouse, and it was only then, on the fourth
trip, that a theft was discovered. 33' Travelers Insurance Company (Insurer)
paid Owner's claim and then, as subrogee, sued Alarm Company and Securi-
ty Company.332 Insurer alleged that Alarm Company and Security Company
(referred to collectively as Companies) were negligent, and Insurer included
a claim for gross negligence.333 There were also allegations of breach of
contract against both Companies.334 The trial court determined, as a matter
of law, that there was no duty owed by Security Company to Owner, and all
of Insurer's claims against Security Company were dismissed.335 Insurer
appealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed.336 In addition to
324. Id. at 1012. The appellate court's affirmance on this claim was based on different
reasoning than that of the trial court. Id.
325. ld. at 1011.
326. Brace, 2 So. 3d at 1011.
327. 995 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
328. Id. at 1176.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. There was a ladder that descended from a skylight that was broken, and merchan-





336. Travelers Ins. Co., 995 So. 2d at 1176.
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relying on "well-settled" Florida law that a non-contracting, but intended
beneficiary, may sue for breach of contract, the Third District also relied on
Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson,337 where the Supreme Court of
Florida adopted the "undertaker doctrine" of section 324A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.338 Under the doctrine, liability may be found for
physical harm that results to a third party if the actor undertakes to provide
services, even without compensation, which the actor should know are ne-
cessary to protect the third party, including the possessions of the third party,
and the actor does not act with reasonable care.339 In order for the doctrine to
apply, the lack of reasonable care must have "increase[d] the risk of harm,"
the actor must have undertaken the performance of a duty that another owes
to the third party, and the harm is the result of the reliance by the other party
or the third party on the actor's undertaking.3" The appellate court found
that Insurer's allegations were sufficient under this doctrine. 34'
E. Forum Selection Provision
AT&T Corp. sued Travel Express Investment, Inc. (Travel Express) in
Seminole County, Florida.342 Travel Express sought dismissal of the breach
of contract action, alleging improper venue.343 Travel Express relied on a
clause in the parties' contract which provided that "[t]he parties consent to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts located in New York City, USA.'344
The trial court denied Travel Express's motion to dismiss, and Travel Ex-
337. 873 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2003).
338. Travelers Ins. Co., 995 So. 2d at 1177; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A
(1965).
339. Travelers Ins. Co., 995 So. 2d at 1177 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
324A).
340. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A).
341. Id. at 1177-78. Security Company also argued that the dismissal of the complaint
was proper because it was found that that there had been full performance of its contractual
obligation, that is, that Alarm Company had exercised reasonable care. Id. at 1178. The ap-
pellate court said this determination should not have been made on a motion to dismiss. Id.
342. Travel Express Inv., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 14 So. 3d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2009).
343. Id.
344. Id. The appellate court pointed out that the contract was "prepared by AT&T for its
customer." Id. But this was not a case of the court finding an ambiguity and resolving it
against the party that drafted the contract. The court said that "[t]his exclusivity provision
clearly makes this clause unambiguous and mandatory." Travel Express Inv., Inc., 14 So. 3d.
at 1227 (relying on Weisser v. PNC Bank, N.A., 967 So. 2d 327, 331 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2007)); see also TECO Barge Line, Inc. v. Hagan, 15 So. 3d 863, 864 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2009). Thus, the exclusive forum was New York. Travel Express Inv., Inc., 14 So. 3d at
1227.
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press appealed. 45 The Fifth District noted that forum selection clauses "fall
into two categories: mandatory and permissive. 346 Although the distinction
to be made is generally between a clause by which the parties "consent" to,
but do not require a particular jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a clause
where filing of a suit in a specified forum is "required," on the other hand,
the issue in this case was different. 347 The question presented was the effect
of the word "exclusive" in the applicable provision of the parties' contract.
34 8
The Fifth District, relying on its decision in Sonus-USA, Inc. v. Thomas W.
Lyons, Inc., 9 and agreeing with the Third District in Weisser v. PNC Bank,
N.A.,350 which involved "[a]n almost identical clause," concluded that the
provision was of the mandatory variety. 5 What made it mandatory was the
use of the word "exclusive. ' '352 Had the parties merely consented to the ju-
risdiction of the courts located in New York City, the clause would have
been permissive and venue in Seminole County would likely not have been
disturbed.3 53 Having found that the clause was "unambiguous and mandato-
ry," the appellate court ruled that the clause would only be set aside upon a
showing that it would be unfair, unreasonable, or unjust to enforce the provi-
sion.354 There having been no such showing, the decision of the trial court
was reversed. 5
F. Liability Disclaimers
The Roses purchased a fire alarm system from ADT Security Services,
Inc. (ADT).356 Shortly after the service agreement was signed by the Roses
and the alarms were installed, there was a fire in their house.3 57 The alarms
did not send a fire signal and the house was completely destroyed.358 State
Farm Insurance Company (State Farm), the Roses' homeowners insurer, paid
345. See Travel Express Inv., Inc., 14 So. 3d at 1225.
346. Id. at 1226.
347. See id.
348. Id. at 1226.
349. 966 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
350. 967 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
351. Travel Express Inv., Inc., 14 So. 3d at 1226-27.
352. Id. at 1227.
353. See id.
354. Id. at 1226-27 (quoting Aqua Sun Mgmt. v. Divi Time Ltd., 797 So. 2d 24, 24-25
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
355. Id. at 1227.
356. Rose v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 989 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(per curiam).
357. Id.
358. Id. The facts stated that the house was presumably struck by lightning. Id.
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the Roses' policy claim, and State Farm then sued ADT on various theo-
ries.9 The trial court granted ADT's motion for summary judgment, con-
cluding that none of the theories stated a cause of action, and the Roses and
State Farm appealed. 360 The first theory addressed by the First District was
the "fraud in the inducement" claim based on a representation of the sales-
man.36' It was undisputed that when the salesman from ADT met with the
Roses, he "represented that the Roses would never lose their house to a fire
and that the alarm and fire detection system would save the lives of the Ros-
es' dogs and family members in the event of a fire. 362 The written service
contract entered into between the Roses and ADT several weeks later, which
agreement required ADT to install the fire alarm system and "provide securi-
ty and fire detection services," had numerous liability and warranty limita-
tions and disclaimers.363 The district court acknowledged that the rule in
Florida is that summary judgment generally should not be granted with re-
spect to a fraud claim, but said that there are situations where summary
judgment on a fraud claim is proper.3 4 The court concluded that summary
judgment was proper in this case because there could not have been justifia-
ble reliance by the Roses on what the salesman said.365 According to the
First District, there could be no justifiable reliance because the agreement
provided in capitalized print that:
NO ALARM SYSTEM CAN GUARANTEE PREVENTION OF
LOSS, THAT HUMAN ERROR ON THE PART OF ADT OR
THE MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE,
AND THAT SIGNALS MAY NOT BE RECEIVED IF THE
TRANSMISSION MODE IS CUT, INTERFERED WITH, OR
OTHERWISE DAMAGED.... CUSTOMER AGREES THAT
ANY REPRESENTATION, PROMISE, CONDITION, INDUCE-
MENT OR WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, NOT
359. Id. State Farm, proceeding under the policy's subrogation provision, alleged "breach
of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of fitness, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, fraud in the inducement and deceptive trade practices under section 501.211,
Florida Statutes" by ADT. Rose, 989 So. 2d at 1246. Summary judgment was conceded by
the Roses and State Farm to be warranted with respect to the deceptive trade practices claim.
Id. at 1246 n.I.
360. Id. at 1246.
361. Id. at 1247.
362. Id. at 1246.
363. Rose, 989 So. 2d at 1246.
364. Id. at 1247.
365. Id. at 1248.
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INCLUDED IN WRITING IN THIS AGREEMENT SHALL
NOT BE BINDING UPON ANY PARTY.... 366
The agreement also contained language in boldface capital letters that
the Roses had read and understood the agreement.367
With respect to product liability based on theories of strict liability and
warranty, the First District ruled that the case "sounded in contract" because
of the contract between ADT and the Roses.368 Therefore, this was a contract
claim, not a tort claim, and the Florida Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
applied.369 It was permissible under the UCC for ADT to disclaim warranties
including "'implied warranties of merchantability and fitness'"'-provided
the written disclaimer was conspicuous, expressly referred to merchantability
and the Roses understood what was being done.370 Here, the warranty dis-
claimers met those requirements.37'
In the agreement, ADT also prominently disclaimed incidental and con-
sequential damages based on negligence.372 The First District upheld the
negligence disclaimer, observing that while negligence disclaimers are not
favored in the law, they will be upheld if they are "'so clear and understand-
able that an ordinary and knowledgeable party will know what he is contract-
ing away.' ' 373 The First District decided that the negligence liability dis-
claimers were sufficiently "clear and unequivocal. 374 Also, there was no
showing that ADT violated a statute under which it had "a positive statutory
duty to protect the well-being of' another.375
Waivers of liability for negligence are also covered in the Torts section
of this survey.376 Of particular importance is the Supreme Court of Florida's
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1247-48.
368. Rose, 989 So. 2d at 1248.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1248-49.
371. Id. at 1248.
372. Id. at 1249.
373. Rose, 989 So. 2d at 1249 (quoting Southworth & McGill, P.A. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 580 So. 2d 628, 634 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
374. Id.
375. Id. Contra Loewe v. Seagate Homes, Inc., 987 So. 2d 758, 761 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that Florida law places a duty on building contractors to remain liable
"for personal injury caused by their negligent acts"). See Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra
note 120, at 127.
376. See infra Part XV.
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decision regarding the validity of pre-injury waivers of liability by parents of
minors in the context of commercial activities.
377
G. Exclusive Real Estate Listing
The owner of real estate (Owner) signed a real estate listing agreement
with a real estate broker (Listing Agent) that stated in part:
Exclusive Brokerage Listing. The exclusive agent for all Units...
shall be . ..("Listing Agent") for a term of ten (10) years ....
Listing Agent shall be the sole listing broker for all Units within
the Condominium, and be entitled to payment of a commission on
all sales and leases of Units within the Condominium.
378
Owner entered into a lease with respect to a building that was part of the
condominium project but no broker was used. 379 Listing Agent sued for a
commission.380  Both parties relied on definitions in Florida Real Estate
Principles, Practices & Law by Linda L. Crawford.38' In this treatise, a dis-
tinction is made between an "exclusive-agency listing" and an "exclusive-
right-of-sale listing. '382 In the former, an owner may sell the subject proper-
ty without owing a commission, provided the buyer did not learn about the
property from the broker or someone acting on behalf of the broker.383 In the
latter, it does not matter who sells the property during the term of the list-
ing.384 The broker is entitled to a commission, even if the owner is the sel-
ler.38' Thus, applying the distinction between the "exclusive right to sell"
where the broker is entitled to a commission regardless of whether a broker
is involved in the sale, and an "exclusive agency" where the owner still has
the right to sell without having to pay a commission, the court determined
that the listing agreement in this case was of the exclusive-agency type.
386
377. See Kirton v. Fields (Fields 11), 997 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 2008); see also infra notes
820-47 and accompanying text.
378. Fischer-Gaeta-Cromwell, Inc. v. Oakwood St. Enters., LLC, 997 So. 2d 1271, 1272
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
379. Id. at 1271-72.
380. Id. at 1271.
381. Id. at 1272.
382. Id.
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Thus, under the facts presented, Listing Agent was not entitled to a commis-
387sion.
VII. DEEDS AND TAX SALES, MORTGAGES, LIS PENDENS, AND PARTITION
A. Lis Pendens Damages
This appeal arose out of a lis pendens, notice of which was filed by
Buyer in connection with its suit against Sellers for specific performance of a
contract for sale of a commercial building.388 The trial judge required that
Buyer post a lis pendens bond.389 Sellers ultimately prevailed on the merits
in the specific performance action.39 ° Sellers then sought damages against
the bond, including damages for lost rent and other expenses.39 ' The trial
court refused to award damages to Sellers because the value of the property
had increased substantially during the period that the lis pendens was in ef-
fect. 392 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. 393 Damages would be
appropriate only if the property had declined in value by the time the lis pen-
dens was lifted.394 With respect to the lost rent claim, the appellate court
noted that when the lis pendens bond was ordered to be posted, the court
ruled, without objection by Sellers, that Sellers would not be entitled to dam-
ages for lost rent given the lamentable condition of the building on the prop-
erty-it was un-rentable. 395 Thus, it was not necessary to address what the
measure of damages might have been for lost rent.396 The appellate court
found no other damages.397
387. Id.
388. Levin v. Lang, 994 So. 2d 445, 445-46 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied,
13 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 2009) (unpublished table decision).
389. Id. at 446. The title search showed a substantial lien on the property which sellers did
not pay. Id. at 445. Since the lis pendens was not based on a recorded instrument, the trial
court had the discretion under section 48.23(3) of the Florida Statutes to require a lis pendens
bond. See FLA. STAT. § 48.23(3) (2009); Levin, 994 So. 2d. at 446.
390. Levin, 994 So 2d. at 447. The trial court ruled in favor of Buyer in the underlying
action, and Sellers appealed. Id. at 445-46. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court and directed that judgment be entered for Sellers. Id. at 447.
391. Id. at 446.
392. Id.
393. Levin, 994 So. 2d at 447.
394. See id. at 446-47.
395. Id. at 446.
396. See id.
397. Levin, 994 So. 2d at 447.
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B. Wrongful Discharge of Lis Pendens Bond
The Haven Center (Seller) and Mr. Meruelo (Buyer) entered into an
agreement for the sale to Buyer of twenty-one acres of the Seller's real estate
for $10,500,000.398 Disputes arose between the parties, and Buyer sued Sel-
ler in 2005, recording a lis pendens when he filed the complaint. 399 The trial
court required that Buyer post a lis pendens bond in the amount of
$1,000,000 to cover any damages that might result from a wrongful filing of
the lis pendens. ° In 2008, Buyer asked the trial court for permission to "re-
linquish" the lis pendens, and if so permitted, that the lis pendens bond be
discharged.40 1 Buyer's motion was heard the day after notice of it was giv-
en.402 No evidence was considered by the trial court, although the court did
consider memoranda and legal argument by the parties . The trial court
granted Buyer's motion and directed the clerk of the circuit court to release
the bond.4"4 Seller successfully petitioned the Third District Court of Appeal
for a writ of certiorari to quash the trial court's order.405 The lis pendens was
a cloud on Seller's title for almost three years. 4°6 The lis pendens bond not
only protects the public, it also serves to protect the owner of property from
damages that result from the filing and recording of a lis pendens by a party
who then fails to prevail in the underlying action.4 °7 Voluntarily withdraw-
ing the lis pendens does not automatically result in the discharge of the bond,
especially when the conditions stated in the bond for its discharge have not
been met.4 8 Seller was entitled to a ruling by the court as to whether the
recording of the lis pendens was proper, that is, that Buyer had prevailed
regarding his alleged interests in the property. 409 If Buyer had not prevailed,
then Seller was entitled to an opportunity to prove its damages that may be
recovered under the bond.4'0 The bond did not contain any provision that
398. Haven Ctr., Inc. v. Meruelo, 995 So. 2d 1166, 1166 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per
curiam).
399. Id. at 1166-67.
400. Id. at 1167. Seller sought discharge of the lis pendens, or alternatively, that a bond be
required in the amount of $1,000,000. Id.
401. Id.
402. Haven Ctr., Inc., 995 So. 2d at 1167.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1166.
406. Id. at 1167.
407. See Haven Cr., Inc., 995 So. 2d at 1167.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 1167-68.
410. Id. at 1168. The Third District Court, in dicta, briefly discussed what is ordinarily
necessary to prove such damages. Id. The court said that "appraisal testimony or other evi-
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made it conditional on the continued term of the lis pendens. 41" Furthermore,
there is nothing in the applicable statute, section 48.23 of the Florida Sta-
tutes, or in the case law, that provides any such condition.412
C. Unrecorded Mortgage Assignment
In JP Morgan Chase v. New Millennial, L. C.,4 13 Mr. Jahren purchased
real estate in Pinellas County and financed the transaction with money from
two mortgage loans made to him by AmSouth.4 14 The AmSouth mortgages
were recorded in Pinellas County.4"5 In 2004, AmSouth assigned the mort-
gages to JP Morgan Chase (JP Morgan). 416 JP Morgan did not record the
assignment. 47 In 2006, Mr. Jahren and New Millennial entered into a sale
and purchase agreement for the Pinellas County real estate, with Branch
Banking & Trust Company financing New Millennial's purchase.41 8 The title
search performed on behalf of New Millennial disclosed the two recorded
AmSouth mortgages but no satisfactions of them.419 Chicago Title excepted
the two mortgages from coverage, pending receipt of the cancelled mortgage
notes and satisfactions.420 New Millennial's closing agent telephoned Am-
South and was told by an unidentified employee that the two mortgages had
been paid off and written confirmation would follow. 42' The "written con-
firmation" was a faxed form from AmSouth titled "Installment Loan Ac-
count Profile" which showed a loan "close date" of June 30, 2004 and a zero
balance.422 The Installment Loan Profile also stated "PD OFF., 423 The sale
dence" of a decline in market value between the time of the recording of the lis pendens and
the lifting of the lis pendens is required. Haven Ctr., Inc., 995 So. 2d at 1167 (citing Haisfield
v. ACP Fla. Holdings, Inc., 629 So. 2d 963, 965-66 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)). The Third
District, relying on Haisfield, also referred to "lost opportunities for a sale above a later mar-
ket value." id. This was not mentioned as a ground for recovering damages against a lis
pendens bond in Levin, where the Third District Court of Appeal also relied on Haisfield. See
supra text accompanying note 388.
411. Haven Ctr., Inc., 995 So. 2d at 1167.
412. Id. Since this real property litigation was not based on a "duly recorded instrument,"
nor was "a statutory mechanics lien" involved, the lis pendens here was governed by the law
governing injunctions. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 48.23(3) (2005)).
413. 6 So. 3d 681 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).




418. JP Morgan Chase, 6 So. 3d at 683.
419. Id.
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was completed, and JP Morgan, as the assignee of the mortgages, began fo-
reclosure proceedings. 424 New Millennial and Branch Banking & Trust ar-
gued that the mortgages held by JP Morgan were unenforceable because JP
Morgan had failed to record the assignments to them pursuant to section
701.02 of the Florida Statutes. 425 The trial court agreed and granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of New Millennial and Branch Banking & Trust. 426
The trial court also found that New Millennial was a subsequent purchaser
for value without notice of the assignments of the mortgages to JP Morgan,
and that Branch Banking & Trust was a subsequent creditor for value with-
out notice of the assignments of the mortgages.427 The Second District Court
of Appeal reversed.428 Noting that this was an issue of first impression, the
Second District held that section 701.02 of the Florida Statutes was misap-
plied by the trial court.429 This section does not operate to invalidate a mort-
gage. 430 Rather, it establishes the rights of competing mortgage assignees
and purchasers.431 In the example given by the court, "if the original mortga-
gee assign[ed] the mortgage to Entity A and Entity A fails to record that as-
signment, Entity A cannot claim priority over a latter assignee of the same
mortgage (Entity B). 432 The Second District determined that New Millenni-
al and Branch Banking & Trust could not be without notice of the mortgages
because the mortgages were a matter of public record.433 The Second District
also noted that the closing agent could have made written demand on Am-
South for a mortgage estoppel letter pursuant to section 701.04 of the Florida
Statutes.434 This would have uncovered the fact that the mortgages were out-
standing.435 Mr. Jahren did not claim otherwise.436 The Installment Loan
Profile sent in response to the closing agent's oral inquiry is not an estoppel
letter.437 In addition, New Millennial could not be a purchaser in good faith
because someone claiming under the mortgagor is not intended to be covered




427. Id. at 682-83.
428. JP Morgan Chase, 6 So. 3d at 688.
429. Id. at 684-85.
430. See id. at 685.
431. Id. (citing Kapila v. At. Mortgage & Inv. Corp. (In re Halabi), 184 F.3d 1335, 1338
(I 1th Cir. 1999)).
432. Id.
433. JP Morgan Chase, 6 So. 3d at 686.
434. Id. at 687.
435. See id.
436. See id.
437. Id. at 687-88.
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by section 701.02.438 The Second District Court of Appeal said that "[w]e




A. Computation of Business Damages
The Supreme Court of Florida, in System Components Corp. v. Florida
Department of Transportation,44° affirmed the decision of the Fifth District
Court of Appeal, 44 thereby resolving a conflict between the Fifth District
Court of Appeal in this case and the Fourth District Court of Appeal in De-
partment of Transportation v. Tire Centers, LLC.442 In System Components
Corp., the Florida Department of Transportation took by eminent domain, a
part of the property owned by System Components Corporation (Corpora-
tion) that ran right through the middle of the property in order to widen a
road." 3 Corporation relocated and continued its business."4  Corporation
was entitled to business damages resulting from the taking, and the jury, us-
ing an income valuation approach, determined gross business damages in the
amount of $2,394,964.445  The jury calculated net business damages at
$1,347,911 which was the amount of the award to Corporation. 446 In reach-
ing the $1,347,91 1 figure, the jury took into consideration the fact that Cor-
poration continued its business.44  Corporation appealed the verdict, relying
on the Department of Transportation v. Tire Centers, LLC decision.448 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal there determined that business damages
called for by section 73.071(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes must be determined
without reduction or mitigation by reason of the property owner's relocation
438. JP Morgan Chase, 6 So. 3d at 685-86 (citing Kapila v. Atil. Mortgage & Inv. Corp.
(In re Halabi), 184 F.3d 1335, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999)).
439. Id. at 685.
440. 14 So. 3d 967 (Fla. 2009).
441. Id. at 985; Sys. Components Corp. v. Dep't of Transp. (Sys. Components Corp. I),
985 So. 2d 687, 693 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g granted, 990 So. 2d 1060 (Fla.
2008).
442. 895 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); see Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra
note 120, at 109-10.
443. Sys. Components Corp. II, 14 So. 3d at 971.
444. Id. at 972-73.
445. Id. at 974.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Sys. Components Corp. 1H, 14 So. 3d at 974.
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and continuation of the business being valued. 449 That is, business damages
would be determined as though the business ceased to exist on the date of the
eminent domain taking.450 The Fifth District Court of Appeal disagreed with
the Fourth District, and certified conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida.45'
The Supreme Court provided a brief history of eminent domain proceedings
in Florida pointedly noting that compensating a property owner for the taking
of real estate is constitutionally required, but that is not so with respect to
providing compensation to the owner for lost business profits.452 The Court
also noted that while severance damages reimburse the property owner for
the reduction in value that the eminent domain taking causes to any remain-
ing land of the property owner, business damages compensate the owner for
probable reductions in business value, business losses, and increased busi-
ness expenses caused by the taking.453 Lost profits and business opportuni-
ties are intangible assets, not real property.454 Business damage awards are
"a matter of legislative grace, 'A55 unless the government takes the business
itself in which case compensation is required.456 Business damage provi-
sions are to be narrowly construed and are available only if:
a partial taking occurs; the condemnor is a state or local "public
body;" the land is taken to construct ... a right-of-way; the taking
damages or destroys an established business, which has existed on
the parent tract for [five years]; the business owner owns the con-
demned and adjoining land .. . ; business was conducted on the
condemned land and the adjoining remainder; and the [property
owner] specifically pleads and proves [all of the foregoing ele-
ments] .457
The Court concluded that adopting the Fourth District's reasoning
would provide an undeserved windfall to the business owner who relocates
449. See id.
450. Id. at 975.
451. See id.
452. Id. at 975-76.
453. Sys. Components Corp. 11, 14 So. 3d at 976-77.
454. Id. at 976 (quoting Jamesson v. Downtown Dev. Auth. of Fort Lauderdale, 322 So.
2d 510, 511 (Fla. 1975)).
455. Id. (quoting Jamesson, 322 So. 2d at 511).
456. Id.
457. Id. at 978 (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b)(2009)). The five year requirement ap-
plies for takings on or after January 1, 2005. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b). For takings before
January 1, 2005, the required period was four years. Id.
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and continues in business.458 However, the Court refused to impose an af-
firmative duty on a property owner to reduce damages by relocating and con-
tinuing business.45 9 That, it said, was the province of the legislature.4 °
B. Public Purpose and Reasonable Necessity
The City of Lakeland (the City), located in Polk County (the County),
took property by eminent domain for a right-of-way that would allow for a
road extension. 46' The property that was subject to the trial court's orders of
taking was County-not City-property, and the property was not "conti-
guous to the City's boundaries. 462 The road project, however, was only a
short distance east of an area undergoing development that was within the
City's boundaries.4 63 The property owners appealed, and the Second District
Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that the eminent domain power of the State
of Florida was delegated to the City not only in the City's charter, but also by
section 166.411(3) of the Florida Statutes.464 The Second District concluded
that the delegation was broad enough to allow a taking outside the City
boundary.465 The appellate court noted that in Prosser v. Polk County,466
where Hillsborough County did not object, Polk County was allowed to take
land in adjacent Hillsborough County.467 Similarly, here, there was no objec-
tion by the County to the City's taking of County land.468 The appellate court
observed that the City also relied on a 2003 interlocal agreement with the
County that recognized the need for the road project, and the County had
agreed to finance part of the project.469 In light of this agreement, the appel-
late court found that the City had met its burden of demonstrating "a public
purpose and a reasonable necessity," and it was not necessary that the City
458. Sys. Components Corp. 11, 14 So. 3d at 981 (citing Sys. Components Corp. v. Dep't
of Transp. (Sys. Components Corp. 1), 985 So. 2d 687, 690 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008),
reh'g granted, 990 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 2008)).
459. Id. at 985.
460. Id.
461. Kirkland v. City of Lakeland, 3 So. 3d 398, 399 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 400.
465. Id.
466. 545 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
467. Kirkland, 3 So. 3d at 400 (citing Prosser, 545 So. 2d at 934).
468. Id.
469. Id. Part of the funding was provided by the Florida Department of Transportation,
with the City and the County agreeing to split the balance of the cost. Id.
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demonstrate "a public purpose that was exclusively or even primarily a mu-
nicipal purpose of the City" rather than both entities.470
C. Inverse Condemnation
In Drake v. Walton County,471 the property owners bought their Walton
County (the County) property in 1992.472 Before then, the upper part of the
property had been subjected to an overflow of water from Oyster Lake.473
The outflow was stabilized in 1988 with assistance from the State.4 74 There
was no overflow of water across this part of the property after the stabiliza-
tion, at least not until 1995.475 Thus, after the stabilization, this part of the
property could be developed, and it was during this period that the property
owners purchased the property.4 76 However, in 1995, following a hurricane,
the County diverted lake water across the property.477 Between 1996 and
1999, the County tried unsuccessfully to assist in directing the lake water
overflow away from the property.478 The overflow was stopped in 2004, but
in 2005, under emergency conditions, the County again diverted overflow
water across the upper section of the property.479 This was done "to protect a
neighbor's home and property. 480 The property owner brought an action
against the County for inverse condemnation. 48' The trial court found that
the County had merely restored the natural drainage pattern and was res-
ponding to emergency conditions pursuant to section 252.43(6) of the Flori-
da Statutes.482 The First District Court of Appeal reversed.48 3 In ruling for
the property owners, the First District found that the "critical undisputed
fact" was that four years before the 1992 purchase of the property by proper-
ty owners, overflow had been stabilized-with the help of the State of Flori-
470. Id.
471. 6 So. 3d 717 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).









481. Drake, 6 So. 3d at 719. There were claims for trespass and negligence as well. Id. at
719 n. I. The property owners appealed the trial court's ruling in favor of the County on these
claims, and the First District affirmed the trial court. Id. at 719, 722.
482. Id. at 719-20.
483. Id. at 722.
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da-and was no longer crossing the property.484 The overflow drainage onto
the property resulted from the County's actions in 1995 and 2005.485 The
hurricane and other emergencies did not flood the property.486 It was "the
County's action in response to the hurricane that caused the flooding" on the
property.487 The property owners "could reasonably rely on the drainage
pattern" set in 1988.488 When the pattern was changed by the County, there
was a taking.489 Even if the County acted in the face of an emergency pur-
suant to section 252.43(6) of the Florida Statutes, that does not prevent the
successful prosecution of an inverse condemnation proceeding.49° Judge
Barfield dissented.49' According to the dissent, the facts were distinguishable
from the cases cited by the majority, and the majority never explained how
the County's actions "somehow resulted in a 'taking' of the subject proper-
ty. '492 Judge Barfield said that "[t]o allow the plaintiff to recover" from the
County based on the facts presented "is, in my opinion, a travesty of justice
and a clear departure from well-settled law. 493
IX. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Non-Compete Agreements
In Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Interstate Chemical, Inc.,4 9 the em-
ployment contract between Robert Hutchens (Former Employee) and Fiber-
glass Coatings, Inc. (Former Employer) contained a non-compete clause.495
Former Employee, a salesperson for Former Employer, was prohibited by the
non-compete clause from working in Florida for a competitor of Former Em-
ployer during the one year following the end of his employment, which em-
ployment ended in March 2002.496 Within weeks after leaving the employ of
484. Drake, 6 So. 3d at 720.
485. See id. at719.
486. Id. at 720.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Drake, 6 So. 3d at 720 (citing Schick v. Fla. Dep't of Agric., 504 So. 2d 1318, 1320
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987)); see also Martin v. City of Monticello, 632 So. 2d 236, 237
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Leon County v. Smith, 397 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
490. Drake, 6 So. 3d at 721-22.
491. Id. at 722 (Barfield, J., dissenting).
492. id. at 725.
493. Id.
494. 16 So. 3d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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Former Employer, Former Employee went to work for a short time for Po-
lymeric, a fiberglass competitor.49 ' Then, in September 2002, Former Em-
ployee went to work as a salesperson for Interstate Chemical, Inc. (New Em-
ployer), another competitor of Former Employer.498 In January 2004, Former
Employer sued New Employer alleging that New Employer had "tortiously
interfered with the restrictive covenant. '499 Former Employer asserted two
theories for the interference: "a 'solicitation of customers' theory and an
'employment' theory." 5°° The trial court granted New Employer's motion
for summary judgment, agreeing with New Employer's argument that, as a
matter of law, New Employer could not be liable for inducing or causing
Former Employee's breach because Former Employee "was predisposed to
breach" the non-compete clause, as demonstrated by Former Employee's
previous employment for Polymeric.50 1 Former Employer appealed.50 2 The
Second District affirmed on the "employment" theory. 503 In order to estab-
lish liability for tortious interference on this theory, it is necessary to estab-
lish causation.'°4 In order to establish causation, Former Employer would
have had to show that New Employer "'intended to procure a breach of the
contract."'5 5 Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as quoted by
the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Martin Petroleum Corp. v. Amerada
Hess Corp.,506 the Second District concluded that the mere hiring of Former
Employee during the non-compete period did not amount to tortious interfe-
rence. 507 This would have been so even if the new employment agreement
was entered into with New Employer's knowledge that Former Employee
could not work for New Employer and, at the same time, honor his promise
not to compete with Former Employer. 50 8 However, it was not appropriate to
grant summary judgment in favor of New Employer on the "solicitation of
customers" theory of tortious interference. 5' There was "direct and circums-
tantial evidence" in the record that could result in findings of fact by which
497. Id.
498. Id. at 837-38.





504. Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 16 So. 3d at 838.
505. Id. (quoting Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Alday-Donalson Title Co. of Fla., 832 So. 2d 810,
814 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
506. 769 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
507. See Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 16 So. 3d at 838 (citing Martin Petroleum Corp., 769
So. 2d at 1107).
508. Id.
509. Id. at 839.
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New Employer could be held liable for tortious interference on the "solicita-
tion of customers" theory.51°
B. Enjoining Violation of Non-Compete Agreement: Ex Parte Order
Mr. Bookall (Former Employee), who had signed a covenant not to
compete with Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. (Former Employer), resigned and went to
work for a competitor (New Employer).51' After finding out about Former
Employee's new job, Former Employer advised Former Employee that it
considered his actions a breach of the agreement.5 2 Former Employee did
not terminate his new employment, despite written assurances from Former
Employee's lawyer that there would be compliance with the non-compete
agreement.5 3 Former Employer proceeded ex parte to obtain a temporary
injunction against Former Employee and New Employer.1 4 The Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order that granted the request
for an injunction.515 The trial court's order was insufficient because it did not
comply with all the requirements of rule 1.610(a) of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure."6 Before an ex parte temporary injunction may be issued,
the rule requires that the moving party allege specific facts showing irrepara-
ble and immediate injury absent the injunction, and that the movant's attor-
ney provide a written certification as to the reasons for not requiring no-
tice.5" 7 The trial court's order granting the injunction must state what the
injury would be, explain why it "may be irreparable," and list the reasons for
not having required notice.518 The trial court's order was defective in failing
to state those reasons." 9 The Fourth District Court of Appeal cited the
Second District Court of Appeal's decision in Lewis v. Sunbelt Rentals,
Inc. 520 and the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Soud v. Kendale,
Inc.521 when it stated that this omission would not have invalidated the order
510. Id.





515. Id. at 1118.
516. Bookall, 995 So. 2d at 1117.
517. Id. (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)(1)-(2)). If notice was attempted, the attorney must
certify what the efforts were to give notice. Id.
518. Id. (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)(2)).
519. Id.; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)(2).
520. 949 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
521. 788 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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had the complaint or motion explained why the order should be entered
without notice, as this would have substituted for the statement in the or-
der.522 Former Employer did not do so.
523
C. Employment Discrimination
Ms. Carsillo (Employee) was a firefighter/paramedic employed by
the City of Lake Worth (City).524 When Employee became pregnant, she
requested a light duty assignment. 25 Although she requested to be assigned
to the fire department, she was assigned elsewhere.526 She objected, but ul-
timately she proceeded with the light duty assignments in those other de-
partments.527 Employee sued the City under the Florida Civil Rights Act
(FCRA), sections 760.01-.10 of the Florida Statutes, claiming discrimina-
tion.528 Her allegation of discrimination was based on light duty assignments
at the fire department for other employees who had "physical restrictions."5 29
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City concluding
that the FCRA does not address "discrimination based on pregnancy," al-
though it covers discrimination based on sex.530 The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that discrimination based on pregnancy is sex dis-
crimination.531 The appellate court said that "if a Florida statute is patterned
after a federal law, the Florida statute will be given the same construction as
the federal courts give the federal act., 532 The court then noted that the pro-
vision at issue in the FCRA was "identical to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended., 533 The pertinent "identical" provision of the federal Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as quoted by the appellate court, does not, as Florida does not,
list pregnancy. 5 34 However, that provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
522. Bookall, 995 So. 2d at 1118; see Lewis, 949 So. 2d at 1115; Soud, 788 So. 2d at 1053.
523. Bookall, 995 So. 2d at 1118.





529. Carsillo, 995 So. 2d at 1119.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 1119,1121.
532. Id. at 1119 (citing State v. Jackson, 650 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 1995)).
533. Id.
534. Carsillo, 995 So. 2d at 1119. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 was said to
have been a legislative response to the five-four decision of the United States Supreme Court
in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429, U.S. 125, 125-126 (1976), where the Court held that
an employer did not violate the federal Civil Rights Act even though its disability insurance
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was amended by the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
to include employment discrimination based on pregnancy as prohibited dis-
crimination based on sex.535 The FCRA, however, has not been amended.536
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, after reviewing the federal pre-emption
analysis as applied by the First District Court of Appeal in O'Loughlin v.
Pinchback,537 as well as federal court decisions where relief has been
sought-and denied-under the FCRA, concluded that the appellate court
was required to consider the later amendment of the federal law. 53 8 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal "'had the right and the duty, in arriving at
the correct meaning of a prior statute, to consider subsequent legislation,"'




The next case, Attorney's Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. M. I. Industries
USA, Inc. (M.I. Industries USA, Inc. I1),540 is a case to watch, as the Supreme
Court of Florida has accepted jurisdiction to review the decision of the
Fourth District Court of Appeal in M.L Industries U.S.A, Inc. v. Attorneys'
Title Insurance Fund, Inc. (M.I. Industries USA, Inc. /).51' Attorneys' Title
Insurance Fund, Inc. (the Fund) obtained an ex parte order enjoining M.I.
Industries USA, Inc. (M.I. Industries) from transferring or withdrawing funds
from its bank accounts and from disposing of other assets.542 The underlying
allegations were that M.I. Industries was involved in illegal real estate
schemes, and that profits from these land schemes were moved through a
did not provide coverage for disability that arose from pregnancy. Id. at 125. (citing Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 685 (1983) (overruling Gil-
bert)).
535. Carsillo, 995 So. 2d at 1119.
536. Id. at 1120.
537. 579 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991). In O'Loughlin, a pregnancy discrimi-
nation suit seeking back pay, the First District Court of Appeal held that where Florida law
provides "less protection to its citizens than does the corresponding federal law," so that Flor-
ida law is "'an obstacle to the accomplishment"' of the objectives of the U.S. Congress, the
Florida statute will be deemed pre-empted by the federal statute to that extent. Id. at 792
(citing Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987)).
538. Carsillo, 995 So. 2d at 1120-21.
539. Id. (quoting Gay v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Fla., 59 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 1952)).
540. 10 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 2009) (unpublished table decision).
541. 6 So. 3d 627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009), cert. granted, 10 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 2009)
(unpublished table decision).
542. Id. at 628.
[Vol. 34
120
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss1/1
2009] SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW AFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS 119
member-agent's attorney trust fund to the M.I. accounts.543 The trial judge
denied the request of M.I. Industries for dissolution of the injunction, al-
though some assets were released from the injunction. 44 M.I. Industries
appealed and the Fund cross-appealed as to the release of those assets and an
increase of the injunction bond amount.545 The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal held that the general rule is that, in an action for damages, it is improper
to issue an injunction freezing a bank account since damages will suffice,
even if the money in the account is lost.546 The appellate court noted that the
fact that money damages may be uncollectible does not change the result.
547
However, the appellate court acknowledged that there is an exception when
the injunction serves "to protect the res of a trust" while litigation is pend-
548 hing. Thus, had the alleged profits from the scheme "remained specifically
identifiable in the member-agent's attorney's trust account, then the injunc-
tion may have been proper. 5 49 The Fourth District Court of Appeal said that
because "the Fund expressly sought damages in its complaint ... for unjust
enrichment," money damages would be sufficient to compensate the Fund.55 °
The Fourth District concluded that it was "improper to enter an injunction
preventing a party from using or disposing of its assets prior to the conclu-
sion of a legal action. 551
While the appellate court did not, in its original opinion, specifically
state that the Fund's unjust enrichment claim was not an equitable action, it
did appear to conclude that the Fund's action was a legal action for which
there was an adequate remedy at law.552 On the Fund's motion for rehearing,
which the Fourth District Court denied, the Fund asserted that the Fourth
District Court of Appeal had previously recognized the claim of unjust
enrichment "in causes of action based in law and equity. ' 53 The Fourth Dis-




546. M.I. Indus. USA, Inc. I, 6 So. 3d at 628-29 (citing Hiles v. Auto Bahn Fed'n, Inc.,
498 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).





551. M.L Indus. USA, Inc. 1, 6 So. 3d at 629 (emphasis added) (citing Bricefio v. Bryden
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action for unjust enrichment is an action at law., 554 The court, however, rec-
ognized that this position, including "the current definition of 'no adequate
remedy at law,' can result in an injustice in a case such as this one, ' 555 citing
the concurring opinion in the decision of another panel of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Weinstein v. Aisenberg.5 6
The court then went on to certify the following question to the Supreme
Court of Florida as one of great public importance,
INCIDENT TO AN ACTION AT LAW, MAY A TRIAL COURT
ISSUE AN INJUNCTION TO FREEZE ASSETS OF A
DEFENDANT, WHERE THE PLAINTIFF HAS DEMON-
STRATED: (1) [THAT] DEFENDANT WILL TRANSFER, DIS-
SIPATE, OR HIDE HIS/HER ASSETS SO AS TO RENDER A
TRIAL JUDGMENT UNENFORCEABLE; (2) A CLEAR
LEGAL RIGHT TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED; (3) A
SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE ME-
RITS; AND (4) A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION WILL SERVE
THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
557
Although not expressly asked to do so, perhaps the Court will take this
opportunity to clarify the nature of an action alleging unjust enrichment5 8 as
there appears to be some difference of opinion 9.5 " For example, in Brace v.
Comfort, discussed earlier in this article,560 the Second District Court of Ap-
peal characterized a claim of unjust enrichment as an equitable claim. 561
554. Id. (citing Commerce P'ship 8098 Ltd. P'ship v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 So. 2d
383, 386-87 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
555. Id. (citing Weinstein v. Aisenberg, 758 So. 2d 705, 711-12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000) (Gross, J., concurring)).
556. 758 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam).
557. M.L Indus. USA, Inc., 6 So. 3d at 629.
558. See, for example, Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp where the Court was asked to deter-
mine whether Florida recognized the tort of false light invasion of privacy. 997 So. 2d 1098,
1100 (Fla. 2008). After answering no to the certified question, the Court went on to address
the defamation rule under section 559 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id.; see also
Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 120, at 129-30.
559. See Brace v. Comfort, 2 So. 3d 1007, 1011 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
560. See supra text accompanying notes 312-26.
561. Brace, 2 So. 3dat 1011.
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XI. JURISDICTION, VENUE, FORUM NON CONVENIENS, AND STANDING
A. Personal Jurisdiction: Conferred by Contract
In Jetbroadband WV, LLC v. MasTec North America, Inc. ,562 the Third
District Court of Appeal was called upon to determine, as "an issue of first
impression," if the parties' consent to a contract provision could, in and of
itself, confer jurisdiction on a Florida court over two Delaware limited liabil-
ity companies under sections 685.101 and 685.102 of the Florida Statutes.56 3
MasTec North America, Inc. (Florida Corporation) contracted with Jetbroad-
band WV, LLC and Jetbroadband VA, LLC (Delaware LLCs) to perform
certain services for Delaware LLCs in Virginia.564 Delaware LLCs had their
principal places of business in New York.565 The contract clause at issue
provided that the parties "irrevocably agree and submit to the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the Circuit Court, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami. 566 The
clause also contained a choice of law provision, choosing Florida law as the
governing law. 567 A disagreement between the parties led Florida Corpora-
tion to sue Delaware LLCs in Miami-Dade County. 568 Delaware LLCs took
the position that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over them,
but the trial court disagreed, and their motion to dismiss was denied.569 The
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court.5 70 The appellate court
acknowledged that the Supreme Court of Florida, in McRae v. J.D./M.D.,
Inc.,5 7 held that an agreement alone is not enough to "confer personal juris-
diction on Florida courts. 572 However, the Supreme Court of Florida's
McRae decision in 1987 was rendered in the context of section 48.193 of the
Florida Statutes, Florida's traditional basis for long-arm statute jurisdic-
tion.573 Two years later, however, sections 685.101 and 685.102 of the Flor-
ida Statutes were enacted.5"4 These provisions of the Contract Enforcement
Chapter of the Commercial Relations Title are entitled "Choice of Law" and
562. 13 So. 3d 159 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
563. Id. at 160.
564. Id. at 160-61.
565. Id. at 161 n.1.
566. Id. at 161.
567. Jetbroadband WV, LLC, 13 So. 3d at 161.
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Id. at 163.
571. 511 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1987).
572. Jetbroadband WV, LLC, 13 So. 3d at 161 (citing McRae, 511 So. 2d at 542).
573. Id. (quoting McRae, 511 So. 2d at 543); see FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2009).
574. Jetbroadband WV, LLC, 13 So. 3d at 161.
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"Jurisdiction," respectively.575 Under these sections, personal jurisdiction
can be conferred on Florida courts by a contract provision, provided several
requirements are satisfied.5 76  The agreement at issue must contain both a
Florida choice of law clause, pursuant to section 685.101 of the Florida Sta-
tutes, and a clause by which the non-resident agrees to submit to the Florida
court's jurisdiction.577 In addition, the agreement must involve consideration
in the aggregate amount of at least $250,000; and then, if bringing the action
in Florida is not in violation of the United States Constitution and "'bears a
substantial or reasonable relation to Florida, or ... at least one of the parties
is either a resident or citizen of Florida ... or is incorporated or organized
under the laws of Florida"' the parties can, by the provision, confer jurisdic-
tion on the Florida court. 578  The facts of this case satisfied the five part
test.5 79 The Third District Court of Appeal also observed that while the due
process minimum contacts with the forum state test-the "not in violation of
the United States Constitution" part of the test-must be met "in the com-
mercial context," the choice of law clause itself satisfies the due process min-
imum contacts requirement, provided it "is 'freely negotiated' and is not
'unreasonable and unjust.' 580
B. Personal Jurisdiction: Contracts Cases and Burden of Proof
Club & Community Corporation (Florida Corporation) sued Hampton
Island Preservation, LLC (Georgia LLC) in the Palm Beach County Circuit
Court for breach of contract.581 After Georgia LLC's motions to dismiss
Florida Corporation's complaint and first amended complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute were granted by the
575. Id. at 161-62; see FLA. STAT. §§ 685.101-.102 (2009).
576. Jetbroadband WV, LLC, 13 So. 3d at 161-62. The court broke these down into five
requirements and numbered them accordingly. Id. at 162.
577. Id.
578. Id. at 161-62 (quoting Edward M. Mullins & Douglas J. Giuliano, Contractual Waiv-
er of Personal Jurisdiction Under F.S. § 685.102: The Long-Arm Statute's Little-Known
Cousin, 80 FLA. B.J. 36, 36-37 (May 2006)).
579. Id. at 163.
580. Jetbroadband WV, LLC, 13 So. 3d at 163 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985)); see also Desai Patel Sharma, Ltd. v. Don Bell Indus., Inc.,
729 So. 2d 453,454 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
581. Hampton Island Pres., LLC v. Club & Cmty. Corp., 998 So. 2d 665, 666-67 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009). There was also a claim based on quantum meruit, a claim alleging un-
just enrichment, and a claim of gross negligence. Id. at 667. The portion of the Florida long-
arm statute that is based on tortious conduct occurring in the state, section 48.193 of the Flor-
ida Statutes, was not mentioned in the court's opinion.
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trial court, Florida Corporation filed a second amended complaint.582 Geor-
gia LLC again filed a motion to dismiss, but this time the trial court denied
the motion.583 Georgia LLC appealed, and the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal reversed. 584 Although the appellate court discussed the two-part test of
Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais,5 85 its decision focused on burden of
proof.586 A defendant must file affidavits in support of its motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction. 87 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff who
must file "opposing affidavits or other evidence. 588 With respect to the first
statutory prong of the Venetian Salami Co. test, the Fourth District noted that
Florida Corporation alleged in its second amended complaint that under the
parties' agreement, "all payments were required to be made and were made
in Palm Beach County. 5 89 Florida, as the place of payment with respect to a
contract with a Florida resident, has previously been recognized by the
Fourth District Court of Appeal as a sufficient jurisdictional fact.5 90 There
was no opposing affidavit filed by Georgia LLC to contest this allegation. 59'
However, as to minimum contacts, the second prong of the Venetian Salami
Co. test, Florida Corporation relied on an unsigned copy of an "Agreement
for Professional Services", which contained a forum selection clause stating
that the Agreement was governed by the laws of Florida.5 92 Georgia LLC
filed an affidavit of its manager, who stated that he had no knowledge of the
Agreement for Professional Services ever having been signed by "any autho-
rized representative" of Georgia LLC.593 No opposing affidavit was filed by
Florida Corporation.594 Thus, the defendant submitted an affidavit contesting
582. Id. at 666.
583. Id. at 667.
584. Hampton Island Pres., LLC, 998 So. 2d at 668.
585. 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989). The two part test includes the question of whether first,
there are sufficient jurisdictional facts alleged for purposes of section 48.193(1)(g) of the
Florida Statutes. See id. at 502. If the answer is yes, the second part examines the due
process requirement that the defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida. Id.
586. Hampton Island Pres., LLC, 998 So. 2d at 667.
587. Id.
588. Id. (citing Becker v. Hooshmand, 841 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
589. Id.
590. Id. at 668 (quoting Woodard Chevrolet, Inc. v. Taylor Corp., 949 So. 2d 268, 270
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007)). The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Woodard concluded
that under the second prong of the Venetian test, there were not sufficient minimum contacts
to justify Woodard being haled into the Florida courts. Woodard, 949 So. 2d at 270; see Bar-
bara Landau, 2006-2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 32 NOVA L. REV.
21, 86-87 (2007) [hereinafter Landau, 2006-2007 Survey].
591. Hampton Island Pres., LLC, 998 So. 2d at 668.
592. Id. at 667.
593. Id. at 668.
594. Id.
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minimum contacts, but the plaintiff did not submit the required opposing
affidavit to establish minimum contacts. 595 The appellate court did note, in
dicta, that under McRae, even if the Agreement for Professional Services had
been signed, "'a forum selection clause, designating Florida as the forum,
cannot operate as the sole basis for Florida to exercise personal jurisdiction
over an objecting non-resident defendant.' ' 596
In light of the Third District Court of Appeal's ruling on the minimum
contacts issue in its Jetbroadband decision, albeit a decision under sections
685.101 and 685.102, rather than section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes, and
the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Desai Patel Sharma, Ltd. v.
Don Bell Industries, Inc.,5 cited in Jetbroadband, it appears that there is a
question as to whether, in the context of section 48.193, a signed jurisdiction
agreement can ever meet the minimum contacts constitutional prong under
Venetian Salami Co., or whether it only did so under section 685.102 when
considered together with the other requirements of that section. 598
C. Personal Jurisdiction: Corporate Shield Doctrine
Mr. Rensin (Nonresident) was the CEO of a Maryland and a Virginia
limited liability company (LLCs).5 99 The LLCs and Nonresident, individual-
ly, were sued by the Attorney General, on behalf of the State of Florida
(State) for alleged violations of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act and its Retail Installment Sales Act.6°° These claims arose out of
the sale of electronics, including computers, to Florida customers.60 ' The
State claimed personal jurisdiction over Mr. Rensin, individually, under Flor-
ida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes, and the trial
595. See id.
596. Hampton Island Pres., LLC, 998 So. 2d at 668 (quoting McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc.,
511 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 1987)).
597. 729 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
598. See Jetbroadband WV, LLC v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 13 So. 3d 159, 162 n.3 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2009). The exact language of the forum selection clause is not set forth in the
appellate court's decision in Hampton Island, which may very well have been because the
clause was contained in a copy of an unsigned agreement. See Hampton Island Pres., LLC,
998 So. 2d at 667. However, if the agreement had been signed, then the determination of what
type of clause it was may have been crucial. See id. Was it a forum selection clause, a choice
of law provision, or both, and did the provision include an agreement to submit to Florida's
jurisdiction?
599. Rensin v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D402, D402 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009).
600. Id. The corporations were also defendants, but this appeal only addressed Nonresi-
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court agreed.62 Nonresident appealed, and the First District Court of Appeal
reversed.6°3 Florida adopted the corporate shield doctrine in Doe v. Thomp-
son,6W4 which says that the "'acts of [a] corporate employee performed in
[his] corporate capacity do not form the basis for jurisdiction over [the] cor-
porate employee in his individual capacity. '" '6° At this point in its opinion,
in a footnote, the First District Court of Appeal confirmed that this doctrine
applies in the context of limited liability companies. 6°6 Further, the appellate
court held that "'it is unfair to force an individual to defend a suit brought
against him personally in a forum with which his only relevant contacts are
acts performed not for his own benefit but for the benefit of his employ-
er.' '607 An exception to the corporate shield doctrine exists in cases where
the employee is accused of "'fraud or other intentional misconduct"' directed
to Florida residents.6°8 The First District Court of Appeal reversed because
the State had not met its burden of proof as set forth in Venetian Salami Co.
v. Parthenais.°9 Nonresident filed an affidavit to the effect "that he, perso-
nally, had no Florida contacts and was not a primary participant in any inten-
tional tortious contacts expressly aimed at Florida.' '610 It was then up to the
State to file counter-affidavits to establish personal jurisdiction, but the State
failed to do so. 611 In addition, on Nonresident's motion for clarification, the
First District Court of Appeal said that the State could not now hold an evi-
dentiary hearing in the trial court, since no affidavit was submitted by the
State, and the appellate court clarified its earlier order to direct that the trial
court dismiss the action as to Nonresident.612
D. Personal Jurisdiction: Tort Case
The next case is another long-arm statute case, but this one is a tort ac-
63tion. '3 Beta (Florida LLCs) hired Mintz & Fraade, P.C., a New York pro-
602. See id.
603. Rensin, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D402.
604. 620 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1993).
605. Rensin, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D402 (quoting Thompson, 620 So. 2d at 1006) (altera-
tion in original).
606. See id. at D403 n.1 (citing Stomar, Inc. v. Lucky Seven Riverboat Co., LLC, 821 So.
2d 1183, 1187 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
607. Id. at D402 (quoting Estabrook v. Wetmore, 529 A.2d 956, 959 (N.H. 1987)).
608. Id. (quoting Thompson, 620 So. 2d at 1006 n.I).
609. 554 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1989); see Rensin, 34 Fla. L. Weekly. at D403.
610. Rensin, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D402.
611. See id. at D403.
612. See id.
613. See Beta Drywall Acquisition, LLC v. Mintz & Fraade, P.C., 9 So. 3d 651 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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fessional corporation (NY Firm), to handle legal work involving the acquisi-
tion of the assets of Beta Drywall, a Florida corporation. 614 The legal work
was all done in New York, except for the closing.6 5 Florida LLCs sued NY
Firm for malpractice, alleging failure to prepare certain documents for the
newly created Florida LLCs, which resulted in disputes among the members
and a derivative action.616 The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction over NY Firm.617 On appeal, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal discussed the two-part test under Wendt v. Horowitz,61 8 as interpreted
by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Renaissance Health Publishing,
LLC v. Resveratrol Partners, LLC.6 19 With respect to the first prong of the
test, which requires that the court find the commission of a tort in Florida,
the court needs to consider the following rules in applying section
48.193(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes.620 "[A] cause of action for tort accrues
wherever plaintiff suffers damage to his property. '62 The defendant does
not have to be physically in Florida to commit a tort in Florida, nor does
there have to be "a physical tort" committed in Florida to be within the reach
of the long-arm statute.622 "[A] foreign defendant can commit a tort within
Florida via its electronic, telephonic, or written communications into" Flori-
da provided the cause of action for tort results from those communications. 62 3
As alleged, the tort of malpractice involved the claimed faulty formation of
and filing of faulty documents in Florida for the two Florida LLCs.624 The
entities could only have been formed by NY Firm sending communications
into Florida, that is, the filing of the documents in Florida.625 As to the
second prong of the Wendt test, the appellate court found that NY Firm's
activities also satisfied the due process minimum contacts requirement, con-
cluding that "[a] reasonable person having conducted the activities conducted
614. Id. at 652.
615. Id. The opinion does not state where the closing was held or who attended.
616. See id.
617. Beta, 9 So. 3d at 652.
618. 822 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2002); see Beta, 9 So. 3d at 652.
619. 982 So. 2d 739, 741 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); see Beta, 9 So. 3d at 652; see also
Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 120, at 117 (discussing the Renaissance Health deci-
sion).
620. Beta, 9 So. 3d at 653 (citing Becker v. Hooshmand, 841 So. 2d 561, 562-63 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
621. Id. (citing Becker, 841 So. 2d at 562).
622. See id.
623. Id.
624. See id. at 652.
625. See Beta, 9 So. 3d at 653.
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by [NY Firm] would reasonably foresee being haled into court in Florida
should an issue regarding the very formation of [Florida LLCs] arise. 626
E. Forum Non Conveniens
Lisa, S.A. (Plaintiff), a Panamanian corporation that owned shares in
Avicola, a Guatemalan corporation, sued other shareholders of Avicola (De-
fendants) in connection with Plaintiffs interests in the Guatemalan corpora-
62tion. 27 The trial court dismissed the second amended complaint, concluding
that Plaintiff had an "adequate alternative forum" in the Guatemalan
courts.628 With respect to Plaintiffs allegations that defendant shareholders
"stole" Plaintiffs "one-third share of [Avicola's] assets and profits" and
converted them to Florida situs assets, the Third District Court of Appeal
noted that there have been cases where jurisdiction has properly been re-
tained over a defendant's assets here for satisfaction of a final judgment that
might be obtained in a foreign jurisdiction.62 9 However, since Plaintiff was
not able to adequately trace the conversion of Guatemalan assets to Florida
assets, or demonstrate a connection between the Defendants' Florida assets
and the alleged wrongdoing of the Defendants, there was no justification for
the trial court in Florida to retain even limited local jurisdiction over Defen-
dants' Florida assets.63 ° However, that would not preclude future proceed-
ings in Florida under the rules of comity to satisfy a Guatemalan judgment
from Defendants' Florida property.631
F. Venue
In Koslow v. Sanders,632 Sanders sued Koslow for breach of contract,
instituting the action in Collier County where Sanders resided.633 Koslow's
motion to change venue to Broward County, where he resided, was denied
634by the court. Sanders claimed "that venue was proper in Collier County
where he resided because that is where any payments owed to him under the
contract would be due. 635 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and
626. Id. at 653.
627. Lisa, S.A. v. Gutierrez, 992 So. 2d 413,413 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
628. Id. at 414.
629. Id. at413-14.
630. See id. at415.
631. Id.
632. 4 So. 3d 37 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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ordered the transfer of the action to Broward County.6 36 The Second District
acknowledged that venue is proper in the county where the creditor resides
when the contract does not state the place where payment is to be made, but
only if the amount of the payment is specified in the context of a "debtor-
creditor relationship" and the lawsuit is over an amount specified in the con-
tract.637 Sanders and Koslow were not in a debtor-creditor relationship.638
This was an accounting and declaratory judgment action arising out of an
alleged breach of contract, and the amount Koslow owed Sanders, if any, had
yet to be determined. 639 Therefore, the general breach of contract venue rule
applicable to performance contracts applied, that is, the place where the de-
faulting party fails to perform. 640 Koslow's breach of the contract, if it oc-
curred, would have been failure to perform administrative duties, and that
would have taken place in Broward County, where Koslow resided.64'
G. Standing
In Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc. v. Citrus County, Florida,
642
the Citrus County Board of County Commissioners passed an ordinance that
amended its land development code allowing the Homosassa River Resort,
LLC to develop property it owned along the Homosassa River.643 The Coun-
ty was sued by Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc. (the Alliance), Mr.
Bitter, Ms. Rendueles and Ms. Watkins (collectively referred to as Plain-
tiffs), who claimed that the ordinance violated the land development code.644
The "Alliance is a not-for-profit corporation 'committed to the preservation
and conservation of environmentally sensitive lands and the wildlife in and
around the Homosassa River and in Old Homosassa, Florida." '' '64 All of the
individual plaintiffs lived on property they owned in Citrus County, but none
owned property that was adjacent to the development site.646 And all of the
636. Id. at 39.
637. Koslow, 4 So. 3d at 38 (citing James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Co., 238
So. 2d 487, 487-89 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970)).
638. See id.
639. Id.
640. Id. at 38-39 (quoting Speedling, Inc. v. Krig, 378 So. 2d 57, 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979)).
641. Id. at 39.
642. 2 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied, 16 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2009)
(unpublished table decision).
643. Id. at 331.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. See id. at 331, 339.
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individual plaintiffs expressed a general concern with and an interest in pre-
serving the environment so that they could continue to enjoy it in various
ways-for example, boating, fishing, bicycling, and walking.647 Plaintiffs
also cited increased demands on public services, such as water and roadways,
which would result from a larger population attracted by the development.
648
The trial court found that Plaintiffs' assertions about the development were
not sufficient allegations that they were adversely affected "in a way not
experienced by the general population." 649 Plaintiffs' second amended com-
plaint was dismissed with prejudice by the trial court on the ground that
Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.65 ° The Fifth District Court of Appeal re-
versed and remanded. 651 The appellate court began its analysis on standing
by stating the common law rule applicable before 1985, "that, in order to
have standing to challenge a land use decision, a party had to possess a legal-
ly recognized right that would be adversely affected by the decision or suffer
special damages different in kind from that suffered by the community as a
whole."652 In 1985, the legislature passed section 163.3215 of the Florida
Statutes, and according to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, "[t]here is no
doubt that the purpose of the adoption of section 163.3215 was to liberalize
standing in [the] context" of challenging land use decisions.653 The new and
more liberal standing rule only requires that the person complaining "must
allege that they have an interest that is something more than a 'general inter-
est in community well being."' 654 The Fifth District Court of Appeal stated
that "the case law assumes that an organization has an interest that is greater
than 'the general interest in community well being' when the organization's
primary purpose includes protecting the particular interest that they allege
will be adversely affected by the comprehensive plan violation., 655 Plain-
tiffs' allegations satisfied the new, more liberal standing requirements.
656
Judge Pleus dissented, saying that the majority's opinion regarding standing
647. Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc., 2 So. 3d at 332-33.
648. Id. at 334.
649. Id. at 332.
650. Id.
651. Id. at 340. The appellate court also held that "Plaintiffs had not abused the privilege
to amend," and it, therefore, was error for the trial court to have dismissed Plaintiffs' second
amended complaint with prejudice. Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc., 2 So. 3d at 340
n.l .
652. Id. at 336.
653. Id.
654. Id. at 337.
655. Id.
656. Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc., 2 So. 3d at 340.
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is squarely opposed to the weight of authority.657 Judge Pleus found it espe-
cially troubling that the individual plaintiffs' Citrus County property was not
658adjacent to the development site. 8 Judge Pleus observed that "[e]very gadf-
ly with some amorphous environmental agenda, and enough money to pay a
filing fee, will be anointed with status simply because the gadfly wants to
'protect the planet."' 659 and he concluded his dissent by saying, "[flor those
who respect property rights, look Out!'66°
H. Domestication of Out-of-Country Foreign Money Judgment
In Israel v. Flick Mortgage Investors,66' Purchasers, who were Israeli
citizens, bought homes at a Florida golf resort, and Flick held mortgages on
the properties. 62 As it turned out, Purchasers paid substantially more for the
properties than the properties were worth, and they sued Flick and others, in
Israel, to "unwind" the sales. 663 Purchasers, as plaintiffs in the Israeli action,
served Flick in Florida with their complaint and did so using registered
mail. 664 Flick moved to dismiss the suit in Israel on the grounds of lack of
personal jurisdiction over him, and he filed a supporting affidavit.665 Flick's
attorney appeared in connection with the motion, but the Israeli court struck
the affidavit because Flick failed to appear.666 Ultimately, the motion to
dismiss was denied.667 Flick did not challenge the sufficiency of service of
process, and he did not subsequently participate in the action in Israel.66 8
After Purchasers obtained a judgment against Flick for almost $1,500,000,
Purchasers sought to domesticate the Israeli money judgment in Florida un-
der Florida's Uniform Out-of-Country Foreign Money-Judgment Act (the
Act), sections 55.601-.607 of the Florida Statutes.669 Flick successfully
moved for summary judgment in the Florida trial court on the ground of "in-
sufficiency of service of process in the Israeli action." 670  Purchasers ap-
657. Id. at 340-41 (Pleus, J., dissenting).
658. See id.
659. Id. at 346.
660. Id.
661. 33 Fla. L. Weekly D2732 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2008).











Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss1/1
2009] SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW AFFECTING BUSINESS OWNERS 131
pealed, and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded.67' In
the Florida trial court, Flick failed to raise any defense to domestication that
was authorized by the Act. 672 The manner of how service of process is ef-
fected is not "one of the ten grounds for nonrecognition or nonenforceability
that may be asserted under the Act."673 Further, Flick waived the defense of
insufficient service of process by not raising it in the Israeli court when he
challenged personal jurisdiction there.674
XII. LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP
A. Execution Requirements
In Skylake Insurance Agency, Inc. v. NMB Plaza, LLC,675 NMB Plaza
(Landlord LLC) was constructing an office building when it entered into a
lease agreement with Skylake Insurance Agency, Inc. (Tenant).676 The lease
was signed by a member of Landlord LLC and by the president and a vice-
president of Tenant, on behalf of their respective entities. 677 The lease term
was for ten years to begin about three months after the building was com-
pleted.678 None of these signatures were witnessed.679 Prior to completion of
the building, Landlord LLC claimed that the lease was unenforceable against
it under the Florida Statute of Frauds, section 689.01 of the Florida Statutes,
because of the absence of witnesses. 68 Tenant sued Landlord LLC for spe-
cific performance. 681 The trial court granted summary judgment to Landlord
LLC.682 Tenant appealed and the Third District Court of Appeal reversed,
identifying and relying on sections 608.425(3) and 608.4235(3) of the Flori-




675. 33 Fla. L. Weekly D2215 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2008), rev'd, No. 3D07-454,
2009 WL 3446494 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2009).




680. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D2215. Tenant relied on the corpo-
rate exception at the end of section 689.01 of the Florida Statutes. Id. The appellate court
held that the corporate exception does not apply to a limited liability company. Id.
681. Id. Tenant also sought damages for fraud, and the trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Landlord LLC on this claim as well. Id.
682. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D2215.
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da Statues.683 Section 608.425(3) validates the "disposition" of property by a
limited liability company if the documents are executed as provided in chap-
ter 608 of the Florida Statutes.6 84 Notably, the Third District held that a
lease is a "disposition of property., 685 The appellate court concluded that
since section 608.4235(3) grants limited liability company members, or man-
agers as the case may be, the authority to deal with the limited liability com-
pany's real estate by merely signing and delivering the appropriate instru-
ments, no witnesses were required.686
B. Landlord's Right to Writ of Possession
Kosoy Kendall Associates, LLC v. Los Latinos Restaurant, Inc.6 87 is a
short opinion that illustrates the draconian remedies available to a landlord
whose tenant is in default.688 The trial court held an adversarial hearing on
the default and refused to issue the landlord a writ of possession. 689 The
Third District Court of Appeal said that the adversarial hearing was unautho-
rized, and "[u]pon the lessee's failure to timely deposit a monthly rental
payment into the registry as required by court order under section 83.232,
Florida Statute[s], the petitioner-landlord was absolutely entitled to an ex
parte, immediate default for a writ of possession of the premises." 690 Te-
nant's payment, due February 1, 2009 and tendered February 5, 2009, was
too late. 691 Landlord's application for mandamus was granted.692
683. Id. In the absence of a provision to the contrary in an LLC's articles of organization
or in its operating agreement, a member can sign on behalf of a member-managed company,
and a manager is authorized to sign on behalf of a manager-managed LLC. See FLA. STAT. §
608.4235(3) (2009). There was no discussion in the opinion as to whether Landlord LLC was
member-managed or manager-managed or as to what the company's organization documents
may have provided, but the appellate court noted that the Landlord had admitted that it signed
the lease, and Landlord "raise[d] no claim that the ... signature was unauthorized." Skylake
Ins. Agency, Inc., 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D2215.
684. FLA. STAT. § 608.425(3).
685. Skylake Ins. Agency, Inc., 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D2215.
686. See id.
687. 10 So. 3d 1168 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
688. See id. at 1168.
689. Id.
690. Id. (footnote omitted).
691. Id. at 1168 n.l.
692. Kosoy Kendall Assocs., LLC, 10 So. 3d at 1169.
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XIII. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
In Jaylene, Inc. v. Moots, 693 Ms. Crisson (Principal) had given her pow-
er of attorney to Ms. Moots (Agent).694 Agent's authority included entering
"into binding contracts on [Principal's] behalf," and taking "any and all legal
steps necessary to collect any ... debt owed to [Principal], or to settle any
claim." 695 The general power of attorney also granted to the agent "full pow-
er and authority to act" on behalf of the principal.696 The general power of
attorney went on to say that "'[t]he listing of specific powers is not intended
to limit or restrict the general powers granted in this Power of Attorney in
any manner. ' '697 Acting under this power, Agent arranged for Principal to
live in a nursing home. 698 The agreement with the nursing home, signed by
Agent, contained an optional arbitration clause.699 The arbitration clause
could be eliminated by marking an "X" through it.7°° This was not done by
Agent.701 The arbitration clause provided that the Florida Arbitration Code
would apply to any claim or controversy arising from the agreement. 70 2 Af-
ter Principal died, Agent, as personal representative of Principal's estate,
brought a nursing home resident's rights lawsuit against the nursing home
and others.70 3 The nursing home's motion to compel arbitration under the
terms of the agreement was denied by the circuit court. 704 The Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeal reversed. 705 The appellate court acknowledged that the
general power of attorney did not give the agent specific authority to consent
to arbitration.7 °6 Nevertheless, the appellate court found that the power of
attorney was "extremely broad and unambiguous," and Agent's authority
was virtually all-inclusive. 70 7 The Second District went on to say that, "[w]e
are not prepared to state that a grant of the authority to settle claims includes
the authority to consent to arbitration., 708 The Second District Court of Ap-
693. 995 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
694. Id. at 567.
695. Id. at 568.
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. See Jaylene, Inc., 995 So. 2d at 567.
699. Id. at 567-68.
700. Id. at 568.
701. Id.
702. Id.
703. Jaylene, Inc., 995 So. 2d at 567.
704. Id.
705. Id.
706. Id. at 568.
707. Id.
708. Jaylene Inc., 995 So. 2d at 569.
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peal found, however, that "the specific grant of authority to settle claims in
the document under review in this case is consistent with the view that the
[power of attorney's] broad grant of authority includes the power to consent
to arbitration. ' '709 Agent relied on In re Estate of McKibbin v. Alterra Health
Care Corp.7 0 The In re Estate of McKibbin court-also the Second Dis-
trict-held in that case that the power of attorney there did not contain any-
thing that authorized the agent to enter into, on behalf of his principal, an
agreement to arbitrate.7 1' The Second District Court of Appeal concluded
that In re Estate of McKibbin was not controlling.712 The In re Estate of
McKibbin opinion did "not set forth the language of the power of attorney"
considered by the court to be deficient.1 3
About five weeks after the Second District Court of Appeal rendered its
opinion in Jaylene, Inc., the court decided Sovereign Healthcare of Tampa,
LLC v. Estate of Huerta.71 4 Ms. Huerta's daughter-in-law (Agent), under the
power of attorney given to her by Ms. Huerta, arranged for Ms. Huerta's
admission to a nursing home owned by Sovereign Healthcare of Tampa,
LLC (Sovereign). 1 5 The general power did not grant Agent specific authori-
ty to agree on Ms. Huerta's behalf to arbitration.716 Ms. Huerta died, and
Agent, as personal representative, sued Sovereign.717 Sovereign moved to
compel Agent to arbitrate these issues, but the trial court denied the motion,
relying on In re Estate of McKibbin.1 8 The Second District Court reversed,
stating that the trial court incorrectly relied on In re Estate of McKibbin in
denying Sovereign's motion. 7 9 Noting that it had addressed the limitations
of the In re Estate of McKibbin decision in Jaylene, Inc., the Second District
Court of Appeal found in this case that the general catch-all provision's grant
of authority contained in the power of attorney was sufficiently broad and
unambiguous enough to permit the agent's consent to arbitration on behalf of
the principal.7 20 This provision, when considered with several other provi-
sions of the power of attorney that granted the right to sign consents and re-
709. Id.
710. Id. (relying on 977 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008 (per curiam)).
711. In re Estate of McKibbin, 977 So. 2d at 613.
712. Jaylene, Inc., 995 So. 2d at 570.
713. Id. (citing Shaw v. Jain, 914 So. 2d 458,461 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
714. 14 So. 3d 1033 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
715. Id. at 1034.
716. Id.
717. Id. The complaint alleged negligence, wrongful death, and breach of fiduciary duty.
Id.
718. Sovereign Healthcare of Tampa, LLC, 14 So. 3d at 1034.
719. Id.
720. Id. at 1035.
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leases, was sufficient to find that the agent had the authority to consent to
arbitration. 2 ' The court relied on its March 2009 decision in Carrington
Place of St. Pete, LLC v. Estate of Milo,722 and held that, "[w]hether a [power
of attorney] contains a provision that constitutes a sufficiently broad and
unambiguous grant of general authority ... requires examination of the lan-
guage of any catch-all provision contained in [the power of attorney], as well
as of the relationship of that language to the type" of authority specifically
granted.723
XlV. TAXES
A. Documentary Stamp Tax
Department of Revenue v. Pinellas VP, LLC724 involved two distinct sets
of transfers.725 With respect to the first transaction, Mr. Pridgen was the sole
member of Pinellas VP, LLC (Pinellas) and the sole shareholder and director
of Tarpon Ridge, Inc.726 Pinellas received twenty acres of land from Tarpon
Ridge, Inc. by warranty deed.727 Thus, Mr. Pridgen's solely owned corpora-
tion transferred real estate to his solely owned LLC.728 Although Pinellas
paid no money for the conveyance, it took the land subject to a mortgage. 729
Pinellas "paid a $19,250 documentary stamp tax based on the outstanding
[mortgage] balance. '730 The second transaction involved the transfer of real
estate from an LLC to its members.73 ' Tarpon Ridge, Inc. was the managing
and sole member of TPA Investments, LLC (TPA).732 TPA and Lindell-
Gandy LLC,7 33 in turn, were the members of Imperial, LLC7 3 4 Imperial, LLC
transferred real estate by warranty deed to its members, TPA and Lindell-
721. Id.
722. 34 Fla. L. Weekly D640 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2009).
723. Sovereign Healthcare of Tampa, LLC, 14 So. 3d at 1034.
724. 3 So. 3d 361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also Dep't of Revenue v. Pilgrim Hall,
LLC, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D456 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2009) (per curiam).





730. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 362.
731. Id.
732. Id.
733. Id. The opinion does not disclose who the members of Lindell-Gandy LLC are, but it
does say that Mr. Pridgen was not a member. See id.
734. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 362.
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Gandy, as tenants in common. 735 TPA and Lindell-Gandy paid no money for
the real estate, but took it subject to a mortgage.736 Imperial, LLC had given
a promissory note securing the mortgage, and Mr. Pridgen guaranteed one-
half of Imperial's note.737 TPA recorded the deed and paid a documentary
stamp tax of $161,546.70 based on the principal amount of the mortgage.738
Pinellas and TPA then sued for refunds of the documentary stamp tax paid.739
The trial court granted their motions for summary judgment. 740 The Second
District Court of Appeal reversed, distinguishing the facts of Crescent Miami
Center, LLC v. Florida Department of Revenue74' from the two situations
before it.7 41 In Crescent Miami Center, no money changed hands upon a
direct real estate transfer from a parent corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiary.743 In addition, there was no mortgage involved.7 " The Supreme
Court of Florida in Crescent Miami Center held that there was no taxable
event, no change of beneficial ownership, only a change in the form of own-
ership.745 In this case, there was consideration in the form of mortgages en-
cumbering the transferred property.74 Section 201.02(1) of the Florida Sta-
tutes specifically refers to mortgages as consideration upon which calculation
of the seventy cents per one hundred dollars of consideration is applied.747
The fact that Mr. Pridgen would bear the economic burden of the mortgages






739. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 362.
740. Id. at 362-63.
741. 903 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 2005).
742. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 364; see also Dep't of Revenue v. Pilgrim Hall, LLC,
34 Fla. L. Weekly D456, D456 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2009) (per curiam) (a case heard
with the Pinellas and TPA Investment cases).
743. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 364 (citing Crescent Miami Ctr., LLC, 903 So. 3d at
914).
744. Id. (citing Crescent Miami Ctr., LLC, 903 So. 3d at 914).
745. Crescent Miami Ctr., LLC, 903 So. 3d at 918-19.
746. Pinellas VP, LLC, 3 So. 3d at 364.
747. FLA. STAT. § 201.02(1) (2009); see also S.B. 2430, 2009 Leg., (Fla. 2009) (signed by
Gov. Crist on June 10, 2009, amending section 201.02(1) of the Florida Statutes, for statutory
limitations on the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Miami Crescent Ctr., LLC).
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B. Florida Tax on Real Estate Rental Payments
Section 212.03 1(l)(c) of the Florida Statutes imposes a six percent pri-
vilege tax on total rent charged for leasing real estate.75° Under this section,
total rent specifically includes "base rent. '75' The section goes on to say that
where there are required contractual payments taxable as total rent and those
that are not, reasonable allocation must be made between taxable and non-
taxable payments.752 In USCardio Vascular, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Revenue,753 USCardio Vascular (Landlord) made a lease agreement with a
physician group (Tenant).754 The lease agreement called for the payment of
"base rent." 755 The agreement also referred to center expenses and the rental
fee.756 The latter two items were synonymous with base rent.757 Included in
the definition of center expenses, and thus a part of base rent, were items
"such as salaries, benefits and insurance for the employees leased by the
[Landlord] to the [Tenant]. 758 Standing alone, the payments of these ex-
penses are not subject to the six percent tax.759 Landlord paid the excise tax
on the amount of lease payments it deemed subject to the tax but not on the
entire base rent.760 The Florida Department of Revenue assessed a deficiency
calculated on the entire base rent. 6 Its motion for summary judgment was
granted by the trial court.762 Landlord appealed, and the First District Court
of Appeal reversed.763 The First District Court of Appeal held that, regard-
less of how the payments were characterized, that is, as base rent, some of
the center expenses are not subject to the six percent tax.764 The case was
remanded for the trial court's determination of taxable and non-taxable pay-
ments under the lease agreement. 765 Judge Benton dissented. 766 He would
have held that the Landlord was bound by its use of "base rent" in the
750. FLA. STAT. § 212.031(1)(c) (2009).
751. Id.
752. Id.
753. 993 So. 2d 81 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied, 8 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. 2009).
754. Id. at 82.
755. Id.
756. Id. at 82-83.
757. Id. at 82-84.
758. USCardio Vascular, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 84-85 (footnote omitted).
759. Id. at 85.
760. See id. at 84.
761. Id.
762. Id.
763. USCardio Vascular, Inc., 993 So. 2d.at 82.
764. Id. at 85.
765. Id.
766. Id. at 85 (Benton, J., dissenting).
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agreement,767 which was described by the majority as "undoubtedly a poor
choice of words. 768
XV. TORTS
A. Negligence: Limitation of Liability of Professional
Witt v. La Gorce Country Club, Inc.7 69 involved a professional's-a li-
censed geologist's-attempt, by contractual provision, to limit his malprac-
tice liability.770 Mr. Witt (Geologist) was employed by Gerhardt M. Witt and
Associates, Inc. (Geologist's Corporation).77 ' Geologist's Corporation was
hired by La Gorce Country Club (Club) to consult on the design and install-
ment of a "reverse osmosis water treatment" project.772 The contract be-
tween Club and Geologist's Corporation contained a limit of liability provi-
sion.773 Despite numerous problems with the system, the project was even-
tually completed, but after fourteen months of continued deterioration, "the
system failed completely., 774 Club sued Geologist and Geologist's Corpora-
tion for, among other things, professional malpractice. 775  The trial judge
ruled that the contractual liability limitation was enforceable with respect to
Geologist's Corporation, but not with respect to Geologist personally, as a
professional.776 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.777 The limita-
tion of liability as to Geologist was unenforceable as a matter of law under
section 492.111(4) of the Florida Statutes-professional geologist's personal
liability. 778 As a matter of public policy, "[a] cause of action in negligence
against an individual professional exists irrespective, and essentially, inde-
pendent of a professional services agreement.
779
767. Id.
768. USCardio Vascular, Inc., 993 So. 2d at 85 (majority opinion).
769. 34 Fla. L. Weekly DI 161 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. June 10, 2009).
770. Id. at D1 161. The court also had before it issues involving arbitrability, "fraud in the
inducement and violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act." Id.
771. Id.
772. Id.
773. Witt, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at DI 161.
774. Id. at D 161-62.
775. Id. at DI 162.
776. Id.
777. Id. atDI63.
778. Witt, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at DI 162 (citing FLA. STAT. § 492.111 (2009)); see Moran-
sais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 983 (Fla. 1999).
779. Win, 34 Fa. L. Weekly at D! 163.
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B. Tortious Interference with Business or Contractual Relationship
The Palm Beach County Heath Care District (District) was created by
Florida statute.780 Its purpose was "'to maximize the health and well-being
of Palm Beach County residents by providing comprehensive planning, fund-
ing, and coordination of health care service delivery.' 781 It could "'sue and
be sued" and was also vested "with all sovereign immunity and limitations
provided by the State Constitution or general law."'' 782 The District em-
ployed Dr. Davis (Director) as its Trauma Agency director.783 Professional
Medical Education, Inc. (PME) provided training to Palm Beach County
emergency medical services employees. 784 The District would pay for the
training upon completion of the program. 78' Basic Trauma Life Support of
Florida, Inc. (BTLS) was an organization that certified the providers of med-
ical personnel training.786 Director wrote to BTLS after there had been some
disagreement between Director and the owner of PME regarding "necessary
documentation for reimbursement., 787 After the letter was sent, the contents
of which are not disclosed in the opinion, BTLS suspended PME's certifica-
tion.788 In the meantime, PME had contracted to provide instruction to Palm
Beach County Fire Rescue personnel, but the training was placed on "hold"
when told by Director that the District would not be paying for the train-
ing. 789PME sued the District and Director for defamation and the District
for tortious interference and conspiracy. 790 The trial court directed a verdict
for Director on the defamation count ruling that, under McNayr v. Kelly,
791
Director had absolute immunity as an "executive official of government"
who "was acting within the scope of his employment. '792 However, the trial
court let the jury's verdict of over $690,000 against the District on all counts
780. Palm Beach County Health Care Dist. v. Prof'l Med. Educ., Inc., 13 So. 3d 1090,
1092 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
781. Id. (quoting Palm Beach County Health Care Act, ch. 2003-326, § 3(2), 2003 Fla.
Laws 101, 102).
782. Id. (quoting Palm Beach County Health Care Act §6(6)).
783. Id. at 1093.
784. Id.





790. Palm Beach County Health Care Dist., 13 So. 3d at 1093.
791. 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1966).
792. Palm Beach County Health Care Dist., 13 So. 3d at 1093, 1095 (quoting McNayr,
184 So. 2d at 433).
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stand.793 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order
against the District.794 In order to sustain a tortious interference claim, the
defendant must be a "'stranger to the business relationship' 7 95 at issue and
can have no "'beneficial or economic interest in, or control over, that [busi-
ness] relationship.' 796 The District was an interested third party.797 It was
paying the bills, including those submitted by PME.798 Furthermore, the de-
famation count against the District was grounded on the action of Director,
the District's employee.799  The appellate court concluded that the trial
court's directed verdict in favor of Director was proper and therefore, Direc-
tor's immunity from the defamation claim had to exonerate the District.8"
As no wrongful acts were committed by the District and Director against
PME, there was no basis for a civil conspiracy action.
C. Investment Advice: Fraudulent Inducement
When Plaintiffs sold their company to Winstar Communications, Inc.
(Winstar) in 1998, they were paid eighty percent of the purchase price in
Winstar stock.802 They also were named as vice presidents of Winstar. °3
Winstar entered into an "investment banking relationship" with Salomon
Smith Barney, Inc. (SSB) in 1999, and some "transactions generated substan-
tial fees for SSB."8°4 The appellate court noted that the relationship between
Winstar and SSB "created incentives for SSB" to encourage potential and
current owners of Winstar stock, respectively, to buy and to hold Winstar
stock.8 °5 The evidence showed that the Winstar stock investment quality was
overstated by SSB analysts "through a series of communications with the
general public and with Winstar employees. ' 8° In addition, starting in Janu-
793. See id. at 1093.
794. Id. at 1096.
795. Id. at 1094 (quoting Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742
So. 2d 381, 386 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
796. Id. (quoting Nimbus Techs., Inc. v. SunnData Prods., Inc., 484 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11 th
Cir. 2007)).
797. Palm Beach County Health Care Dist., 13 So. 3d at 1094.
798. Id.
799. Id. at 1095.
800. Id.
801. Id. at 1096.
802. Goldin v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 994 So. 2d 517, 518-19 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2008).
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ary 2000, there were conference calls on a quarterly basis with an SSB ana-
lyst "who consistently reiterated the positive outlook [about] Winstar stock,"
and Plaintiffs were on the phone during these calls. 80 7 However, beginning
early in 2001, the analysts "were privately rating [the] stock at more negative
levels. '80 8 In April 2001, Winstar filed for bankruptcy protection and the
value of Winstar stock owned by Plaintiffs collapsed.8° Plaintiffs sued SSB
alleging that SSB had fraudulently induced them to buy and hold Winstar
stock.810 Plaintiffs alleged that they "justifiably relied on affirmative misre-
presentations" of SSB and its analysts in these quarterly calls, quarterly re-
ports, and the news, in their decision to purchase and retain Winstar stock. 81'
The parties agreed that New York law applied. 2 The trial court dismissed
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint with prejudice "for failure to allege a
sufficiently direct communication" to them by SSB, and for their "failure to
demonstrate that SSB had a duty to disclose any material information it may
have withheld." 83 Plaintiffs appealed, and the Third District Court of Ap-
peal acknowledged that New York recognizes a claim of fraudulent induce-
ment "to retain securities in reliance on a defendant's affirmative misrepre-
sentations. 8t 4 However, a plaintiff must allege facts that would prove justi-
fiable reliance, which here would have required that they allege delivery of
the misrepresentation from SSB to them, that they were induced by the mi-
srepresentation to retain their stock, and that their reliance on alleged misre-
presentation and their decision to hold the stock were both reasonable. 5
Plaintiffs failed to allege, nor could they "in good faith" have alleged, that
they ever asked the SSB representative any questions during the conference
calls, or that the SSB analyst even knew that Plaintiffs were on the line.8t 6
Under New York law, the alleged affirmative misrepresentation must be di-
rectly communicated to a plaintiff.87 Plaintiffs here were in the same posi-
807. Goldin, 994 So. 2d at 519. Plaintiffs alleged that they "participated" in the calls, but
the court noted that they could not "in good faith" allege that SSB or the analyst was aware of
the presence of Plaintiffs or of Plaintiffs' participation, or that Plaintiffs had asked any ques-
tions during the calls. Id. at 520.
808. Id. at 519.
809. Id.
810. Id.





816. Goldin, 994 So. 2d at 520.
817. Id.
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tion as any other stockholder.818 New York law does not recognize reliance
on publicly disseminated forecasts as justifiable. 819
D. Pre-injury Liability Release on Behalf of Minor Child
Several cases decided in the past year and a half have addressed the is-
sue of whether a parent's execution of a release absolving a commercial ac-
tivity from liability to a minor for injury-prior to the injury-is binding on
the minor child or the child's estate.8 20 Before discussing the Supreme Court
of Florida's answer to this important question in Kirton v. Fields (Fields
/),82 1 a little procedural history will help set the stage.822 In Fields v. Kirton
(Fields 1),823 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that such a waiver was
ineffective.824 In reaching its conclusion, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
certified an implicit conflict with a Fifth District Court of Appeal case, Lantz
v. Iron Horse Saloon, Inc.,825 where such a waiver was found effective.826 In
Fields I, the Fourth District Court of Appeal also certified the case as one of
great public importance.8 7 However, subsequent to the Fourth District
Court's decision in Fields I, and its certification of conflict with Lantz, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal decided Applegate v. Cable Water Ski, L.C.
(Applegate 1),828 where it agreed with the Fourth District in Fields 1.829 The
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Applegate I, however, did not recede from
Lantz.83 ° Instead it distinguished Lantz, finding that the issue there was
whether the trial court had correctly determined that the exculpatory provi-
sion involved was unambiguous.83' In addition, the Fifth District Court of
818. Id.
819. See id.
820. See Kirton v. Fields (Fields 11), 997 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 2008); Applegate v. Cable
Water Ski, L.C. (Applegate 1), 974 So. 2d 1112, 1113 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); see also
Landau, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 120, at 95 (discussing Applegate 1).
821. 997 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2008).
822. Id. at 351-52.
823. 961 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007), reh'g granted, 973 So. 2d 1121 (Fla.
2007).
824. Id. at 1130.
825. 717 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), overruled by, 997 So. 2d 349 (Fla.
2008).
826. Fields 1, 961 So. 2dat 1130.
827. Id.
828. 974 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
829. See id. at 1113 & n.1.
830. Id. at 1116.
831. Id. It is not disclosed in Lantz whether the issue of the effectiveness of such a release
was ever raised by the parties, and it apparently was not raised on appeal. See Lantz v. Iron
Horse Saloon, Inc., 717 So. 2d 590, 591-92 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998), overruled by, 997
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Appeal in Applegate I certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida
as one of great public importance.832 Thus, there was then pending in the
Supreme Court of Florida the certification of conflict with Lantz by the
Fourth District, in Fields I, and the certification by the Fifth District in Ap-
plegate J.833 On December 11, 2008, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Fields
II, enunciated, as a matter of first impression, a public policy exception to the
general rule that pre-injury releases are enforceable if they are not ambiguous
and not equivocal. 834 The facts of the Fields II were that fourteen-year-old
Christopher Jones was fatally injured at Thunder Cross Motor Sports Park
(Park) after he was ejected from the all terrain vehicle he was driving when
he lost control of it.835 His father, "Bobby Jones, as Christopher's natural
guardian, [had earlier] signed a release and waiver of liability, assumption of
risk, and indemnity agreement" with the attraction's operator.836 Fields, as
personal representative (Personal Representative) of Christopher's estate,
sued the owners and the operators of Park (Park Owner) for wrongful
death.837 Park Owner argued that the claim was barred because of the execu-
tion of the release.838 The trial court agreed and granted Park Owner's sum-
mary judgment motion.839 Personal Representative appealed, and the Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed, certifying the case to the Supreme Court
of Florida.8' ° In reaching its decision in Fields II, the Supreme Court ba-
lanced the well-recognized right of parents to make decisions for their minor
children-said by the Court to "derive[] from the liberty interest . . . in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the guarantee
of privacy in article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution"-against the
State's parens patriae authority.84' After reviewing the case law from Florida
and other jurisdictions, the Court decided that the State's parens patriae au-
thority prevailed in this case, and that as a matter of public policy, a "pre-
injury release executed by a parent on behalf of their minor child is unenfor-
So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2008). The Fifth Circuit did not address this issue when it reached the con-
clusion that the language there was sufficiently "clear and unequivocal." Id. In any event, the
decision in Lantz has now been disapproved by the Supreme Court of Florida. See Kirton v.
Fields (Fields 11), 997 So. 2d 349, 358 (Fla. 2008).
832. Applegate I,974 So. 2d at 1116.
833. Id.; Fields v. Kirton (Fields 1), 961 So. 2d 1127, 1130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
834. Fields 11, 997 So. 2d at 358; Lantz, 717 So. 2d at 591-92 (citing Greater Orlando
Aviation Auth. v. Bulldog Airlines, Inc., 705 So. 2d 120, 121 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
835. Fields 1I, 997 So. 2d at 351 (quoting Fields 1, 961 So. 2d at 1128).




840. Fields 1I, 997 So. 2d at 351-52.
841. Fields il, 997 So. 2d at 352-53 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)).
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ceable" by commercial enterprises.842 However, the Court was careful to
note that even in the case of commercial enterprises, a parent could bind a
minor child to arbitrate, rather than litigate, personal injury claims. 843 The
Court did not decide if such releases will be upheld in the case of non-
commercial activities, nor did it set forth a test to determine what is classi-
fied as non-commercial activity as opposed to commercial activity, although
there was an in-depth discussion of decisions involving non-commercial ac-
tivities.8 In a concurring opinion, Justice Pariente made it clear that she did
not hold the view "that all releases from liability for non-commercial activi-
ties are automatically valid," and that there is still room to hold a non-
commercial activity liable for negligence in the face of a release.845 Justice
Wells dissented on the ground that it will often prove very difficult to draw a
bright line distinction between commercial and non-commercial activities.
46
According to Justice Wells, it is the legislature's duty to take up the issue of
the enforceability of pre-injury releases executed by parents on behalf of
their minor children.847
With respect to Applegate IH, after the Court's decision in Fields II, it
declined to review Applegate J.848
842. Id. at 358.
843. See id. at 355 (quoting Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392, 404 (Fla.
2005)).
844. See id. at 356-57.
845. Id. at 361-62 (Pariente, J., concurring).
846. Fields i, 997 So. 2d at 363 (Wells, J., dissenting). An example discussed in the case
questions whether "a Boy Scout or Girl Scout, YMCA, or church camp [is] a commercial
establishment or a community-based activity." Id.
847. Id. Pertinent legislation introduced in the Florida House of Representatives and the
Senate after Fields il was not passed. See Florida House of Representatives, Legislative
Tracking: Fla. HB 363 (2009), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/
billsdetail.aspx?Billld=40275&BillText=363&HouseChamber=-H&Sessionld=61&. HB 363
was introduced on January 14, 2009 but "[d]ied on [Unfinished Business] Calendar" on May
2, 2009. Id. The bill
[a]uthorize[d] natural guardians to waive [and] release, in advance, any claim or cause of ac-
tion that would accrue to any of their minor children to the same extent that any adult may do
so on his or her own behalf; provid[ed] that such waivers [and] releases are disfavored [and]
must be strictly construed against party claiming to be relieved of liability; provide[d] readabil-
ity requirements for wording of such waivers [and] releases, etc.
Id. A related bill, SB 886, was also withdrawn. See Florida Senate, Legislative Tracking:
Fla. SB 886 (2009), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/SectionsfBills/billsdetail.
aspx?Billld=40472&BillText=363&HouseChamber=-H&Sessionld=61 &.
848. Cable Water Ski, LLC v. Applegate (Applegate I), 5 So. 3d 668, 668 (Fla. 2009).
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XVI. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR RIGHTS
A. Statute of Limitations on Debt Deficiency Collection
Ms. Arvelo (Borrower) bought a car and obtained auto financing from
Park Finance of Broward, Inc. (Lender) in 1999. 49 The finance agreement
provided that if Borrower missed a payment to Lender, the balance of her
debt would be immediately accelerated and due in full. 80 Borrower failed to
make her March 2002 payment.85' The auto was repossessed and sold by
Lender on August 7, 2002.852 After the debt was reduced by the amount of
net sale proceeds, 853 Borrower still owed Lender more than $6000 under the
finance agreement. 854 On May 29, 2007, Lender sued Borrower in county
court "for the deficiency amount plus accumulated interest. ' 855 Borrower
raised the five-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(2)(b) of the
Florida Statutes and claimed that the limitations period commenced in
March 2002 when she missed a payment.856 If she was correct, then the May
29, 2007 lawsuit against Borrower was filed too late.857 Lender argued that
the agreement to pay the deficiency amount was tantamount to a separate
debt under the deficiency provision of the agreement-whereby Borrower
agreed to the deficiency if permitted by law-and the deficiency was not
determined until August 2002.858 Therefore, according to Lender, the law-
suit, started in May 2007, was within the five-year statute of limitations. 9
The county court agreed with Lender.860 The appellate division of the circuit
court affirmed, and Borrower petitioned the Third District Court of Appeal
for a writ of certiorari which was granted.86' The Court of Appeal reversed,





853. Id. Lender subtracted $464 from the sale proceeds for expenses of repossession and





858. Arvelo, 15 So. 3d at 662. The appellate court distinguished this situation from the
rules that apply with respect to accrual of an action to foreclose on real estate. Id. at 663 n.4
(relying on Chrestensen v. Eurogest, Inc., 906 So. 2d 343, 345 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (citing FLA. STAT. § 702.06 (2009)).
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finding that there was one debt owed by Borrower.862 The deficiency amount
was part of that debt.86 3 Borrower's "post-repossession failure or refusal to
pay the deficiency [did not] 'reset the clock. ' '' 864 Had Borrower voluntarily
made a payment on the delinquent debt, that would have tolled the statute
under section 95.05(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes.865 The only post-default
payments made resulted from repossession and sale, and that does not toll the
statute of limitationS.81
B. Vendor's Lien on Real Estate
In Golden v. Woodward,867 Mr. Woodward Sr. (Transferor) and Mr. and
Mrs. Golden (Transferees) entered into an "Agreement to Sell Personal Real
Estate Property" in 2003 for $109,000.868 Transferees were to pay Transferor
$550 a month for seven years ($46,200), and at the end of seven years, make
a balloon payment of $62,800.869 Transferor did not take back a mortgage or
other security for payment.870 In 2004, Transferor gave Transferees a war-
ranty deed for the property.871  Transferor died in 2006, and Transferees
stopped making payments.872 The personal representative of Transferor's
estate sought to have a vendor's--equitable-lien placed on the property to
secure payment of the $89,000 purchase price balance.873 The basis of the
claim for a vendor's lien was to prevent unjust enrichment. 874 The trial court
granted the lien, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed.875 A ven-
dor's lien "is 'a creature of equity, a lien implied to belong to a vendor for
the unpaid purchase price of land, where he has not taken any other lien or
security beyond the personal obligation of the purchaser.' 876 Equitable liens
862. Arvelo, 15 So. 3d at 662.
863. Id.
864. Id. at 663.
865. See id.
866. Id.
867. 15 So. 3d 664 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
868. See id. at 666.
869. Id.
870. See id.
871. Golden, 15 So. 3d at 667.
872. See id.
873. Id. at 666.
874. See id. at 667.
875. Id. at 668, 671.
876. Golden, 15 So. 3d at 669 (quoting Special Tax Sch. Dist. No. I of Orange County v.
Hillman, 179 So. 805, 809 (Fla. 1938)).
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may be granted on the basis of estoppel or unjust enrichment. 77 The 2003
agreement between Transferor and Transferees did not disappear by merger
with the 2004 warranty deed.878 Although merger of the sales contract into
the later deed is the general rule, it is not absolute and did not apply under
the facts of this case since that was not the intention of the parties.879
C. Jurisdiction over Loan Guarantors
Whitney National Bank (Bank) sued three individuals (Guarantors) who
resided in Tennessee, seeking to enforce their loan guarantees. 880 The bor-
rower was a Florida corporation that allegedly was in default on the loan.881
Guarantors claimed that Bank could not obtain personal jurisdiction over
them under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes,
because they were not residents of Florida, had "never engaged in business in
Florida," and did not, individually, own Florida real estate.882 Furthermore,
they all signed the guaranty in Tennessee, and there was nothing in the gua-
ranty that called for any performance or action by them in Florida.883 Gua-
rantors had provided financial statements to Bank.884 The trial court deter-
mined that the long-arm statute was satisfied.885 The First District Court of
Appeal reversed.886 The plaintiff must prove the defendant's "minimum con-
tacts" with Florida to comply with due process requirements.887 Simply sign-
ing a loan guaranty in favor of a Florida bank is not sufficient "minimum
contacts. 888 The appellate court noted that there was no forum selection
clause in the guaranty, but even if there had been, it was still necessary to
establish minimum contacts with the forum state absent a waiver of personal
877. Id. (quoting Plotch v. Gregory, 463 So. 2d 432, 436 n.1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1985)).
878. Seeid.at671.
879. Id.; see Polk Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Dwiggins, 147 So. 855, 857 (Fla. 1933); Milu,
Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
880. See Labry v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, AB9G, LLC, 8 So. 3d 1239, 1239 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2009).
881. Id.
882. Id. at 1240-41.
883. Id. at 1241.
884. Id.
885. See Labry, 8 So. 3d at 1239.
886. Id. at 1242.
887. Id. at 1240.
888. Id. at 1241 (citing Holton v. Prosperity Bank of St. Augustine, 602 So. 2d 659, 662-
63 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)). Contra Kane v. Am. Bank of Merritt Island, 449 So. 2d
974, 975-76 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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jurisdiction.889 The fact that financial statements were furnished by the gua-
rantors to the Florida creditor made no significant difference.89 °
D. Enforcement of Foreign Judgment
Creditor sought recognition, in the Miami-Dade Circuit Court, of Credi-
tor's judgment for $236,900 against Debtor obtained from a court in Argen-
tina.891 The trial court entered judgment for the amount of the foreign judg-
ment, and Debtor filed an appeal with the Third District.892 Debtor also per-
suaded the trial judge to stay enforcement of the judgment during the ap-
peal.893 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed.894 While the trial court
may consider a stay pursuant to rule 9.3 10 of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure, under section 55.607 of the Florida Statutes, a stay here would
only have been proper if the debtor had "satisfie[d] the [trial] court that an
appeal is pending," or that the debtor "intend[ed] to appeal"-but only if a
stay has been issued by the foreign court.895 The trial judge should have fol-
lowed the Florida Uniform Out-of-Country Foreign Money-Judgment Rec-
ognition Act.896 The Uniform Act requires that domesticated foreign judg-
ments be enforced in the same way as a judgment rendered by a court in
Florida.897
XVII. WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
The following is an update on two homestead cases mentioned in the
2006-2007 Survey.898 On rehearing en banc in Cutler v. Cutler,8 the Third
District Court of Appeal again affirmed the trial court's decision that the
decedent's residence, which she had conveyed to a land trust not long before
her death and that was to be distributed on her death to her estate for further
889. Labry, 8 So. 3d at 1241-42 (citing Hamilton v. Bus. Assistance Consortium, Inc.,
602 So. 2d 619, 621 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
890. Id. at 1242.
891. See Tettamanti v. Opcion Sociedad Anonima, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D917, D917 (3d




895. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 55.607 (2009)).
896. See FLA. STAT. §§ 55.601-.607; Tettamanti, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D917.
897. See Tettamanti, 34 Fla. L. Weekly at D917. The appellate court noted that it would
then be necessary that a bond be posted by Debtors under rule 9.310 of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Id.
898. Landau, 2006-2007 Survey, supra note 590, at 119 n.1272, 121 n.1294.
899. 994 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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distribution under the terms of her will to her daughter, did not, merely by
being held in the trust, lose its status as protected homestead. 9°° The resi-
dence, however, did lose its protected homestead status by virtue of a provi-
sion in the decedent's will that provided that the property could be used to
pay claims against her estate in the event that her residuary estate was insuf-
ficient.90' The appellate court noted that the specific direction in her will,
that the home be used to satisfy debts if the residuary was insufficient, "was
the equivalent of ordering [the home] sold and the proceeds distributed to
pay debts. 9 °2 Thus, under Florida law, the property lost its status as pro-
tected homestead.9 °3 Judge Shepherd dissented.9°4
In another case decided at about the same time as Cutler, Phillips v.
Hirshon,9 5 the Third District Court of Appeal held that for purposes of limi-
tations on and rules regarding devise and descent, a cooperative apartment is
not homestead, but certified the conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida.9°6
The Supreme Court initially accepted jurisdiction, but then reversed its deci-
sion to review the matter.9 v
900. See id. at 342.
901. Id. at 345.
902. Id.
903. Id. at 346-47.
904. See Cutler, 994 So. 2d at 347 (Shepherd, J., dissenting).
905. 958 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
906. Id. at 430-3 1.
907. Levine v. Hirshon, 980 So. 2d 1053, 1053 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey examines the key developments in constitutional, statutory,
regulatory, administrative, and case law governing public employment in
Florida during 2008-09. Part H looks at such hiring issues as privatization,
background checks, nepotism, immigration, ethics, budget cuts, employ-
ment-related torts, and jobs of the future. Part III, Terms of Employment,
covers a wide array of issues, such as hours and wages, health benefits,
workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, public pensions, safe-
ty issues, the Internet, public union issues and the Family Medical Leave
Act. Part IV addresses legal issues involving discipline, retaliation against
whistle-blowers, the False Claims Act, layoffs, furloughs and tenure issues.
Finally, Part V, Employment Discrimination, surveys the major develop-
ments in the past year involving affirmative action, bias on grounds of gend-
er, age, disability, religion, a new federal law regulating genetic testing and
remedies.
II. HIRING ISSUES: INTRODUCTION
Employers recruit employees through a wide array of methods: want
ads; "Internet job postings; 'help wanted' signs placed in storefronts, em-
ployment agencies, executive search firms, union hiring halls, job fairs, col-
lege placement offices; referrals from state employment services; and word
of mouth."1 In Florida, as elsewhere, help wanted advertising has shifted to
the Internet.2
A. Special Programs for Hiring Veterans and Mid-Career Teachers
In 2008, the Department of Labor's (DOL) Veterans' Employment and
Training Service published a final rule entitling veterans of the United States
Armed Services and spouses of some veterans to enjoy priority for employ-
ment, training, and placement services within DOL job training programs.3
1. DAVID J. WALSH, EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICE 78 (2004).
2. See Number of Jobs Advertised Online in Fla. Is Up, MIAMI HERALD, June 10, 2009,
at C3. "The number of jobs advertised online in the state was up by 5700 to 164,500 ...."
Id. Moreover, the unemployed are flocking to social networking sites such as Twitter to seek
"job leads and listings." Bridget Carey, Can You Tweet Your Way to a New Job?, MIAMI
HERALD, July 28, 2009, at Al.
3. See 20 C.F.R. § 1010.100 (2009). While traditionally veterans enjoy "lower unem-
ployment rates than nonveterans," in recent years, veterans "in their 20s have faced higher
unemployment rates" than nonveterans. Lizette Alvarez, Newest Veterans Hit Hard by Eco-
nomic Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at Al.
20091
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The rule implements section 2(a)(1) of the 2002 Jobs for Veterans Act and
section 605 of the 2006 Veterans' Benefits, Health Care, and Information
Technology Act.4
By 2013, over one-third of the United States' "3.2 million teachers
could retire, . . . a loss of talent that costs school districts millions in recruit-
ing and training expenses."5 To meet this challenge, "teacher preparation
programs geared toward job-changers is rising sharply."6  For example,
"[t]he New Teacher Project . . . oversees Teaching Fellows programs . . .
established to eliminate the achievement gap by recruiting career-changers
and college graduates to work in inner-city schools. Applications ... are up
80 percent over [2008]."'
B. Privatization
While the drive to privatize governmental entities such as schools and
prisons was at its peak in the 1980s and 90s, 8 the 2009 economic stimulus
bill unintentionally dampened interest in this practice. 9 Nevertheless, locally,
several governmental agencies have been privatized in the past year, usually
in an effort to cut costs.' ° For example, "[a] private company will take over
adult day-care offered through Pembroke Pines' popular adult day-care cen-
ter, one of several city functions jettisoned to the private sector to save mon-
ey" in 2009."
At times, Florida legislators' efforts to prevent privatization raise con-
flict of interest questions. 2 For example, when a private company sought to
privatize a Florida state hospital, a vocal opponent, a state lawmaker, "never
4. 20 C.F.R. § 1010.100. The final rule was published in the Dec. 19, 2008 issue of the
Federal Register. Priority of Service for Covered Persons, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,132 (Dec. 19,
2008) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 1010).
5. Sam Dillon, Report Envisions Shortage of Teachers as Retirements Escalate, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2009, at AI6.
6. Michael Alison Chandler, Business Is Brisk for Teacher Training Alternatives,
WASH. POST, July 31, 2009, at B I.
7. Id.
8. See David W. Breneman, For Colleges, This Is Not Just Another Recession, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), June 14, 2002, at B7.
9. Leslie Wayne, Politics and the Financial Crisis Slow the Drive to Privatize, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2009, at B3.
10. See id.
1I. Diana Moskovitz, City Will Outsource Senior Care, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 5, 2009, at
BI.
12. See Shannon Colavecchio, Hospital Privatization Is a Special Issue for Lawmaker,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 15, 2009, at B6.
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mentioned her family-owned assisted living facility's relationship with the
state hospital."' 3
Seminole County, Florida, in an effort to cut costs, is privatizing its li-
braries and there is no assurance that "a private company might keep existing
employees or hire its own staff."'
14
"The contract to centralize and consolidate the state's massive payroll
system was one of the first large-scale privatization efforts to draw fire in
Florida, in 2002."'5 Controversy over the privatization of the state's payroll
system continues in 2009: "The state's decision to consider a no-bid contract
extension for a controversial human-resources company has renewed criti-
cism from a leading state senator who says privatization initiatives have cost
taxpayers $200 million with little to show for the money."'16
Florida "privatized prison health care several years ago, but a legislative
watchdog agency said in a report [in] January [2009] that the change has
yielded 'mixed results.""17 In 2009, the Department of Corrections decided
to replace the vendor with a rival even though this new company "would
charge the state $5.5 million more for the same service over a five-year pe-
riod." ' 8 The ousted vendor has sued the state accusing it "of illegally favor-
ing a competitor."' 9
C. Background Checks
In 2008, President Bush issued an executive order, framing rules for the
presidential transition that, for the first time, allowed background checks on
prospective presidential appointees to begin before the November 4, 2008
election.2°
In 2009, labor and employee advocacy groups urged the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to investigate, among other
entities, a government career center to see if it was violating Title VII by
13. Id.
14. Dennis Boyle, Seminole County to Privatize the Library?, EXAMINER.COM, June 14,
2009, http://www.examiner.comlx- 10758-seminole-county-Liberal-Examiner-y2009m6d 14-
seminole-county-to-Privatize-the-Library.
15. Marc Caputo, No-bid Contract Draws Fire Again, MIAMI HERALD, June 4, 2009, at
B3.
16. Id.
17. Steve Bousquet, State Accused of 'Secret' Deal, MIAMI HERALD, June 6, 2009, at B .
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Exec. Order No. 13,476, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,605, 60,606 (Oct. 9, 2008).
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barring individuals with arrest or conviction records from securing bank cler-
ical jobs.2
Under the Federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act," hospitals are
required to report to a national database when a physician resigns from privi-
leges at the hospital while under investigation.23 The aim of this rule is to
bar incompetent physicians from moving from one state to another without
the second state being aware of prior problems2A
"Broward County rules stipulate that felons convicted of any crime are
not supposed to be hired for positions where they would have contact with
children. 25 In 2009, "Broward County officials are investigating how a reg-
istered sex offender managed to get a job at the Quiet Waters Park marina,
where he allegedly molested a 10-year-old girl. '' 6
Florida law requires background screenings for "noninstructional con-
tractor[s] who [are] permitted access to school grounds. 27 A federal district
court in Florida, in 2008, issued a temporary injunction barring a contractor,
who had pled nolo contendere to child abuse charges, "from entering onto
School Board property., 28 The court rejected the contractor's claim that the
statute was "unconstitutional as applied to him," because the statute was
enacted after his nolo contendere plea and "retroactively convert[ed] his nolo
contendere plea into a conviction. 29
21. See Letter from All of Us or None et al. to Stuart J. Ishimaru, Acting Chairman,
EEOC (June 9, 2009), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/aa8a86751197fa03ef-z2m6b5abc.pdf.
"Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, Baltimore, Minneapolis, and St. Paul, Minn.... have
adopted [a] 'ban the box' polic[y]" when it comes to hiring applicants with criminal records.
EEOC Weighs Guidance on Employers' Use of Criminal Records in Employment Decisions,
77 U.S.L.W. 2335, 2335 (2008). Under this system, the criminal conviction issue is deleted
from the employment application, and the issue is dealt with later in the hiring process. Id.
22. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
23. Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § II 133(a)(l)(B)(i)
(2006)).
24. Id. at 83 (citing 42 U.S.C. §11101(2) (2006)). In Leavitt, the First Circuit ruled that
an investigation of a physician, "as [the] word is used in the [Health Care Quality Improve-
ment Act] .... ends only when a health care [provider's] decision-making authority either
takes a final action or formally closes the investigation." Id. at 86.
25. Sofia Santana & Scott Wyman, Park Employee Was Convicted Sex Offender, SUN-
SENTINEL, July 23, 2009, at B8.
26. Id.
27. FLA. STAT. § 1012.467(2)(a) (2008).
28. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade v. Carralero, 992 So. 2d 353, 354 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
29. Id. at 355.
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In 2009, the Jacksonville city council enacted an ordinance, which
among other things, requires employers "contracting with the city ...to
identify potential job opportunities for ex-offenders" and try to hire them.
D. Nepotism
Florida's anti-nepotism law generally prohibits public employers from
hiring members of their families or other relatives. 31 Pembroke Pines offi-
cials may have violated Florida's anti-nepotism law by giving "a commis-
sioner's daughter a job managing the city's art studios. 32 Moreover, "[t]he
newly created job was never publicly advertised. 33
E. Immigration
In 2009, Congress passed a law forcing banks receiving "federal bailout
money to hire [U.S.] citizens over foreign guest workers. 34
In 2009, the Labor Secretary suspended regulations enacted "by the
Bush administration [governing] wages and recruitment of immigrant guest
workers for agriculture., 35
In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security issued new rules go-
verning employers receiving Troubled Asset Relief Program funds who seek
to hire foreign workers under the H-lB visa program.36 The number of guest
workers admitted to the United States under the H-lB temporary visa pro-
gram for skilled workers dropped in fiscal year 2008 by eleven percent.37
The sharp drop in H-lB visa applications was attributed "to the economic
30. G. Thomas Harper, Local Ordinances Update, FLA. EMP. L. LETTER, June 2009, at 2.
31. FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3135(2)(a), 760.10(8)(d) (2009). In an unusual case, the Kansas
City, Missouri City Council enacted an anti-nepotism ordinance barring the mayor's wife
from volunteering in the mayor's office. Andale Gross, Kansas City Chafes Under Mayor's
Wife, JOURNAL-GAZETTE, Dec. 8, 2008, at A] 2. The mayor "vetoed it, and the council over-
rode the veto." Id. In response, the mayor sued the city, alleging the "ordinance infringed on
his authority." Id.
32. Jennifer Golan, Daughter Hired for City Job, MIAMI HERALD, July 27, 2009, at B3.
33. Id.
34. Rob Hotakainen, Skilled Foreigners Hurt for Jobs, MIAMI HERALD, May I, 2009, at
A3.
35. Julia Preston, Rule Change for Workers on Farms, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at
A15.
36. CIS Announces New Requirements for TARP Recipients on Hiring H-lB Workers, 77
U.S.L.W. 2588, 2588-89 (2009).
37. RANDALL MONGER & MACREADIE BARR, NONIMMIGRANT ADMISSIONS TO THE UNITED
STATES: 2008, 2009 OFF. OF IMMIG. STAT. ANN. REP. 4, available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois ni fr 2008.pdf.
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downturn and to new restrictions on [banks] that received" federal bailout
aid.38
In 2009, the Department of Labor's Administrative Review Board ruled
that a consulting group that neglected to pay a nonimmigrant alien worker's
salary during periods of idleness, despite knowledge of H-lB visa program
rules, was liable both for back pay under the Immigration and Nationality
Act,39 and for a civil money penalty.40
In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security Secretary, Janet Napoli-
tano, said "DHS will 'strengthen employment eligibility verification' by ...
mandating the use of E-Verify by federal contractors and by [ending] the...
'no match' regulation.' In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security
modified the list of approved identity documents for the 1-9 employment
eligibility verification process. 41 Under the new rule, only unexpired docu-
ments may be accepted during the verification process. a
In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security promulgated new rules
shifting the agency's focus "more on criminal prosecution[s] of [employers]
hiring illegal immigrants and less on work[site] raids to [arrest illegal] work-
ers."
44
In 2009, both the Department of Labor and Department of Homeland
Security issued final rules governing the hiring of aliens under the H-2A
temporary agriculture system aimed at modernizing the program and enhanc-
ing worker protections.45 In 2009, the Department of Labor's Employment
and Training Administration published an interim final rule, lengthening the
transition period for employers to comply with new recruitment rules go-
vering H-2A visas.46 In 2009, the Department of Labor proposed a nine-
38. Kirk Semple, Applications for Foreign Worker Visas Are Down, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,
2009, at AI8.
39. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000 & Supp. V 2007).
40. Adm'r Wage & Hour Div. v. Pegasus Consulting Group, Inc., No. 05-086 at 7 (Dep't
of Labor Apr. 28, 2009) (final admin. review).
41. DHS Plans to Implement Federal Contractor E-Verify Mandate, Rescind 'No-Match'
Rule, 78 U.S.L.W. 2025, 2025 (2009).
42. Documents Acceptable for Employment Eligibility Verification, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,505,
76,505 (Dec. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a).
43. Id.
44. DHS Issues New Enforcement Guidelines Focusing on Employer Criminal Prosecu-
tion, 77 U.S.L.W. 2666, 2666 (2009).
45. See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations,
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., to Field Leadership 1 (June 24, 2009) (on file with
author). For the DHS rule, see Changes to Requirements Affecting H-2A Nonimmigrants, 73
Fed. Reg. 76,891, 76,891 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 214, 215, 247a).
46. Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 74 Fed.
Reg. 17,597, 17,597 (Apr. 16, 2009) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655).
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month delay of a final rule governing the hiring of foreign workers under the
H-2A temporary agriculture system.47
In 2009, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a federal district court should
have certified a class action covering employees of Mohawk Industries on
claims that the employer engaged in racketeering activity by hiring illegal
workers.48
F. Ethics
1. Supreme Court Decisions
In 2009, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,49 the Supreme Court
ruled that due process required a West Virginia justice to recuse himself
from a case involving a big donor to the justice's election campaign.50
2. Executive Orders
In 2009, President Obama signed an Executive Order enhancing ethics
rules for executive branch officials by restricting the "revolving door" be-
tween government service and lobbying and prohibiting administration offi-
cials from taking gifts from lobbyists.51
3. Supreme Court of Florida Decisions
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the state's tough lobbyist
ethics law, rejecting claims that it violated the constitutional separation of
powers and that it "infringe[d] on the Supreme Court's authority to regulate
lawyers who work as lobbyists. '"52
4. Florida Legislation
In 2009, Florida's Governor "signed into law new rules that will [re-
strict] state employees' ability to collect a paycheck and a pension from the
47. Id.; Modernizing the Labor Certification Process and Enforcement, 73 Fed. Reg.
77,110, 77,110 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 655).
48. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1358-59 (11 th Cir. 2009).
49. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
50. Id. at 2257.
51. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673, 4673, 4678 (Jan. 21, 2009).




Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
same agency."53 The law forces "retirees to wait six months before they re-
turn to work.",
54
5. Public Disclosure Issues
"Under Florida law, anyone can request a public record for any reason
and expect to get it, no questions asked. But in reality, what residents face
are confused public employees and questions: Who are you? Why do you
want this? Can you put your request in writing?"5 5 The Miami Herald found
that "[a]lmost 43 percent of the offices failed to comply with the law either
because they required a name, reason or written request or because they we-
ren't able to reasonably produce a record. 56
For some time, the city of Fort Lauderdale has released a list of the top-
paid employees "to make the salaries transparent, and it has continued as a
unique practice for local government in South Florida. Though public sala-
ries are a matter of public record, other governments-such as Broward and
Miami-Dade counties-do not produce similar annual lists."57
6. Conflict-of-Interest Issues
A report "identified 18 current and recently retired lawmakers who
work for or draw income from contracts with state universities and commu-
nity colleges. 58 Critics claim there is an "inherent conflict of interest in hav-
ing college employees sitting on committees that oversee higher education
funding and policy. ' 59 The Florida Commission on Ethics lodged an ethics
complaint against a state lawmaker "in connection with his taking a
$1 10,000 job at his local college."'6
53. Crist Signs Law Restricting Double-Dipping, MIAMI HERALD, June 19, 2009, at B5.
54. Id.
55. Public-Records Is Law Frequently Violated, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 22, 2008, at B5.
56. Id. By contrast, "[a] judge ruled that the Alaska governor's office can use private e-
mail accounts to conduct state business" without violating the state's public records law.
Associated Press, Alaska: Private E-Mail Ruling, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 13, 2009, at A20.
57. Amy Sherman, Public Service Pays Off in Lauderdale, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 5, 2009,
at Al.
58. Jennifer Liberto, Mary Ellen Klas & Steve Bousquet, Lawmakers Cash in with Cam-
pus Jobs, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 21, 2008, at Al.
59. Id.
60. Alex Leary, Sansom Hires Prominent Lawyer, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 31, 2008, at B2.
"The complaint cites a Florida statute that says no public officer shall 'corruptly use or at-
tempt to use his or her official position to secure a special privilege, benefit of exemption for
himself, herself or others."' Id.
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7. South Florida Ethics Developments
The question arose in 2009 whether Miami-Dade County officials were
improperly enlisting police officers to serve as personal drivers.61 In re-
sponse, the Commission chairman created a new system to track commis-
sioners' use of sergeants after an Internal Affairs review of the practice.
62
The 2008 "Broward Ethics Commission has one job: draft a code of
ethics to regulate commissioners' behavior. Then it ceases to exist ...
They'll consider questions like whether gifts to commissioners should be
banned, or whether they can moonlight.
63
"A series of e-mails among Dania Beach commissioners discussing city
businesses may have skirted Florida's open-meetings rules. ' 6
4
G. Budget Cuts
In the face of hard times, public sector employers in Florida are taking a
variety of steps to cut costs, including: 1) banning "most out-of-state travel
by state employees"; 65 2) "pay cuts for public officials making over
$100,000",;66 3) reducing starting pay for firefighters by "14 percent to about
$35,000,;67 4) instituting salary freezes; 68 5) abolishing "year-end bonuses or
holiday gifts"; 69 6) "quit rehiring employees who have retired"; 70 7) increas-
ing all high school teaching schedules to seven-period days;71 8) "switching
61. Matthew Haggman & Jack Dolan, Chairman Pledges to Better Track Use of Cop-
Chauffeurs, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 22, 2009, at A].
62. Id.
63. Dan Christensen, New Ethics Panel Gets the Green Light, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 5,
2008, at B3.
64. Amy Sherman, E-Mails May Violate Sunshine Law, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 10, 2009, at
BI. "Florida's Government-in-the-Sunshine Law forbids elected officials from privately
discussing issues that could come before them as an elected body." Id.
65. See Steve Bousquet, Lawmakers' Trips to Cost Public, MIAMI HERALD, July 15,
2009, at B5. "But the travel restriction doesn't apply to lawmakers themselves .... " Id.
Moreover, "[t]ravel that is related to law enforcement, military, emergency management or
public health is exempt from the restriction." Id.
66. Amy Sherman, Taxpayers Will Soon Pay More, Get Less, MIAMI HERALD, July 26,
2009, at Al.
67. Id.
68. See Cindy Goodman, Surviving a Pay Cut, MIAMI HERALD, July 15, 2009, at Cl.
69. Joyce M. Rosenberg, Economic Woes Squeeze Holiday Bonuses at Work, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 20, 2008, at G 12.
70. Nirvi Shah, Union: Stop Rehiring Teachers, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 19, 2008, at B1.
71. Patricia Mazzei, High Schools Could Get 7-Period Schedule, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
1, 2009, at B2.
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high schools to four-day weeks"; 72 9) cutting "every state worker's salary by
about 5 percent"; 73 and 10) colleges going "to a four-day schedule in the
summer."
74
H. Torts Related to Hiring
1. Respondeat Superior and Florida's Ridesharing Law
Under Florida law, an employer is not liable for injuries sustained by
third parties by employees commuting to work.75 Florida's "ridesharing law
helps limit respondeat superior liability for scope of employment injuries by





[an employer who discloses information about a former or current
employee to a prospective employer ... upon request of the pros-
pective employer ... is immune from civil liability for such dis-
closure or its consequences unless it is shown by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the information disclosed by the former or
current employer was knowingly false. 77
Employers should take note that "e-mails, Twitter, Facebook and blogs
[are] making it easier to [circulate damaging] information about em-
ployees. '"78
Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal ruled that while defamatory
"[s]tatements made by employees to other employees" are usually entitled to
qualified privilege, that "privilege vanishes if the statement is made with
malice, or to too wide an audience. 79
72. Patricia Mazzei, 4-Day School Week on Table, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 25, 2009, at B 1.
73. Marc Caputo & Breanne Gilpatrick, Pay Cuts for Workers Studied, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 17, 2009, at B6.
74. Luisa Yanez, College Cuts to 4-Day Workweek to Save Cash, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 3,
2009, at B3.
75. See FLA. STAT. § 768.091(1) (2009).
76. Martin E. Segal, Are We at Risk for Company Carpool Accidents?, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 3, 2008, at G14.
77. FLA. STAT. § 768.095.
78. Tresa Baldas, Workplace Defamation Suits Rise, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 13, 2009, at 1.
79. Glynn v. City of Kissimmee, 383 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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At the federal level, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in 2009 that members of Congress enjoy immunity from defamation
suits for speech made within the scope of their employment. 80
3. Negligent Hiring
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal certified the following ques-
tion for review:
After the legislature created a statutory duty requiring [the De-
partment of Children and Family Services] (DCF) to license and
monitor the activities of substance abuse counselors, does a duty in
tort arise, owing by DCF to a counselor's client: (1) when DCF
negligently licenses the counselor, (2) when the counselor harms a
client, and (3) when the client has no relationship with DCF great-
er than that of any other citizen?
81
It turned out that a Florida Power and Light (FPL) employee who
drilled a hole in a nuclear plant pipe causing huge losses "had a long criminal
record. '82 Nevertheless, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) con-
cluded "FPL was not liable because it had followed all of NRC's 'rigorous'
procedures in hiring and supervising the worker.
' 83
A Miami-Dade jury awarded $1.2 million to a "man hit in the groin by a
batting-cage pitch," concluding that the employer "negligently failed to
properly supervise its employees. '
In L.A. Fitness International, L.L.C. v. Mayer,85 a gym patron suffered a
cardiac arrest while using a stair-stepping machine. 86 "The club manager had
CPR training but decided not to administer it since he believed the injured
person had suffered a stroke. 87 The Florida court rejected a suit for negli-
gence in failing to properly administer CPR, concluding that "a business
80. See Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Congressman John
Murtha enjoyed immunity from defending a defamation suit arising from comments made to
the press on civilian deaths in Haditha, Iraq. Id. at 377-78, 387.
81. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Chapman, 9 So. 3d 676, 686-87 (Ha. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2009) (alteration in original).
82. FPL Customers Pay for Others' Mistakes, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 14, 2008, at A1 6.
83. Id.
84. Jennifer Lebovich, Man Hit at Batting Cage Awarded $1.2M, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
12, 2008, at B3.
85. 980 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
86. Id. at 552.
87. Martin E. Segal, Does Health Club Have Legal Obligation to Give Medical Aid?,
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 6,2008, at GI6.
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owner satisfies its legal duty to come to the aid of a patron experiencing a
medical emergency by summoning medical assistance within a reasonable
time. 88
I. Jobs of the Future
By 2016, jobs in health care89 and those requiring postsecondary educa-
tion will see the largest gains while manufacturing will continue its gradual
decline.90 According to the Labor Department, the fastest growing occupa-
tions are systems and data analysts and home care aides.91 Even though
South Florida hospitals suffer from extreme shortages in nurses, until recent-
ly the high cost of housing here "'saw a lot of nurses resigning, moving away
from this area-to North Florida, Tennessee, Georgia, the Carolinas.' 92
Besides the demand for nurses, the United States economy has created de-
mand for people with specialized skills such as pharmacists and engineers
even amid a recession.93
Workers furloughed from dwindling manufacturing jobs "are training as
truck drivers and welders," jobs thought at least to last through the "deep
recession."94  Moreover, "[t]he tough job market is prompting a growing
number of women across the country to dance in strip clubs, appear in adult
movies, or pose for magazines" such as Hustler.95
88. Id. (quoting LA. Fitness Int'l, L.LC., 980 So. 2d at 558).
89. See Editorial, Caring for the Caregivers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at A30. "In
December [2008], employers added 32,000 health-related positions [nationally]." Id. In
2009, "only the healthcare sector has gained jobs in South Florida." Scott Andron & Joel
Poelhuis, Where's the Work?, MIAMI HERALD, June 20, 2009, at Al.
90. Catherine Rampell, Job Growth in Health Is Expected to Be Strong, N.Y. TIMES, July
14, 2009, at B3.
91. Douglas Martin, Evelyn Coke, 74, Dies; Home Care Aide Fought Pay Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, at A16. "Home care agencies are... expected to employ nearly two
million aides by 2014." Id.
92. John Dorschner, Nurses Lured from S. Fla., MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 30, 2008, at C3.
"Nurses in some South Florida hospitals are now averaging over $30 an hour, and some are
getting signing bonuses of $5,000. They can earn $45,000 to $69,000 a year .... Id.
93. See Christopher S. Rugaber, Even in the Recession, Some Jobs are Out There,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 2009, at A7.
94. Louis Uchitelle, Bad Times Spur a Flight to Jobs Viewed as Safe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 2009, at Al.
95. Karen Hawkins, Recession, Unemployment Give Some Reason to Dance,
CHARLESTON GAzErrE, Mar. 23,2009, at A6.
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III. TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT
A. Hours and Wages
1. Fair Labor Standards Act Issues
a. Minimum Wage and Overtime Issues
In 2009, the Federal Government Accountability Office found that the
Labor Department's Wage and Hour Division is failing in its role of "enforc-
ing minimum wage, overtime, and many other labor laws. 96 But "[d]uring
the first six months of the [Obama administration], the Department of Labor
recovered more than $82 million in back wages for almost 107,000 mini-
mum-wage workers." 97
On July 24, 2009, the federal minimum wage increased from $6.55 to
$7.25 per hour.98
Owing to the "Great Recession" 99 in 2009, the average workweek
shrank to "33 hours-the shortest ever recorded."' °  "Wages have fallen
each month since October [2008]-a total of 5 percent over the past eight
months."1 1 "Two surveys found employers have increased salaries [in 2009]
by the smallest percentage in decades .. .."',02 Florida alone has seen the
personal income of state residents decline for nine months-the longest in
sixty-one years. 103 "Florida recorded a 0.9 percent fall in personal income in
the first quarter of [2009], compared with the fourth quarter of 2008."' '
96. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Agency Is Failing Workers, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2009, at A14.
97. Hilda Solis, Minimum-Wage Increase Can Make a Difference, MIAMI HERALD, July
25, 2009, at A23.
98. Id. "Eighteen states and the District of Columbia already have minimum wages that
are higher or equal to $7.25 an hour." Minimum Wage Will Go Up Friday, MIAMI HERALD,
July 20, 2009, at A3.
99. Editorial, Dangers of the D-Word, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2009, at A32 ("Alan Green-
span said a depression required 15 percent unemployment for three to nine months or 12 per-
cent unemployment for nine months or more.... President Ronald Reagan said: 'A recession
is when your neighbor loses his job. A depression is when you lose yours."').
100. Roger Lowenstein, The New Joblessness, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 26, 2009, at ]], 12.
101. Christopher Leonard, Any Job at All, Just to Pay the Bills, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 8,
2009, at C4 [hereinafter Leonard, Any Job at All]. In the private sector with 109 million jobs,
during the last 10 years, the annual growth rate for jobs was an anemic 0.01 percent. Floyd
Norris, Job Growth Lacking in the Private Sector, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at B3.
102. Raises Among Tiniest, MIAMI HERALD, July 22, 2009, at Cl.
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"Florida's first-quarter decline was larger than income cuts in all but seven
states."'05 One report "ranks South Florida No. 85 among the nation's 100
largest metropolitan areas in economic performance, as of March 2009,
based on employment, unemployment rates, wages, gross metropolitan prod-
uct, housing prices, and foreclosure rates."' 10 6 According, to the Commerce
Department, Florida "ranked 45th among the 50 states for growth in per-
person income."'' 0 7 In Florida, per-capita income for 2008 "was $39,070, up
1.7 percent from $38,417 the previous year. ' 10 8 "National per-capita income
[in 2008] was $39,751, up 2.9 percent from the previous year. ' 9
The plight of home health care workers drew renewed attention with the
death of Evelyn Coke who sued "[i]n a case that reached the Supreme Court
in 2007 ... to reverse federal labor regulations that exempt home care agen-
cies from having to pay overtime."' 0 Although the Court rejected her claim,
in 2009, "15 senators and 37 House members wrote to Hilda L. Solis, secre-
tary of labor, urging her to eliminate the exemption for home attendants."' "
In 2009, the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division issued the
following opinion letters: 1) a letter making clear that an employer may in-
sist that employees who are exempt from the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the Fair Labor and Standards Act (FLSA) use their accrued
vacation time amid a temporary plant closure without losing their exempt
status or violating the FLSA;1l2 and 2) three opinion letters making clear that
employers assessing whether time spent by employees in training is com-
pensable under the FLSA, must consider the timing and goal of the training
and its relationship to a worker's usual duties.'1 3
105. Id.
106. Clifford M. Marks, Report: South Florida Recovery May Be Near, MIAMI HERALD,
June 17, 2009, at C i.
107. Scott Andron, Income Trails Inflation, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 25, 2009, at C3.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Martin, supra note 91.
111. Id.
112. Opinion Letter from Alexander J. Passantino, Acting Adm'r, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Employment Standards Admin., Wage & Hour Div., No. FLSA2009-2, 1 (Jan. 14, 2009),
available at http:llwww.dol.gov.lesa/whd/opinion/FLSA/2009/2009 01_14_02_FLSA.pdf.
113. Opinion Letter from Alexander J. Passantino, Acting Adm'r, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Employment Standards Admin., Wage & Hour Div., No. FLSA2009-1, I (Jan. 7, 2009),
available at http:llwww.dol.govlesa/whd/opinion/FLSA/200912009_01_07_01-FLSA.pdf;
Opinion Letter from Alexander J. Passantino, Acting Adm'r, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employ-
ment Standards Admin., Wage & Hour Div., No. FLSA2009-13, 2 (Jan. 15, 2009), available
at http:llwww.dol.gov/esalwhdlopinionlFLSA/2009/200901_ 15 13 FLSA.pdf; Opinion
Letter from Alexander J. Passantino, Acting Adm'r, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment Stan-
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Under proposed federal legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 2008, com-
pensatory and punitive damages would be recoverable under the FLSA."
14
The bill would also amend the Equal Pay Act "to make it more difficult for
employers to use the 'bona fide factor other than sex' defense."" 
5
Sugar companies invoked a nineteenth century Florida law requiring
workers suing for back wages to each post a $100 bond. 16 Critics contend
"'the de facto function of the bond is to [bar court] access ... on the basis of
poverty."'1
7
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that plaintiffs who were employed as either
firefighter/emergency medical technicians or rescue supervisors fell within
an exemption from overtime applicable to employees who engage in fire
protection activities where plaintiffs "have been trained in fire suppression,
have been issued 'turn-out' gear, and can be required on pain of disciplinary
action to engage in fire suppression."'"1 8
The City of Fort Lauderdale plans to cut overtime pay to its police of-
ficers from $6.1 million in 2009 to less than $2 million in the future."19
"Some employment lawyers anticipate more salespeople who work on
commission will be filing lawsuits over pay issues such as minimum-wage
violations as layoffs climb in the faltering economy." 120
b. Child Labor Issues
"Businesses at three South Florida malls let 50 underage employees op-
erate dangerous equipment" in violation of the FLSA's provisions governing
child labor.' 2' "Although it's legal to employ minors in most workplaces,
federal law prohibits them from performing certain jobs deemed dangerous,
such as roofing, coal mining, operating a meat slicer, making explosives,
using power saws and scrap compacting.
''122
dards Admin., Wage & Hour Div., No. FLSA2009-15, at 2 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://
www.dol.gov/esa/whd/opinion/FLSA/2009/2009011515-FLSA.pdf.
114. John B. Phillips, The Obama White House and HR: Possible Changes Based on
Pending Laws, FLA. EMP. L. LETTER, Dec. 2008, at 6.
115. Id.
116. Laura Wides-Munoz, Cane Workers See Last Chance to Recover Fla. Wages,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 5, 2009.
117. Id.
118. Gonzalez v. City of Deerfield Beach, 549 F.3d 1331, 1334-36 (11 th Cir. 2008).
119. Brittany Wallman, Police Overtime Pay Being Cut, MIAMI HERALD, May 26, 2009, at
B3.
120. Patrick Danner, Car Salespeople See Less Pay, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 21, 2009, at C3.
121. Evan S. Benn & Laura Figueroa, Teen Labor Violations Cited, MIAMi HERALD, Jan.
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c. Proposed Paid Vacation Act
In 2009, a Florida congressman introduced a bill-the Paid Vacation
Act-that would make paid vacation a requirement under the FLSA. 2 3 Em-
ployers of more than one hundred employees would be required to give full-
time and part-time employees a week of paid vacation after working one
year.'24 Three years after the law is in place, employees who put in one year
would be entitled to two weeks of paid vacation, but employers with "50 or
more employees" would only have to provide one week. 125
A 2009 survey found that thirty-four percent of U.S. employees will not
use all of their earned vacation time in 2009," citing work-related pres-
sures. 26 Employees "will give back an average of three vacation days
each.' 'f 27 "[W]omen are more likely than men to feel guilty about taking
time off from work."' 12
8
2. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
In 2009, Congress overturned the Supreme Court ruling in Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 29 by enacting the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act, 130 making clear that the deadline for filing a claim of pay discrimination
under Title VII runs from when an employee receives unequal pay, not from
the time the employer first decided to discriminate. 3' But one "South Flori-
da labor lawyer says until women make different choices, their incomes
won't rise, no matter how many bills are signed into law. By choices, he's
talking about the careers they pursue, the hours they work, the jobs within
their industries they hold and the parenting decisions they make."' 132
123. Paid Vacation Act of 2009, H.R. 2564, 111 th Cong. (2009).
124. H.R. 2564 § 3(c)(1).
125. H.R. 2564 § 3(c)(2).
126. G. Thomas Harper, Workplace Trends, FLA. EMP. L. LETTER, June 2009, at 6.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
130. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, S. 181, 111 th Cong. (2009).
131. See id. S. 181 § 3. "A broader bill aimed at combating gender-based wage discrimi-
nation remains stalled in Congress." Editorial, Paycheck Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
2009, at A24.
132. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Matters of Money, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28, 2009, at Cl
[hereinafter Goodman, Matters of Money].
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"In one of the first decisions to interpret the scope of the . . .Fair Pay
Act, a federal judge.., refused to apply the law's relaxed time limits to fail-
ure-to-promote claims."' 33
3. Gender and Racial Wage Gap
"In Florida, women made no significant gains in winning top corporate
jobs and even lost board director positions over the past two years.' 134 But
"more women are advancing into the executive offices by holding the posi-
tion of chief financial officer."'35 "One percent of senior corporate officers
are black women... compared with 3 percent for black men, 14 percent for
white women and 77 percent for white men."' 36
"[W]omen make only 77 cents for every dollar paid to men."' 3 7 In Mi-
ami-Dade County, women earn "72 cents for every dollar a man earns.
138
Moreover, "wage theft, or the nonpayment of money owed for work, is ram-
pant in Miami-Dade County. This may be because immigrant women make
up 63 percent of the female workforce."' 39
4. Farm Workers' Wages
At the national level, "[ltens of thousands of Mexicans who labored in
the United States under a World War H-era guest worker program will be
eligible to collect back pay under a settlement to a long-fought lawsuit.
' 4°
"Under the settlement ... Mexico would give each bracero, or a surviving
heir, $3500."'
14 1
133. Shannon P. Duffy, Judge: Ledbetter Act Doesn't Apply to Lost Promotion Suit,
LAW.COM, May 27, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202430992687 (last visited
Nov. 7, 2009).
134. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Fewer Women Winning Jobs in Executive Suites, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 11, 2009, at CI [hereinafter Goodman, Fewer Women Winning Jobs in Execu-
tive Suits].
135. Id.
136. Jesse Washington, Study: Networking Hinders Black Women Execs, CONN. POST,
Jan. 7, 2009.
137. Goodman, Matters of Money, supra note 132.
138. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Working Women Worse Off in Dade, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
17, 2009, at C3 [hereinafter Goodman, Working Women Worse Off in Dade].
139. Id.
140. Pam Belluck, Settlement Will Allow Thousands of Mexican Laborers in U.S. to Col-
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In the past, Florida tomato growers refused calls for farm "workers to
be paid at least another penny per pound of tomatoes picked.' 42 But "to
combat the perception that they are not helping improve the lives of farm-
workers ... growers [have] launched the Farmworker Community Support
Foundation to fund programs related to farmworkers' child care, education
and healthcare."' 43 Despite these efforts, "[flarm workers from Immokalee
traveled to Tallahassee to ask the state to fight 'modern-day slavery' and
improve working conditions."' 44 In 2008, "five farm bosses pleaded guilty to
a scheme to enslave Mexican and Guatemalan nationals as farm workers in
Immokalee. Prosecutors said the farm bosses were paying the workers mi-
nimal wages and had threatened them with violence."'45
B. Health Benefits
I. Health Insurance
"Surveys suggest that rising premiums have prompted more than half of
small businesses to reduce benefits, raise deductibles or require workers to
shoulder a larger share of an ever more expensive pie."'
146
Since 1990, "the number of employers who have switched to self insur-
ance has increased dramatically," starting with big employers and spreading
to smaller employers.'47
2. Domestic Partnership Benefits
By presidential memorandum in 2009, federal employees may add
same-sex domestic partners to their long-term care insurance plans and can
"use their sick leave to take care of domestic partners and [their] non-
biological, non-adopted children.' 4 8 Moreover, foreign service employees'
142. Elaine Walker, Tomato Growers Give Workers a Lift, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 24, 2009,
at C3.
143. Id.
144. Breanne Gilpatrick, Farm Workers Protest Conditions, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 10,
2009, at B6.
145. Id.
146. Kevin Sack, Small Payroll, but Big Woes on Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at
Al.
147. Healthlnsurance.info, Self-insured Employers, http://www.healthinsurance.info/
HISELFI.HTM (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
148. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Presidential Memorandum on
Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination (June 17, 2009) [hereinafter Press Release, Fact
Sheet] (on file with author); see Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Memorandum for
the Heads of Executive Dep'ts and Agencies (June 17, 2009) (on file with author).
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same-sex domestic partners may use medical facilities at posts overseas, be
eligible for medical evacuations, and be included in housing allocations.14 9
In 2009, Miami commissioners "unanimously passed a domestic part-
nership ordinance giving employees with same-sex or opposite-sex partners
the same rights and benefits as married couples."' 5 ° "Gay activists say it's
only a matter of time before legal challenges are filed to domestic partner-
ship laws in Miami-Dade, Broward and other parts of the state."'' 1 Indeed, a
charter amendment has already been proposed "in Hillsborough County that
would pre-emptively outlaw spending taxpayer dollars on same-sex bene-
fits.,' 5
2
3. Insuring the Uninsured and Underinsured
"By some estimates, about half of the nation's uninsured are people
who are self-employed or work for a small business.' 153 "Workers in firms
with fewer than 25 workers are now twice as likely to be uninsured as those
in larger firms.' 5 4 "[S]ome 70 percent of uninsured Americans come from
families with one or two full-time workers."' 55
More than two dozen states allow "parents to claim these [uninsured]
young adults as dependents for [health] insurance purposes up to age 29." 156
"At least one-fifth of Florida's population lacks health coverage. Flori-
da's uninsured rate is the third-highest in a nation where about 50 million
people are uninsured .... "'15 According to a report by Families USA, more
149. Press Release, Fact Sheet, supra note 148. In 2009, suit was filed in Massachusetts
alleging that the federal government violates equal protection by denying same-sex couples
federal benefits. Abby Goodnough & Katie Zezima, Suit Seeks to Force Government to Ex-
tend Benefits to Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at A12. Although over 1100
federal laws distinguish on the basis of marital status, the lawsuit focuses on "Social Security,
federal income tax, federal employees and retirees, and the issuance of passports." Id.
150. Charles Rabin, Domestic-Partner Ordinance Passed, MIAMI HERALD, June 12, 2009,
at B5.
151. Beth Reinhard, Activists Ready to Fight Threat to Partnerships, MIAMI HERALD, Nov.
21, 2008, at Al.
152. Id.
153. Reed Abelson, Health Insurers Balk at Changes for Small Business, N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 2009, at B I.
154. Sack, supra note 146.
155. Editorial, Health Reform and Small Business, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at A20.
156. Cara Buckley, For Uninsured Young Adults, Do-It-Yourself Medical Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at Al.
157. Marc Caputo, Crist Touts Limited Health Plan, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9, 2009, at B I
[hereinafter Caputo, Crist Touts Limited Health Plan].
[Aiccording to research from the Economic Policy Institute ... 58 percent of [Floridians] un-
der age 65 were covered by employer-sponsored plans in 200607... down 4.2 percent since
2009]
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than 3500 Floridians per week will lose healthcare coverage through 2010.158
"Fewer women who work full time in Miami-Dade County have healthcare
coverage from their employers than the national average."'159
Florida Governor "Crist's new Cover Florida healthcare proposal has
signed up only 3757 people in a state with nearly four million uninsured.
[Meanwhile,] an estimated 77,250 Floridians have lost health-insurance cov-
erage since Cover Florida began releasing statistics in March." 160
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida is offering the uninsured discount
cards. 16 1 "It's not insurance, but the program boasts it can offer discounts of
5 to 40 percent for those providers who take the card. . . . But the plan
doesn't cover hospital costs-a crucial gap if anyone . . . gets seriously
ill. ' ' 161 "The FamilyBlue card costs $20 a month to get discounts on doctor
visits, prescription drugs, dental care, vision care, hearing care, diabetic sup-
plies and vitamins.' 63
4. Rising Health Insurance Costs
"U.S. health care spending in 2007 grew at its lowest rate in nine years,
due mainly to a slowdown in prescription drug spending and lower adminis-
trative costs for the Medicare program . . . ."'64 "Premiums for job-based
health insurance [rose] 5 percent in 2008 and have more than doubled since
1999, a growth rate that far [exceeds] inflation and the [slow rise] in work-
ers' wages over the same period ... .
Miami ranked number one "for healthcare costs [for seniors] among the
307 metropolitan areas surveyed"-"$16,351 a year-twice the national av-
2000-01. For workers, 64.9 percent were covered by employer plans in 2006-07, down 4.7
percent from 2000-01. For children under 18, 54.9 percent were covered by employer plans in
2006-07, down 3.3 percent from 2000-01.
G. Thomas Harper, Florida News in Brief, FLA. EMP. L. LETTER, Dec. 2008, at 5.
158. See John Dorschner, Coverage Losses Per Week in State: 3500, MIAMI HERALD,
July 16, 2009, at C2.
159. Goodman, Working Women Worse off in Dade, supra note 138. "Only 51 percent of
women working full-time have healthcare coverage from their employer. The national aver-
age is 66 percent." Id.
160. Caputo, Crist Touts Limited Health Plan, supra note 157. In Massachusetts, after a
three year effort, "97 percent of [its] residents have health insurance-by far the highest rate
in the nation." Editorial, The Massachusetts Model, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at WK7.
161. See John Dorschner, Discount Healthcare?, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 30, 2008, at El.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Tony Pugh, Growth Rate of Health Spending Slows in U.S., MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 6,
2009, at A5.
165. Tony Pugh, Job-Based Premiums Rise 5%, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 25, 2008, at Cl.
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erage of $8304."' 166 Fort Lauderdale ranked twenty-third-"with an average
cost per senior of $9,816 a year.' 167
5. Gender and Racial Health Care Gap
A 2008 study found "a widespread gap in the cost of health insurance,
[with] women pay[ing] much more than men of the same age for individual
insurance policies" offering the same coverage. 168  "[W]omen [even] pay
more than men for insurance that does not cover maternity care."'169 Over-
weight and obese women earn less than their slimmer counterparts., 70 "In
1981, the thinner women earned about 4.29 percent more than their heavier
counterparts. But by 2000, that difference grew to 7.47 percent .... 171 This
year, "[t]he Florida Legislature . . .may consider a bill to end one of the
thorniest situations in healthcare-women paying more for health insurance
than men.' 7 2
6. COBRA Issues
The 2009 "federal stimulus package will pay 65 percent of the cost of
COBRA health insurance for those being laid off.'' 173 "To get the full subsi-
dy, adjusted gross income must be less than $125,000 if single or $250,000 if
married and filing a joint tax return. ' 174 The subsidy ends "once income ex-
ceeds $145,000 for singles and $290,000 for joint filers.' 75 Under the 2009
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, employers must notify all em-
166. John Dorschner, Miami Care Costliest in Nation, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 26, 2009, at
Cl.
167. Id. "Some leading South Florida doctors maintain high costs are driven by the large
number of malpractice lawsuits, which increase liability insurance prices and cause many
doctors to go without coverage." Id.
168. Robert Pear, Women Buying Health Policies Pay a Penalty, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30,
2008, at Al.
169. Id. "Insurers say they have a sound reason for charging different premiums: Women
ages 19 to 55 tend to cost more than men because they typically use more health care, espe-
cially in the childbearing years." Id.
170. Brett Graff, Women Make Gains by Losing Weight, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 15, 2009, at
El.
171. Id.
172. John Dorschner, Bill Seeks Gender Equity in Insurance Premiums, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 1,2009, at El.
173. John Dorschner, COBRA's a Conundrum for Many Who Lose Jobs, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 29, 2009, at El.
174. Eileen Ambrose, Stimulus Package has COBRA Expense Relief, MIAMI HERALD,
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ployees who were laid-off between September 1, 2008 and December 31,
2009 that they are eligible for the sixty-five percent government-funded
COBRA discount.'76 The premium reduction ends 1) when the individual
becomes eligible for Medicare or other group coverage; 2) after nine months
of the discount; or 3) when the maximum period of COBRA coverage ends,
whichever occurs first.177
"In Florida, the average monthly family COBRA premium is $1037,
which is more than the average monthly unemployment benefit of $1013.
For an individual policy in Florida, COBRA is $371 monthly-more than a
third of the unemployment check., 178
7. HIPAA Issues
In 2009, a nurse was charged with HIPAA violations after she took pic-
tures of a patient with a sex device lodged in his rectum and "posted them on
her Facebook page."1 7
9
C. Workers' Compensation
Penalties against Florida employers who fail to provide workers' com-
pensation insurance can be severe. 80 "The penalty for not carrying workers'
[compensation] coverage for employees may be $1000 or a formula based on
the premium the employer would have paid, multiplied by 1.5. The penalty
can go back three years and may be stiffer for riskier businesses, such as
roofing."1 81 To encourage compliance, a new whistle-blower website aims at
"mak[ing] it easier for workers to check their companies' coverage and to
complain anonymously if their employer does not carry workers' [compensa-
tion]."182
176. See Marjorie Glover & Edward Smith, New COBRA Subsidy Requirements Impact
Employers, Insurers and Health Plan Participants, LAW.coM, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.law.
com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id= 1202430059402.
177. Id.
178. John Dorschner, Report: COBRA Cost Is Too Much, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 10, 2009,
at C3.
179. Nurses Fired over Cell Phone Photos of Patient, WISN.COM, Feb. 25, 2009, http:l/
www.wisn.com/cnn-news/1 879631 5/detail.html.
180. See Marcia Heroux Pounds, Firms Without Coverage Nabbed, MIAMI HERALD, Aug.
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In 2008, in Murray v. Mariner Health,183 the Supreme Court of Florida
ruled "that an attorney representing injured employees" in workers' compen-
sation cases "should collect 'reasonable fees.""'  Critics of the decision
feared it would result in a "return to an hourly fee structure for attorneys in
workers' comp cases, eliminating the schedule set up by the 2003 law" re-
sponsible for workers' comp rates falling sixty percent. 85 In fact, in 2009,
Florida's insurance commissioner "raise[d] workers' compensation rates 6.4
percent in response to" the Murray ruling.
186
A year after the Supreme Court of Florida struck down the attorneys'
fee limits law for workers' compensation, the Florida Legislature passed a
new law overruling the high state court and "restor[ing] caps on fees for law-
yers who represent workers in compensation appeals for on-the-job inju-
ries. ,187 "[T]rial lawyers and unions say the [new law is] unfair to workers
who are hurt and help companies that can spend more on lawyers, raising
constitutional problems."'188 In response to the new law, Florida's insurance
commissioner rescinded the 6.4 percent "workers' compensation rate in-
crease that went into effect April 1 .,,189
In Sanders v. City of Orlando,9 ° the Supreme Court of Florida settled a
state court split over a 2001 amendment to the state's workers' compensation
statute dealing with how lump-sum settlements are approved.'9 ' The Court
ruled that the change did not divest judges of compensation claims of their
ability to set aside improper settlements.
192
183. 994 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2008).
184, Beatrice E. Garcia, Workers' Comp Rate May Rise Close to 19%, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 18, 2008, at C3 [hereinafter Garcia, Workers' Comp Rate]; Murray, 994 So. 2d at 1062.
The attorney representing "an injured nurse was initially awarded $685 after 80 hours of work.
The court ruling reset his fees to $16,000." David Decamp, Panel OK's Limits on Attorney
Fees, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 18, 2009, at B6.
185. Garcia, Workers' Comp Rate, supra note 184. "Changes in the law passed in 2003
imposed a strict fee schedule for attorneys." Bill on Attorney Fees Heads to the House, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 18, 2009, at 3C.
186. Workers' Compensation Rates Raised 6.4 %, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 27, 2009, at C3.
The increase was the first one in over five years. Workers Compensation Insurance Rates
Rise, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 11, 2009, at C3.
187. Associated Press, New Law Caps Lawyers' Fees for Workers' Comp, MIAMI HERALD,
May 30, 2009, at B3.
188. Decamp, supra note 184.
189. Bill Kaczor, Workers' Comp Hike Rolled Back, MIAMI HERALD, June 4, 2009, at C 1.
190. 997 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 2008).
191. See id. at 1094.
192. See id. at 1095.
20091
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Under Florida's Heart-and-Lung Act, hypertension "applies only to ar-
terial or cardiovascular hypertension."' 193 Florida's workers' compensation
statute creates a presumption that hypertension leading to disability of fire-
fighters, law enforcement officers, or correctional officers are compensa-
ble.194 Invoking this presumption, a 50-year-old retired Miami police offic-
er's health insurance carrier denied his hundreds of thousands of dollars in
medical claims, "saying it is the responsibility of workers' compensation
because he had a preexisting condition at the time of his first heart attack in
2007."195
In Bifulco v. Patient Business & Financial Services, Inc.,' 96 plaintiff
brought a retaliation claim for filing a workers' compensation claim against a
public entity. 197 Florida courts are split over whether workers' compensation
claims against public entities are tortious in nature, which triggers a notifica-
tion process enabling the public entity to decide whether to waive its sove-
reign immunity. 198 This court distinguished workers' compensation claims
from common law tort claims, thus dispensing of the notification require-
ment. i99
Cabrera v. T.J. Pavement Corp.2° interpreted the 2003 change in work-
ers' compensation law regarding when an employee can sue the employer in
tort and is not bound by the exclusivity of workers' compensation. 20 ' The
2003 law made it harder for employees to sue their employers in tort by
changing the substantially certain "standard with the virtually certain stan-
dard. 202
In Houck v. Lee County Board of County Commissioners,°3 under the
workers' compensation law in effect at the time of the plaintiffs accident, an
injured worker need only establish that his injuries were "catastrophic" to
prove a claim for permanent total disability. 204 To rebut, the employer must
offer conclusive evidence that the worker had "a substantial earning capaci-
193. Bivens v. City of Lakeland, 993 So. 2d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
194. FLA. STAT. § 112.18(1) (2009); see Bivens, 993 So. 2d at 1102.
195. Jennifer Lebovich, Ill Ex-Officer's Bills in Limbo, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 20, 2009, at
B4.
196. 997 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
197. Id. at 1257.
198. See id. at 1257-58.
199. Id. at 1258.
200. 2 So. 3d 996 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
201. Id. at 998-99.
202. Id. at 999 n.4.
203. 995 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
204. Id. at 1104.
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"[T]his recession has been the most punishing job destroyer in at least
60 years, slashing a net total of 6.7 million jobs. All told, 14.5 million
people were out of work [in July 2009], with a jobless rate of 9.4 percent., 27
In South Florida, the unemployment rate for Miami-Dade in June 2009 was
10.6 percent "and 9.4 percent for Broward. '2 °8 Florida "ranked second in the
United States for job losses in 2008 ... Florida lost 255,200 jobs last year,
more than any other state except California.' '209 "State forecasters also are
predicting an unemployment rate near 11 percent-with close to 1 million
out-of-work Floridians-through the end of 2011 .,210
In 2009, nine million Americans received unemployment compensation,
with payments averaging around $300 per week,21' varying by state and work
history. 212 Laid-off workers in half the states are eligible for up to seventy-
nine weeks of benefits, the longest period ever.213 As a result, unemployment
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Leonard, Any Job at All, supra note 101. "All told, nearly 25 million Americans
were either unemployed, underemployed, or had given up looking for a job in April [2009]."
Frank Bass, Even Part-Time Workers Losing Jobs, MIAMI HERALD, June 6, 2009, at C4. "U.S.
births fell in 2008, the first full year of the recession, marking the first annual decline in births
since the start of the decade and ending an American baby boomlet." Mike Stobbe, Births
Fell 2 Percent as Recession Began, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 8, 2009, at A7.
208. Editorial, Tough Choices Ahead for South Florida, MIAMI HERALD, July 20, 2009, at
A16. Miami-Dade's unemployment rate is "the worst jobless rate since September 1983,
when it was 10.8 percent." Scott Andron, I in 9 Out of Work in County, MIAMI HERALD, July
18, 2009, at Al. In January 1983, Miami-Dade's jobless rate was 13.7 percent. See id.
209. Scott Andron, State Economy Not Quite Worst, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28, 2009, at Cl.
210. Scott Andron & Marc Caputo, Later Florida Recovery Seen, MIAMI HERALD, July 22,
2009, at CI.
211. Erik Eckholm, Prolonged Aid to Unemployed Is Running Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2009, at Al. In Florida, the maximum weekly unemployment check is $275. See Michael
Luo, Extended Benefits Are a Lifeline for Many Unemployed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at
A30 [hereinafter Luo, Extended Benefits].
212. Eckholm, supra note 211. In Florida,
[ylou must have worked in the state for a minimum period of time, earned a certain amount of
money and have been dismissed from your last job for reasons other than "misconduct." In
this context, misconduct means a willful disregard of the employer's interests; poor job per-
formance is not necessarily misconduct.
Scott Andron, Some Tips on Filing Jobless Claims, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 2, 2009, at El.
213. Eckholm, supra note 211. "[Ulnemployment benefits are exempt from Social Securi-
ty and Medicare taxes." Richard Perez-Pena, As It Cuts Jobs, Gannett Also Cuts Severance
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funds are being exhausted.2"4 States are borrowing billions of dollars to pay
idled workers who wait far longer for benefits to begin." 5
In 2008, the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Admin-
istration issued a final rule barring unemployment compensation claimants
with multistate wages from forum shopping.1 6 While Florida accepted near-
ly two billion dollars in federal stimulus money in 2009 to extend the dura-
tion of jobless benefits by up to twenty weeks and to pay an extra $25 per
week, the state rejected $444 million which would have extended benefits to
some part-time employees and to those who quit out of necessity.1 7
In Florida,
only 32 percent of jobless state residents are able to access unem-
ployment benefits. Many of the remaining workers fall through
the cracks because of outdated eligibility rules that do not count
their most recent work .... The result often prevents low-wage
workers and those in high-turnover fields from getting unemploy-
ment compensation .... 218
Pay, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at B5. But "[m]any jobless Americans find their problems
aggravated by bank fees on their unemployment benefits." Christopher Leonard, Bank Fees
Compound Problems of Jobless, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 20, 2009, at Cl. "Through the first
quarter of 2009, employment for 16- to 24-year-olds dropped by 5 percent, the largest decline
for any age cohort.... This produced the lowest employment rates for young people in al-
most 40 years." Morley Winograd & Michael D. Hais, Young Adults Remain Optimistic,
MIAMI HERALD, June 25, 2009, at A15. "For instance, the government does not consider so-
called 'discouraged' workers, who have given up looking for a job, as part of the labor force.
And part-time workers who want full-time jobs, but can't find them, are considered em-
ployed." Scott Andron & Joel Poelhuis, Where's the Work?, MIAMI HERALD, June 20, 2009,
at Al. "Currently, people can draw benefits for up to 79 weeks in 24 states and from 46
weeks to 72 weeks in others." Eckholm, supra note 211.
214. Eckholm, supra note 211.
215. Lawrence Downes, Scrambled States of America, N.Y. TIMEs, July 27, 2009, at A20.
Some banks are "lower[ing] mortgage payments for some homeowners to an average of $500
a month for three months as part of a new program to help the unemployed." Citigroup to Aid
Jobless on Loans, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 4, 2009, at D3.
216. Employment and Training Administration, 73 Fed. Reg. 63,068, 63,069 (Oct. 23,
2008) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 616).
217. Alex Leary, State Rejects Some Jobless Funds, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 30, 2009, at B6.
Federal stimulus money would also mean that "the nearly 10 percent of Floridians receiving
food stamps should get $27 more a month." Marc Caputo, $13.5 Billion Stimulus Could Boost
Food Stamps, Jobless Aid, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 5, 2009, at B6. "Florida added 50 staff
members to its unemployment insurance division in [2008], bringing its total to around 870. It
also recently added 345 lines to its phone system for a total of just over 1,000, and has ex-
tended its call-in hours." Luo, Extended Benefits, supra note 211.
218. Arthur J. Rosenberg, Too Few Eligible for Assistance, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 6, 2009,
at AI5. "Two bills before the Florida Legislature, SB 516 and H 1333, would modernize this
[Vol. 34
179
: Nova Law Review 34, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
SURVEY OF FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LA W
In 2009, a new law amended Florida's unemployment compensation
law governing the "calculation of employers' tax rates and the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Trust Fund['s] solvency. ' 219 The new law lowers that
part of an employee's wage that is not subject to the unemployment tax until
2015.220 Afterwards, taxable wages revert to $7000.221 In sum, for five
years, "employers will be taxed on an additional $1,500" of income to re-
store solvency to Florida's Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund.222
Moreover, the new law raises "the positive fund balance adjustment factor
from 3.7 percent of taxable payrolls to 4 percent. 2 3
"Unemployment among black Floridians could reach almost 17 per-
cent" by Spring 2010, up from 14.6 percent in 2009, while the overall jobless
rate is estimated to be 11.8 percent in Spring 20 10.224 "Much of the disparity
is due to a concentration of blacks and Hispanics in construction, blue-collar
or service-industry jobs that have been decimated by the economic melt-
down.
225
"If the recession continues, women are poised to surpass men on the na-
tion's payrolls . . . because most large-scale layoffs have been in male-
'p226dominated industries.
[A] full 82 percent of the job losses have befallen men, who are
heavily represented in distressed industries like manufacturing and
construction. Women tend to be employed in areas like education
and health care, which are less sensitive to economic ups and
downs, and in jobs that allow more time for child care and other
domestic work.227
system. They would give part-time workers, victims of domestic violence and low-wage
earners a lifeline....I" d.
219. Fla. Senate Comm. on Commerce, SB 810 (2009): Summary of Legislation Passed






224. Scott Andron, Black Joblessness Could Leap, MIAMI HERALD, July 28, 2009, at C3.
225. Jesse Washington, Firing Habits Favor Whites-Traditional Layoff Formula Increases
Minority Job Loss, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 24, 2009, at D3.
226. Goodman, Fewer Women Winning Jobs in Executive Suites, supra note 134.
227. Catherine Rampell, U.S. Women Set to Surpass Men in Labor Force, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2009, at Al. "'The unemployment rate for males in April 2009 was 10 percent, versus
only 7.2 percent for women, the largest absolute and relative gender gap in unemployment
rates in the post-World War II period."' Bob Herbert, No Recovery in Sight, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 2009, at A 17.
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"Workers ages 45 and over form a disproportionate share of the hard-
luck recession category, the long-term unemployed-those who have been
out of work for six months or longer .. .
E. Public Pensions
1. Federal Regulation
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed new rules
to end the practice known as "pay to play," an unspoken arrangement where-
by public pension fund "investors are chosen [by fund managers] not for
their low fees and high skills but for their connections. 229
Nationally, "[s]tate pension funds lost $865.2 billion in 2007-2008....
And assets for 109 state funds declined about 30 percent" in that period. 3 °
2. Florida's Public Pension Fund
Amid the economic recession of 2008-09, Florida's public employee
pension plan "lost $37.9 billion-27 percent-over 13 months. 231  While
Florida's retirement fund enjoyed "an $8.2 billion surplus" in 2008, it sus-
tained "an $8.7 billion deficit" in 2009.232 Despite these losses, "[t]he direc-
tor of the Florida's $90 billion state retirement fund says the pension account
is in good shape. "233
Florida's State Board of Administration (SBA) "manages more than
$122.6 billion of the state's investments," including billions of dollars in
Florida employees' pension funds.234 A bill is likely to be introduced in the
2009 "legislative session that would expand the SBA's investment advisory
committee to include qualified representatives from the pension plans. 235
228. Michael Luo, Longer Periods of Unemployment for Workers 45 and Older, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at AlIl [hereinafter Luo, Longer Periods].
229. Editorial, A $2.2 Trillion Temptation, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2009, at A24.
230. Donya Currie, State Pensions Go Downhill, AARP BULLETIN, Mar. 2009, at 6.
"Pension costs were blamed for bankrupting Vallejo and pushing other California cities to the
brink." Fred Grimm, Warnings Not Heeded About Pension Burden, MIAMI HERALD, June 14,
2009, at B 1.
231. Bill Kaczor, State Pension Fund Takes Hit, but Still Above Water, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 18, 2008, at Cl.
232. Grimm, supra note 230.
233. Pension Boss Says Florida's Fund Is Stable, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 25, 2009, at C3.
'The fund has 93 percent of what it needs to cover everyone entitled to a pension." State
Fund Suffers Loss, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 6, 2009, at Cl.
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The SBA's new executive director said, "Florida will still have a conserva-
tive and diversified investment strategy with a focus on the long term. 236
"In 2007, the state Legislature passed a bill that required the pension plans to
divest any stock issued by any company or its subsidiaries that did business
with Iran or Sudan. 237
In June 2009, Governor Crist "signed into law new rules that will limit
state employees' ability to collect a paycheck and a pension from the same
agency.
238
The amount of overtime put in by police officers and firefighters has a
dramatic effect on their public pensions which are based on an employee's
five highest-paid years.239 Some "deputies and fire rescue workers bumped
up those averages considerably, some nearly doubling base salaries with
[overtime]." 240
Under Florida law, public officials who commit certain crimes stand to
forfeit their public pensions.24' The former Broward sheriff lost his
$130,000-a-year pension after "admitting he took tens of thousands of dollars
from BSO vendors and lied on his income-tax returns., '242 An administrative
law judge ruled in 2009 that the crimes the disgraced former sheriff pleaded
guilty to constituted a felony under Florida law.243
F. Safety Issues
I. Federal Activity
In 2009, reversing a Bush administration policy, President Obama in-
structed executive departments and agencies that state law should be
preempted sparingly.2 "Throughout our history, [s]tate and local govern-
236. Bill Kaczor, Pension Chief's Approach Conservative, Diversified, SUN-SENTINEL,
Nov. 28, 2008, at B10.
237. Beatrice E. Garcia, Florida Retirement System Often Votes Its Shares for Change,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 19, 2009, at 19.
238. Crist Signs Law Restricting Double-Dipping, supra note 53. In 2009, some school
districts began to "no longer allow[] teachers to work [beyond] their planned early retirement-
unless they agree to work in a disadvantaged school." Patricia Mazzei, Teacher Rehiring
Considered, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 17, 2009, at B3.
239. Grimm, supra note 230.
240. Id.




244. Memorandum from President Barak Obama to the Heads of Exec Dept's & Agencies,
74 Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693 (May 20, 2009).
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ments have frequently protected health, safety, and the environment more
aggressively than has the national Government.
245
In 2008, the Department of Transportation's Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration issued interim regulations permitting commercial mo-
tor vehicle drivers "to drive up to 11 hours" within a single workday. 46
2. Florida Safety Issues
In 2008, "Gov[ernor] Charlie Crist signed [the] so-called guns-at-work
legislation... allowing employees with concealed-weapons permits to begin
stashing their firearms in their locked cars at work starting July 1 .,247 In the
first case to assess the validity of the new law, a federal district court ruled
that the Florida statute forcing employers to allow employees with permits to
carry concealed weapons to keep guns secured in their vehicles in the em-
ployer's parking lot is, for the most part, likely valid. 48 Other lawsuits alleg-
ing violations of the new concealed-arms law include a security guard who
sued Walt Disney World "after he was terminated for having a weapon in his
car at work."249 The first South Florida case involves a funeral home em-
ployee who claims his firing violated the new state law.25
"Five employees at Broward County's main courthouse have filed law-
suits saying mold at the building made them sick." 251
The Palm Beach County Public School Board "is considering amending
the requirements of a new anti-bullying policy, mandated by state law, to
specifically prohibit harassing students [or staff members] who believe they
245. Id. The White House memorandum was published in the May 22, 2009 issue of the
Federal Register, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693. Id.
246. Hours of Service of Drivers, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,567, 69,567 (Nov. 19, 2008) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 385, 395). The final rule was published in the November 19, 2008
issue of the Federal Register, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,567. Id.
247. Monica Hatcher, Governor Signs Gun Law, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 16, 2008, at C2.
248. Fla. Retail Fed'n Inc. v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1289-91 (N.D. Fla.
2008). In 2007, a federal judge found the Oklahoma concealed-arms law was preempted by
the "[Flederal Occupational Safety and Health Act, which requires employers to maintain a
safe work environment." Patrick Danner, Fired Worker's Suit Tests New Concealed-Arms
Law, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 29, 2009, at C1.
249. Danner, Fired Worker's Suit, supra note 248.
250. Id. In 2008, Disney World agreed "to restrict its employee gun ban to company
property only. Employees who work outside the Walt Disney World Resort area will be al-
lowed to keep guns locked in their cars if they have a concealed-weapons permit, keep the
guns hidden, and leave them in their cars." G. Thomas Harper, Disney Relaxes Hard-Line
Stance Against Guns at Work Tweaks Policy, FLA. EMP. L. LETrER, Oct. 2008, at 6.
251. Diana Moskovitz, Court Staff: Building Mold Made Us Sick, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 1,
2009, at B 1.
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were born the wrong sex and those who may be perceived as being too mas-
culine or too feminine for their gender.
252
G. Internet, E-mail, and Cell Phone Issues
Many employers are still struggling to shape their online policies. 3
While both wide-open Internet access and fully closed approaches are unten-
able, employers should conduct employee training on topics such as "online
liability and confidentiality. '254 One option is for employers to grant em-
ployees online access to some sites, but limit what they can do there. s
"A national safety group is advocating a total ban on cell-phone use
while driving" and says "businesses should prohibit employees from using
cell phones while driving on the job. 256
H. Public Union Issues
In 2008, "[u]nion membership in the United States rose ... by the larg-
est amount in a quarter-century, a gain of 428,000 members ... [and] most
of the new members were government employees. 257 In 2008, "36.8 percent
of government employees belong to unions, compared with just 7.6 percent
of workers in the private sector. ' 258 In 2008, "[the number of unionized
government workers grew by 275,000 ... and the number of unionized pri-
vate sector workers grew by slightly more than 150,000.,,259
In 2009, in Locke v. Karass,260 a unanimous United States Supreme
Court ruled that a local union can charge a service fee to objecting non-
members for a share of the national union's litigation expenses without vi-
olating the First Amendment. 26' Those costs, the Court made clear, are prop-
erly related to collective bargaining.262 Also in 2009, in Ysursa v. Pocatello
Education Ass'n,263 the United States Supreme Court ruled that an Idaho law
252. Laura Green, School District Explores New Protection for Gay Students, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 6, 2008, at CI.
253. See Martha Irvine, Opening Up the Internet, MIAMI HERALD, July 18, 2009, at C3.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Joan Lowy, Group to Drivers: Hang up Phone, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2009, at 6.
257. Steven Greenhouse, Union Growth in 2008 Was Largest in 25 Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2009, at A 18.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. 129 S. Ct. 798 (2009).
261. Id. at 806-07.
262. Id. at 807.
263. 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009).
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banning local government employers from allowing payroll deductions for
political activities does not violate the public unions' First Amendment free
speech rights.26
In 2009, charter schools, "which are publicly financed but managed by
groups separate from school districts," have become targets of unionization
drives.265 Some question whether unions will enhance "the charter move-
ment by stabilizing its ... transient teaching force, or weaken it by" barring
employers from dismissing incompetent teachers. 66
While the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 granted collective bargain-
ing rights to federal employees, it permits the President to remove some
classes of employees from coverage.267 Exercising this option, in 2008, Pres-
ident Bush, by executive order, ruled out collective bargaining rights for
"8600 federal employees who work in law enforcement, intelligence and
other agencies" tied to national security.
268
A federal district court in Florida ruled that a public union did not vi-
olate its duty of fair representation by refusing to represent an employee
dismissed "for filing a false worker's compensation claim ... in the griev-
ance process against the County,, 269 concluding that "the Union did not act
arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith. 27°
I. Family Medical Leave Act Issues
The Defense Department's authorization bill for fiscal year 2008 in-
cluded provisions amending the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to offer
two new leave options-military caregiver leave and qualifying exigency
leave.2 71 Eligible employees who are family members of soldiers are entitled
to take up to six months of leave in a twelve month period to care for a se-
riously ill or wounded soldier whose injury occurred in the line of duty while
on active duty.272
264. Id. at 1096.
265. Sam Dillon, As More Charter Schools Unionize, Educators Debate the Effect, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2009, at Al.
266. Id.
267. Robert Pear, Some Federal Workers Lose Bargaining Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2008, at A20.
268. Id.
269. Wimberly v. Miami-Dade County, 8 So. 3d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
270. Id. at 1162.
271. Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.100(a) (2009).
272. 29 C.F.R. § 825.127(a). New Department of Labor regulations implementing these
statutory amendments took effect January 16, 2009. Id.
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Federal legislation proposed, in 2008, the Federal Employees Paid Pa-
rental Leave Act,2 73 which would allow federal employees to take four weeks
of paid leave after the birth or adoption of a child. 74 The worker would also
be entitled to four additional weeks of accrued paid sick leave.275
Proposed federal legislation, the Healthy Families Act, 76 among other
things, requires employers with fifteen or more employees to provide paid
sick leave based on a formula set out in the bill.277
In 2009, a Labor Department opinion letter made clear that a 1995 regu-
lation interpreting the phrase notice as soon as is practicable in the FMLA
usually meant notification within one or two business days no longer ap-
plied.278 Instead, under the new rule, an employee is not guaranteed an al-
lowance of a specific number of days within which to provide notice of unfo-
reseen FMLA leave.279
In Martin v. Brevard County Public Schools,2 80 the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that a public school employee, who was fired for not completing a per-
formance improvement plan while on approved leave, may pursue FMLA
interference and retaliation claims against her former employer.28'




Fort Lauderdale's Office of Professional Standards is conducting an in-
vestigation over whether the police department "purportedly rewards officers
for making arrests and handing out citations, while penalizing those who
don't go along by revoking overtime and voluntary details. ' 282 "Quotas for
273. Federal Employees Paid Parental Leave Act of 2008, H.R. 5781, 110th Cong. (2008).
274. Id. § 2(a)(3)(A).
275. Id. § 2(a)(3)(A)-(B).
276. Healthy Families Act, S. 910, 1 10th Cong. (2007).
277. Id. §§ 4(3)(B)(i)(I), 5(c).
278. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter FMLA2009-I-A (Jan. 6,
2009), available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/opinion/FMLA/2009/2009_01_06_IA
FMLA.pdf.
279. See id.
280. 543 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2008).
281. Id. at 1267-68.
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making arrests and writing tickets are widely criticized in law enforcement
circles. 283
In 2007, a Florida circuit judge, "a longtime criminal court judge, was
transferred to the civil division after making a racially-charged comment




"A Weston middle school principal said a sleeping disorder led him to
try to strangle his wife. '285 Even though the principal was charged with bat-
tery by strangulation, his public employer said the principal's "arrest is 'not
what we consider to be a school-related matter. It doesn't have any impact
on the school district or this individual's ability to function as a school prin-
cipal." 286
"Sixteen Broward Sheriffs Office employees, including 15 deputies,
have been moved to desk jobs while they are investigated for possible steroid
use ... [t]hat lead to the group's being told to submit to drug tests., 287 Sub-
sequently, nine deputies "were cleared after tests showed they were steroid-
free. ,,288
B. Retaliation and Whistle-Blowing
In 2009, in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government,2 8 9 the Supreme
Court ruled that an employee who did not initiate a job discrimination com-
plaint, but spoke up about harassment when questioned during her employ-
283. Jennifer Mooney Piedra, System Widely Criticized but Sometimes Used, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 27, 2008, at A2.
284. Todd Wright, Minority Lawyers Eye Judge Vacancies, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 20,
2008, at B 1.
285. David Smiley, Principal Cites Sleep Disorder, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 8, 2009, at B1.
286. Id.
287. Diana Moskovitz, 16 Investigated for Possible Steroid Use, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 25,
2009, at B3.
288. Diana Moskovitz, Nine Cleared in BSO Steroid Case, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 18, 2009,
at B3. "BSO prohibits the use of steroids unless obtained 'through a legitimate physi-
cian/patient relationship and prescription.' BSO policy also outlaws the use of masking
agents to hide steroid use." Id.
289. 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009). "Lower courts had ruled Crawford was not protected under
the federal anti-retaliation law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, because she had not 'insti-
gated or initiated' the complaint, but merely answered questions in a case already under way."
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er's internal investigation of sex bias allegations, is protected from retaliation
by her employer under Title VII.290
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal ruled that a "building-
inspection supervisor and whistle-blower fired by the Broward School Board
should get her job back. 291
A Miami-Dade prosecutor was suspended after a memo raising doubts
about the Miami-Dade State Attorney's independence from the Miami-Dade
Police Department was posted on his blog "and linked it to a popular Miami-
Dade legal website for the world to see. ' 92 The veteran prosecutor claims
his employer "trampled on his First Amendment free-speech rights by reta-
liating against him for posting his own memo to the 'Justice Building'
blog. '' 293 The employer, citing Garcetti v. Ceballos,294 asserts that "'state-
ments made by public employees pursuant to their official duties are not pro-
tected under the First Amendment.'
' 295
The Republican Party of Palm Beach County refused to seat a white su-
premacist, the winner of an "election as a committeeman because he failed to
sign a loyalty oath. 296 The Republican Party claims "Mr. Black's associa-
tions appear to violate the oath he failed to sign, which requires that candi-
dates avoid activities that are 'likely to injure the name of the Republican
Party.' 2
97
In Bruley v. Village Green Management Co.,298 the plaintiff alleged
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.299 The employee invoked
the public policy supporting the exercise of his right to bear arms.3°° The
court dismissed the plaintiff's claim, given that he was an at-will employee
and Florida does not recognize the common law doctrine of wrongful dis-
charge in violation of public policy absent a specific statute creating the
cause of action.3°'
290. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849.
291. Hannah Sampson, Court: Give Job Back to Whistle-Blower, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 8,
2009, at B3.
292. Jay Weaver, Free-Speech Suit Rocks State Office, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 21, 2009, at
Al.
293. Id.
294. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
295. Weaver, supra note 292 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421).
296. Damien Cave, A Local Election's Results Raise Major Questions on Race, N.Y.
TIME, Dec. 12, 2008, at A22.
297. Id.
298. 592 F. Supp. 2d 1381 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
299. Id. at 1384.
300. Id. at 1386.
301. See id. at 1386-88.
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C. False Claims Act
Under the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA),3 °2 the
False Claims Act's (FCA) reverse false claim provision was amended to
make clear that the knowing retention of an overpayment is a violation of the
statute.3°3 In addition, FERA expands liability under the FCA to eliminate
the requirement that a false claim be presented to a federal official or that it
directly involve federal funds. 3"
D. Layoffs
A 2009 study found that most workers laid-off in a recession, "on aver-
age, had not returned to their old wage levels,... even 15 to 20 years lat-
er.'3 5 Moreover, "earnings were about 15 percent to 20 percent less than
they would have been had they not been laid off.
3 06
Laid-off "[w]orkers ages 45 and over ... were out of work 22.2 weeks
in 2008, compared with 16.2 weeks for younger workers. 3 7 Even when
finally re-employed, older workers face a "steeper [decline] in earnings than
their younger counterparts. 3 8
Public employees, however, "have faced fewer layoffs and pay cuts
than those in the private sector.'30
9
"There is robust social science evidence that there is serious workplace
discrimination against mothers, and that in the context of this economic
downturn it appears that mothers are encountering lots of what they see as
'mommy RIFs,"' 31 ° or reductions in force.31'
"The Broward Teachers Union filed a lawsuit [in July 2009] to stop the
school district's plans to hire new teachers until the union can review public
302. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-32).
303. Id. § 4.
304. See id. § 4.
305. Michael Luo, Years After Layoffs, Many Still Struggle to Match Old Salaries, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, at Al.
306. Id. A new reinsurance provider, PayCheck Guardian, pays policyholders "$1,500 a
month for six months" if they "lost [their] job through no fault of [their] own." Ron Lieber,
Insure YourselfAgainst a Job Loss? Good Luck, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at B 1.
307. Luo, Longer Periods, supra note 228.
308. Id.
309. Marc Caputo, State Officials' Pay to Be Cut 2 Percent, MIAMI HERALD, May 30,
2009, at B I.
310. Jonathan D. Glater, Job Cuts Cause Boom in Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at
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records to make sure Broward is first bringing back as many laid-off teachers
as possible. 312
E. Furloughs
Furloughs-temporary, usually unpaid, leave-are popular compared to
layoffs.313 While some workers take the time off, others work through fur-
loughs, out of fear of losing their jobs.31 4 "[F]urloughs have become increa-
singly common in the public and private sectors as employers" search for
ways to avoid layoffs.31 5 During the 2008-09 recession, even if employees
"avoid being laid off, many employers have [retrenched] in other ways, re-
ducing employees' hours, imposing furloughs, and even" reducing salaries.3 1 6
The number of people working part-time has increased sharply during the
recession.31 7
Furloughs may be voluntary or involuntary.3 8 For example, in Broward
County, Florida, the sheriff "asked law enforcement and detention deputies
to take voluntary furloughs" in order to avoid layoffs.3 19
As for salaried workers, "[fiurlough rules are clear: [i]f ... any work
[is performed] at all during a week-long furlough-[even] answering an e-
mail .... [the employee] is owed the entire week's salary. 32 °
One furloughed-worker even "started a website called furloughhouses-
wap.com, where [the furloughed] can swap [houses] for a week in another
city. 32
1
Seventeen states have adopted "work-sharing," under which "employers
reduce their workers' weekly hours and pay, often by 20 or 40 percent, and
then states make up some of the lost wages, usually half, from their unem-
ployment funds. 322
312. Patricia Mazzei, Union Sues over Rehiring, MIAMI HERALD, July 30, 2009, at B1.
313. Susan Saulny & Robbie Brown, On a Furlough, but Never Leaving the Cubicle, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2009, at Al.
314. Id.
315. Amy Sherman, Wanted: Furlough Volunteers, MIAMI HERALD, July 14, 2009, at B 1.
316. Michael Luo, Still Working, but Forced to Make Do with Less, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2009, at A I.
317. Id.
318. See Sherman, Wanted: Furlough Volunteers, supra note 315.
319. Id.
320. Cindy Krischer Goodman, The New F-word [Furloughs] Are Forcing Employees to
Do the Unthinkable-Shut offfrom Work Completely, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 15, 2009, at Cl.
321. Id.
322. Steven Greenhouse, Out of Work, Part Time, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, at B I.
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Some of the biggest legal challenges faced by employers as a result of
furloughs include: 1) its impact on exempt employees, i.e., salaried em-
ployees who get paid if they work twenty hours or sixty hours. 323 -if not
careful, such employees may become "non-exempt employees" entitled to
overtime; 2) whether to "force employees to use accrued vacation [or] make
it optional;" 3) its impact on 401 (k) plans; and 4) whether WARN Act notifi-
cation duties are triggered.2 4
F. Tenure
In 2008, the chancellor of the Washington public schools proposed huge
raises, up to "$40,000, financed by private foundations, for teachers willing
to give up tenure. 325
In 2009, the Florida Legislature considered a bill, HB 1411, which
"would take teachers hired after July 1 five years, instead of three, to reach a
less-protective tenure .... A tenured teacher would be limited to a five-year
contract and could be [dismissed] without cause when it expires ... [or] at
any time if their students underachieve. '"326
In 2009,
Florida Atlantic University professors.., filed a formal com-
plaint against the school, claiming the layoffs of tenured faculty
members violate their union contract.
Under the union contract, less-experienced faculty members
must be laid off before tenured professors when they are all in the
same program, or "lay off unit.
'327
323. Amanda Bronstad, Mandatory Employee Furloughs Carry a Long List of Legal Con-
cerns for Employers, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNU.jsp?id=1202428552132&slreturn=l&hbxlogin=l.
324. Id.
325. Sam Dillon, School Chief Takes on Tenure, and Stirs a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2008, at Al.
326. Associated Press, Teaching Contracts New Teachers Could Get Less Job Security,
MIAmi HERALD, Apr. 8, 2009, at B8. By contrast, New York law bars "the use of student test
scores in teacher tenure decisions." Sam Dillon, Administration Takes Aim at State Laws on
Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009, at A11.
327. Kimberly Miller, Four FAU Professors Challenging Layoffs, MIAMI HERALD, June
30, 2009, at B5.
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V. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Generally
In 2008, charges of age discrimination rose by 28.7 percent (24,582
claims); allegations of race discrimination rose by 11 percent; retaliation
claims rose 22.6 percent; and sex discrimination claims rose 14 percent.
328
In 2009, the Supreme Court ruled in Pearson v. Callahan29 that the
two-step analysis, required in Saucier v. Katz,331 for assessing whether de-
fendants in a civil rights action are entitled to qualified immunity,3 ' is flexi-
ble. 3 2 Courts need not always start by settling whether a constitutional vi-
olation occurred, but may begin the inquiry by asking whether the alleged
right was clearly established at the time.333
Under proposed federal legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 2008, the
damage caps under Title VII would be removed.334
B. Affirmative Action
In 2009, in Ricci v. DeStefano, 3 5 the Supreme Court set a new rule of
law on when an employer can intentionally discriminate to avoid a lawsuit.
3 3 6
Ruling in favor of white firefighters, the Court concluded the city violated
Title VII by throwing out the results of tests used for firefighter promotions
because minorities did not make the cut.337 The Court made it clear that the
city's fear of a disparate impact lawsuit was an insufficient basis for discard-
ing the test results, thereby relying on race to the detriment of successful test-
takers.338
"To avoid charges of discrimination, many cities have already been
moving away from such tests in favor of other methods of hiring and promot-
328. Sam Hananel, Complaints of Job Bias Hit a Record, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 12, 2009,
at C6.
329. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
330. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
331. See id. at 201.
332. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
333. Id. at 819 (quoting Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2005)).
334. Phillips, supra note 114, at 6.
335. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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ing employees in places like fire and police departments. They say written
tests are often not the best way to determine who can perform best." '339
In 2009, fifty advocacy groups "asked President Barack Obama to issue
an executive order . . . encourag[ing] the hiring and training of minorities,
women, and low-income residents to work on federal construction projects,
[specifically] those funded by the economic stimulus package." 34
"A plan to devote construction contracts from a new ballpark to black-
owned businesses fell apart... because [the] Miami-Dade County Attorney.
. . said the pact would violate court rulings prohibiting governments from
awarding contracts based on race."34'
C. Gender, Same-Sex, Transsexuals, and Pregnancy Discrimination
In 2009, in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,342 the Supreme
Court ruled that Title IX does not preclude filing a gender discrimination suit
under the equal protection clause against a school system under the federal
civil rights damages statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 343
In 2009, in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen,344 the Supreme Court resolved a
circuit court split over whether an employer violated the Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act (PDA) by calculating a woman's current retirement benefits
based on the employer's pre-PDA practice of denying service credit for
pregnancy leave. 345 The Court rejected arguments that the PDA applied re-
troactively. 46
A federal district court in Florida ruled that an employer unlawfully
fired a worker in retaliation for filing a charge of gender and pregnancy dis-
crimination under the participation clause of the Florida Civil Rights Act.347
Florida state courts and federal district courts in Florida are split over
whether the Florida Civil Rights Act encompasses pregnancy discrimina-
339. Steven Greenhouse, For Employers, Ruling Offers Little Guidance on How to Make
Their Hiring Fair, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at AI3.
340. Tony Pugh, Diversity Sought in Stimulus Hiring, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 9, 2009, at C3.
341. Jack Dolan & Charles Rabin, Race-Based Deal Crumbles, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 18,
2009, at B5. In 2008, "[i]n Nebraska, a proposed ban on affirmative action passed easily with
nearly 58 percent of the vote. But in Colorado, a nearly identical proposal was narrowly re-
jected, marking the first time a state's voters chose to retain such preferences." Dan Frosch,
Vote Results Are Mixed on a Ban on Preference, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at A19.
342. 129 S. Ct. 788 (2009).
343. Id. at 797.
344. 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009).
345. Id. at 1973.
346. Id. at 1971.
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tion. 48 In Carsillo v. City of Lake Worth,349 the state court concluded in the
affirmative.35° By contrast, a federal district court, in Boone v. Total Renal
Laboratories, Inc., 351 ruled that the Florida law does not cover pregnancy
discrimination.352
A federal district court in Florida ruled that "offensive language need
not . . . be targeted at the plaintiff in order to support a claim of hostile
workplace environment" sexual harassment.353
In Scott v. Publix Supermarkets, 354 the court found that the plaintiff did
not put her employer on notice regarding sexual harassment but allowed the
case to go to trial on the issue of whether denial of a transfer request consti-
tutes an adverse employment action.355
In 2009, more than one hundred female employees filed a lawsuit
against Florida's Department of Corrections, "alleging they were subject to
constant sexual harassment from male inmates., 35 6 "The Corrections De-
partment changed its rules ... [in 2008] to make the intentional exposing of
genitals or masturbating by an inmate subject to 60 days in disciplinary con-
finement and the loss of 90 days of gain time. 357
In 2009, "[a] bipartisan group of U.S. representatives . . . introduced
legislation that would make it illegal for employers to discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. 3 58 At present, discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity "is legal in 30 states
based on sexual orientation and in 38 states based on gender identity. 359
Lake Worth and Palm Beach County added provisions to their anti-
discrimination codes that "prevent discrimination based on gender identity,"
348. Id. at 1265-66.
349. 995 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
350. Id. at 1121.
351. 565 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
352. Id. at 1327. While pregnancy discrimination is actionable under Title VII, in this
case plaintiff's Title VII claim was time-barred. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss & Alterna-
tive Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 4; Boone, 565 F.
Supp. 2d at 1323.
353. Blizzard v. Appliance Direct, Inc., 34 Fla. L. Weekly D1604, D1606 (5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2009).
354. No. 07-60624-CIV, 2008 WL 2940672 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2008).
355. Id. at *7, *9.
356. Alex Leary, Female Prison Employees Sue Over Inmates' Sexual Harassment, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 20, 2009, at B6.
357. Id.
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following the firing of the former Largo city manager for undergoing a sex
change.36
D. Age Discrimination
In 2009, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,6 the Supreme Court
made it substantially harder for employees to win age discrimination claims
by ruling that employees bringing disparate treatment claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) must prove "that age was the
'but-for' cause of the ... adverse employment action." 362 The Court made it
clear that, unlike Title VII disparate treatment cases where employees need
only prove that illegal bias was just a motivating factor,363 the ADEA bars
discrimination "'because of" the employee's age,3 6 which means "'by rea-
son of [or] on account of."' 36 5  In essence, the Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins366 burden-shifting framework for mixed-motive cases under Title
VII does not apply to ADEA cases.367
In 2009, the EEOC issued a technical assistance document aimed at
helping employees and employers understand the rules governing waivers of
ADEA claims, including a checklist for employees to consult before signing
a waiver as well as a sample release for employers.368
E. Disability Discrimination
In 2009, the EEOC approved a rule implementing the 2008 Americans
with Disabilities Act Amendments Act,369 which overturned four United
States Supreme Court rulings that Congress concluded had misread the ADA
360. Willie Howard, A Transgender Triumph, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 9, 2009, at B5.
361. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
362. Id. at 2352.
363. Id. at 2349.
364. Id. at 2350 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006)).
365. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1966)).
366. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
367. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351-52; see Mora v. Jackson Mem'l Found., Inc., 21 Fla. L.
Weekly Fed. D407, D411 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2008) ("Age discrimination claims" under Flor-
ida's Civil Rights Act "are analyzed under the same framework as ADEA claims.").
368. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Understanding Waivers of
Discrimination Claims in Employment Severance Agreements, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/qanda.severance-agreements.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
369. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 1, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553
(2008) (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
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and unduly restricted the statute's coverage.370 Among other things, the new
rule "identifies impairments that 'will obviously be "substantially limiting,"'
including cancer, diabetes, HIV/AIDS, major depression, post-traumatic
stress disorder, and schizophrenia.
37
'
In 2009, the EEOC issued guidelines on how employers should handle a
possible swine flu pandemic without violating the ADA.372 Under the guide-
lines, an employer may require new hires to submit to a medical exam to
determine exposure to the flu virus after extending a conditional job offer,
but before the new hire begins work, so long as all new employees in the
same job class face the same examination. Employees may also be re-
quired to wear personal protective gear, subject to the right of reasonable
accommodations.374
The Second, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have ruled that driv-
ing is not a major life activity under the ADA.375 In 2009, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit ruled that the U.S. Marshals Service's (USMS) ban on the use of hearing
aids by court security officers during mandatory hearing tests did not violate
the ADA because the USMS established that the ban was both job-related
and a business necessity.376
370. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 §§ 3-4. The 2008 ADA Amendments Act re-
jected the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of "disability" in the ADA in Sutton v.
United Air Lines and Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams. See Toyota Motor Mfg. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187, 195-98 (2002); Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 481-82
(1999).
371. EEOC Clears Notice of Proposed Rule Interpreting the ADA Amendments Act, 77
U.S.L.W. 2780, 2781 (June 23, 2009) (quoting Christopher Kuczynski, EEOC assistant legal
counsel and director of EEOC's Office of Legal Counsel's ADA policy division).
372. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Pandemic Preparedness in the
Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/pandemic
flu.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Pandemic Preparedness].
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. E.g., Winsley v. Cook County, 563 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2009) (nurse with exces-
sive absenteeism after being diagnosed with a stress disorder following a car accident that
made her anxious about driving had no ADA claim) (citing Kellog v. Energy Safety Serv.
Inc., 544 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2008); Chenoweth v. Hillsborough County, 250 F.3d
1328, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2001); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 158 F.3d 635, 643
(2d Cir. 1998)).
376. Allmond v. Akal Sec., Inc., 558 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11 th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff's pro-
posed reasonable accommodation, removing the ban, was not reasonable given public safety
concerns. Id. at 1318.
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In 2008, the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA)
377
was signed into law, prohibiting employment discrimination based on the
genetic information of an individual and his or her family members.378
GINA prohibits employers from obtaining or disclosing such information.
379
The Act's coverage, enforcement, and remedial provisions mirror those un-
der Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended by the
1991 Civil Rights Act.380  GINA took effect on Nov. 21, 2009.8 Unlike
Title VII, however, GINA expressly rules out disparate impact claims.382
In 2009, the EEOC published a proposed rule that incorporates refer-
ences to GINA into some of the EEOC's existing regulations that cover pro-
cedures under Title VII and the ADA.383
G. Religion
A "midnight" regulation issued by the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services in December 2008, aimed at barring bias against providers who
prefer not to supply emergency contraceptives and other reproduction servic-
es to women, was challenged as unconstitutional.384
In 2009, the Department of Health and Human Services published a
proposal to rescind a regulation barring employment discrimination against
health care workers who refuse to provide abortion-related services owing to
religious objections. 385
377. Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff-2000ff 11).
378. Id. § 203(a).
379. Id. § 203(b).
380. See id. § 207]
381. See id. § 213.
382. Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008 § 208(a).
383. See Amendment of Procedural and Administrative Regulations to Include the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), 74 Fed. Reg. 23,674, 23,674 (May 20,
2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1601, 1602, 1603, 1607, 1610, 1611, 1614, 1625,
1690).
384. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4-5, Connecticut v. United States,
No. 09-CV-54 (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 2009).
385. Rescission of the Regulation Entitled "Ensuring That Department of Health and
Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in
Violation of Federal Law"; Proposal, 74 Fed. Reg. 10207, 10208-09 (proposed Mar. 10,
2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88).
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In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Papin Enterprises,
Inc.,386 the court rejected the employer's claim that it need not reasonably
accommodate an employee's religiously-based right to wear a nose ring on
food safety grounds.387
H. Remedies
In 2009, in 14 Penn Plaza, L.L.C. v. Pyett,388 the Supreme Court ruled
"that a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably re-
quires" employees to arbitrate claims under the ADEA is enforceable.
389
Under proposed federal legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 2008, the
Federal Arbitration Act would be amended to bar "clauses requiring arbitra-
tion of federal constitutional or statutory claims (unless an employee kno-
wingly and voluntarily consents to this clause after a dispute has arisen), as
part of a [collective bargaining agreement], or after a dispute has arisen."390
Under proposed federal legislation, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, the
Federal Arbitration Act would be amended "to invalidate all predispute arbi-
tration agreements that require the arbitration of employment disputes or any
conflict arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights. 391
In Board of Trustees of Florida State University v. Esposito,392 a Florida
court concluded that the Florida Civil Rights Act limits damage awards
against the state to $100,000, 393 but the twenty-five percent attorney's fee
limitation does not apply to claims against the state.394
VI. CONCLUSION
This survey dipped into a wide array of public employment issues
emerging in 2008-09. Every stage of employment, from hiring, to the terms
of employment, to discipline and retaliation against whistle-blowers, to em-
ployment discrimination, has witnessed a flurry of activity at the federal,
386. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Papin Enters., Inc., No. 6:07-cv-1548-
Orl-28GJK (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2009) (order denying injunctive relief and punitive damage).
387. See id. at 2, 8.
388. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
389. Id. at 1474.
390. Phillips, supra note 114, at 6.
391. Supreme Court Affirms Arbitration for Union Member Discrimination Claims, FLA.
EMP. L. LETrER, May 2009, at 3.
392. 991 So. 2d 924 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
393. Id. at 927-28 (citing Gallagher v. Manatee County, 927 So. 2d 914, 917 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2006)).
394. id. at 927.
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state, and local levels. As evidenced by the countless citations to new ar-
ticles, public sector employment issues draw high-profile media attention,
and news stories (whether found in newspapers or on the Intemet) provide a
wealth of insight and supplement the usual source of legal precedent: consti-
tutional, statutory, regulatory, administrative, and the common law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past two years the Supreme Court of Florida has not been active
in the juvenile law area. During the past survey year, it has only decided one
case directly related to juvenile law.' On the other hand, the intermediate
appellate courts remained active as they have for the past decade. As they
usually do, the courts of appeal provide statutory interpretation of chapters
39 and 985 as well as oversee trial court evidentiary rulings in dependency,
termination of parental rights, and delinquency cases.
II. DEPENDENCY
Under Florida law in a dependency proceeding, a party is defined as
"the parent or parents of the child, the petitioner, the [Department of Child-
ren and Families], the guardian ad litem or the representative of the guardian
ad litem program when the program has been appointed, and the child.",
2
Grandparents are not included in the statutory definition.3  Thus, where a
father petitioned the appellate court for writ of certiorari to review a trial
court order granting a motion to intervene by a grandparent, the appellate
court held, in J.P. v. Department of Children & Family Services,4 that the
grandmother was not included within the statutory definition of a party.5
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. This
Survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2009.
1. See generally E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 2009).
2. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(5 1) (2009); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.2 10(a).
3. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(5 1).
4. 12 So. 3d 253 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
5. Id. at 254-55.
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Therefore, she could not intervene.6 However, Florida law does allow a
grandparent to intervene as a "participant., 7
There are often situations where one parent is charged with dependency
and the other parent is viewed as non-offending. The issue of how the trial
court goes about evaluating the transfer of custody to the non-offending par-
ent was before the court in T.S. v. Department of Children & Families.8 The
non-offending parent challenged the court order denying the Department of
Children and Families' motion to grant temporary custody to that parent.9
The court did so on the basis of the best interests of the child standard.' ° The
appellate court reversed, finding that under the Florida Statutes, the court is
required "to place a child who is adjudicated to be dependent, as to one par-
ent, with the non-residential parent upon request unless the court 'finds that
such placement would endanger the safety, well-being, or physical, mental,
or emotional health of the child.'". There having been no such showing, the
parent's appeal, viewed as a writ by the appellate court, was granted.' 2
Once children have been adjudicated dependent, and the parent is pro-
vided with a case plan and has substantially complied with it, "there is a pre-
sumption that the children should be returned unless it is [determined] that
returning the children would endanger them."' 3 The trial court's obligation
to make detailed findings regarding the relevant statutory standard for reuni-
fication was before the appellate court in L.J.S. v. Department of Children &
Families.4 Florida law provides that in order to deny the motion for reunifi-
cation, the court must find that if there was compliance with the case plan,
reunification would be detrimental to the children, by addressing six subfac-
tors found in the law.'5 The statute is mandatory in that the court cannot de-
viate from the statutory requirement and must make detailed factual findings
regarding the factors. 16 In L.J.S., the court had failed to make detailed factual
6. Id. at 255.
7. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50) (2009); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.210(b).
8. 992 So. 2d 299, 299 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 300 (citing M.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 777 So. 2d 1209, 1212 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); FLA. STAT, § 39.521(3)(b) (2009)).
12. T.S., 992 So. 2d at 300. As the court in T.S. noted, appellate challenges to non-final
trial court orders in Florida are often taken by writ of certiorari. See id.
13. L.J.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 995 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App.
2008) (per curiam); see FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(1).
14. LJ.S.,995So.2dat152-53.
15. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.522(2), .621(10)(a)-(f).
16. FLA. STAT. § 39.522(2); LJ.S., 995 So. 2d at 1153.
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finding regarding five of the six factors. 7 The appellate court thus re-
versed.' 8
Under Florida law, a court need only make one order of dependency to
maintain jurisdiction over a dependency case as the order establishes a legal
status of the child for proceedings under the chapter.' 9 However, the court
shall order evidentiary hearings to determine whether there is a separate state
of events which also constitutes neglect.2° In P.S. v. Department of Children
& Families,2' the appellate court held that it was improper for the trial court
to enter a second order of adjudication of dependency as it maintained juris-
diction over the dependency case once the initial order adjudicating the child
was entered.22 Thus, it remanded for entry of a supplemental adjudicatory
hearing finding and reversed the second order of dependency.
23
As an evidentiary matter in dependency proceedings, the Department of
Children and Families (DCF), as the usual petitioner, is obligated to prove
one of the statutory grounds for dependency by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.24 In two recent cases, the appellate courts reversed on grounds that
there was not competent evidence for a finding of dependency.25 In the first
opinion, M.C. v. Department of Children & Families,26 a mother appealed
from a finding of dependency arguing DCF "failed to present competent,
substantial evidence [to establish] prospective neglect or abuse." 27 At the
heart of the Department's case was the allegation that the parent suffered
from mental illness and that there was a nexus between her psychiatric dis-
order and potential harm to the children. 28 The appellate court held that there
was no evidence, including expert testimony, as to "the existence, extent, or
nature of [the mother's] mental health problem," nor whether there were any
17. L.J.S., 995 So. 2d at 1153.
18. Id.; see also C.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 12 So. 3d 309, 310-11 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
19. FLA. STAT. § 39.507(7)(a).
20. See FLA. STAT. § 39.507(7)(b).
21. 4 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
22. Id. at 720.
23. Id. at721.
24. See FLA. STAT. § 39.507(l)(b).
25. M.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 993 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2008); J.R. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 995 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
26. 993 So. 2d at 1123.
27. Id. at 1124.
28. Id. at 1124-25.
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negative effects caused by her illness upon the children's well-being. 29 There
was simply speculation. 0 The court thus reversed.3'
In the second case, J.R. v. Department of Children & Families,32 a
mother appealed from an order adjudicating her children dependent alleging
insufficiency of the evidence.33 Specifically, the mother argued that "DCF
failed to present witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the allegations to
support a finding of dependency based upon abandonment. '34 The only di-
rect evidence was from the mother and the only substantive evidence from
"DCF was uncorroborated hearsay evidence of an anonymous abuse report
stating that the children had been abandoned at the great-grandmother's
home."35 The appellate court reversed finding that "an uncorroborated report
and hearsay evidence is insufficient to support an adjudication of dependen-
cy."
36
Domestic violence is not only an important societal issue but it can be
grounds for a finding of dependency.37 In C. W v. Department of Children &
Families,38 a mother appealed from a trial court order adjudicating a child
dependent as well as a dispositional order withholding adjudication of de-
pendency. 39 The basis for the proceeding was an allegation of an incident of
domestic violence in "which the mother allegedly choked the father while he
was holding the three-month-old child. '40 The father was also alleged to
have "slapped the mother during the incident."'4' The Department alleged
that the "behavior demonstrated a wanton disregard for the presence of the
,,42 Teftechild and could reasonably result in serious injury. The father consented
to the finding but the mother did not.43 Florida courts have repeatedly held
that domestic violence can constitute harm when "it occurs in the presence of
29. Id. at 1125-26.
30. See id. at 1126.
31. M.C., 993 So. 3d at 1126.
32. 995 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
33. Id. at611.
34. Id. at 612; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.604 (2009) (requiring personal knowledge for a
witness to testify).
35. J.R., 995 So. 2d at 612.
36. Id.
37. See generally Michael J. Dale, 2007-2008 Survey of Juvenile Law, 33 NOVA L. REv.
357, 357-63 (2009) [hereinafter Dale, 2007-2008 Survey].
38. 10 So. 3d 136 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).




43. C.W., 10 So. 3d at 137.
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a child." 44 However, the courts have also held that there must be more than
the child's physical proximity to the events in order to make a finding of
dependency.45 There must be an evidentiary showing "that the child saw or
was aware of the violence" that occurred and that the violence resulted "in
some physical or mental injury to the child. 46 In the C. W. case, "the trial
court made no findings that the three-month-old child was aware of the inci-
dent or was physically or mentally harmed. 47 Nor was there any evidence
that the infant comprehended the incident.48 The appellate court thus ruled
that absent "any evidentiary finding that the child appreciated or suffered any
physical or mental injury" or an evidentiary finding that the parent "posed a
current threat of harm to the child, the ...court's finding of dependency
[could not] stand. 4 9 The court thus reversed.5°
The failure of the Department of Children and Family Services to
comply with Florida's dependency statutes when interacting with parents is
reported regularly in the appellate case law. In C.J. v. Department of Child-
ren & Family Services,51 a parent appealed from an order adjudicating the
child dependent.52 The district court of appeal affirmed. 53 However, it spoke
at length about the actions of the Department in the case.54 The appellate
court found that the Department violated the spirit as well as the letter of the
statute, worked at cross purposes with the mother, was in an adversarial rela-
tionship with the mother, and distorted the matter in which the goals of chap-
ter 39 ought to be pursued. 55 In sum, the court said "[t]he actions and atti-
tudes displayed by the Department in this case are ones we cannot and do not
condone.56 Nonetheless, on the facts of the case, the court affirmed.57
44. Id. at 138 (citing R.V. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 939 So. 2d 200, 202
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); M.B. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 937 So. 2d 709,
710-11 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); D.D. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 773 So. 2d 615,
617 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)); see also Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 37, at 357.
45. C.W., 10 So. 3d at 138; R.V., 939 So. 2d at 202; M.B., 937 So. 2d at 711; D.D., 773
So. 2d at 617-18; Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 37, at 357-58.
46. C.W., 10 So. 3d at 138.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 139.
50. Id.
51. 9 So. 3d 750 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
52. Id. at 751.
53. Id. at 756.
54. See id. at 750-56 (describing the actions of the Department).
55. d.at 756.
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I. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Among the grounds for termination of parental rights (TPR) in Florida
is incarceration of the parent.58 The relevant statute provides that the termi-
nation is authorized when "the period of time for which the parent is ex-
pected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of
time before the child will attain the age of 18 years." 59 The appellate courts
have dealt on a number of occasions with questions of just what the term
"substantial portion" means. In J. W.B. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies,6° a father who was incarcerated appealed from an order terminating his
parental rights.61 The appellate court found that the father had been incarce-
rated since the child's birth, had never seen the child or provided financial
support, and was scheduled to be released from prison when the child was
approximately twelve years of age.62 The court relied on a Supreme Court of
Florida ruling in which the court applied a percentage to determine a sub-
stantial portion of time.63 Applying that test, the court in J. W.B. found that
the percentage was sixty percent of the time before the child turned eighteen
and thus, together with other factors of noninvolvement by the parent, af-
firmed.64
In S.H. v. Department of Children & Family Services,65 DCF filed an
amended petition to terminate parental rights "when the children, who in-
cluded twins, were two, three, and four years old."'66 When the parent was to
be released from prison, the children would be eight, nine, and ten.67 Recog-
nizing that the time factor was incarceration in the future and not the time the
parent had been incarcerated in the past, and finding further that precedent
suggested that an eight year incarceration did not constitute clear and con-
vincing evidence of incarceration for a substantial period of time, the court
reversed.68
58. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(l)(d) (2009).
59. Id.
60. 8 So. 3d 1191 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
61. Id. at 1192.
62. Id. at 1193.
63. Id. at 1192 (citing B.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 887 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Fla.
2004)).
64. Id. at 1193.
65. 992 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
66. Id. at317.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 317-18 (citing B.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 887 So. 2d 1046, 1055
(Fla. 2004) (per curiam); J.P.C. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 819 So. 2d 264, 266
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
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A second ground for termination of parental rights in Florida, as is the
case in other jurisdictions, is abandonment. 69 Abandonment is defined in
chapter 39 and, as most recently amended, provides that the parent "makes
no provision for the child's support and has failed to establish or maintain a
substantial and positive relationship with the child., 70 This includes frequent
regular contact with the child and exercising parental responsibility. 7' Mar-
ginal efforts are not enough.72 The issue before the appellate court in T.G. v.
Department of Children & Families,73 was whether termination was appro-
priate on abandonment grounds, where included among the factual informa-
tion was the fact that the mother "failed to visit [the children] for over a year
prior to the final hearing."74 Mississippi's law includes a one year time
frame and Missouri's a six month time frame.75 The court applied the one
year time period as well as other facts presented to the trial court and af-
firmed the termination.76
Another ground for termination of parental rights in Florida is when
there is abuse of a sibling and a nexus is found between abuse of the sibling
and the prospective abuse of the child who is the subject of the proceeding. 77
In addition, in any termination of parental rights case, the court must also
find that the manifest best interests of the child requires termination and that
termination is in the child's best interests. 78 In T.L. v. Department of Child-
ren & Family Services,79 a father appealed from termination of parental
rights because the trial court failed to base its decision "on evidence demon-
strating that the [f]ather posed a threat of prospective harm to" the child, but
instead terminated parental rights because it thought that "offering services
to the [f]ather would result in an unwarranted delay in achieving permanency
69. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(b) (2009).
70. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(1).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 8 So. 3d 1198 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
74. Id. at 1199.
75. Id. at 1199-1200 (citing In re A.M.A., 986 So. 2d 999, 1010 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007),
cert. denied, 987 So. 2d 451 (Miss. 2008); In re J.W., 11 S.W.3d 699, 703 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999)).
76. Id. at 1200.
77. See A.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 870 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2004). The nexus issue also comes up in dependency cases. See Dale, 2007-2008 Sur-
vey, supra note 37, at 363-64. As to the nexus test in TPR cases, see Michael J. Dale, 2005-
2006 Survey of Juvenile Law, 31 NOVA L. REv. 577, 594-95 (2007) [hereinafter Dale, 2005-
2006 Survey].
78. FLA. STAT. § 39.810(2009); G.W.B. v. J.S.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 973 (Fla. 1995).
79. 990 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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for the child., 80 The appellate court held that the trial court was correct in
finding that there had been egregious abuse by the father of the sibling of the
child who was before the court for failing to take appropriate steps to obtain
necessary care for the other child.8' However, there was no competent evi-
dence of the nexus requirement in the sense of a "predictive relationship be-
tween the past abuse of the injured child" and prospective abuse of the sibl-
ing before the court as required under Florida law. Specifically, the trial
court had before it no psychological assessment that would show "that the
[f]ather lacked self-control," had a drug addiction problem, or suffered from
''a mental or emotional condition" that would produce the nexus between the
injury to the sibling and the threat of prospective harm to the child.83 Finally,
the appellate court found that "there was no evidence that the [f]ather would
not benefit from court-ordered services," and thus the trial court failed to
show that termination was the least restrictive means to protect the child. 8
4
The appellate court thus reversed.
Evidentiary issues arise in TPR proceedings just as they do in depen-
dency matters. In F.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services,86 both
the Department of Children and Family Services and the Guardian ad Litem
Program, as parties to the proceedings, conceded "the court's termination
order [was] legally insufficient because it contain[ed] only a conclusory
statement that termination of ... parental rights would be in the manifest best
interests of the child. 87 However, the appellate court also reversed based on
insufficient evidence.88 The issue which the court discussed was hearsay.89
At the termination hearing, the trial court took judicial notice 9 of a file
which contained shelter documents, orders of the court including the depen-
dency judgment and the case plan.9' It also "contained an assessment of the
child" which the mother had "reported to have said that [the father] refused
to acknowledge paternity. '92 Inexplicably, the father's lawyer "did not make
80. Id. at 1270.
81. Id. at 1272.
82. Id. (citing K.A. v. Dep't of Children & Family Services, 880 So. 2d 705, 709 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
83. Id. at 1273.
84. T.L., 990 So. 2d at 1273.
85. Id.
86. 4 So. 3d 684 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
87. Id. at 685.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 686.
90. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.202, .203 (2009).
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any hearsay objections to the documents encompassed within the request for
judicial notice," according to the appellate court.93 More apparent was the
objection to an improper request for judicial notice under the Florida Rules
of Evidence although there is no reference to that in the opinion. Despite
these failures to object, the appellate court held that "the Department failed
to show by clear and convincing evidence that [the father] was able [to] but
failed to provide for the child" under the abandonment provision of chapter
39 of the Florida Statutes.95 The court found that the only evidence pre-
sented by the Department was hearsay and thus inadmissible, and the only
competent evidence was that of the father who claimed "he had never denied
paternity and that he had tried without success to locate the mother."96 The
appellate court therefore reversed.97
The second evidentiary opinion at the TPR stage is M.E. v. Department
of Children & Families.98 In M.E., the appellate court applied the clear and
convincing evidence standard in reversing the finding of termination of pa-
rental rights. 99 It did so because the trial court had "found the evidence
troubling" because of gaps of proof including a lack of any evidence or
records of "any mental health professional treating [the] appellant" parent.' °°
It also found "'obvious' errors in the testimony of the 'only professional'
who testified and a 'certain vagueness even on subjects where the [profes-
sional] appeared to be reasonably accurate."" 0' The appellate court reversed
because it found that the trial court "was not convinced without hesitancy
that the evidence warranted the termination of appellant's parental rights,"
and thus the appellate court could not "say that competent, substantial evi-
dence support[ed] the court's finding that the evidence was clear and con-
vincing."' 2
During the course of child welfare proceedings, including dependency
matters and TPR cases, a child's placement may be changed under Florida
law.'0 3 However, the test for that change is one of the child's best inter-
ests. " Florida law further states that when the child is first placed with the
93. id.
94. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.201-.204.
95. Id. at 686-87; see FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(1), .809(1) (2007).
96. F.B., 4 So. 3d at 686.
97. Id. at 687.
98. 1 So. 3d 268 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
99. Id. at 268-69; see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
100. M.E., I So. 3d at269.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See FLA. STAT. § 39.521 (2009).
104. FLA. STAT. § 39.521 (1)(b)(1), (1)(d)(8)(b).
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Department because there is no suitable relative, there is no obligation to
later place the child with a relative "if it is in the child's best interest to re-
main in the current placement."10 5 In Guardian Ad Litem Program v. R.A.,'°6
the guardian ad litem (GAL), according to the court, appealed from "an order
granting [the] father's motion to change the placement of his daughter" from
the foster parent's home to that of the grandmother.10 7 While the appellate
court describes the matter as an appeal by the guardian ad litem, it would
appear, given the caption of the case, that the appeal was by the Guardian Ad
Litem Program, 1 8 as the Guardian Ad Litem Program was a party to the pro-
ceeding pursuant to chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes.'°9 When the trial
court ordered a transfer of placement, the Guardian Ad Litem Program ap-
pealed. 0 Treating the matter as a non-final order and thus describing the
appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, the appellate court reversed.'
Finding that the evidence at the trial level was that it was in the child's best
interest to remain in the current foster home, the court reversed concluding
that the trial court failed to follow the clear statutory directions which were
based upon a best interest standard.'"2
In 2004, the Supreme Court of Florida decided Florida Department of
Children & Families v. F.L.,13 which held that in an involuntary termination
of parental rights case, the Department must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that there was a substantial risk of significant harm to the child be-
fore the court then decides whether termination of parental rights "'is the
least restrictive means of protecting the child from ... harm.' 14 Applica-
tion of the F.L. test was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in J.J. v.
Department of Children & Families.15 The appellate court first found that
the trial court in J.J. made a series of errors by basing termination of parental
rights in part on testimony that a parent failed to admit abuse, and that the
parent lacked financial resources to provide for the child, as well as failing to
105. FLA. STAT. § 39.521(l)(d)(8)(b).
106. 995 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
107. Id. at 1083.
108. See id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(5 1).
110. R.A., 995 So. 2d at 1083.
111. Id. at 1084 n.1, 1085. As to the proper method for raising an appeal from a non-final
order, see FLA. R. App. P. 9.040(b)(2)(C); R.J. v. Guardian Ad Litem Program, 993 So. 2d
176, 177 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
112. R.A.,995So.2dat1083-84.
113. 880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam).
114. Id. at 608 (quoting Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d
565, 571 (Fla. 1991)).
115. 994 So. 2d 496, 501 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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"include the passage of time and positive changes in a parent's circums-
tances." ' 16 Finally, the appellate court concluded that DCF had expedited
termination of parental rights, "did not offer the mother a case plan for the"
children before the court, "did not obtain a psychological evaluation of the
mother to assist the court," and thus failed to offer opportunities to the moth-
er to prove her ability to care for the children.' 17 Failure to do so showed that
there was a failure to prove that termination of parental rights was the least
restrictive means to assist the parent."
18
The least restrictive means test in the termination of parental rights cas-
es was also before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in C.A.T. v. Department
of Children and Families."9 In that case, "[t]he father was not offered a case
plan for reunification prior to initiation of the.., termination proceeding."'
120
In an earlier dependency case involving the child who was the subject of the
TPR proceeding, the father had been found to be non-offending despite the
fact that he had refused a case plan. 121 In fact, he had not received any ser-
vices from DCF "since his participation in the original case plan in 2002" in
a prior proceeding. 22 In the TPR proceeding, "he was never offered a case
plan with services as an alternative to losing his parental rights in the current
proceeding[]." 23 Of course under Florida law, DCF does not have to provide
a case plan for reunification.' 24 DCF can show that the parent will not bene-
fit from court-ordered services. 125 Because the Department did not prove
"that the father was not amenable to remedy his problems through actual,
appropriate services," the court reversed.
126
In addition, however, in dicta, the court noted that the father was not "a
model parent."'127 Judge Sawaya, writing for the court, then made the follow-
ing statement:
We are not aware of a precise definition that tells us what a model
parent is. Perhaps it is nothing more than a mythical figure, much
116. Id. at 502.
117. Id. at 503.
118. Id.
119. 10 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).




124. See CA.T., 10 So. 3d at 684; FLA. STAT. § 39.806(3) (2009).
125. See, e.g., T.L. v. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 990 So. 2d 1267, 1273 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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like the reasonable person in tort law, that good parents should
seek to emulate. Although it may be inescapable that many will
assume that mothers and fathers may not be model parents if DCF
has intervened in their lives to protect their child[ren] from harm,
the law does not profess to require parental perfection. Indeed, the
provisions contained in chapter 39 reveal an acute awareness that
many parents, like the father in the instant case, are in need of as-
sistance to achieve the necessary skills to simply be adequate par-
ents who do not harm, neglect or abuse their children.' 28
The issue of whether ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be
made in TPR proceedings remains undecided in Florida. 129 The issue was
raised again during this survey year in L.H. v. Department of Children &
Families.130 The Fifth District Court of Appeal referred to the last reported
opinion in the area, E.T. v. State, Department of Children & Families,13' de-
cided by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in 2006, and recognized that the
Supreme Court of Florida has still not ruled on this issue having "referred
[the] issue to the Juvenile Court Rules Committee and the Appellate Court
Rules Committee for consideration.' ' 32 The appellate court in L.H. also rec-
ognized that trial and appellate courts around the country struggled with the
issue, and encouraged the Supreme Court of Florida and the committees "to
provide guidance on this important issue." 133 On a motion for rehearing,
clarification and certification, the district court of appeal certified the ques-
tion of recognition of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel to the Su-
preme Court of Florida."3
The issue of a parent's nonappearance at a termination of parental rights
proceeding has come up regularly before the appellate courts. 35 Florida law
provides that the failure to personally appear can constitute consent to termi-
nate parental rights. 136 The issue arose again in L.S. v. Department of Child-
128. Id.
129. See E.T. v. State, Dep't of Children & Families, 930 So. 2d 721, 729 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2006).
130. 995 So. 2d 583, 583-84 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
131. 930 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
132. L.H., 995 So. 2d at 584 (citing E.T. v. State, 957 So. 2d 559, 599 (Fla. 2007) (per
curiam)).
133. Id. at 585. See also I MICHAEL J. DALE, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, §
4.06[l][c] (2009).
134. LH., 995 So. 2d at 585. See also Dale, 2005-2006 Survey, supra note 77, at 599;
Michele R. Forte, Making the Case for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary Termi-
nation of Parental Rights Proceedings, 28 NOVA L. REV. 193, 194-95 (2003).
135. See Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 37, at 371.
136. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(a)(7) (2009).
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ren & Family Services. 37 In this case, the mother argued on appeal "that the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow her to appear by tele-
phone to explain her absence from the adjudicatory hearing" and concluding
that "her nonappearance [was] consent to the termination of her parental
rights.' ' 38 The appellate court agreed and reversed. 39 The mother's counsel
did appear "at the scheduled adjudicatory hearing and informed the court that
the mother was out of state and unable to personally appear because of finan-
cial difficulties."' The counsel further "advised the court that the mother
was available to appear by telephone" and that she should be given that op-
portunity to explain why "she was unable to appear in person.'' Both DCF
and the guardian ad litem (GAL) objected. 142 Specifically the GAL said that
"'there's a history here of the mother not showing, and I think this is just
indicative of a pattern.' '1 43 The appellate court held that the GAL statement
"was disputed at the hearing by the mother's counsel and [was] not sup-
ported by the record."' 44 Under these circumstances, the appellate court re-
versed concluding "the trial court should have allowed the mother the oppor-
tunity to appear by telephone to explain the reasons for her nonappearance
instead of entering a default."'
' 45
In a second consent to TPR case, J.M. v. Department of Children &
Families,'46 although the court had warned the parent at three prior hearings
that "her failure to attend the adjudicatory hearing would constitute consent
to the petition," at the hearing when the court continued the matter for a third
time, it "failed to advise the mother that she must personally appear at the
reset date.' ' 147 She did not appear, sending "word that she was attending [to]
matters regarding the recent death of her father."'' 48 However, although never
moving to vacate the consent, the mother then did participate with the ap-
proval of the court on the further days of the proceeding. 49 The trial court
found that the DCF had proved termination by clear and convincing evi-
137. 995 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).




142. L.S., 995 So. 2d at 517.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 37, at 371 (collecting case law on this
issue).
146. 9 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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dence."5° The appellate court thus ruled that the failure "to order the mother
to appear on the hearing date at which the adjudicatory hearing actually
commenced" was an "oversight" and thus "the court should not have entered
a consent to the petition. '1 5' However, the court did not reverse because the
mother was given a full opportunity to participate in the proceeding and the
court ruled that DCF had met its burden.
52
Florida's law regarding who is a party to a dependency in a termination
of parental rights case is expansive. 53 It includes "the parent or parents of
the child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem or the repre-
sentative of the guardian ad litem program when the program has been ap-
pointed, and the child."'' 54 In a termination of parental rights proceeding, the
individuals who may appeal under Florida law are "[a]ny child, any parent or
guardian ad litem of any child, any other party to the proceeding who is af-
fected by an order of the court, or the department."155 Thus, a review of re-
cent reported appellate opinions shows that parents, the Department, and the
Guardian ad Litem Program regularly appeal. In R.H. v. Department of
Children & Family Services,156 the child's grandparents, who were not par-
ties to the proceeding below, sought to challenge the trial court order modify-
ing placement of the granddaughter whose parents' parental rights had been
terminated, and which order placed the child "in the temporary legal custody
of her paternal aunt and uncle.' ' 157 Reviewing the statutes in question con-
cerning party status at the trial level and on appeal, the appellate court ruled
that the grandparents lacked standing to challenge the order on appeal.158
IV. SURRENDER OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
While most case law concerns involuntary termination of parental
rights, a parent may voluntarily surrender parental rights pursuant to chapter
150. Id.
151. J.M., 9 So. 3d at 36.
152. See id. at 36-37.
153. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2009).
154. Id. Despite the statutory references to the Guardian ad Litem Program as a party to a
proceeding in chapter 39, both the Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal have raised the
issue of the Guardian ad Litem Program's standing as a party. See Dep't of Children & Fami-
lies v. S.T., 963 So. 2d 314, 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Dep't of Health & Rehabilita-
tive Servs. v. Cole, 574 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
155. FLA. STAT. § 39.815(1).
156. 994 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
157. Id.atl154.
158. Id. at 1154-55 (citing C.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 981 So. 2d 1272, 1272
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008); D.M. v. State, Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 980 So. 2d
498, 498 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
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39 of the Florida Statutes.1 59 The proper procedure for doing so was before
the Fifth District Court of Appeal in R.B. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies.'6° A mother appealed "an order denying her motion to set aside the sur-
render of her parental rights to her two children. ' 16' After her two children
were removed and sheltered and at an arraignment hearing, there was a re-
presentation that the mother was interested in signing paperwork to surrender
parental rights.1 62 After conferring with her counsel, the mother was "placed
under oath and signed the 'Affidavit and Acknowledgment of Surrender of
Parental Rights, Consent, and Waiver of Notice' forms" which were wit-
nessed by counsel and a bailiff.163 Because the mother's counsel suggested
to the general master that his client "had indicated she might be mentally
unstable .... the general master asked several pertinent questions. ' '164 The
master found that the surrender was "knowingly, freely, and voluntarily ex-
ecuted;" and the trial court accepted it. 165 "Five months later, with new
counsel," the mother moved to set aside the voluntary surrender.' 66 The ap-
pellate court found, first, that the general master had authority to '"adminis-
ter oaths and conduct hearings' [and thus] inherently had the power to take
acknowledgment"; and, second, that there was no showing of fraud or du-
ress. 167 The appellate court noted that the burden of proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence to vacate the surrender rests on the parent. 168 The appellate
court thus affirmed. 1
69
V. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
Once a court in a juvenile delinquency case holds an adjudicatory hear-
ing and finds that the child has committed an act, which if committed by an
adult would be a crime under chapter 985, the court proceeds to a disposi-
tional hearing.' 70 States differ as to the degree of discretion that the juvenile
court has in making a disposition. 17 Florida's dispositional statute contains a
159. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(a).
160. 997 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).




165. R.B., 997 So. 2d at 1217.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1217-18.
168. Id. at 1218.
169. Id.
170. FLA. STAT. §§ 985.35, .43 (2009).
171. 1 DALE, supra note 133, at § 5.03[13][a].
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list of alternatives and further provides that the Department of Juvenile Jus-
tice (DJJ) shall recommend a disposition to the court. 172 In E.A.R. v. State, 17 3
the issue before the Supreme Court of Florida was whether the juvenile court
must "justify departures from the Department of Juvenile Justice's (DJJ)
recommended dispositions by explaining a judge's 'reasons' for a depar-
ture."'' 74 It must do so in terms of the "characteristics of the imposed restric-
tiveness level" under the Florida Statutes as compared to "the rehabilitative
needs of the child.' 75 In a lengthy opinion, including a detailed exposition
of the particular case before the Court, and with a strong dissent with two
concurrences, the Court set out a test by which the juvenile court should
"provide 'reasons' that explain, support, and justify why one restrictiveness
level is more appropriate than another and thereby rationalize a departure
disposition.' 76  The Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial court
should:
Articulate an understanding of the respective characteristics of the
opposing restrictiveness levels including (but not limited to) the
type of child that each restrictiveness level is designed to serve,
potential "lengths of stay" associated with each level, and the di-
vergent treatment programs and services available to the juvenile
at these levels; and [tihen logically and persuasively explain why,
in light of these differing characteristics, one level is better suited
to serving both the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile-in the least
restrictive setting-and maintaining the ability of the State to pro-
tect the public from further acts of delinquency. 177
M.J.S. v. State78 and D.B. v. State 179 are cases the district courts of ap-
peal decided after the opinion in E.A.R. M.J.S. described the opinion in
E.A.R. as "a new, more rigorous analysis in which a trial court must engage
before departing from the DJJ's recommendation."' 80 In D.B., the trial court
failed to comply with the new standard and thus the appellate court reversed
and remanded.' 8'
172. See FLA. STAT. § 985.03(21); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.115.
173. 4 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 2009).
174. Id. at 616-17 (internal footnote omitted).
175. Id. at 617.
176. Id. at 638.
177. Id.
178. 6 So. 3d 1268 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
179. 12 So. 3d 875 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
180. M.J.S., 6 So. 3d 12 at 1269.
181. D.B., 12 So. 3d at 876.
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In Florida, secure detention either pretrial or after adjudication, is spe-
cifically controlled by statute.182 When trial judges act in contravention of
the time frames set forth in the statute, writs of habeas corpus are taken seek-
ing discharge. 83 In M.A.M. v. Vurro,'84 a juvenile sought relief arguing that
he could not be held in secure detention under the twenty-one day rule found
in Florida law. 185 A situation in which a child who might "not otherwise
meet the secure detention criteria" may be held in secure detention is when
the court makes certain findings "that respite care is unavailable and that
secure detention is required to prevent victim injury.' 86 The appellate court
in M.A.M. concluded that under Florida law, the court may not order "a child
charged with domestic violence [to] be held in secure detention for more
than twenty-one days in total.' 87 The two separate sections may not be used
in combination. 88 On this ground, the court granted the writ.
89
Where a child in a delinquency case is incompetent to proceed, after a
hearing, the court may order the child placed in a secure residential facili-
ty.' 9° Thus, the finding of involuntary commitment requires clear and con-
vincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood that the child would
inflict serious bodily harm on himself or others.' 9' This was the issue in
A.L.M. v. Department of Children & Families.9 2 The child sought certiorari
and habeas corpus relief from the order committing him to DCF under the
secure placement statute. 193 The appellate court reviewed the facts of the
case finding that, "[a]lthough three psychologists testified, their testimony
did not support, by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court's finding
that . . . there was a 'substantial likelihood' of infliction of serious bodily
harm by the child upon himself or others. 194 The court thus granted the
writ. 195
It would appear obvious that a juvenile delinquency case is not a matter
in which a child is described as a criminal, nor one in which the child is con-
182. See FLA. STAT. §§ 985.24(1), .245(1), .25, .255 (2009).
183. See, e.g., M.A.M. v. Vurro, 2 So. 3d 388, 389 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
184. 2 So. 3d 388 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
185. Id. at 389.
186. Id. at 390; FLA. STAT. § 985.255(2).
187. M.A.M., 2 So. 3d at 390.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 390-91.
190. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.095.
191. See FLA. STAT. § 985.19(3).
192. 995 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
193. Id. at 1085.
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victed of a crime.'96 Nonetheless, in D.A. v. State,197 a child was obligated to
appeal from a trial order imposing the cost of prosecution pursuant to the
criminal law cost payment statute in Florida.198 The appellate court reversed,
pointing to the variety of provisions in the Florida Juvenile Delinquency Sta-
tute and case law that stand for the proposition that an adjudicated delinquent
has not been convicted and is not a criminal.'99 Conditions of probation are
among the dispositional alternatives the court may impose upon a child.2"
The issue in J.W.J. v. State20 1 was whether special conditions of probation
were both orally announced and whether they were permissible.2 °2 The court
in J.W.J. held that where the special condition of probation is statutorily au-
thorized, there is no obligation to orally announce the condition.0 3 The court
reversed in part based upon the state's concession that certain aspects of the
special condition did not comply with state law or were not orally pro-
nounced.2°
The dispositional alternative of restitution comes up regularly in the ap-
pellate courts in substantial numbers despite the fact that the matter is one of
statutory construction. 205 In J.C. v. State2° the order of restitution dealt with
the theft of four pocket bikes from a store owner.0 7 On appeal, the child
argued that the owner "purchased the bikes wholesale and could not sell
them at their marked retail prices [and therefore] restitution should [be] li-
mited to the wholesale price. '208 The appellate court affirmed, finding "that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the bikes at a discounted
retail price. '2 °9
A juvenile appealed a restitution award claiming that it should be re-
versed because it included the amount "for a purse, three pairs of sunglasses,
and sixty CDs," in G.P. v. State.210 Apparently, the petition for delinquency
196. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
197. 11 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
198. Id. at 423; see FLA. STAT. § 938.27(1) (2009).
199. D.A., 1I So. 3d at 423-24 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.35(6); A.M.P. v. State, 927 So. 2d
97, 100 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
200. See FLA. STAT. § 985.435.
201. 994 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
202. Id. at 1224.
203. Id. at 1226.
204. Id. at 1227.
205. See Dale, 2007-2008 Survey, supra note 37, at 378-79; Dale, 2005-2006 Survey,
supra note 77, at 590-91.
206. 3 So. 3d 346 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
207. Id. at 346.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 996 So. 2d 920, 921 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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charged the child with "theft of miscellaneous jewelry and/or clothing" but
did not list the particular items in the charging document.21 Finding that the
jewelry and clothing may be included in the term miscellaneous jewelry
and/or clothing but that the CDs could not, the court held that the latter could
not be contained in the restitution award.212
Finally, in J.A.B. v. State,213 the child appealed an order requiring resti-
tution "in the amount of $1479.09 at the rate of $50 per month, commencing
on a specified date approximately four months after the entry of the restitu-
tion order. ' 214 The child's argument on appeal was that the "court abused its
discretion in setting the amount and payment schedule for restitution. 2 5 In
J.A.B., the appellate court sitting en banc, and receding from prior opinions
in that district, ruled that a "trial court may set the restitution amount and
payments in a reasonable amount based upon evidence [showing] the earn-
ings [that] the [child] may reasonably be expected to make., 216 The court
may also "set a commencement date for the payments so long as the court
provides a reasonable amount of time for the [child] to obtain employ-
ment. '217 In so doing, the court in J.A.B. noted the conflict with the First
District Court of Appeal decision in J.A.M. v. State.218 On this basis, the
court in J.A.B. certified the conflict.
219
VI. OTHER MATTERS
Several changes in the Florida Statutes in 2009 require brief discussion.
Section 39.0016 was amended to provide dependency courts and district
school superintendents with the ability to appoint surrogate parents for child-
ren under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.220 Under Florida
law, where the child is suspected of having special education needs and
where a parent cannot be located, the responsibilities of the surrogate parent
under the federal law must be implemented.22'
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 993 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (en banc).
214. Id. at 1150.
215. Id. at !151.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 601 So. 2d 278, 278-79 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam).
219. J.A.B., 993 So. 2d at 1155.
220. Act effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-35, 2009 Fla. Laws 319 (codified as amended in
FLA. STAT. § 39.0016, 402).
221. FLA. STAT. § 39.0016(3).
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Chapter 39 has been amended by adding the "Give Grandparents and
Other Relatives a Voice Act" which ensures that relatives are to be provided
with notice of all dependency hearings and proceedings. 2  Chapter 39 also
has been amended to require the court to ask the parent's consent to provide
access to a child's medical and educational records, and to provide that in-
formation to the court, the lead community agency (CBC), the guardian ad
litem, and any attorneys for the child.223 If the parent cannot do so or is un-
willing to do so, the court may issue an order granting access. 24
Significantly, Florida law was also changed to have the CBC and the
local education agency work together to see to it that a child remain in the
school where he or she was enrolled at the time of placement in the child
welfare system, a matter that has first been institutionalized in Broward
County in the settlement of a federal lawsuit in 2000.25
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida decided one significant case in the delin-
quency area explaining the test by which a trial court determines that it shall
override a dispositional recommendation of the State Department of Juvenile
Justice.226 The state's intermediate appellate courts, on the other hand, were
quite busy ruling in dependency, termination of parental rights, and delin-
quency cases on a number of statutory issues. In two cases, one involving
the interpretation of the delinquency restitution statute and the other involv-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel in termination of parental rights cases,
the appellate courts suggested that the Supreme Court of Florida should re-
solve those issues.27
222. Zahid Jones, Jr., Give Grandparents and Other Relatives a Voice Act, ch. 2009-43,
2009 Fla. Laws 343-44, 348 (codified as amended in scattered sections of chapter 39 of FLA.
STAT.).
223. Ch. 2009-35 Fla. Laws at 322.
224. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(1).
225. Ch. 2009-35 Fla. Laws at 323; Order Approving Settlement Agreement, Ward v.
Kearney, No. 98-7137- Civ-Moreno (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2000).
226. E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614, 616-17 (Fla. 2009).
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Proponents of greater enforcement of the nation's immigration laws
need only cite one statistic to advocate their point of view. "Three 9/11 hi-
jackers-Mohammed Atta, Hani Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah-came into con-
tact with state and local police before the attacks for speeding."'
Atta was stopped by police in Tarmac [sic], Florida, in July 2001
and was ticketed for having an invalid license. He ignored the
ticket and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He was
stopped a few weeks later in a town nearby for speeding and the
officer, unaware of the bench warrant, let him go with a warning.
Hijacker Mohammed Atta is believed to have piloted American
Airlines Flight 11 into the World Trade Center's north tower. 2
During contact with law enforcement, Mohammed Atta "was illegally
present in the United States."' 3 In a post-September 11 th world, knowing that
several hijackers came into contact with law enforcement while their immi-
gration status was in question is certainly troublesome. This fact has fueled
the national debate as to whether local law enforcement should be more en-
gaged in enforcing federal immigration laws.
The debate is fueled not only by grand incidents on a national scale like
the 9/11 attacks, but also by gruesome crimes that leave local communities in
shock.4 In 2002, for example, "Miguel Angel Heredia Juarez, an illegal alien
from Mexico, was convicted for viciously raping and beating a 19-year old..
1. State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law: Evaluating a Unified Ap-
proach for Stopping Terrorists: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Secu-
rity and Citizenship of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 127 (2004) (statement of
Michelle Malkin, Investigative Journalist & Author).
2. Id. at 2 (statement of Hon. Saxby Chambliss, Sen. from the State of Georgia).
3. The 287(g) Program: Ensuring the Integrity of America's Border Security System
Through Federal-State Partnerships: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Mgmt., Integration,
and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 52 (2005) (statement of
Kris W. Kobach, Professor, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1 09_housejhearings&docid=
f:28332.pdf. A source for the federal government actually notes that four of the hijackers,
illegally present in the United States, had contact with police officers. Id.
Four members of the 9/11 terrorist cohort were stopped by state and local law enforcement in
the United States for routine traffic violations. In all four of those instances, the aliens were il-
legally present in the United States. (The four hijackers who were stopped by police were
Nawaf al Hazmi, Mohammed Atta, Hanji Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah.).
Id. at 55 (statement of Kris W. Kobach, Professor, University of Missouri-Kansas City of
Law).
4. See id. at 51-53.
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. woman."5 He was on probation at the time, having "been previously con-
victed of four other felonies, including theft and assault, since illegally cross-
ing the Mexican border."'6 Both the 9/11 terrorists and Miguel Angel Here-
dia Juarez were examples cited by United States Senator Saxby Chambliss
during a statement to the Immigration Subcommittee regarding the authority
of local police to enforce federal immigration laws.7
In 1983, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the role of states in
enforcing this nation's federal immigration laws. 8 The court held that "fed-
eral law does not preclude local enforcement of the criminal provisions of
the [Immigration and Naturalization] Act." 9 The rationale for this decision is
the lack of a "pervasive regulatory scheme" for enforcement of criminal pro-
visions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), which would effec-
tively preempt states and local governments from acting within the field of
criminal immigration enforcement.1i Nevertheless, the "complex administra-
tive structure" established by the federal government over the civil provi-
sions of the INA has effectively prevented state and local governments from
enforcing civil immigration violations."
In September of 1996, Congress amended the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (ITRAIRA), and added section
287(g). 2 This section authorizes the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and previously the Attorney General of the Unit-
ed States prior to DHS's establishment, to enter into agreements with state
and local governments that empower designated officials to enforce civil
violations of the immigration code.' 3 In 2002, the State of Florida entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United States De-
partment of Justice.14 This agreement established "a pilot project pursuant to
5. Authority to Enforce Immigration Law Hearing (statement of Michelle Malkin, In-
vestigative Journalist & Author), supra note 1, at 130.
6. Id.
7. See id. (statement of Michelle Malkin, Investigative Journalist & Author). See gen-
erally id. at 2 (statement of Saxby Chambliss, Sen. from the State of Georgia). Saxby Chain-
bliss is a Republican and was elected to the United States Senate in 2002 in Georgia. Cham-
bliss, Saxby: Biographical Information, Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000286 (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
8. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 472 (9th Cir. 1983).
9. Id. at 475.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Section 287(g) Immigration
and Nationality Act 1 (Aug. 16, 2006), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/fact
sheets/060816dc287gfactsheet.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2.
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which the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) authorize[d] 35
state and local law enforcement officers ... to perform certain immigration
officer enforcement functions. ' ' 5  This program was renewed by Florida
Governor Jeb Bush in 2003, and remains a model for federal and state coop-
eration in combating illegal immigration.1 6 Federal and state officials have
hailed the Florida MOU as a success and a model for future expansion of
287(g) programs. However, expansion of local enforcement of immigration
laws is not without widespread concern. Minority communities worry about
discrimination and harassment in the form of pretextual investigations relat-
ing to immigration violations. In addition, these programs require extensive
training and funding, both for effective enforcement and to maintain working
community relations. The Florida MOU is a model by which to examine the
recent efforts of the federal government to expand its enforcement capabili-
ties into local communities. This analysis is particularly important given a
current desire to expand the use of 287(g) programs to aid immigration en-
forcement on a national scale.
1I. AUTHORITY OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
REGARDING FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS
A. Scope of Police Powers Defined by Case Law
Case law has established that state and local law enforcement officers
have inherent authority to enforce the criminal provisions of the INA, but not
the civil provisions. 17 Gonzales v. City of Peoria" explained how civil and
15. Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Dep't of Justice (DOJ) and the
State of Fla. 1 (2002), available at http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2002,0729-mou.pdf
[hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding 2002]. "Under the one-year pilot program, 35
members of Florida's Domestic Security Task Force will be trained and supervised by INS
agents." Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), Florida Officers to Receive
Immigration Enforcement Powers, Aug. 2002, available at http://www.fairus.org/site/Page
Server?pagename=researchresearch0e48.
16. Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (DHS)
and the State of Fla. 7 (2003), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foialmemorandumsof
AgreementUnderstanding/stateofflorida.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding
2003].
17. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 476 (9th Cir. 1983).
In examining the INA, it is crucial to distinguish the civil from criminal violations. Mere il-
legal presence in the U.S. is a civil, not criminal, violation of the INA, and subsequent deporta-
tion and associated administrative processes are civil proceedings.... Criminal violations of
the INA ... include, for example, 8 U.S.C. § 1324, which addresses the bringing in and har-
boring of certain undocumented aliens; § 1325(a), which addresses the illegal entry of aliens;
and § 1326, which penalizes the reentry of aliens previously excluded or deported.
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criminal provisions within the same statute could have different implications
on enforcement powers of state and local police.'9 The most important factor
for understanding the implications of INA Section 287(g) is an understand-
ing of why civil and criminal provisions of the INA are treated differently.
21
To begin, Gonzales explained that:
Where state enforcement activities do not impair federal regulatory
interests concurrent enforcement activity is authorized. Therefore,
federal regulation of a particular field should not be presumed to
preempt state enforcement activity "in the absence of persuasive
reasons-either that the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably
so ordained.'
Under the preemption rationale discussed in Gonzales, a substantial dif-
ference must exist between the civil and the criminal provisions of the INA
to warrant such treatment. Referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1325, the criminal provi-
sion of the INA regarding illegal entry into the United States, Gonzales
makes the point that "[f]ederal and local enforcement have identical purpos-
es-the prevention of the misdemeanor or felony of illegal entry. 22  The
circular rationalization of highlighting the purpose of the criminal provisions
versus the civil provisions does not adequately explain why the two warrant
LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE
OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (2009), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/
awc/awcgate/crs/rl32270.pdf (footnotes omitted).
18. 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983).
19. See id. at 475-76.
20. See id. at 476.
21. Id. at 474 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976)) (citations omitted).
22. Id. (emphasis added).
Any alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States at any time or place other than
as designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration
officers, or (3) attempts to enter or obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or
misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact, shall, for the first
commission of any such offense, be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than 6 months,
or both, and, for a subsequent commission of any such offense, be fined under title 18, or im-
prisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).
Title 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a) penalizes noncitizens who enter by eluding immigration officers at
official inspection stations or by making false statements at the time of inspection. The provi-
sion previously designated a first-time commission of any of these offenses as a misdemeanor,
and subsequent commissions as felonies. While the newly amended version of § 1325(a) no
longer contains the words "misdemeanor" or "felony," it still categorizes offenses as such by
reference to 18 [U.S.C.] and to the penalties for each category of offense.
DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES § 7.19 at 7-49
(Dan Kesselbrenner ed., West 2009) (1984) (footnote omitted).
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different treatment.23 It is obvious that both states and the federal govern-
ment would like to enforce criminal laws, but the same argument can be
made for states enforcing civil violations of the INA. 24 In fact, given that
states like Florida bear the majority of the cost of illegal immigration, states
may not only have the same purpose in enforcing the civil provisions of the
INA, but may actually have a greater incentive to do so. 25 Instead, a better
way to understand the difference between criminal and civil violations of the
INA is the assumption by Gonzales "that the civil provisions of the Act regu-
lating authorized entry, length of stay, residence status, and deportation, con-
stitute such a pervasive regulatory scheme, as would be consistent with the
exclusive federal power over immigration., 26  Essentially, Gonzales is re-
cognizing that civil immigration enforcement is complex, and thus has re-
quired pervasive regulation by the federal government.27 This rationale re-
cognizes that civil immigration violations require extensive training in exer-
cising discretion, as well as access to government databases, neither of which
are readily available to state and local police officers.28
B. 1996 Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act,
Analysis of Section 287(g)
"The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act...
effective September 30, 1996, added [s]ection 287(g), performance of immi-
gration officer functions by state officers and employees, to the Immigration
23. See Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 476-77.
24. See id.
25. See JACK MARTIN, FED'N FOR AM. IMMIGRATION REFORM, THE COSTS OF ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION TO FLORIDIANS 10 (2009), available at http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/
flastudy.pdf?doclD=601.
After closely examining costs incurred to provide K-12 education to the children of illegal
aliens, unreimbursed public health care, and for incarceration of criminal aliens, FAIR con-
cluded that the costs [of illegal immigration] to Florida taxpayers amounted to $1.7 billion an-
nually. In 2008, Florida's illegal immigrant population cost state taxpayers more than $3.8 bil-
lion per year.
Id. at 1.
26. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474-75.
27. Id. at 475.
28. See id. "Under current practice, state and local law enforcement officials do not have
direct access to information on the immigration status of an alien." SEGHETTI ET AL., supra
note 17, at 19. "State and local law enforcement officials ... have reported a variety of prob-
lems with accessing LESC [the Law Enforcement Support Center] and soliciting the help of
federal immigration officials .... " Id. at 20. "LESC was established in 1994 and is adminis-
tered by ICE. It operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week. LESC gathers information from
eight databases and several law enforcement databases, including the NCIC. In July 2003,
LESC processed 48,007 inquiries." Id. at 19 n.82.
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and Nationality Act (INA). 29  Section 287(g) of the INA (8 U.S.C. §
1357(g)) was added by section 133 of the IIRAIRA constituting "[o]ne of the
broadest grants of authority for state and local immigration enforcement ac-
tivity. ' 30 Section 287(g) authorizes that
the Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a
State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an
officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined
by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an
immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension,
or detention of aliens in the United States (including the transpor-
tation of such aliens across State lines to detention centers), may
carry out such function at the expense of the State or political sub-
division and to the extent consistent with State and local law.
31
This section is not an authorization of state and local police to obtain
immigration enforcement powers at their own discretion. The usefulness of
this section is in the ability of state and local governments to arrange pro-
grams tailored to their local concerns and benefiting local constituents.32
This provision makes it clear, however, that any participating officers under
the agreement act at the discretion and under the supervision of the Attorney
General of the United States. 33 In fact, every aspect of a state or local offic-
er's involvement in any section 287(g) program must be agreed to and su-
pervised by the Attorney General.34 While section 287(g) allows states to
29. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Section 287(g), supra note
12, at 1.
30. SEGHETnI ET AL., supra note 17, at 12. "Section 1357(g) allows for significant flex-
ibility. It permits state and local entities to tailor an agreement with the AG [Attorney Gener-
al] to meet local needs, contemplates the authorization of multiple officers, and does not re-
quire the designated officers to stop performing their local duties." Id.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006). Note that this provision is the same as INA section
287(g). See SEGHETrI ET AL., supra note 17, at 14.
32. James Jay Carafano, Section 287(g) Is the Right Answer for State and Local Immigra-
tion Enforcement, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Executive Memorandum 994, Mar. 2, 2006, at 2,
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/homelandsecurity/upload/94536l 
.pdf.
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). "In performing a function under this subsection, an officer or
employee of a State or political subdivision of a State shall be subject to the direction and
supervision of the Attorney General." Id.
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(5) ("With respect to each officer or employee of a State or politi-
cal subdivision who is authorized to perform a function under this subsection, the specific
powers and duties that may be, or are required to be, exercised or performed by the individual,
the duration of the authority of the individual, and the position of the agency of the Attorney
General who is required to supervise and direct the individual, shall be set forth in a written
agreement between the Attorney General and the State or political subdivision.").
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make immigration enforcement a greater priority, it seems there is a potential
that state interests may be squeezed out by the interests of the federal gov-
ernment. The federal government's immigration enforcement powers may
be extended into local communities under the guise that the state or local
entity's interests are being addressed. Until 2002, it was unknown how an
agreement pursuant to INA section 287(g) would operate.3 ' However, the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the State of Florida and the
Department of Justice, signed in 2002 and renewed in 2003,36 is often consi-
dered an example of how an INA section 287(g) program may be tailored to
address both state and federal concerns.37
III. OVERVIEW OF THE FLORIDA MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
A. Purpose Behind the Formulation of the Agreement
Florida has actively attempted to increase state influence in immigration
enforcement before.38 In 1998, "U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Com-
missioner Doris Meissner and Florida Governor Lawton Chiles . . . signed
the first agreement between the federal government and a state that pro-
vide[d] for a joint response to a mass influx of aliens."39 The 1998 MOU
was in recognition of a state need "to develop and implement a comprehen-
sive federal response to any mass influx of aliens within the state. ' ° Three
years later, the particular needs of the State of Florida changed drastically
35. See SEGHETTI ET AL., supra note 17, at 14-15; News Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
INS and Florida Sign Historic Agreement on Response to a Mass Migration, (Oct. 19, 1998),
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/migration/florida-agreement.htm [hereinaf-
ter News Release, INS and Florida Sign Historic Agreement].
36. SEGHETr ET AL., supra note 17, at 13, 15.
37. See Carafano, Section 287(g), supra note 32, at 2. "A [section] 287(g) pilot program
with the State of Florida could serve as a national model .... The Florida initiative demon-
strates how to craft a program that meets federal as well as state and local needs." Id.
38. See News Release, INS and Florida Sign Historic Agreement, supra note 35.
39. Id. ("The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) formalizes the terms under which
Florida will support INS operations in response to an actual or imminent mass migration into
the state. Under the MOU, Florida may provide logistical and law enforcement support to the
federal response upon request by INS. INS, as the lead federal agency, will coordinate res-
ponsive law enforcement operations, and the state will be reimbursed for authorized expenses
incurred. Implementation of the MOU is contingent upon action by the Attorney General to
obligate funds from the Immigration Emergency Fund. The Attorney General also can ap-
prove the delegation of authority to state law enforcement officers to enforce immigration law
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and so did the nature of its cooperation with the federal government.4  After
September 11, 2001, the State of Florida shared a common understanding
with the federal government-that a greater role of the State of Florida in
immigration enforcement may have been crucial in preventing the attacks on
September 11, 2001 .42 In 2002, the Florida MOU was signed by the Attor-
ney General of the United States, Commissioner of the INS, Governor of
Florida, and Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
(FDLE).43 In the year following the September 11 th attacks, it is no surprise
that the agreement was formulated under the umbrella of domestic security.
44
The limitation in scope to domestic security was built into the agreement by
limiting eligible officers to those already working within seven Regional
Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF). 45 "These task forces have served
as the cornerstone of Florida's domestic security and anti-terrorism efforts
since that time ... ,46 The RDSTFs, however, often encountered illegal
aliens during operations. 47 While attempts were made to involve federal of-
ficials with immigration authority, the scarcity of federal resources often
41. See The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 55 (statement of Kris W. Kobach,
Professor, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law).
42. Id. "Terrorism and criminal activity are most effectively combated through a multia-
gency/multi-authority approach that encompasses federal, state and local resources, skills and
expertise. State and local law enforcement . . . will often encounter foreign-born criminals
and immigration violators who pose a threat to national security or public safety." U.S. Im-
migration & Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Section 287(g), supra note 12, at 1.
"[S]everal of the 9/11 hijackers had either entered the United States through Florida or had
operated in Florida while preparing for the attack." The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note
3, at 55 (statement of Kris W. Kobach, Professor, University of Missouri-Kansas City School
of Law).
43. Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 9.
44. See id. at 1. "The efforts of officers so authorized under this MOU shall remain
focused on counter-terrorism and domestic security goals." Id.
45. See The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 15 (statement of Mark F. Dubina,
Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement) ("After the atrocities of
September I1, 2001 .... the state of Florida created seven Regional Domestic Security Task
Forces [RDSTFs] .... Their mission is to employ the coordinated resources of various local,
state and federal agencies to prevent, preempt and disrupt any terrorist attack or other domes-
tic security threats within the state of Florida or in the event of ... an attack .... to effectively
respond to the incident to facilitate recovery and investigations."). "The RSDTF concentrates
full-time on domestic security and counter terrorism specific investigative efforts." Authority
to Enforce Immigration Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 226 (statement of E.J. Picolo, Regional
Director, Florida Department of Law Enforcement).
46. The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of Mark F. Dubina,
Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement).
47. Authority to Enforce Immigration Law Hearing, supra note I, at 226 (statement of
E.J. Picolo, Regional Director, Florida Department of Law Enforcement).
20091
228
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
frustrated the efforts of the RDSTFs 8 The FDLE requested greater access
to federal immigration databases to aid the RDSTF in their domestic security
efforts.49 This provided an opportunity for the State of Florida to enter into
an agreement with little controversy, as the focus was on domestic security
rather than increased immigration enforcement.
50
While the stated intent of the MOU is "to address the counter-terrorism
and domestic security needs of the nation and the State of Florida," the func-
tions listed in the agreement are not specifically limited to instances implicat-
ing domestic security concerns.5' Additionally, limiting the agreement to
domestic security and counter-terrorism measures is a unique feature of the
Florida agreement and not in any way required by section 287(g). 2 In fact,
the agreement authorizes normal immigration functions, including, but not
limited to, interrogation of a person believed to be an alien to determine
probable cause, completion of arrest reports, preparation of immigration de-
tainers, and even transportation of aliens under arrest.5 3 It is also important
to note that the agreement supplements already existing duties and authori-
ties of participating officers, rather than limiting them to those set out in the
48. Id. "From the very beginning ,[the FDLE's] investigative efforts would encounter
alien residents both legal and illegal. Many times it took far too long to get immigration re-
lated questions answered, due in some cases to a lack of available federal resources." Id.
49. See The 2 87(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of Mark F. Dubina,
Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement). "The current
ICEIRDSTF initiative evolved from a previous FDLE request to allow state law enforcement
personnel to have direct access to the Legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
record systems and databases." Id.
50. Id. at 55 (statement of Kris W. Kobach, Professor, University of Missouri-Kansas
City School of Law). "Florida's initial interest in seeking a Section 287(g) agreement was
driven in part by the exigencies of 9/11 and the recognition that state and local law enforce-
ment can increase their effectiveness in the war against terrorism with the addition of Section
287(g) enforcement authority." Id.
51. Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 1, 3. The Florida MOU
"specifies that operations conducted jointly by the INS and the state will be limited to mis-
sions involving Florida's Regional Domestic Security Task Force. The agreement, however,
fails to clearly delineate what such operations might entail." INS and Florida Enter MOU to
Allow State Officers to Enforce Immigration Law, IMMIGRANTS' RTS. UPDATE (Nat'l Immigra-
tion L. Ctr. L.A., Cal.) Sept. 10, 2002, at 4, available at http://www.nilc.org/imrmlawpolicy/
arrestdet/ad054.htm,
52. See Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 3. "Section 287(g) of the
INA allows the DHS and state and local governments to enter into assistance compacts. Both
sides must agree on the scope and intent of the program before it is implemented, which gives
states and local communities the flexibility to shape the programs to meet their needs." Cara-
fano, Section 2 87(g), supra note 32, at 2.
53. Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 3; see Carafano, Section
287(g), supra note 32, at 2.
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MOU.5 4 Though the participating officers are required to devote substantial
time to the Cross-Designation program at the federal agency's discretion, the
officers retained their original duties and obligations at the discretion of the
employing state agency.55
B. Organization of the Agreement Between the State of Florida and the
Department of Justice
As discussed earlier, agreements under section 287(g) require extensive
supervision and discretion by the participating federal agency. 6 Under the
Florida MOU, "INS enforcement authority would be delegated to those [par-
ticipating] officers under Section 287(g) and they would work under the di-
rect supervision of an INS Supervisor and the assigned RDSTF Special
Agent Supervisor. '57 According to the structure of the agreement, it is the
responsibility of the federal agency to utilize the participating officers only
when the purpose of the operation relates to domestic security or counter-
terrorism, and the federal agency has the authority to terminate state and lo-
cal officers' involvement in any operation under the MOU at any time.58 The
limitation in authority granted to participating officers extends beyond the
INS' authority under the agreement.59 In response to expected concerns that
participating officers may use their immigration training beyond the stated
intent of domestic security and counter-terrorism-and outside the watchful
eye of the INS-the agreement provides that "[a]ny such actions ... shall not
54. See Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 1.
Nothing herein shall otherwise limit the jurisdiction and powers normally possessed by a par-
ticipating officer as a member of the officer's employing state or local law enforcement entity
(employing entity). Nothing herein shall otherwise limit the ability of participating RDSTF
members to provide, as provided by or allowed by law, such assistance in any enforcement ac-
tion unrelated to RDSTF operations as may be lawfully requested by a law enforcement officer
having jurisdiction over any such incident, crime, or matter under consideration.
Id.
55. Id. at 6. Nothing in this MOU, "limits RDSTF officers or agents who are within their
normal territorial jurisdiction(s) from acting unilaterally as officers or agents of their employ-
ing entity to engage in continued investigative or enforcement actions as authorized by their
employing entity." Id.
56. See id.
57. The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 17 (statement of Mark F. Dubina,
Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement).
58. See Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 6.
Participating state and local officers are not to be utilized in routine INS operations unless the
operation has a nexus to the RDSTF's domestic security and counter-terrorism function.... If
at any time the INS officer determines that an INS-related operation should be terminated, all
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fall within the privileges and obligations of this MOU.'6° The legislature has
acted to limit the exercise of discretion by state officers while working under
the agreement.
61
In addition to being an active member of a RDSTF:
Each nominee has to be a U.S. citizen, have been a sworn officer
for a minimum of three years, and have, at minimum, an Associate
Degree. Candidates also must be able to qualify for federal securi-
ty clearances. Once selected, each candidate's employer has to in-
dicate that it will allow the officer to work a significant portion of
his work responsibilities within the RDSTF for a minimum of one
62year.
These requirements, set out in section V of the MOU, demonstrate an
acknowledgement that empowering state and local officials to enforce immi-
gration laws requires special considerations. 6 In order to deal with the com-
plex immigration regime, the agreement requires educated personnel and
reduces personnel turnover.64 These requirements help ensure competence
and skill, as well as limit the influx of inexperienced officers.65
The design of bringing state and local authorities under the supervision
and discretion of the INS is further emphasized in the structure of the train-
ing program.66 Section VI of the MOU explains that the INS will provide
both the training materials and establish the curriculum for the participating
officers.67 Soon after implementation of the MOU, "the Immigration Officer
Academy crafted a six-week training course featuring the delegation of au-
60. See id. Under the agreement, "[plarticipating state and local officers will have the
same qualified immunity as do INS officers from personal liability from tort suits based on
actions conducted under this MOU." Id. at 7. The agreement therefore "shift[s] liability to
the federal government and provid[es] the officers with additional immunity when enforcing
federal laws." Carafano, Section 287(g), supra note 32, at 2. However, even if an officer is
not subject to qualified immunity under section X of the MOU, government agents are gener-
ally afforded qualified immunity from their actions as long as the officer could believe he was
acting within his discretion under the law clearly established at the time. See Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
61. See Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 6.





67. Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 4. "Training will include
presentations on the pilot project, elements of the MOU, scope of officer authority, cross-
cultural issues, use of force policy, civil rights law, liability and issues." Id.
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thority curriculum. ' 68 "Legacy INS and FDLE, working with law enforce-
ment agencies participating in the RDSTF, finalized the selection of 35 vet-
eran law enforcement investigators as the initial cadre of delegated-authority
officers., 69 "All 35 state and local designees attended [the] six-week inten-
sive training course pursuant to this Memorandum of Understanding in Or-
lando, Florida during July and August 2002. "70
The course covered immigration and nationality law, immigration
criminal laws, removal statutes, civil rights, cultural diversity,
alien processing, INS structure and record systems and employed
the same testing criteria and techniques as basic Immigration Of-
ficer Training. On August 15, 2002, the course graduated all 35
participants, who then returned to their assigned RDSTF locations
and became operational.71
Pursuant to the 2003 renewal of the MOU, training is provided by ICE
and "[t]he program uses ICE curriculum and competency testing. 72 Upon
completion of the training program, officers are authorized to perform certain
immigration functions with close oversight by the DHS.73
The expense of the 287(g) program is borne by both sides of the agree-
ment; the INS is responsible for "training personnel, training materials and
supervision. 74 However, the agreement specifies that the expense of offic-
68. The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 18 (statement of Mark F. Dubina,
Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement); see also Envisage, Case
Study: U.S. Immigration Officer Academy, http://www.envisagenow.com/resources/case-
studies/usioa.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2009) ("The U.S. Immigration Officer Academy
(USIOA) operates under the directives of the Department of Justice, Immigration and Natura-
lization Services. The USIOA provides training to officers in twelve areas of discipline to
enforce and maintain the integrity of the immigration laws of the United States. The Acade-
my instructs approximately 3,100 students per year at its Glynco, Georgia training facility.").
69. The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 18 (statement of Mark F. Dubina,
Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement).
70. Authority to Enforce Immigration Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 227 (statement of
E.J. Picolo. Regional Director, Florida Department of Law Enforcement).
71. The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 18 (statement of Mark F. Dubina,
Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement).
72. SEGHEIn ET AL., supra note 17, at 15.
73. Id. "The officer's performance is evaluated by the District Director and the FDLE
commissioner on a quarterly basis to assure compliance with the [MOU] requirements. Au-
thorization of the officer's powers could be revoked at any time by DHS, FDLE or the em-
ploying agency." Id.
74. Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 5.
2009]
232
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
ers' participation in training and operations under the MOU is the responsi-
bility of the state and local entities.7 5
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SUCCESSES OF THE FLORIDA
AGREEMENT WITHIN THE STATE OF FLORIDA
A. Specific Successes of the Florida Agreement
The history of the Florida agreement began with the signing of the ini-
tial document in July of 2002. After structural reorganization issues were
sorted out at both the federal and state levels, the MOU "was renewed and
signed by Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary Hutchinson
and Florida Governor Bush. 76 The renewal of the MOU after a potential
set-back during the reorganization of the executive branch demonstrates the
strong desire of both the federal government and the state of Florida to con-
tinue cooperative efforts.77 In April 2005, upon continued support from the
75. Id. at 4. "The FDLE will cover the costs of all candidates' housing and per diem
while involved in training required for participation in this pilot project. Costs of travel to and
from required training will be the employing entity's responsibility." Id. In addition,
"[p]articipating RDSTF officers will carry out designated functions at state or local expense,
including salaries and benefits, local transportation, and official issue material." Id. at 5.
76. The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 17-18 (statement of Mark F. Dubina,
Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement). On March 1, 2003, "the
Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . ceased to exist" and, along with other federal
agencies, was absorbed by the Department of Homeland Security under the Homeland Securi-
ty Act. Francesco Isgio, After 63 Years in the Department of Justice, INS Ceases to Exist-Its
Functions Transfer to New Department of Homeland Security, IMMIGRATION LITIGATION
BULLETIN, 1 (Feb. 28, 2003). ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) "[c]arries out
homeland security inspection and investigation[] [functions] formerly handled by [the] INS,
Customs Services and Federal Protective Services." Department of Homeland Security,
DEFENSE NEVER RESTS, July 2003, at 10; see U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
About, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2009). At the state level, in
October, 2003, "the Florida Department of Law Enforcement ... received a new Executive
Director, Commissioner Guy Tunnell." The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 18
(statement of Mark F. Dubina, Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law En-
forcement). Due to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), section
287(g) now "authorizes the secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies . . . provided that the
local law enforcement officers receive appropriate training and function under the supervision
of sworn U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers." U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Section 287(g), supra note 12, at 1.
77. See Authority to Enforce Immigration Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 227-28 (state-
ment of E.J. Picolo, Regional Director, Florida Department of Law Enforcement). "During
the months between September and December 2003, no action could be taken by [the] Cross
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state and federal governments, "the ICE Academy graduated twenty-seven
(27) additional Task Force Agents. 78 The continuation of the program in
Florida is a reflection of the perception by both state and federal agencies
that the Florida MOU is effectively addressing immigration concerns within
Florida previously beyond the scope of state officers and under the radar of
the federal government.
Representing the opinion of the Attorney General was Kris W. Kobach,
who claimed that "[t]he success of the [Florida] program was immediately
apparent. In the first year under the Florida MOU, the trained state officers
made 165 immigration arrests, including the bust of a phony document pro-
duction ring in the Naples area. ' 79 In a hearing on the Florida 287(g) pro-
gram in 2005, Special Agent Supervisor Mark F. Dubina of the FDLE men-
tioned that "[tlo date over 100 persons have been arrested, and many more
have been interviewed by trained officers who can more adequately deter-
mine if a person poses a threat based [on] a number of variables, including
knowledge gained by participating in the extensive ICE 287(g) training." 80
The FDLE, in particular, claims that implementation and renewal of the
MOU directly led to various arrests of illegal aliens at sites invoking national
security concerns. 81 One concrete example cited by the FDLE is operation
"Open Water," in which "members of the Tampa Bay Regional Domestic
Security Task Force ... arrested several individuals who had obtained port
access badges as a result of illegal activity. ' 82 The arrests were a result of an
Designated agents, as the Memorandum of Understanding had not been renewed, and was
under review." Id. at 228.
The hiatus experienced in renewing the agreement coupled with the reorganization of INS/ICE
threatened to cause this valuable and important program to drift into merely 'standby' status-
used only when an emergency prompted a need for the use of the specially designated state and
local officers. From Forida's perspective, and indeed from Washington's, this was not what
anyone wanted to occur.
Id. at 229.
78. The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 18-19 (statement of Mark F. Dubina,
Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement).
79. Id. at 55 (statement of Kris W. Kobach, Professor, University of Missouri-Kansas
City School of Law).
80. Id. at 19 (statement of Mark F. Dubina, Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Depart-
ment of Law Enforcement).
81. See id. ("To date, the arrests cover a broad spectrum of activity. We have arrested
single individuals involved in what appears to be surveillance activities of sensitive locations.
We have also conducted extensive investigations that have resulted in illegal aliens being
apprehended working in restricted or secured areas of airports, seaports and nuclear plants.").
82. News Release, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, TBROC RDSTF An-
nounces Arrests in Operation "Open Water," (Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter News Release,
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effort "to investigate instances of identity fraud and false statements used by
subjects to obtain employment and access to restricted areas of Florida sea-
ports. 83 The investigation was a joint effort between several state and local
entities, including "the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO), Florida Department
of Law Enforcement Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF), So-
cial Security Administration (SSA), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Tampa Port
Authority." 84 It is unquestionable that cooperation by the state and federal
entities was paramount in the success of the operation.85
The fundamental inquiry is how effective Section 287(g) and the Flori-
da MOU are in combating illegal immigration and serving the needs of Flor-
ida and the federal government. In his law review article, Kobach argues
that the entire community of local police throughout the nation are needed to
combat illegal immigration.86 However, the Florida MOU only authorizes a
select group of state officers to perform certain immigration functions at the
discretion of the federal government, hardly the force multiplier discussed by
Kobach.87 Still, analyzing the structure of the Florida MOU in light of the
success of operation "Open Water" suggests Florida and the federal govern-
ment may have formulated an agreement that effectively accomplishes its
stated purpose, while striking a balance between greater local involvement in
immigration and protection against wide grants of discretion to local law
enforcement. The agreement is tailored to domestic security, and though this
is an undefined and ambiguous term, the officers involved are solely within
the RDSTFs, which only conduct operations implicating domestic security.88
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. ("A comprehensive list with biographical information of port access badge
holders was obtained from the FDLE Applicant Services Section. From that list, biographical
information relative to name, date of birth, Social Security number and other identifying fea-
tures was compared to SSA, ICE and FDLE records in an effort to identify which subjects
provided false information to receive port access badges. The screening identified potential
suspects that provided inconsistent or false information during the application and security
background process. These subjects were than [sic] further examined and the cases were
presented to a Federal Grand Jury.").
86. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005).
87. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Section 287(g), supra
note 12, at 2.
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In his article, Kris Kobach cites an example demonstrating how local
enforcement of immigration laws is vital to domestic security. 89 In his ex-
ample,
a police officer learns that a university student from a country that
is a state sponsor of terrorism has made several purchases of sig-
nificant quantities of fertilizer. He may also learn from other uni-
versity students that the individual has not been attending classes.
Neither of these actions constitutes a crime. However, from these
circumstances, the officer may reasonably suspect that the alien
has violated the terms of his student visa.
90
This is certainly an example of how local officers may assist in address-
ing domestic security concerns that would ordinarily fly under the radar of
the federal government. What this example does not address, however, is the
concern of how local officers can operate within the pervasive regulatory
scheme identified in Gonzales without access to the requisite training and
federal databases. 91 This concern is addressed by Section 287(g) and the
Florida MOU; and Operation "Open Water" is an example of their effective-
ness. In that operation, state officers identified the suspicious characters, and
obtained the necessary biographical information to identify potential domes-
tic security threats.92 The officers then referenced both state and federal da-
tabases in an effort to determine which suspects had "provided false informa-
tion to receive port access badges. 93 It is unclear whether the state officers
would have had access to either the Social Security Administration (SSA) or
the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) databases without
cross-agency cooperation. Essentially, Operation "Open Water" demon-
strates how the Florida MOU closed gaps between the investigative spheres
of the state and federal law enforcement agencies, providing an opportunity
to conduct targeted domestic security operations previously unachievable. 94
89. Kobach, supra note 86, at 189.
90. Id. at 189-90 (footnote omitted).
91. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1983).
92. FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, QUARTERLY PERFORMANCE REPORT, OPERATION
"OPEN WATER" NETS 15 ARRESTS AT TAMPA PORT (2004-05), available at http://www.fdle.
state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/402a 16e9-7c21-409d-93ea-3ef3c435a3 1 8/FDLECabinetPackage
_041905.aspx.
93. Id.
94. See The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 18-19 (statement of Mark F.
Dubina, Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement). Operation
"Open Water" "was successful because it combined the efforts of a number of FDLE pro-
grams/initiatives and the training and expertise of the ICE 287(g) trained Agents and the ICE
Lead Worker assigned to the RDSTF." Id. at 19.
2009]
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Florida had the intention of designing a limited program, by which state
law enforcement could assist the federal government in addressing immigra-
tion violations related to domestic security concerns that would have ordina-
rily been outside the investigative authority of the state and under the radar
of the federal government. The Florida MOU, the first agreement of its kind
formulated under Section 287(g) of the INA, seems to have accomplished
that goal. Nevertheless, the program does provide for greater local involve-
ment in immigration enforcement. Anytime there is a wider local involve-
ment in immigration enforcement, concerns of civil rights and community
relations must be addressed.
V. CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES REGARDING INCREASED LOCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION VIOLATIONS
A. Civil Rights Concerns
Civil rights concerns are a big factor when discussing local enforcement
of federal immigration law. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
has commented that "[i]nvolving state and local law enforcement in immi-
gration status issues would have a severe impact on the civil rights and civil
liberties of all persons, citizens and non-citizens alike, who reside in com-
munities with large immigrant populations."95 It is important to understand
how the empowerment of local law enforcement could implicate civil rights
concerns, and how the Florida MOU addresses these common concerns.
Empowering local law enforcement to investigate and arrest for civil
immigration violations creates an avenue by which minority groups may be
subject to harassment. 96 Pretextual stops by police with the intention to in-
vestigate immigration status may have drastic consequences for both illegal
immigrants as well as legal minorities who are unable to provide proof of
citizenship.97 Local law enforcement simply does not have the resources or
training to properly investigate citizenship status without illegally subjecting
citizens and legal immigrants to illegal investigations. 98
95. Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003 (CLEAR ACT):
Hearing on H.R. 2671 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 108 (2003) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2671]
(statement of Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel, ACLU).
96. See SEGHETrl ET AL., supra note 17, at 20.
97. See id.
98. See id. ("Because unauthorized aliens are likely to be members of minority groups,
complications may arise in enforcing immigration law due to the difficulty in identifying
illegal aliens while at the same time avoiding the appearance of discrimination based on eth-
nicity or alienage. Thus, a high risk for civil rights violations may occur if state and local
[Vol. 34
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The Florida MOU does not seem to implicate these common civil rights
concerns due to its narrow scope and implementation. It has even been sug-
gested that the Florida MOU alleviates some of the civil rights problems
associated with greater local enforcement of immigration violations and ac-
tually benefit immigrants in that respect.99 There is some substance to this
argument simply based on the training and access to information that is
available to the participating state officers. However, it is difficult to see
how greater training and information can benefit immigrants who remain in
targeted ethnic communities. Simply acknowledging that this program may
lead to shorter immigration related detentions of innocent individuals who
are members of certain ethnic communities is an acknowledgment that racial
profiling does occur in immigration enforcement.1°° A better way to under-
stand the civil rights implications is to accept that empowering local law
enforcement to enforce civil immigration violations will inherently have an
element of racial profiling as a means of investigation and enforcement. The
Florida agreement, however, only empowers a relatively small amount of
state and local officials to engage in these enforcement practices and is fairly
limited to the realm of domestic security and under the supervision of the
federal government.' °' The amount of oversight required by Section 287(g)
and the Florida MOU, along with the narrowly tailored enforcement powers
of the participating state and local officers, substantially decreases the like-
lihood of participating officers engaging in activities that threatens the civil
rights of minority communities.
B. Strained Relationships with Minority Communities
While citizens and legal immigrants worry about the potential civil
rights abuses stemming from local enforcement of immigration violations,
police do not obtain the requisite knowledge, training, and experience in dealing with the
enforcement of immigration laws.").
99. The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 19 (statement of Mark F. Dubina,
Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement) ("In those cases where an
immigrant is cleared of suspicion, but still has immigration issues, the subject is afforded the
same consideration as an illegal alien not encountered under these circumstances." "Ironical-
ly, this training and experience has proven to be a benefit to the immigrant communities be-
cause the Agents are more readily able to clear a person that is suspected of suspicious activity
by having access to the wealth of information contained in ICE databases.").
100. See SEGHETTl ETAL., supra note 17, at 20. "[S]uspects of immigration violations may
become victims of 'racial profiling'-the practice of targeting individuals for police or securi-
ty detention based on their race or ethnicity in the belief that certain minority groups are more
likely to engage in unlawful behavior or be present in the United States illegally." Id.
101. Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 1.
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law enforcement entities worry about a resulting strain on community rela-
tions." 2 The ACLU, an opponent to greater local enforcement of immigra-
tion violations, explains that involvement in enforcement of immigration
violations "is opposed by many police departments and local governments
who fear it would undermine public safety.' 0 3 The main priority of local
police is crime control and maintenance of law and order within their dis-
trict.' 4 Empowering local officers to enforce immigration laws encourages
minority citizens and illegal aliens to retreat from the police, essentially dis-
couraging the reporting of crimes and cooperation with local police offic-
ers. 05  Florida officials have consistently acknowledged this concern.10 6
During the training period of the initial MOU in 2002,
the State of Florida, through the RSDTF's, expended considerable
energy and time communicating the purpose of the program to var-
ious ethnic groups.... Some cultural groups expressed concerns
related to any INS authority being delegated to state and local of-
ficers. The Office of the Governor, the RSDTF's, and Legacy INS
diligently worked to communicate exactly what Florida's inten-
tions were with this program to the ethnic groups with concerns,
including community and religious leaders representing Hispanics,
Haitians and persons from countries in the Middle East. All par-
ticipating agencies collaborated on, and later produced, an infor-
mative brochure that explained in simple terms, and multiple lan-
guages, the mission of the program. Additionally, we did not miss
an opportunity to communicate our message via the print, radio
and television media.
0 7
The FDLE has ensured that no activity has occurred which should concern
local immigrants, regardless of their status.0 8
102. Hearing on H.R. 2671, supra note 95, at 108.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 108-09.
105. SEGHETTI ETAL.,supra note 17, at 21.
[Ultilizing state and local law enforcement to enforce immigration law would undermine the
relationship between local law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve. For ex-
ample, potential witnesses and victims of crime may be reluctant to come forward to report
crimes in fear of actions that might be taken against them by immigration officials.
Id.
106. See The 2 87(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 17-18 (statement of Mark F.
Dubina, Special Agent Supervisor, Florida Department of Law Enforcement).
107. Id. at 18.
108. See id. at 18. "Within this program there have been no examples where persons have
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Again, the structure of the Florida MOU should ease concerns that im-
migrants may have in interacting with law enforcement. Only a handful of
officers are empowered to enforce certain civil immigration violations and
only under the discretion of the overseeing federal agency.' °9 The main rea-
son that citizens need not fear this program is that the officers within the
RDSTFs are not engaged in day-to-day law enforcement activity."' 0 Propo-
nents of greater local enforcement of immigration may wish that the Florida
agreement provided for broader grants of authority to a wider segment of
Florida state law enforcement, but it is this limit on the program's scope that
should ease immigrants' fears of looming mass deportation.
VI. EXAMINATION OF THE PROPER WAY TO PROCEED WITH AN EXPANSION
OF 287(G) PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES
Taking into account the concerns regarding local enforcement of immi-
gration laws as well as the actual effectiveness of programs designed to in-
crease local participation in enforcement of civil violations of the INA, the
Florida MOU seems to be a model for the structuring and implementation of
future agreements."' Shortly after Florida became the first state to utilize
INA Section 287(g), the trend of expanding 287(g) programs into other states
began.' 1 2 "In November 2003, ICE and the Alabama Department of Public
Safety (ALDPS) signed an MOU to provide immigration authority to 21 Al-
abama state troopers.""' 3 The Alabama MOU was structured in a similar
fashion as the Florida MOU, mainly due to the limitations required by Sec-
[W]hile significant concerns were expressed particularly by groups representing seasonal
workers at the duration of our Cross Designation project, we have stuck to the spirit and letter
of our Memorandum of Understanding. There have been no situations where fields have been
raided, labor camps infiltrated, nor would such be tolerated.
Authority to Enforce Immigration Law Hearing, supra note 1, at 228 (statement of E.J. Picolo,
Regional Director, Florida Department of Law Enforcement).
109. See Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 5-6.
110. See id. at 6. The responsibilities of the Task Force will include:
improving Florida's ability to detect and prevent potential terrorist threats; collecting and dis-
seminating intelligence and investigative information; facilitating and promoting ongoing se-
curity audits and vulnerability assessments to protect critical infrastructures; coordinating the
delivery of training and supporting the purchase of proper equipment for public safety first
responders and [disaster] response teams; improving Florida's response and recovery capabili-
ties; [and promoting better public awareness of how suspicious incidents may be reported]; and
facilitating initial response to terrorist incidences within each region.
FLORIDA FIRE CHIEFS' ASSOCIATION, REGIONAL DOMESTIC SECURITY TASK FORCE-DRSC
PLAN I, available at http://www.ffca.org/files/public[DSRC 10-02.pdf.
I1ll. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Section 287(g), supra
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tion 287(g).' 4 However, the Alabama MOU is not limited to instances of
domestic security like the Florida MOU, a key limitation in the Florida
agreements' scope." 5 Alabama's desire was to design a program that al-
lowed for state law enforcement officers to assist in general identification
and removal of illegal aliens. 16 Under the program, Alabama's officers "re-
ceived extensive training in immigration and nationality law and procedures
and now have the authority to determine whether or not an individual is an
illegal alien and can be removed from the U.S. in addition to their normal
duties.""' 7 In describing the limitation in scope of the Alabama agreement
beyond those enumerated in Section 287(g), Col. Mike Coppage, then Direc-
tor of the Alabama Department of Public Safety, stated that "the troopers
will engage in immigration enforcement actions only as needed during
the course of their regular duties.""' 8 This was followed by a promise that
"[t]hese are state troopers, not immigration agents ... and they will not
take part in 'sweep' searches for illegal aliens.""' 9 This trend has been
seen in other states as well, including Virginia, where an agreement "al-
low[ed] specially trained state police officers to make arrests for immi-
114. SEGHErrl ET AL., supra note 17, at 16 (recognizing that under the Alabama MOU,
"[t]raining is provided by ICE, and the curriculum is the same as provided in Florida's
[MOU]."
Immigration enforcement activities of the officers will be supervised and directed by ICE spe-
cial agents, who are located in Huntsville, Birmingham and Montgomery, Alabama. Such ac-
tivities can only be performed under direct supervision of ICE special agents. Arrests made
under the authority must be reported to ICE within 24 hours, and will be reviewed by the ICE
special agent on an ongoing basis to ensure compliance with immigration laws and procedures.
Id.
115. See id. at 15-16.
116. The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 55 (statement of Kris W. Kobach,
Professor, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law) ("Alabama had experienced
widespread and increasing violations of federal immigration law by aliens in its jurisdiction.
However, the distribution of INS manpower left Alabama underserved, in the judgment of
Alabama's law enforcement leadership and members of its congressional delegation. At
times, as few as three INS interior enforcement agents were operating in the state. Recogniz-
ing that breakdown of the rule of law in immigration carries with it attendant public safety
threats, Alabama addressed the INS manpower shortage by committing its own officers to the
task.").
117. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Section 287(g), supra note
12, at 2.
118. News Release, Ala. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Alabama Implements Agreement with U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Oct. 3, 2003), available at http://dps.alabama.gov/
appDocumentslDocuments/News%20Release/10-03-03-ICEGraduation.pdf [hereinafter News
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gration violations.' 120  "Virginia officials decided to seek extra immigration
powers for some state police officers after participating in local and federal
task forces on terrorism and gang violence."' 12' These programs, similar to
the Florida MOU, empower relatively small amounts of state officers to per-
form certain immigration functions.
22
Another example of an agreement being narrowly tailored to address a
specific state need is the agreement with the Mecklenburg County Sheriff's
Office in Charlotte, North Carolina, entered into in February 2006.123 In that
agreement, the Mecklenburg County Sheriffs Office desired a limited pres-
ence in the county prison system to investigate the immigration status of
those already involved in the justice system. 2 4 This is just another example
of the wide variety of issues that can be addressed with INA 287(g) coopera-
tion. 125
An issue in need of discussion is the scope of these additional agree-
ments. For example, the Alabama program is unquestionably broader than
the Florida program in that it is not narrowly tailored to instances involving
domestic security or any other specific area of law enforcement. 126 Instead, it
supplements the participating officers' existing duties with the authority to
120. Third State to Get Power to Enforce Immigration Laws, 9-10 BENDER'S IMMIGR.
BULL. 4 (2004). Col. Steven Flaherty, superintendent of Virginia's state police at the time,
explained that
[u]nder the agreement.., about 50 Virginia state police officers would be able to enforce fed-
eral immigration law in addition to their other responsibilities .... The officers would be sta-
tioned throughout the state, with one attached to each of the 24 drug task forces in Virginia...
SThey would be under the supervision of federal authorities when carrying out immigration
enforcement.
Mary Beth Sheridan, Va. Seeks New Role Against Illegals; Police to Enforce Immigration
Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2004, at Al.
121. Sheridan, supra note 120.
122. See News Release, Ala. Dep't of Pub. Safety, supra note 118.
123. Empowering Local Law Enforcement to Combat Illegal Immigration: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the. Comm. on
Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. 16 (2006) (statement of Kenneth A. Smith, Special Agent, ICE).
124. See id.
ICE said it will train 10 deputies to carry out certain duties traditionally handled by fed-
eral immigration officers. The Mecklenburg County Sheriffs Office deputies will operate
within the Mecklenburg County Jail facilities to interview foreign national inmates to deter-
mine whether there is probable cause for an immigration violation; complete the processing for
criminal aliens, including fingerprinting; prepare documentation to place aliens in deportation
proceedings concurrent with their prison term; and prepare documentation to deport aliens fol-
lowing their terms.
Program Federalizes Deputies to Process Illegal Aliens, WSOCTV.COM, Feb. 6, 2006,
http://www.wsoctv.comlnews/6784297/detail.html.
125. See News Release, Ala. Dep't of Pub. Safety, supra note 118.
126. See SEGHETri ETAL., supra note 17, at 15-16.
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perform certain immigration enforcement functions.1 27 Nevertheless, given
the relatively small amount of officers trained under the programs and the
extensive oversight of the federal government required by section 287(g), the
probability of civil rights abuses or extensive strains of community relations
is minimal.12 8 According to the Department of Homeland Security, only
"159 officers within seven distinct law enforcement agencies in five States"
had been trained by ICE under 287(g) agreements by August 25, 2006.129
This relatively small number is a balancing factor against any abuses that
may arise out of these agreements. 3 ° The question for the future, however,
is the extent that the federal government should expand the use of INA Sec-
tion 287(g) programs to address illegal immigration issues throughout the
nation.
VII. EXPANSION OF 287(G) PROGRAMS AND ICE ACCESS
A. ICE ACCESS
After the initial implementation of 287(g), cross-designation programs
were slow to be implemented. 3' But what began as isolated agreements to
meet specific state or local needs eventually developed into a broader desire
of state and local entities to address the hot political issue of immigration
enforcement. 132 ICE set out to make cross-designation programs more ac-
cessible to the growing number of communities expressing interest. 33
On August 21, 2007, ICE announced a new program designated ICE
ACCESS (Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety
and Security).' 34 The program was developed in response to "the widespread
interest from local law enforcement agencies that have requested ICE part-
nerships through the 287(g) program."'' 35 ICE explains that ICE ACCESS
127. See id. at 16.
128. See Empowering Local Law Enforcement, supra note 123, at 21-22 (statement of
Kenneth A. Smith, Special Agent, ICE). Since its inception in which twenty-one Alabama
troops were trained under the agreement, only "an additional 27 troopers have been trained
and certified." Id.
129. Id. at 16.
130. See id.
131. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE ACCESS, http://www.ice.gov/
partners/dro/iceaccess.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, New ICE ACCESS Pro-
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stems from the success of cross-designation programs, as well as the over-
whelming increase in interest of state and local officials in entering into co-
operative agreements with ICE. 136 But the new ICE ACCESS program is
more than a means to contract with local agencies under INA 287(g). 13 7 In-
stead, 287(g) is but "one component under the ICE ACCESS umbrella of
services," which includes various other programs related to immigration en-
forcement. 38 For example, under the Document and Benefit Fraud Task
Forces, local agencies may partner with ICE in ferreting out document fraud
within their jurisdictions. 39 This one program has already been implemented
in seventeen cities around the country. 4° It is clear that ICE is building on
the framework established by 287(g) to partner with various law enforcement
agencies to address a variety of immigration-related tasks. 14' Unlike the
Florida Memorandum of Understanding, these immigration-related tasks are
not limited to domestic security concerns, but span the realm of immigration
related functions. 42 But much like agreements under 287(g) only a few
years ago, it is still too early to gauge the impact of these programs both on
the crimes they address, and on the communities in which they operate.
136. Id. "In the past two years, the 287(g) program has identified more than 22,000 illegal
aliens for possible deportation. More than 60 municipal, county, and state agencies nation-
wide have requested 287(g) MOAs with ICE and more than 400 local and state officers have
been trained under the program." Id.
137. See U.S. Immigration & Enforcement, ICE ACCESS, supra note 131.
138. Id. These programs include Asset Forfeiture, Border Enforcement Security Task
Forces (BEST), Criminal Alien Program (CAP), Customs Cross-designation (Title 19), Doc-
ument and Benefit Fraud Task Forces, Equitable Sharing/Joint Operations, Fugitive Operation
Teams (FOTs), Immigration Cross-designation (Title 8)-287(g) Program, IPR Center (Intel-
lectual Rights Property Center), Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC), Operation Com-
munity Shield, Operation Firewall, and Operation Predator. Id.
139. id. ("ICE created Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces (DBFTFs) to target,
dismantle and seize illicit proceeds of the criminal organizations that threaten national security
and public safety by exploiting the immigration process through fraud. The DBFTFs provide
an effective platform from which to launch anti-fraud initiatives using existing manpower and
authorities. Through DBFTFs ICE partners with other federal agencies, state and local law
enforcement. These task forces focus their efforts on detecting, deterring and disrupting both
benefit fraud and document fraud."). Id.
140. U.S. Immigration & Enforcement, ICE ACCESS, supra note 131. DBFTFs are lo-
cated in "Atlanta, Boston, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, Newark, Phila-
delphia, St. Paul, . . . Washington D.C ..... Baltimore, Chicago, Miami, Phoenix, San Fran-
cisco, and Tampa." Id.
141. See id.
142. See Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at 5.
20091
244
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
B. Adoption of ICE ACCESS Programs
ICE ACCESS has proven to be a useful tool for the national spread of
287(g) training programs, as the program has drawn interest from a wide
spectrum of local governments and law enforcement agencies. 4 3 In just one
five-week session in January 2008, thirty-seven officers from five different
states and eight different law enforcement agencies received training under
the 287(g) component of ICE ACCESS. 1" At the same time, another four-
week program offered 287(g) training to thirty-six officers from five differ-
ent law enforcement agencies in Maryland and Virginia.
145
In fact, as of August 18, 2008, ICE had entered into Memorandums of
Agreement with sixty-three separate law enforcement agencies, spanning
across the entire country. 46 Throughout these agencies, more than 840 offic-
ers have received training, and ICE claims that more than 70,000 individuals
have been identified for possible immigration violations pursuant to section
287(g) authority.147 These programs are vastly different from the original
section 287(g) Memorandum of Understanding between ICE and the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement, which was limited specifically to domestic
security. 14 8 While ICE notes that the purpose of section 287(g) programs is
to combat "[tlerrorism and criminal activity . . . through a multi-
agency/multi-authority approach," it is clear that these programs are actually
143. News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Begins Immigration
Training for Georgia Sheriffs' Offices and Others (Jan. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ice.
gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/0801 08hallcounty.htm.
144. Id. The agencies included:
Hall County Sheriff's Office (GA)--9 officers; Whitfield County Sheriffs Office (GA)-6 of-
ficers; Butler County Sheriffs Office (OH)-8 officers; Durham Police Department (NC)-I
officer; Cabarrus County Sheriff's Office (NC)--5 officers; Colorado State Patrol-2 officers;
El Paso County Sheriffs Office (CO)--5 officers; [and] Florida Department of Law Enforce-
ment-I officer.
Id.
145. News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Begins Immigration
Training for Maryland and Virginia Officers (Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/
pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080204federickcounty.htm [hereinafter News Release, ICE
Begins Immigration Training for Maryland and Virginia Officers]. The agencies included
"Frederick County Sheriffs Office (MD)--26 deputies; Manassas Police Department (VA)-
1 officer; Manassas Park Police Department (VA)-1 officer; Prince William County Police
Department (VA)-6 officers; [and] Prince William County Sheriff's Office (VA)-2 depu-
ties." Id.
146. Programs, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Delegation of Immigration
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act (Aug. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/section287-g.htm?searchstring=287g.
147. Id.
148. See id.; see also Memorandum of Understanding 2002, supra note 15, at I.
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less related to specifically combating terrorism, and more geared towards
criminal investigation.
149
This shift to a generalized immigration enforcement function at the lo-
cal level can be seen in Frederick County, Maryland, where twenty-six She-
riff's deputies "receiv[ed] training that will enable them to start deportation
for [illegal] immigrants who ...have been apprehended for committing a
crime.""15 Of the twenty-six officers trained, sixteen consist of correctional
officers who work in the Frederick County Adult Detention Center, similar
to the officers from the Mecklenburg County Sheriff's Office in Charlotte,
North Carolina.151 But the other ten officers are sworn deputies intermingled
within various units of the department, including narcotics, criminal investi-
gation, the Community Response Team, and even the patrol unit. 52 Sheriff
Chuck Jenkins, in attempting to assure that the program would be limited in
scope, gave the following example of when an immigration investigation
might be triggered: "If a driver is stopped for speeding and unable to present
identification or possesses a fake ID, an immigration check could be trig-
gered.' 53 Sheriff Jenkins seems to misunderstand the concerns that immi-
grants have for such a program. In assuring that the program would not lead
to round-ups of immigrants, Sheriff Jenkins explained that the trained offic-
ers "won't all be in a white van driving up and down the streets looking for
people to pick up."'15 4 This simplistic understating of the fear held by immi-
grant populations threatens to increase the divide between the immigrant
community and local law enforcement.1 5 The threat of immigration investi-
gations pursuant to ordinary traffic stops is exactly the type of conduct that
immigrants, both legal and illegal, are concerned about. 156
149. Programs, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Delegation of Immigration
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 146.
150. Don Kornreich, There's a New Sheriff in Town, and He's Dealing with Criminal
Illegal Immigrants, FREDERICK NEWS POST (Md.), Feb. 24, 2008, available at http://www.
fredericknewspost.com/sections/archives/display-detail.htm?StorylD=79466; see News Re-
lease, ICE Begins Immigration Training for Maryland and Virginia Officers, supra note 146.
151. Marge Neal, Jenkins Defends Immigration Program, FREDERICK NEWS POST (Md.)
Feb. 8, 2008, available at http://www.fredericknewspost.com/sections/archives/display-detail.
htm?StorylD=78614; see also Empowering Local Law Enforcement, supra note 123, at 16
(statement of Kenneth A. Smith, Special Agent, ICE).
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C. Response to ICE ACCESS in Danbury, Connecticut
Danbury is a city in Fairfield County, Connecticut, of about 90,000 res-
idents.'5 7 The city, however, is known to have an actual population of about
80,000 legal residents. 158 "At least 10,000 illegal immigrants ... are esti-
mated to reside in Danbury ... What makes Danbury even more inter-
esting in the national immigration debate is the fact that "Danbury has a
greater proportion of foreign-born residents than any other city in Connecti-
cut, [constituting] 34 percent of the population."' 6 ° This sets the backdrop
for one of the more interesting immigration cases on the national scene to-
day, where a government is determined to begin cooperation with federal
immigration authorities, and a wary public awaits the implementation of the
program with skepticism and fear. 6 '
In 2004, Mark Boughton, Mayor of Danbury, began actively pursuing
immigration reform on both the national and local level. 62 Mayor Boughton
expressed concern that the federal government was not enforcing immigra-
tion regulations, and, by letter to the Director of the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, specifically requested greater focus on enforcement in
Danbury. 63 The following year, Mayor Boughton requested that Attorney
General Richard Blumenthal negotiate an agreement with the federal gov-
ernment "to increase enforcement of immigration laws."'" The implementa-
tion of ICE ACCESS provided an opportunity for Mayor Boughton's vision
of immigration enforcement to be realized. 65 On September 13, 2007, the
Danbury Common Council informed the Mayor of the ICE ACCESS pro-
gram and requested that he contact the Chief of Police to study the feasibility
157. See Thomas Kaplan, Danbury Council Vote on Policing Immigrant Community
Draws Thousands to Protest, N.Y. TIEs, Feb. 7, 2008, at B3.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Jill P. Capuzzo, Connecticut City Plans to Team Its Police with Federal Immigration
Agents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008, at B 1.
161. See id.
162. See Press Release, Michael McLachlan, Mayor Boughton Calls on Immigration Ser-
vice to Increase Enforcement in Danbury (Dec. 17, 2004), http://www.ci.danbury.ct.us/content
/39n-5/2732/2481 .aspx.
163. Id.
164. Press Release, Michael McLachlan, Mayor Requests State Police be Deputized as
Immigration Agents (Apr. 15, 2005), http://www.ci.danbury.ct.us/contentI39/75/2732/
3186.aspx.
165. See Letter from Common Council, City of Danbury, to Mark D. Boughton, Mayor of
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of such an agreement. 166 Within two months, both the Deputy Corporation
Counsel of Danbury and Chief of Police Alan Baker were advocating for a
cooperative agreement under the ICE ACCESS program. 167 A few days lat-
er, Mayor Boughton endorsed the ICE ACCESS program, and the process
began to implement such an agreement. 68 On February 7, 2008, the Com-
mon Council voted 19 to 2 to approve a plan for cooperation with ICE, al-
lowing Police Chief Baker to enter into a training agreement. 69
Not all Danbury residents were happy to see these events unfold. On
the same night as the Council's vote, thousands of protesters picketed near
City Hall.170 "Opponents of the plan said it would inspire racial profiling and
damage the trust between the large immigrant community [in Danbury] and
the authorities.'' While the Mayor, Police Chief, and council members
have all reassured Danbury residents that the agreement would not lead to
"sweeps" in local communities,172 residents may nevertheless have reason to
be skeptical. In an effort to ease fears about a formal agreement, Police
Chief Baker has insisted that the agreement would be a mere formalization of
a long-standing relationship with ICE.173 In a similar respect, Deputy Corpo-
ration Counsel Laszlo L. Pinter has stated that the ICE ACCESS programs
do not "provide for the unbridled arrest or detention of individuals involved
in day labor, housing violations or related non criminal activity."' 174 But
166. Id.
167. Memorandum from Laszlo L. Pinter, Deputy Corp. Counsel, City of Danbury, on the
ICE ACCESS Program to the Honorable Mayor Mark D. Boughton and the Honorable Mem-
bers of the Common Council (Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://www.ci.danbury.ct.us/filestor
age/45/464/1108/11692/11732/19B.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Laszlo L. Pinter];
Memorandum from Alan D. Baker to Mayor Mark D. Boughton (Dec. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.ci.danbury.ct.us/filestorage/45/464/1108/11692/11732/19C.pdf [hereinafter Me-
morandum from Alan D. Baker].
168. See City of Danbury, Conn., Minutes of the Common Council Committee of the
Whole (Jan. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ci.danbury.ct.uslfilestorage/45/464/l108/
11692/12089/29.
169. Kaplan, supra note 157.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See id. Danbury residents were reassured by Councilman Benjamin Chianese,
"'[t]here aren't going to be sweeps,"' but rather "'there is going to be mutual trust in this
community."' Id. Police Chief Alan Baker has met with representatives of the immigrant
community, explaining that working with ICE does not mean "the mass roundup of people
who look like 'immigrants,' as predicted by the activists on both sides." News-Times Staff,
ICE, NEWS-TIMES (Ct.), Feb. 27, 2008. Mayor Boughton has also reassured the community,
expressing that "'[b]oth sides think there will be sweeps. It's not going to happen."' Eugene
Driscoll, ICE Dominates Danbury Forum, NEWS-TIMES (Ct.), Feb. 28, 2008.
173. See Memorandum from Alan D. Baker, supra note 167.
174. Memorandum from Laszlo L. Pinter, supra note 167.
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many residents doubt the true motives behind the plan to formalize a rela-
tionship with ICE.'75 They point to an incident from September 2006, where
eleven illegal immigrants were approached by law enforcement in a city
park, offered jobs, and "when the workers followed, they were arrested.' 76
One year later, nine of the day laborers filed a federal lawsuit challenging the
legality of the sting operation, claiming that the arrests were a result of racial
profiling and that they were illegally detained for immigration violations by
Danbury police officers.177 The lawsuit further clarified that none of the of-
ficers involved in the operation were searching for a fugitive, and there was
no evidence of illegal entry into the country by any of the individuals. 178
Mayor Boughton defended the operation, claiming that "local police had
only provided 'logistical support' to federal immigration agents during the
operation.,, 179 Nevertheless, residents remain skeptical, and continue to pro-
test the formalization of the relationship with ICE. 80
Danbury officials have maintained that the program will be of limited
scope. 18' Officers will participate in the enforcement of several specific
"crimes committed by illegal immigrants.' 82  But a simple notation of
crimes which will be targeted by local officials does not effectively limit the
scope of discretion and authority exercised by the officers. 83 This was rec-
ognized by Danbury Council Member Paul Rotello who called for further
discussion regarding the grant of authority before voting on approving a
plan.' 8 Rotello argued that the information provided to the Council did not
175. See Kaplan, supra note 157.
176. Id.
177. Nina Bernstein, Challenge in Connecticut Over Immigrants' Arrest, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2007, at B 1.
According to the complaint, on Sept. 19, 2006, a Danbury police officer posing as a con-
tractor drove an unmarked van belonging to the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement
agency to a park in downtown Danbury where day laborers, many from Ecuador, gather. Pre-
tending to offer $11 an hour to demolish a fence, the officer transported I I would-be workers
to a fenced-in lot where they were arrested, handed over to federal immigration agents and




180. Kaplan, supra note 157.
181. See Memorandum from Alan D. Baker, supra note 167.
182. Id. (stating that these crimes included, but were not limited to, "gangs [and] orga-
nized crime, drug smuggling, human trafficking, document fraud, identity and benefit theft,
[and] work site investigation").
183. See Eugene Driscoll, Rotello Wants Details on ICE: Councilman Sent Plan to Com-
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adequately explain what the Danbury police would be doing.185 Rotello ex-
plained, as an example, that the ICE ACCESS literature included programs
regarding "asset forfeiture," a function in which Rotello does not want Dan-
bury police to be engaged. 86 But Rotello also takes issue with the ambi-
guous crime descriptions provided by the Police Department and endorsed
by Mayor Boughton, including the inclusion of "work site investigation"
within the enumerated powers of the local officers. 87 Mr. Rotello recognizes
the danger of granting broad immigration authority to local police officers. 181
Whereas the Florida Memorandum of Understanding employed a structural
limitation on authority by only empowering officers within the RDSTFs,
which focused solely on domestic security concerns, the Danbury officers
will be limited only by their own discretion and their inclination to follow the
policy principles described by Mayor Boughton and Police Chief Baker. 189
More importantly than the concerns of Mr. Rotello, however, are the
concerns of the actual citizens and residents of Danbury. 9° Recent protests
in Danbury highlight the importance of communication between a local gov-
ernment and the people over which it exercises power.' 9' While a final Me-
morandum of Understanding has yet to be completed, residents have been
left uninformed about the specifics of the agreement during the early stages
of its creation. 92 The lack of effective communication, coupled with skeptic-
ism rooted in previous incidents, has led to wide scale demonstrations and
protests. 93 Effective communication between a skeptical immigrant popula-
tion and the local government is important not only to explain the specific
intentions and limitations of the program, but also to combat the local media
and newspaper editorials that fuel impassioned responses of local immi-
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Nick Keppler, Fire and ICE, FAIRFIELD COUNTY WEEKLY, Jan. 10, 2008, availa-
ble at http://www.fairfieldweekly.com/article.cfm?aid=5148. "'I see this [letter] and it says
"work site investigation" and I think, "What does that mean? Does that mean, if you suspect a
company is hiring undocumented people you can go in and take their computers? When do
they get them back? How long will it take? ..... Id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See Driscoll, ICE Dominates, supra note 172.
191. See Keppler, supra note 187.
192. Id.
193. Id. On January 10, 2008, "[p]icketers circled City Hall [in Danbury] waving signs
with slogans like Stop the Abuse of Power and Full Rights For All Immigrants!" Id. Other
opponents of ICE and of the Danbury partnership have undertaken organizing "a boycott of
businesses owned by Common Council members who voted for the ICE partnership." News-
Times Staff, ICE, supra note 172.
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grants. 9 4 For example, just three weeks after the council approved coopera-
tion with ICE, an article in The News-Times, a local Danbury newspaper,
described Danbury's partnership with ICE as "a clever ruse by the mayor to
divert people's attention from his dismal failure to come up with pragmatic
and practical solutions to" illegal immigration. 195 The article continued by
calling those who approved the partnership "racists," and explaining that the
"move has frightened documented and undocumented immigrants, many of
whom are already leaving."'196 Mayor Boughton has addressed the criticism
by explaining that the discussion must happen in the middle, rather than dig-
nifying the extreme opinions on the left and right of the political spectrum.' 97
But given the reaction of the immigrant community in Danbury, and the in-
cendiary commentaries appearing in the local media, it seems that the discus-
sion needs to happen wherever there is concern, and not just where that con-
cern may be considered legitimate.
D. The Future Local Immigration Enforcement: Section 2 87(g) Goes
National
There are certain areas of immigration that seem ripe for section 287(g)
expansion. Just recently, a spokesman for DHS explained that greater coop-
eration with state and local governments is desired for bolstering border se-
curity.198 The Heritage Foundation has also advocated for increased use of
section 287(g) in dealing with border security.' 99 INA section 287(g) can
194. See generally Gulamhusein A. Abba, Opinion Letter, Boughton Panders to the Shrill
Voices, NEws-TIMES (Ct.), Feb. 28, 2008.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Driscoll, ICE Dominates, supra note 172.
198. Empowering Local Law Enforcement, supra note 123, at 16 (statement of Kenneth A.
Smith, Special Agent, ICE) (ICE is committed to "continue to establish and augment effective
partnerships and information sharing with State and local law enforcement agencies. Such
partnerships are essential to our mission of deterring criminal alien activity and threats to
national security and public safety. We are grateful for [the work of] the many State and local
law enforcement officers who assist ICE daily in [its] mission and we are pleased to assist
them."). Id. at 17. "In the FY06 Emergency Funding Bill, $50 million is being provided for
the expansion of training for these authorities, including the training of additional local law
enforcement officers to bolster border security efforts." Id. at 26.
199. James Jay Carafano, Build on Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
to Boost State and Local Immigration Enforcement, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Web Memo
1212, Sept. 14, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/
upload/wm_1212.pdf.
Over the next few weeks, the House will consider, and likely pass, a series of measures to
improve border security. Action from Congress on border security is welcome and long over-
due. One subject requiring special attention is how to better engage state and local law en-
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certainly be beneficial in this area.200 Border states could contribute state and
local officers to assist in the protection and immigration enforcement on the
Mexican border.20' Under a 287(g) agreement, officers would receive the
proper training, as well as have access to the appropriate federal resources.2 2
Task forces, similar to the RDSTFs in Florida, could be designed where state
and federal officers can conduct investigations into human and drug smug-
gling organizations operating on and beyond the physical border.20 3 This
would allow for greater investigatory abilities into areas previously outside
the scope of both the federal and state governments.2 °4
With section 287(g) programs increasing throughout the country, and
many programs receiving positive reports, the question looms: should coop-
erative agreements with the federal government under section 287(g) be
mandated? The Heritage Foundation argues for a strengthening of section
287(g) by asking Congress to "[d]raft a strategy for implementing [section]
287(g) nationwide." 205  This sentiment has been reflected in congressional
bills, such as section 232 of the TRUE Enforcement and Border Security Act
of 2005, which "[r]equires DHS to execute cooperative enforcement training
programs in each state under INA [section] 287(g)."2°  Such sentiment,
however, has not always been well received.2 7
The greatest limitation on potential abuse for these programs continues
to be the discretion of the states or local governments in deciding whether to
enter a partnership, and if so, what "type of partnership is most beneficial" to
the particular locality.208 Major cities throughout the country have resisted
coercion from the federal government to enforce federal immigration laws.2°9
forcement. The right answer is to strengthen and expand programs authorized under Section
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Id.
200. See id.
201. Carafano, Section 287(g), supra note 32, at 1.




206. TRUE Enforcement and Border Security Act of 2005, H.R. 4313, Section-by-Section
Summary, xi, available at http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/TRUEEnforcement-section.
pdf?doclD=741.
207. See Editorial, More Immigration Non-Solutions, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at A18.
208. See News Release, New ICE ACCESS, supra note 134. In an assurance that these
programs will not be forced on local communities, ICE explains that "ICE and local agencies
will determine which type of partnership is most beneficial and sustainable before entering
into an official agreement." Id.
209. Press Release, Rep. Steve King, King-Campbell Amendment Passes: Protecting
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On June 6, 2006, the House of Representatives approved an amendment by
United States Representatives Steven King and John Campbell that would
"refuse federal funding for states and localities that have sanctuary policies
to harbor illegal aliens. 210 In response, the National League of Cities, U.S.
Conference of Mayors, as well as six major cities around the country, ad-
dressed an urgent letter to the House of Representatives urging them to re-
consider.21 The letter explained that local enforcement hinders community
oriented policing strategies, which use confidentiality as a means to encour-
age immigrants to cooperate with law enforcement.2 2 The letter urged
members of Congress not to "deny necessary homeland security funds to
states" and localities who wish to utilize these community policing strategies
effectively.213
Similarly, on October 15, 2007, just two months after the implementa-
tion of ICE ACCESS, Senator David Vitter proposed an amendment to the
U.S. Senate Commerce, Justice and Science Appropriations Bill which
would "withhold federal Community Oriented Policing Services funding
from sanctuary cities. 21 4  This time, the Major Cities Chiefs Association
(MCCA)215 addressed a letter to Barbara Mikulski, Chairwoman of the Sub-
committee on Commerce, Justice, and State, urging her to oppose the Vitter
Amendment. 216 The MCCA argued that denial of COPS funding would
"make the streets of our major cities less safe and more riddled with
crime. 2 1 It is clear that the MCCA also believed that enforcement of immi-
gration law was contrary to their community policing strategies.2 8
The U.S. Conference of Mayors makes it clear that its position is not
anti-immigration enforcement, but rather protective of effective policing
210. Id.
211. Ed Somers, House Pushing Local Law Enforcement to Enforce Federal Immigration




214. Press Release, Sen. Vitter, Vitter Offers Anti-Sanctuary Cities Amendment to CJS
Appropriations Bill (Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.votesmart.org/speech-detail.
php?scjid=324785&keyword=&phrase=&contain=.
215. Major Cities Chiefs Association Home Page, http://www.majorcitieschiefs.org (last
visited Nov 7, 2009). The Major Cities Chiefs Association "is comprised of the Chiefs of the
sixty-three largest police departments in the United States and Canada." Id.
216. Letter from Major Cities Chiefs Ass'n, to Barbara Mikulski, U.S. Sen. (Oct. 16,
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strategies.2 19 Undermining community policing efforts and alienating immi-
grants hinders crime reporting and other police functions, such as crime in-
vestigations and dealing with homegrown terrorism. 22° Resisting forced or
coerced enforcement of federal immigration law by local law enforcement is
not an anti-immigration enforcement stance, but merely recognizes that
"state and local police should not be made to compensate for the federal gov-
ernment's failure to update outdated immigration admissions policies. 22'
VIII. CONCLUSION
By establishing the first ever cross-designation program under INA sec-
tion 287(g), Florida created a model by which state and local governments
can and should follow when pursuing greater immigration enforcement at the
state and local level. Section 287(g) programs may be effective for combat-
ing various immigration issues afflicting individual states, such as removal of
aliens in the criminal justice system, and infiltrating and removing gangs
through immigration enforcement. However, state and local governments
must strike the right balance between assisting in immigration enforcement,
and serving their citizens' best interests.
The most effective means of protecting against civil rights abuses under
section 287(g) programs is the discretion of state and local governments to
enter into a partnership with the federal government. State and local gov-
ernments are more accountable to their citizens than the federal government,
and will take greater care to preserve community relations. Therefore, ex-
pansion of section 287(g) programs must remain discretionary. Mandating
section 287(g) programs would not only be potentially harmful, but is also
unnecessary. States have a strong desire to address immigration concerns
within their districts, and expansion of INA 287(g) programs is inevitable as
being a functional way to address these various concerns. 222
219. See Letter from the Nat'l League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, to a Member
of Cong. (Sept. 19, 2006), available at http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/Nationallmmig
rationForum-LetterToCongress.pdf.
220. Id.
221. Nat'l Immigration Forum, Immigration Law Enforcement by State and Local Police,
BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 2007, at 6, available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/
uploads/Backgrounder-StateLocaEnforcement.pdf.
222. See The 287(g) Program Hearing, supra note 3, at 53 (statement of Kris W. Kobach,
Professor, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law) (The infrastructure for addi-
tional MOUs is already in place. The training model has been developed. And "[t]he success
of Florida and Alabama is prompting law enforcement agencies across the country to knock
on ICE's door. Interest has been expressed publicly by leaders in Arizona, Connecticut,
Orange County and San Bernardino County, California, and other jurisdictions.").
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Participating entities must find a balance between immigration en-
forcement and maintaining an effective relationship with the local communi-
ty. State and local governments must continue to resist any forced or
coerced cooperation with immigration enforcement that does not address any
specific local need. The Florida Memorandum of Understanding effectively
balanced state needs with citizen concerns, and remains a model for states
that wish to address current and future immigration concerns.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps because of its status as the "Sunshine State," Florida is a grow-
ing population center for lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, and transgendered (LGBT)
individuals and same-sex couples.' In fact, the latest surveys show that Flor-
ida ranks second in overall LGBT population, and second in the number of
same-sex households. 2 Surprisingly, in per capita terms, Miami/Fort Lau-
derdale is not in the top ten of LGBT metropolitan areas, while Tampa/St.
Petersburg ranks fifth nationally.3 Although it is often said that to go south
in Florida you need to head north, it is clear that LGBT discrimination is not
just a concern in "liberal" South Florida, but impacts households all over the
state.4
Despite Florida's many attractions, thirty years after Anita Bryant made
it the "Un-Shine State" in the emerging fight against gay and lesbian rights,5
Florida remains one of the most legally hostile places for LGBTs to live in
the United States. The recent passage of an amendment to the Florida Con-
stitution that limits marriage, or the equivalent of marriage, to "one man and
one woman" demonstrates that neither legislative nor societal hostility in
Florida is likely to end soon.6
1. See ADAM P. ROMERO ET AL., THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW:
CENSUS SNAPSHOT: FLORIDA 1 (2007), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/Williamslnstitute
/publications/FloridaCensusSnapshot.pdf. The number of Florida's same-sex couples rose
thirty-four percent from 2000 to 2005. See id. The LGBT designation is used throughout the
article because of its universal use in modem media.
2. See GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, SAME SEX
COUPLES AND THE GAY LESBIAN BISEXUAL POPULATION: NEW ESTIMATES FROM THE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, app. 1 (2006), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/Williams
Institute/publications/SameSexCouplesandGLBpopACS.pdf.
3. Id. at7.
4. See id. The breakdown of LGBT population by congressional district shows remark-
able parity and decentralization in Florida population figures. See id. app. 3.
5. See Brumm.com, Anita Bryant, http://brumm.comgaylib/anitabryantl977_l.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2009). A popular button during Anita's anti-gay campaign named Florida
the "Un-Shine State." Id.
6. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (amended 2008). Article I, Section 27 of the Florida
Constitution states: "Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman
[Vol. 34
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While it remains vital to continue the fight for equality and basic human
rights, there is a practical need to handle the present reality of living in Flori-
da as an LGBT individual.7 And the word "individual" is used purposely,
because even if you are in a long term, non-marital relationship, you are still
an individual to the laws of Florida except under very limited circumstances.8
But by using the laws that allow any individual-gay or straight, married or
unmarried-to make the personal choices we associate with the time-
honored constitutional traditions of privacy and self-determination, an LGBT
individual can create relationships that have legal meaning in Florida.9 Most
of these "personal choice" laws are associated with disability and elder plan-
ning, are available in almost every state, and are often suggested to the
LGBT community as important parts of a long term strategy.10 By compre-
hensively employing these statutory choices with the right guidance, LGBT
individuals not only gain peace of mind for the future, but minimize the dan-
ger of becoming a legal stranger to loved ones in states, like Florida, where
LGBT's have few supportive laws. 1
This article takes the generalized suggestion of the importance of long-
term planning and presents an in-depth examination and guide to the specific
use and employment of Florida's legislative scheme to provide protection to
LGBT individuals. It illustrates the practical ways Florida laws can be used
to avert real world stress. But it also proposes that even with the limitations
of Florida law, there may be new solutions to giving these highly individua-
lized choices even more legal strength, thereby creating a meaningful bypro-
duct effect to Florida's LGBT community as a whole.
Part II of this article looks at Florida's "un-shine" laws and addresses
the potential problems that can arise, and have arisen, when LGBTs face the
challenges of aging or life's unexpected disabilities. Part I focuses on three
key areas of long-term planning under Florida law, which can create mea-
ningful legal rights for LGBT's health care, finances, and inheritance. Part
IV proposes a number of strategies for insulating validly executed personal
choices from legal challenges, and part V concludes the article.
as husband and wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equiva-
lent thereof shall be valid or recognized." Id.
7. See NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LIFELINES: DOCUMENTS TO PROTECT YOU AND
YOUR FAMILY 2-4, available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/NCLRLIFELINES.
pdf?doclD=521 [hereinafter NCLR, LIFELINES]; see generally FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
8. See BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE art. VIII, § 16 1/2-153 (2009); infra text accom-
panying notes 25-26.
9. See NCLR, LIFELINES, supra note 7, at 2-4.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 16.
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II. WHEN STATUTES ATTACK: THE DANGER OF NOT PLANNING
It is easy to say "you should plan for your future," and easy to agree it is
important. But whether it is called "elder planning" or "long-term planning,"
it is simply too often left undone despite best intentions. 2 When Mike and
Sue leave it undone, there are a myriad of laws that step into the breach to
create solutions.' 3 But if Mike and Steve leave it undone, it will create chaos
if a surprise accident happens or the inevitabilities of aging ensue, because
Florida law takes a dim view of homosexuality.
A. Florida's Legislative Hostility and Amendment 2
Florida has the only state law in the country that bans adoption by ho-
mosexuals. 4 Legislative bills that would remove the gay adoption ban face
intense opposition. 15 In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the gay adoption
ban as constitutional. 6 A recent state trial court victory finding the ban-
once again-unconstitutional faces an uphill battle on appeal. 7 In fighting to
overturn the trial court victory, Florida's deputy solicitor general's position is
that "'[t]here is evidence that homosexuals have higher rates of mental dis-
orders, suicide and domestic violence .... This is a plausible rationale."",18
Florida embraced the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), restricting
marriage to one man and one woman by legislative statute. 9 Florida courts
have previously endorsed that, too.20  Yet some gay rights opponents felt
12. See, e.g., Dalia Sussman & Gary Langer, Poll: Two-Thirds Back Spouse in Right to
Die Cases, ABC NEWS, Mar. 15, 2005, available at http://i.abcnews.com/images/Politics/
975a3schiavo.pdf. Fifty-seven percent of Americans have no "living will or health care
proxy." Id.
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 689.15, 732.4015(1) (2009).
14. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2009); Charles Lane, Gay-Adoption Ban in Florida to
Stand; Justices Decline to Hear Challenge, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2005, at A4.
15. See Lawmaker Hopes to End Ban on Gay Adoption in Florida, ADVOCATE.COM, Mar.
20, 2008, http://www.advocate.com/newsdetail_ektid52818.asp.
16. Lofton v. Kearney (Lofton 1), 157 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1374, 1385 (S.D. Fla. 2001),
affd by Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Fam. Servs. (Lofton 1I), 358 F.3d 804, 806-
08, 827 (11 th Cir. 2004), reh'g en banc and cert. denied, Lofton v. Sec'y of Dept. of Children
& Fam. Servs. (Lofton 111), 377 F.3d 1275, 1312-13 (11 th Cir. 2004).
17. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at 29 (Fla. 11 th Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008);
see also Carol Marbin Miller & Gabriela Gonzalez, Appeals Court Grapples with Gay Adop-
tion, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 27, 2009, at Al.
18, Miller & Gonzalez, supra note 17.
19. Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C. § 7 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2009).
20. See, e.g., Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 155 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that a straight marriage where one spouse had had a sex change was invalid due to
Florida's position against same sex marriage).
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even more was necessary to protect Florida from the LGBT community.
Florida4marriage.org received enough signatures to place "Amendment 2"
on the November 2008 general election ballot.2' Amendment 2 passed with
sixty-two percent of the vote, 22 and expands the statutory DOMA to a consti-
tutional ban on any relationship, such as a civil union or domestic partner-
ship, which approaches the legal equivalency of marriage.23 Amendment 2's
passage only highlights the important premise of this article: LGBTs must
take advantage of the Florida laws unaffected by Amendment 2 that actually
can create effective legal relationships in key areas of anyone's life journey.
B. Domestic Partnership Laws: Limited in Scope and Potentially Moot
Currently, Broward, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Palm Beach Counties,
as well as the Cities of Tampa, Miami Beach, and Gainesville, offer limited
Domestic Partnership protections. 24 While these ordinances are positive oas-
es in Florida's statutory landscape, the scope of their protections is limited
and, as the population studies suggest, they do not geographically encompass
a large percentage of Florida's LGBT population. 25 These Domestic Partner-
ship ordinances are similarly written, and offer some limited protections to
unmarried couples.26 Unmarried couples who meet a basic set of criteria to
ensure they are in a committed relationship may register with the local gov-
ernment to legally establish their relationship. Only registered couples are
protected. 28 Once registered, unmarried couples in these municipalities gen-
erally enjoy: health care facility and jail visitation rights, assurance of non-
discrimination in guardianship and health care surrogate designations, and
county/city employee spousal benefits. 2 9 Broward County also gives prefe-
rences in contract bidding to vendors who offer domestic partnership benefits
to employees.3°
21. Florida Marriage Amendment Wins 62% Support, FLA. BAPTIST WITNESS, Nov. 13,
2008, available at http://www.floridabaptistwitness.com/9579.article.
22. See Jennifer Mooney Piedra, Gay-Marriage Foes Get Several Victories, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 5, 2008, available at http://miamiherald.typepad.com/gaysouthflorida/2008/1 I/
gay-marriage-fo.html.
23. See FLA CONST. art. I, § 27 (amended 2008); Defense of Marriage Act, I U.S.C. § 7.
24. Equality Florida, Human Rights Ordinances Map, http://www.eqfl.org/pdfs/eqflFlor
idaMaps.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
25. See GATES, supra note 2, at app. 2.
26. See MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE art. IX, § II A (2009); PALM BEACH COUNTY,
FLA., CODE art. 1, § 2-6 (2009); BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE art. VIII, § 16 1/2 (2009).
27. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE art. VIII, § 16 1/2-153.
28. Id.
29. See id. at § 16 1/2-159-61.
30. Id. at § 16 1/2-157.
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But the backers of Amendment 2 have mounted legal challenges to
Florida Domestic Partner laws before, and believe that Amendment 2 will
give them the legal framework to win a new round of legal challenges. 31 At
least one anti-LGBT activist and his "Florida Family Association" have
vowed to use Amendment 2 in 2010 as a means for fighting same-sex bene-
fits adopted by some Florida counties and municipalities, stating: 'We're
going to use the momentum from the marriage amendment to speak to the
fact that most people in this state don't want a recognition of that type of
relationship.' "3
The domestic partnership laws have provided an extra layer of protec-
tion to unmarried couples fortunate enough to live in the few places that pro-
vide them. But Amendment 2 and the failure of a recent attempt to pass a
statewide legislative protection for domestic partnerships reinforces the need
to layer that protection as much as possible.33 Furthermore, the protections
only extend to the county line.34 Broward's protections will not reach into an
Orlando hospital when a partner suffers a catastrophic injury at Disney-
World. Thankfully, almost all of the protections conferred by the present
domestic partner laws can be created by statute, for the benefit of any Florida
resident no matter where they live.35
31. See Martin v. City of Gainesville, 800 So. 2d 687, 687-89 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2001). For example, Florida4mariage.org was backed by the Liberty Counsel, a group of
conservative lawyers who were legal counsel in the fight against Gainesville's enactment of
domestic partnership benefits. See Mathew D. Staver, Florida Marriage Amendment Surges
for November Ballot, LIBERTY ALERT, Jan. 25, 2006, http://www.lc.org/libertyalert/2006/
la012506.htm; see also HOWARD SIMON & REBECCA HARRISON STEELE, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION OF FLA., REPORT ON IMPLICATIONS OF FLORIDA'S PROPOSED MARRIAGE BAN (Apr.
2005), http://www.aclufl.org/issues/Iesbian-gay-ights/domesticpartnerbenefitsfina.pdf.
32. Bill Varian, Janet Zink, & Beth Reinhard, Antigay-Rights Activist Seek to Ban Same-
Sex Benefits, ST. PETERSBERG TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://www.tampabay.coml
news/politics/local/article9l1491.ece (emphasis added) (quoting Waymon Hudson, Domestic
Partnership Benefits? They Are After Those Too, THE BILERICO PROJECT, Nov. 21, 2008,
http://florida.bilerico.com/2008/1 I/domestic-partnership benefitsjthey-area.php).
33. See S.B. 1642, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/
session/2009/Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s I 642.pdf. Representative Eleanor Sobel introduced
Senate Bill 1642 in 2009, but it died in committee. Florida Senate, Legislative Tracking: Fla.
SB 1642 (2009), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/session/index.cfm?BlMode=ViewBill
Info&Mode=Bills&ElementlD=JumpToBox&SubMenu= I &Year=2009&billnum= 1642.
34. See BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE art. VIII, § 16 1/2-151 (2009).
35. See Cynthia L. Barrett, Same-Sex Couples in the Elder Law Office, ELDER L. REP.,
Nov. 2007, at 1-2. For example, Broward's protection for the right to make health care deci-
sions for a partner is only effective if there already is a health care surrogate designation in
place. BROWARD COUNTY, FLA. CODE, art. VIII §§ 16 1/2-158-159. Originally a designation
would not have been required, but this was found invalid under Florida law. Lowe v. Broward
County, 766 So. 2d 1199, 1210 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000). Therefore, even Broward
County cannot supplant the default legal priority a spouse or family member would have in
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An even more practical concern is that even if they were available state-
wide, the laws are not known as "Domestic Best Friends" laws. Approx-
imately eighty-five percent of Florida's LGBT population is single,36 and
many single LGBT's have created "family" relationships with their friends
that transcend blood ties, but those would not qualify as domestic partner-
ships. 37 The "personal choice" laws addressed in this article can provide
legal benefits to any individual, whether they are in a domestic partnership or
whether they would consider their best friend closer than a sister.38 The bo-
nus is that legally executing these personal choices in turn makes same-sex
relationships, and the LGBT community as a whole, a stronger part of the
legal fabric of Florida.
C. When Families Attack: In re Guardianship of Atkins
A recent case in Indiana highlights the danger LGBT's face in the ab-
sence of pre-planning. 39 In re Guardianship of Atkins4° recently affirmed a
religious family's successful ousting of a twenty-five year life partner from
their son's life after he was disabled.4' Although Florida's guardianship laws
are analyzed later in this article, the case is here as an illustrative "nightmare
scenario" for anyone in a long-term gay relationship who does not pre-plan
for the vagaries of life.
Patrick Atkins and Brett Conrad were life partners for over twenty-five
years who shared their home and finances as a married couple would, but
they were not accepted as a couple by Patrick's deeply religious family.42
Patrick was the CEO of his family's business and earned more than four
times as much as Brett did as a waiter, but unfortunately Brett was not titled
on their "joint" bank accounts.43 In 2005, while on a business trip to Atlanta,
an aneurism and subsequent stroke severely disabled Patrick.44 During his
the absence of a designated health care surrogate. See FLA. STAT. § 765.401(1) (2009). In the
absence of a designated surrogate, a guardian would have first priority, followed second by a
spouse and third by family; number seven on the list of priority is "a close friend." See FLA.
STAT. § 765.401(I)(a)-(g).
36. See GATES, supra note 2, at app. 1.
37. See, e.g., BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE art. VIII, § 16 1/2-153 (friends normally do
not live together or pledge to provide the comfort and support of a spouse).
38. See NCLR, LIFELINES, supra note 7, at 3.
39. See In re Guardianship of Atkins, 868 N.E. 2d 878, 880-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
40. Id. at 878.
41. Id. at 880.
42. In re Guardianship of Atkins, 868 N.E. 2d at 880-81.
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hospitalization, Patrick's mother said she would rather her son did "not re-
cover at all" if recovery meant he would be reunited with Brett, and that she
could not tolerate Brett's "evil" presence. 45 Although hospital and nursing
facility staff bent the rules over the family's objections to allow Brett visita-
tion after hours, the family was able to bar him once they took Patrick to
their home.4 6 When Brett petitioned for guardianship, the family counter-
petitioned and the trial court sided with the family.47 Although the opinion
of the appellate court is quite sympathetic to Brett, it claimed it could not say
that the trial judge had abused his discretion under Indiana law in appointing
Patrick's parents as his guardians over his obviously committed and loving
partner.48 The only concessions Brett received were limited visitation, part
of the value of their home, partial attorney's fees, and a small portion of the
bank accounts.49 This was still too much for the dissent, whose strongly
worded opinion called the majority's award of limited visitation to Brett-
and application of "common sense"-simply wrong and argued the rules of
parental custody should have applied and barred Brett completely.50 Given
the current laws of Florida, there is certainly no assurance that a judge here
would express any more sympathy for someone in Brett's position.
D. Legal Stranger Danger
In a 1999 lesbian parental custody proceeding, Florida's Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed a lower court ruling that a woman was a legal
stranger to the minor child she had raised with her ex-domestic partner, the
biological mother.5' A "legal stranger" is someone with no standing to bring
suit, so she was barred from fighting for visitation rights and barred by the
court from arguing it was in the "best interests of the child" to see her "oth-
er" mother.52 Since blood and marital ties carry more legal weight over other
relationships in Florida, a court could easily analogize this ruling to a "custo-
dy" fight over a disabled individual and rule against the life-long domestic
partner in favor of a parent or other close family member.
To avoid being considered a "legal stranger" to the partner she has
shared her life with, an LGBT Floridian must take action to protect her wish-
45. Id.
46. Id. at 881-82.
47. See In re Guardianship of Atkins, 868 N.E.2d at 882.
48. See id. at 888.
49. See id. at 887-88.
50. See id. at 889 (Darden, J., dissenting).
51. See Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999), rev.
denied, 760 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 2000).
52. See id.at 108-09.
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es and interests.53 No one likes to think that today is the day she will have an
aneurism and/or stroke, but today is the day it could happen. No one likes to
think about getting old and infirm, but it is a fact of life. Outlined below are
the key personal choices LGBT Floridians can make to create an effective
defense against legal stranger danger.
IlI. THE THREE KEY AREAS OF LONG TERM PLANNING
FOR LGBT FLORIDIANS
Florida's elder and long-term planning statutes contemplate a number of
ways that any adult individual can designate another person to act for that
individual when she cannot act for herself. These laws work the same
whether that adult individual is gay or straight, married or unmarried.
Among other strategies, Florida law allows LGBT's to designate "proxy
54
health care decision-makers, pre-need guardians, and durable attorneys-in-
fact for financial matters, and to designate the recipients of their estates.55
These designations come under the broader sections outlined below: health
and long-term medical care, financial affairs, and inheritance. "Incapacity"
in the context of this article means that an adult has lost the ability to compe-
tently make his own decisions because of physical and/or mental impair-
ment.56 Incapacitation tends to trigger a number of legal consequences for
the individual. 57 For the sake of simplicity, this article will use a fictional
long-term same-sex couple, "Mike and Steve," where Mike's mom refuses to
accept the relationship. However, the situations described could just as easi-
ly apply to "Susan and Jane," lesbian best friends living far from their fami-
lies who consider each other closer than sisters.58
A. Health and Long-Term Medical Care
Health care is probably the most important area of planning, and the one
with the most strategic options. Whether an individual is temporarily or
53. See NCLR, LIFELINES, supra note 7, at 3.
54. "Proxy" is used here for its general definition of selecting someone to act on your
behalf. DICTIONARY.COM. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/proxy (last visited Nov. 7,
2009).
55. See FLA. STAT. §§ 709.08,732.501,744.3045, 765.202 (2009).
56. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 828 (9th ed. 2009).
57. See FLA. STAT. § 765.102 (2009).
58. The author does not mean to imply that all LGBTs have conflicted blood-family
relationships. However, it is the opinion and twenty five year gay adult experience of the
author that LGBTs will often choose someone other than family to be life decision-makers
even when they have close, supportive family relationships.
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permanently incapacitated by accident or disease, or is simply disabled by
advancing age, in the absence of a valid designation otherwise an individu-
al's family members will take precedence over a domestic partner.59 As ex-
plained below, without a "HIPAA" form and advance directive for health-
care,6° if Mike is seriously injured in a car accident tomorrow resulting in a
coma, Mike's mother can legally keep Steve out of Mike's hospital room,
bar his access to pertinent medical updates, and can take over medical deci-
sion-making for Mike. Without a living will, if Mike is in a persistent veget-
ative state, his mother can keep him alive even if Mike had told Steve over
and over again that he would not want to be kept alive in that condition.6'
Only a spouse would have a fighting chance of overruling the mother in Flor-
ida courts.6 2 The following forms can alter these outcomes.
1. HIPAA Forms
Hospitals can and do forbid non-family members from accessing their
loved ones.63 Miami's Jackson Memorial Hospital was sued for refusing to
allow a Seattle woman and her three children access to the woman's life
partner of eighteen years, Lisa Pond, when Ms. Pond was brought in after
experiencing an aneurism at the start of a 2007 cruise vacation and declared
brain dead.64 The hospital refused to speak to the woman or give her up-
dates, and denied visitation "until nearly eight hours after their arrival."'65
Lambda Legal calls this unethical and discriminatory, but there is no legal
mandate that required Jackson Memorial to act otherwise. 66 In fact, a federal
judge recently dismissed the case.67
59. See FLA. STAT. § 765.401 (1).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Mary Coombs, Schiavo: The Road Not Taken, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 542
(2007).
63. See, e.g. Lambda Legal, A Year After Death, Lesbian Fights for Justice for Partner





67. Steve Rothaus, Lesbian's Case Against Jackson Memorial Hospital Tossed, MIAMI
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A HIPAA form may create the legal mandate.68 The Federal Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 brought the HIPAA
acronym into the medical lexicon. 69 A HIPAA form allows an individual to
designate who may or may not access his pertinent private medical informa-
tion.70 Under HIPAA regulations, every medical provider now requires a
patient to fill out a HIPAA compliance form.7 If a patient is competent and
conscious, medical providers are forbidden to divulge a patient's pertinent
medical information to anyone not designated.72 Such designation can be
written or can be inferred from the circumstances if the patient does not ob-
ject to the presence of someone hearing information.73 But if a patient is
incapacitated and there is no designation, medical providers may use their
professional judgment to decide whether to disclose or not to disclose, with
family members taking precedence in the wording of the regulations.74
However, since the regulations allow an individual to create their own
HIPAA form, as long as it complies with the regulatory conditions, it should
be accepted by any medical provider.75
In Mike's situation, where he enters the hospital in a coma, unable to
fill out a HIPAA form, the hospital's doctors may exercise their professional
judgment to choose his mother over Steve, and subsequently respect her
wishes to keep Steve away. If Mike has not previously filled out a form au-
thorizing Steve's access to his medical information, Steve has no substantive
recourse against the hospital or Mike's mother. All Mike and Steve needed
to do before the accident was properly fill out their own HIPAA forms.
Their personal physician should be able to provide them with one, which
could be kept on file and faxed to the hospital in an emergency.
2. Advance Directives for Health Care-Surrogate Decision Maker
A HIPAA form allows access to information, but in order to make med-
ical decisions for Mike, Steve needs to be Mike's designated health care sur-
68. See generally Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201).
69. See generally id. The act mandated that new regulations be promulgated to safeguard
access to health care information. Id. Under the regulations, an individual, to ensure privacy,
must designate who is allowed access to information related to his or her medical care. See 45
C.F.R. §§ 164.502, .508 (2008).
70. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.510.
71. See id. § 164.508(a)(1).
72. See id. § 164.5 10(b)(2).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 164.5 10(b)(3) (emphasis added).
75. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b).
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rogate. Florida law governing this designation is found in the Civil Rights
section of the Florida Statutes, since such designations are linked to the tra-
ditional common law and constitutional right to autonomy in medical deci-
sion-making. 6 As Justice Cardozo once famously remarked, "'[e]very hu-
man being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body."' 7 7 That right is extended under Florida law to
Steve if Mike is incapacitated and has validly designated Steve to act on his
behalf.78 In the absence of this designation, a court must follow the legisla-
tive scheme for choosing a proxy in a prioritized order.79 In that scheme,
Mike's mom is well ahead of "a close friend" like Steve in priority.80
To foreclose that outcome, Mike, as principal, must execute a written
document that designates Steve as his health care surrogate. 81 The legislature
has provided a valid blank form, 82 but, as with any of the documents de-
scribed in this article, expert legal advice is the best way to create a designa-
tion that is tailored to Mike's specific needs and current law. The surrogate
designation document must be witnessed by two adults, and the surrogate
shall not serve as a witness. 83 The surrogate must get a copy of the docu-
ment, and it remains in effect until it is revoked by the principal. 84 The sur-
rogate's ability to make decisions for the principal is triggered by the prin-
cipal's incapacity, and the surrogate's role ends when, and if, capacity is
regained by the principal.85 Incapacity is initially determined and noted by
the attending physician, and if there is any doubt about capacity, a second
physician will also evaluate the principal's capacity.86 When a person has
been declared incapacitated by a medical provider, the provider has a duty to
inform the surrogate. 87 It should be noted, a determination of incapacity un-
der the surrogate designation statute, without more, has no legal effect
76. See FLA. STAT. § 765.102(1) (2009) (asserting the Florida Legislature's intent to
codify the right to health related autonomy); see, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (explaining the common law and United States Constitution's foun-
dations for the doctrine of informed consent).
77. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,
93 (N.Y. 1914)).
78. See FLA. STAT. § 765.102(2).
79. See FLA. STAT. § 765.401(1).
80. See FLA. STAT. § 765.401(1)(d), (g).
81. See FLA. STAT. § 765.202(1).
82. FLA. STAT. § 765.203.
83. FLA. STAT. § 765.202(1)-(2).
84. FLA. STAT. § 765.202(1), (6).
85. FLA. STAT. § 765.204(1), (3).
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beyond health care decision-making.88 This is one reason that LGBTs must
take a comprehensive approach to executing all of the legal documents avail-
able to them for long term planning.
Unless limited by the surrogacy document, a surrogate has the right to
act on the patient's behalf as if he were the patient himself.89 The surrogate's
decision making is guided by his knowledge of what the principal would
want, or by considering the principal's best interests. 90
Where Mike enters the hospital in a coma, he is both physically and
mentally impaired, and his incapacity will easily be judged by the attending
physician. At that point, Steve, by producing the valid surrogate form, su-
persedes Mike's mom and can make the necessary medical decisions for his
partner without any need to consult the mom. 9' Since the statute specifically
says a surrogate controls access to medical information,92 Steve could even
restrict the mother's access if he knows Mike was estranged from his mother
and believes that is what Mike would want. However, because of Florida's
state interest in preserving life,93 there are some specific and important limi-
tations on the scope of the surrogate's decision-making, which may require a
valid living will to overcome.
94
3. Advance Directives for Health Care-Living Wills
If Mike comes out of his coma and recovers from his accident, hopeful-
ly the scare will convince him and Steve that as they continue to age they
may be faced with another life-threatening situation or terminal disease that
requires an end-of-life decision. End-of-life decision-making is contem-
plated by another form of advance directive under the Florida Statutes-the
"living will." 95 Living wills allow someone to express his wishes about re-
fusing life-prolonging medical care if he cannot make those decisions for
himself.9
6
88. FLA. STAT. § 765.204(4).
89. See FLA. STAT. § 765.205(l)(a).
90. FLA. STAT. § 765.205(l)(b).
91. See FLA. STAT. § 765.205(l)(a).
92. FLA. STAT. § 765.205(l)(d), (2).
93. See FLA. STAT. § 765.102(1).
94. See FLA. STAT. § 765.113.
95. See FLA. STAT. § 765.101(11).
96. Id. A living will or declaration should not be confused with a "Do Not Resuscitate"
Order, which may only be executed by a doctor on a special yellow form, and is designed to
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A living will is created and executed in the same way a health care sur-
rogate is designated, and the Florida Legislature has provided a statutory
blank form that may be used as a template.97 Once again, it is strongly sug-
gested that individuals have experts draft documents tailored to specific
needs. Living wills are triggered if "[t]he principal has a terminal condition,
has an end-stage condition, or is in a persistent vegetative state" (PVS).98
End-stage conditions and terminal illnesses are irreversible conditions where
there is severe physical deterioration and/or an expectation of resulting
death. 99 A PVS is an irreversible and permanent state of unconsciousness
marked by no cognitive or communicative ability.1°° The existence of one of
these triggering conditions is medically affirmed by two independent physi-
cian evaluations,' 0 ' and requires a finding that there is no reasonable medical
chance the patient will recover capacity to make the present decision for
himself.102
Many people joke about "pulling the plug," but if Mike has not explicit-
ly given Steve the power to make end-of-life decisions and has not executed
a living will, Steve's ability to make the most vital decisions could be cur-
tailed. Although she might not be his surrogate, Mike's mom can more easi-
ly convince a judge to keep her son on life support if there is any ambiguity
about whether Mike would "pull the plug. ' 10 3 A well drafted surrogate form
and living will can ensure Mike's wishes are honored by Steve.' 4 If Mike's
coma had resulted in a PVS, once two doctors had independently confirmed
the PVS, Mike's living will expressing his wish to refuse life-prolonging
medical treatment would be triggered. 105 As Mike's surrogate, Steve would
be authorized to carry out those wishes. 06 Mike could execute a valid living
will without designating Steve as the surrogate decision maker; 10 7 but by
designating Steve, Mike is making a stronger, unambiguous statement of his
overall wish to have Mike act on his behalf at such life-altering times. °8
97. See FLA. STAT. §§ 765.302, .303.
98. FLA. STAT. § 765.304(2)(b); see also FLA. STAT. § 765.101(12) (defining "persistent
vegetative state").
99. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(4), (17).
100. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(12).
101. FLA. STAT. § 765.306.
102. FLA. STAT. § 765.304(2)(a).
103. Compare FLA. STAT. § 765.401(1)(d), with FLA. STAT. § 765.401(1)(g).
104. See FLA. STAT. § 765.102(2).
105. See FLA. STAT. §§ 765.204(2)-(3), .305.
106. See FLA. STAT. § 765.205(1)(b).
107. See FLA. STAT. § 765.304(1).
108. See FLA. STAT. § 765.205.
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4. Preneed Guardians
Incapacity does not always mean a person is in an end stage condition
thereby triggering a living will.' 9 Incapacity in a person with a long life
expectancy may lead to guardianship. "0 Florida's guardianship statutes are
very extensive, and while the legislature acknowledges its seriousness, any-
one-perhaps an opportunistic nephew-can petition a court to be some-
one's guardian and strip a person of his civil rights and autonomy."' A
guardian is a court appointee who makes personal and/or financial decisions
on an incapacitated person's behalf. 12 Designating a preneed guardian is a
way to tell the court who you think your guardian should be." 3
The designation is made through a written declaration, witnessed by
two adults, where the principal identifies the person he chooses to be his
guardian in the event of incapacity.' A person may also designate an alter-
native choice in case his first choice refuses or is unavailable or is unquali-
fied. ' 5 The declaration may be filed with a court for later use during a guar-
dianship proceeding.1 6 Although the preneed guardian assumes his duties as
soon as the adjudication of incapacity takes effect, he must petition the court
to affirm the choice within twenty days." 7 The court is free to decide if the
choice for preneed guardian is not the right choice and not honor the declara-
tion. 18 Therefore, it is important to choose the right person and be aware
that if, for example, the guardian chosen has a prior felony conviction, the
court will invalidate the choice.' 9
Mike could simply develop Alzheimer's disease, remaining physically
vital for years while being lost mentally. Assuming Steve still has capacity,
and is otherwise qualified, he could be Mike's guardian if they have pre-
planned and executed the valid declaration of preneed guardianship. Without
it, even if Mike designated Steve as his surrogate medical decision maker,
the surrogate statute allows a court to appoint someone other than Steve as
109. See FLA. STAT. §§ 765.101(8), .204(4).
110. See FLA. STAT. § 744.3215(1)(e) (2009).
Ill. See FLA. STAT. §§ 744.1012, .3201. A full review of the guardianship statutes is
beyond the scope of this article. Moreover, the legislative scheme for guardianship is compli-
cated and expert counsel is advised.
112. FLA. STAT. § 744.102(9).
113. See FLA. STAT. § 744.3045(4).
114. FLA. STAT. § 744.3045(l), (2).
115. FLA. STAT. § 744.3045(6).
116. See FLA. STAT. § 744.3045(3).
117. FLA. STAT. § 744.3045(5), (7).
118. See FLA. STAT. § 744.3045(7).
119. FLA. STAT. § 744.309(3).
2009]
270
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Mike's guardian.1 20 Steve could end up making medical decisions for Mike
while a complete stranger or unfriendly family member takes over Steve's
personal and financial affairs. Designating Steve as his preneed guardian
will give Mike a reasonable assurance that someone he knows and trusts will
be his guardian if it is ever needed.
B. Financial Affairs
The second key area of long term planning for LGBTs is in their finan-
cial affairs. Unless a married couple takes steps to separate individual assets
from their marital estate, Florida law tends to regard all of their assets as
assets of the marriage no matter whose name is listed as owner. 21 Mike and
Steve, on the other hand, must be very careful about structuring their finan-
cial lives to avoid both personal and tax pitfalls. 22 The full range of consid-
erations in long term financial planning for LGBTs is beyond the scope of
this article, but there are basic tools at Mike and Steve's disposal to protect
their most important assets.
1. The Basics: Financial Accounts and Homes
Florida law presumes that two people who jointly title themselves on a
deposit account, in the absence of language or contract to the contrary, ex-
pect the ownership of that account to be as joint tenants with the rights of
survivorship (JTWROS). 123 That means that if Mike and Steve open up a
joint checking account, and one of them passes away, the surviving partner
then automatically has title to the entire account without going through pro-
bate. 124 This presumption only applies to deposit accounts, such as standard
checking and savings accounts.1 25 Investment accounts usually require a
specific designation that the owners want it titled as JTWROS. 126 If Mike
and Steve pooled their finances in an account titled solely in Mike's name
120. See FLA. STAT. § 765.205(3) (2009).
121. See FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6) (2009).
122. Please note that nothing written in this section should be construed as tax advice, nor
is it intended to be any form of tax advice or tax strategy. A tax professional must be con-
suited to address the specific needs of the taxpayer.
123. BAC Florida Investments, Overview of Types of Accounts, http://www.bacinvest
ments.com/joint.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Overview of Types of Accounts];
see FLA. STAT. § 655.79(1) (2009).
124. See FLA. STAT. § 655.79(l).
125. See id.
126. Overview of Types of Accounts, supra note 123.
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and Mike passed away, those funds would pass into Mike's probate estate. 127
Depending on Mike's estate planning, Steve might have to fight to regain
any of the assets he put in Mike's account.
128
Therefore, Mike and Steve need to plan the structure of their financial
accounts, and no money should be pooled into a solely titled account unless
it accomplishes another goal, as suggested by an expert. Seeking expert ad-
vice is crucial since certain deposits into joint accounts by one person could
trigger the Federal Gift Tax for the other person. 29
Another basic financial asset is a shared home, and Florida homeowners
who are unmarried and have no minor children are free to title their homes as
JTWROS with an unrelated individual as a co-owner. 30 As with a bank ac-
count, the titling of the property as JTWROS allows the surviving owner to
take title to the entire property without it passing through probate.1 31 If the
home is titled solely in Mike's name and Mike dies without a will, the home
will pass into his estate and probably go to his family.132 However, as with
financial accounts, not seeking expert advice may have consequences. 133 For
example, if Mike had owned his home alone prior to their relationship and
had substantial equity in the home, and then added Steve to the title without
Steve paying for his share, there can be major tax implications for Steve.13 1
a. Cohabitation Agreements
Of special note to same sex couples who share a home is the creation of
a "cohabitation agreement."' 135 It can be especially effective if one person is
unable to have title in the home. Such an agreement may spell out the own-
ership interests of real and personal property, apportionment of tax benefits
and liabilities, and dissolution of the agreement and division of the property
in the event of a break-up. 136 Surprisingly, a Florida court upheld such a
127. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.101(1), 733.607(1) (2009).
128. See In re Guardianship of Atkins, 868 N.E.2d 878, 880-83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(finding that where a partner's solely titled bank account came under parents' control as guar-
dians, other partner had to go to court to prove some funds were his).
129. See Lambda Legal, Tax Considerations for Same-Sex Couples, at I n.2, available at
http://data.lambdalegal.org/pdf/tax bulletin_2006.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2009) [hereinafter
Lambda Legal, Tax Considerations].
130. See FLA. STAT. §§ 689.15, 732.4015(1) (2009); see Lambda Legal, Tax Considera-
tions, supra note 129, at 3.
131. Lambda Legal, Tax Considerations, supra note 129, at 3.
132. See FLA. STAT. § 732.101(1).
133. See Lambda Legal, Tax Considerations, supra note 129, at I n.2.
134. See id. at 3.
135. See Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
136. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 296 (9th ed. 2009).
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contract between two lesbians that even called for support payments. 137 The
court recognized that Floridians are guaranteed the ability to contract away
their property rights as long as the basis of the contract is not sexual servic-
es. 138 Although the court went to great pains to distinguish the contract from
a marital contract, 139 it is another way to solidify property rights in Florida
that has survived judicial scrutiny.
2. Durable Powers of Attorney
Another basic tool of value to LGBTs in Florida is the creation of a dur-
able power of attorney (DPOA). A DPOA is created when someone ex-
ecutes a written document naming a competent adult as his "attorney-in-
fact," with the power to act on the principal's behalf in financial and property
matters as specified in the document. 40 The document must be "executed
with the same formalities required" to transfer real estate, and to survive in-
capacity of the principal, must include the words: "This durable power of
attorney is not affected by subsequent incapacity of the principal except as
provided in [section] 709.08, Florida Statutes.' 14' A DPOA remains in ef-
fect until death or revocation by the principal, or the incapacity of the desig-
nated attorney-in-fact. 42 Although a standard DPOA allows the designated
attorney-in-fact to act on the principal's behalf before incapacity, 43 its true
value comes after incapacity.
If Mike is ever incapacitated by accident or illness, Steve would be able
to act on Mike's behalf and handle his financial and property affairs as if he
were Mike.' 44 If the incapacity is only temporary, Steve can pay Mike's bills
and manage his accounts to guard against deterioration of Mike's credit. 45 If
the incapacity is permanent, recent Florida case law has held that a princip-
al's competent granting of a DPOA may negate the need or requirement to
137. Posik, 695 So. 2d at 760.
138. Id. at 762.
139. Id. at 763 (Peterson, C.J., concurring).
140. 2 FLA. JUR. 2D Agency and Employment § 32 (2005).
141. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(1) (2009). The formalities to transfer real estate generally
means the document must be notarized and witnessed to be valid. FLA. STAT. § 695.03
(2009).
142. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(3)(b).
143. See FLA. STAT. § 709.08(l). A DPOA may be set up to "spring" into effect only upon
incapacitation of the principal, but it would then require a physician's determination of inca-
pacity which might create a burdensome delay. FLA. STAT. § 709.08(l), (4)(d).
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later appoint a guardian due to later incapacity.'46 Therefore, a DPOA, when
executed in concert with the other documents discussed herein, would act to
support an argument by Steve that Mike meant for him to manage his affairs,
if Mike's mother challenged Steve's authority. 147 A DPOA is one more ex-
ample of a legally valid individual choice that may strengthen the legal
standing of Mike and Steve as a couple.
C. Inheritance
The final area in which Florida's statutes allow the LGBT individual to
give legal effect to his non-family relationships is in the area of inherit-
ance. 148 When a person dies without a will he is said to have died "intes-
tate." 49 In intestacy, the person's assets-with the exception of assets like
insurance policies with named beneficiaries-become part of the intestate
estate and will be distributed according to Florida statutes. 50 The legislative
scheme for distributing the estate only includes family members related by
blood, marriage, or adoption.' 5' If there are no family members, the estate
goes to the State of Florida. 52 If an individual wants to distribute his or her
estate in another manner, it simply must be specified with valid legal docu-
ments.
1. Wills and Other Traditional Beneficiary Documents
A validly executed will is the easiest way for any person to designate
the recipients of his estate. To be valid, a will must be in writing and adhere
to the "formalities" of execution in the Florida Statutes. 153 Oral wills and
wills that are not witnessed, as prescribed by statute, have no legal effect in
Florida.154 An unmarried person with no minor children has the right, under
Florida's Constitution, to devise his estate as he prefers. 55 A will is one area
146. Smith v. Lynch, 821 So. 2d 1197, 1197, 1199 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
147. See id. at 1997.
148. See FLA. STAT. § 732.501 (2009).
149. See FLA. STAT. § 732.101.
150. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.2035(6)-(7), .2045(1)(e).
151. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.102,.103,.108.
152. FLA. STAT. § 732.107(1).
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See FLA. STAT. § 732.501. A spouse left out of a will, absent another agreement, has
a statutory right to claim a percentage of the estate, no matter how it was devised. FLA. STAT.
§ 732.201. But see Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 69 (Fla.
1990) (holding that a decedent's decision to exclude his children from inheritance in favor of a
charitable bequest is the decedent's right).
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where courts almost never overrule the clear intent of the decedent. 5 6 If
Mike validly makes Steve the recipient of his estate by will, Mike's family
will have very little chance of legal recourse. 157
Another easy way for any individual to make his inheritance wishes
known is to designate someone as the beneficiary of insurance policies or
other benefits that are paid on death, such as retirement plans. Surprisingly,
Congress recently changed federal retirement plan law under the Pension
Protection Act of 2006, 158 to provide important tax benefits to non-spouse
beneficiaries of employee benefit plans such as 401 (k)s. 59 Previously, only
spouses were allowed to "rollover" the funds in the decedent's retirement
account into another account and avoid the severe tax penalties of early
withdrawal.' 6° And before death, only the medical and financial emergency
needs of a spousal beneficiary qualified for an early "hardship distribution"
of retirement plan assets without severe penalties. 161 The Pension Protection
Act of 2006 extended both of these tax saving benefits to anyone designated
as a retirement plan beneficiary. 162 Mike should check the status of all of his
policies and employee benefits to ensure that Steve is his designated benefi-
ciary, especially if those policies and benefits were commenced prior to his
relationship with Steve. Again, Mike's family will have little legal recourse
to interfere with Mike's wishes.
2. Revocable Living Trusts
The inheritance devices mentioned above are relatively simple, but as
with all the long-term planning tools mentioned in this article, it is advisable
to seek help from elder and long-term planning experts. This is especially
true if an individual has an array of assets and wishes to bypass the probate
process every will must go through. The tool for this probate bypass requires
a bit more planning and is known as a "revocable living trust" (RLT).163
Where wills are public documents, RLTs are private and avoid scrutiny from
156. See Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children, 563 So. 2d at 66.
157. See id.
158. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (co-
dified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
159. See Barrett, supra note 35, at 2.
160. See id.
161. Gays Included in New Federal Pension Law, ADVOCATE.COM, Aug. 19, 2006, http://
www.advocate.com/newsdetailektid35697.asp.
162. Id.
163. FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0601-.0604 (2009).
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unhappy relatives.' 64 While wills must go through probate, and can become
subject to lawsuits that can tie up and deplete the estate, the assets of the
RLT pass immediately to the beneficiaries upon death. 165 The ability to con-
test an RLT is much more limited.' 66 Almost any asset that can be devised
by will can be transferred upon death via an RLT. 167 The creation and execu-
tion of valid RLT documents follows the same rules governing the execution
of a will. 16
8
As Mike ages, he may acquire substantial assets. Although his mother
may have passed on, siblings, nieces and nephews might be eyeing a portion
of his estate. If they could successfully contest and invalidate his will, Mike
would be deemed to have died intestate, and Florida law would give them his
estate. 169 By creating an RLT, his family does not have that statutory scheme
to rely on, and he stands a far better chance of preserving his inheritance
plans. If Mike and Steve are meeting with long-term planning experts to
create a comprehensive plan for cementing their wishes and creating some
legal status in their relationship, an RLT may be an appropriate tool to add to
the mix at the same time.
TV. STRATEGIES FOR SECURING PERSONAL CHOICE
Nowhere in the United States Constitution does it expressly say that a
person has a right to privacy and autonomy in making the decisions that af-
fect the intimate ordering of her life.7 ° But a long line of United States Su-
preme Court decisions, starting in the 1960s, has affirmed these rights for
every competent adult. 171 Yet, the Court has stopped short of holding that
these rights extend by default to someone acting as that person's proxy when
she becomes incapacitated. 1
72
164. Rande Spiegelman, A Living Trust Can Help You and Your Heirs, CHARLES SCHWAB,
Mar. 24, 2004, http://www.schwab.com (search "A Living Trust Can Help You"); see also 12
BRIAN V. MCAvOY ET AL., FLORIDA ESTATE PLANNING §§ 7:1, 7:11 (2008-2009 ed., West).
165. Spiegelman, supra note 164.
166. 12McAvoYETAL.,supra note 164, § 7:11.
167. See Spiegelman, supra note 164.
168. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b) (2009).
169. See FLA. STAT. § 732.101 (2009).
170. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 951 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.. concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
171. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (establishing a woman's right to
control her choice to reproduce); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (estab-
lishing the concept of the penumbra of rights inferred from various parts of the Constitution).
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Florida's Constitution expressly does guarantee its competent citizens a
right to privacy, 173 and that right has served as the foundation for cases af-
firming personal intimate choices.174  But when that competent Floridian
becomes incapacitated, her validly executed personal choices of who she
wanted to handle her affairs is transformed by Florida's statutes into "rebut-
table presumptions" that can be legally challenged.1 75 A rebuttable presump-
tion means that a challenger can try to prove that the personal choices ex-
pressed in the documents are defective or not contemporary enough to reflect
the choice the incapacitated person would now make.176 Therefore, even
when LGBT's validly create legal relationships and status with those they are
closest to, other parties have a statutory basis to challenge and invalidate
those legal relationships.1 77 And, as noted throughout this article, Florida law
tends to prioritize family ties over personal ones.178
But LGBT's who create a comprehensive plan that encompasses most
or all of the documents described here lay a stronger foundation for defend-
ing that presumption when they can no longer defend it themselves. 179 The
cumulative effect of those individual choices, designating that one special
person in someone's life as her proxy, counters arguments that her choices
were ambiguous or defective. Until the law catches up with today's reality
of complex relationships, 80 there are a number of strategies for creating the
best possible chance that personal choices will be effective and respected.1 8
A. Practical Steps
When executing his or her planning documents, any individual can take
some simple, practical steps to erase doubt about "what she really wanted."
For example, she might consider:
0 Not only designating the person chosen to act on her be-
half, but also designating in the documents who she does not
want to act on her behalf.
173. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
174. See Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 109-10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
175. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 765.105, .202(7), .302(3) (2009); FLA. STAT. §§ 744.3045(4),
709.08(3)(c)1 (2009).
176. See 1 CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE, § 301.1, at 96 (2009 ed., West).
177. See id.
178. See supra notes 34 & 161 and accompanying text.
179. See Spiegelman, supra note 164.
180. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289-90 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
181. See infra Part IV.A-C.
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* Having every document notarized, even if the statutes do
not require it.
* Memorializing overall agreements and long-term plan-
ning strategies (see below).
* Involving family members in the decision process to
avoid surprise (see below).
* Videotaping her statement of her personal wishes and
choices. It should be done in one unedited stream, correct-
ing and clarifying any thoughts as the camera keeps running,
so that no one can later say the "true thoughts" were edited
out. She could make a new recording every few years to re-
but an argument that her choices became "stale" over time.
B. If the Doors Are Open: Communicate and Mediate
Private mediation is one way to bring interested parties together to
reach an understanding. 82 Acting as a friendly and impartial legal referee, a
mediator suggests, encourages and facilitates a non-adversarial process
where parties reach a voluntary mutual agreement. 183 "Mediation is based on
concepts of communication, negotiation, facilitation, and problem-solving
that emphasize ... self determination . . . ."'84 Although mediation is often
thought of as a court-ordered strategy to resolve existing legal disputes after
lawsuits have been filed, people are free to consult a mediator outside the
judicial process before a dispute arises.'85
In addition to expert elder law and long-term planning advice, commit-
ted couples could benefit from voluntary mediation to facilitate the decision-
making related to executing the necessary documents. They could also bene-
fit from mediation to facilitate what might be the thorny details of a cohabita-
tion agreement. 86 But couples and single LGBT's could all benefit from
mediation that includes blood relatives if that door to such discussion is
open.
182. See Florida State Courts, Alternative Dispute Resolution, http://www.flcourts.org/
gen-public/adr/adrintro.shtml (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
183. FLA. R. CERT. & CT.-APPTD. MEDIATORS 10.210-220.
184. Id. at 10.230 (emphasis added).
185. See Florida State Courts, Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 182.
186. See Barry Simon, How Mediation Can Help Same Gender Relationships,
MEDIATE.COM, http://www.mediate.com/articles/simon.cfm# (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
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The infamous and tragic case of Terry Schiavo and the legal battle be-
tween her husband and her parents over removal of life support later sparked
some health law experts to suggest hospital based "bioethics consulta-
tions. '187 Specially trained hospital staff would bring family members facing
a medical crisis together to discuss the tough subjects that often go unarticu-
lated between loved ones. 188 Participants would not only learn about all the
medical options and outcomes, but would get a chance to be emotionally
heard. 189 By reaching consensus before hand, Schiavo-type disputes may be
foreclosed later because family members, perhaps even including the patient
if she is still competent, developed an agreement ahead of time. 90
Like discussions of mortality, discomfort over sexuality can lead to si-
lent misplaced assumptions. Even the most supportive families may never
really discuss their son/brother/uncle's "homosexual lifestyle"' 9 and the very
different life experience that has shaped his choices. Therefore, the idea for
open discussion of end-of-life decisions translates to LGBT personal choice
decisions. A traumatized mother may be even more hurt and distressed if the
first time she discovers her son gave decision-making power to his partner is
when that severely injured son goes wheeling by on a hospital gurney. At
such painful times, otherwise reasonable people might misdirect their hurt
into legal recourse.192 But if a same-sex couple invited family to participate
in a pre-need mediation process related to the personal choices advocated
here, hurt feelings and misunderstandings could be addressed and resolved. 93
And while the Schiavo proposal remains a proposal, private mediation is an
established process available now to LGBTs. 194
187. See Coombs, supra note 62, at 566.
188. See id. at 555, 568.
189. See id. at 557.
190. See id. at 569.
191. The author uses this term purposely since the heterosexual community is not always
aware that the LGBT community does not agree with the word "lifestyle," since it implies
they made a choice to be LGBT. University of Tennessee Knoxville, LBGT Glossary,
http://lgbt.utk.edu/glossary.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2009) ("[T]he phrase 'homosexual life-
style' is often used by anti-gay groups to imply that sexual orientation is a matter of choice
rather than of identity.").
192. See Coombs, supra note 62, at 584.
193. See id. at 569.
194. Florida State Courts, Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 182.
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C. If the Doors Are Closed: A Proposal for Official Recognition
Of course, not all LGBT's enjoy close family relationships. 95 Whether
it is a happenstance of geography or estrangement over their daughter's
"choice," it may simply be impractical or futile to engage family in a media-
tion process.1 96 I propose an alternative judicial or quasi-judicial process,
administered by the state. This process would allow anyone to petition for
an "official stamp of approval" for her overall comprehensive long-term plan
and support her constitutionally protected rights to privacy and autonomy.' 97
The petitioner would pay a fee' 98 to appear before a local court or administra-
tive judge, along with the person(s) she is designating to act on her behalf if
she is ever incapacitated, and any witnesses. The comprehensive plan would
include validly executed copies of all the long-term planning documents and
include a sworn affidavit attesting to the choices made. The judge could use
a pattern set of questions to develop testimony from the parties that elicits
their understanding of the choices, so that the judge could reach a conclusive
opinion that those choices were sound. Notice could even be given to all
pertinent family members so that they could have an opportunity to be heard.
In this way, the judge might actually see and understand why someone has
specifically excluded family from her proxy decisions. Or, alternatively, in
"friendly family" situations, the mediation agreement discussed in the pre-
vious section could be submitted as evidence of mutual understanding of the
petitioner's choices. The judge's resulting official opinion would then be
kept on file and be statutorily allowed as evidence of a person's wishes in a
later dispute over those wishes. Another helpful option would be to create an
opportunity for easy amendment or renewal through witnessed and notarized
forms so that the petitioner could re-validate her choices over time or when
necessary by changes in relationships.
"Rebuttable presumptions" serve a purpose in the law: they allow the
asserted truth to be tested to ensure that the "real truth" has not been covered
up. ' 99 But by creating and using this proposed process, an official opinion
195. See, e.g., hi re Guardianship of Atkins, 868 N.E.2d 878, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
196. See Coombs, supra note 62, at 561.
197. This process could be beneficial to anyone-gay, straight, married, single-who is
making health care surrogate, power of attorney, or pre-need guardian choices that divert from
"expected" or traditional choices.
198. With state budgets strained, the ideal solution would be to piggyback onto an existing
adjudicative facility where the fees would be calculated to collectively pay for the extra labor
and administrative requirements.
199. See I EHRHARDT, supra note 176, § 301.1, at 96.
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could create a threshold of presumption that would be extremely difficult to
overcome.
V. CONCLUSION
The 2008 passage of Amendment 2 demonstrates that the state is a long
way from embracing legislation that normalizes the legal status of same-sex
relationships. 21 Such normalization, even if only through meaningful do-
mestic partnership laws, or civil unions, might inspire more of Florida's sin-
gle LGBTs to enter into and stay in long-term, protected relationships. 20 ' But
until then, Floridian LGBTs have a number of statutory legal options to give
some meaning to their intimate relationships.
The options are definitely imperfect. Anyone intent on executing a
comprehensive plan to memorialize and give legal effect to his or her per-
sonal choices has to spend some money on competent, professional advice,
and do a little more leg work than simply saying "I do." Anyone intent on
disrupting those personal choices can institute costly and time consuming
litigation under Florida law. But by executing these highly personal and
autonomous documents in spite of their limitations, Florida's LGBTs can
send a message: we will not have our loved ones become "legal strangers."
By using mediation techniques to involve family members, and advocating
for legal solutions to cement the validity of autonomous choices, perhaps
Florida could shed its Anita Bryant past and serve as a role model for coping
with practical LGBT realities.
200. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
201. See Press Release, Am. Psychological Ass'n, New Research Finds Equal Level of
Commitment and Relationship Satisfaction Among Same-Sex and Heterosexual Couples (Jan.
22, 2008), available at http://www.apa.org/releases/satisfaction0108.html (study results sug-
gest that civil union laws influence gay couples to commit to long-term relationships).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal, in its recent decision in Niko-
lits v. Verizon Wireless Personal Communications L.P.,' construed Florida's
Tax Code to not permit counties to tax "computer software" as tangible
property. 2 The decision has a profound financial impact on the taxing pow-
ers of Florida county governments given the ever increasing reliance on
computers and their software by people and businesses. This impact cuts
even deeper due to the global recession and the State of Florida's ever in-
creasing revenue woes. The decision, however, was in accordance with the
intent of the Florida Legislature. In Part II of this article, I examine the
Fourth District's decision in Nikolits. In Part I of this article, I will show
why the decision is in accordance with the legislature's intent by examining
the applicable tax statute. In my analysis, I will use as guidance the Fourth
* Anthony M. Stella is a judicial law clerk for the Honorable Fred A. Hazouri at Flori-
da's Fourth District Court of Appeal. From August 2010 until August 2012, he will serve as a
judicial law clerk for Justice R. Fred Lewis at the Supreme Court of Florida. He is also a
magna cum laude graduate from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center,
and was the Executive Editor for Nova Law Review in 2007-08. The author is eternally grate-
ful for his family's unconditional love and support. He would also like to extend his sincerest
gratitude to Professor Stephanie Feldman Aleong, whose unwavering guidance and mentor-
ship made the author not only a better attorney, but a better person.
1. 9 So. 3d 690 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
2. Id. at 694.
282
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
District's decision in Nikolits and a decision by the Fifth District on a similar
issue in Gilreath v. General Electric Co.3 I will also invoke the canons of
statutory interpretation. Then, in Part IV of this article, I will briefly ex-
amine the definition of a "computer" and the presumption of correctness
allocated to county tax appraisers, and then provide why, given that defini-
tion and the limitations on a county tax appraiser's taxing power, the Fourth
District's decision was correct. Lastly, I conclude with my recommendation
as to how the Florida Legislature may re-construe the applicable tax section
to permit the State of Florida to benefit from taxation of computer software
as intangible personal property.
H. THE FOURTH DISTRICT'S DECISION IN NIKOLITS
On April 15, 2009, Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal rendered
its decision in Nikolits.4 This case arose from Palm Beach County, in 2005,
having subjected the "Wireless Services Software" of Verizon Wireless Per-
sonal Communications (Verizon) to ad valorem taxation 5 as tangible person-
6al property. Verizon paid the tax under protest, but contested the validity of
the tax by bringing suit against Palm Beach County's Property Appraiser,
Gary R. Nikolits (Nikolits).' After the trial court ruled in favor of Verizon,
Nikolits appealed the decision,8 leading to the Fourth District's decision. 9
The Wireless Services Software is run on the computer system in Veri-
zon's mobile switching center in Jupiter, Florida.' ° The computer system is
called the Autoplex 1000."1 "The Autoplex consists of a network of comput-
ers. Run on the computers are three types of software: boot software, oper-
ating system software, and the Wireless Services Software."' 2 The Wireless
Services Software enables Verizon to provide its customers with the ability
to use their cell phones to make phone calls, "send text messages, operate a
[mobile] GPS navigator, and browse the Internet.' 13 While the Autoplex is
3. 751 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
4. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 691.
5. BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 57 (8th ed. 2004). Ad valorem taxation is taxation that is
"proportional to the value of the thing taxed." Id.
6. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 691.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 694.
10. Id. at 692.
11. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 692.
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the hardware that executes the software, the Wireless Services Software
gives the Autoplex and Verizon the ability to provide the aforementioned
services. "4
In Nikolits, the trial court, in interpreting Florida's Tax Code, held that
the Wireless Service Software fit section 192.001(19), Florida Statutes, defi-
nition of computer software, exempting it from taxation.15 The trial court
also found that the Wireless Services Software did not fall within section
192.001(19)'s "embedded software" exception.16 If it had, the Wireless Ser-
vice Software would have been subject to taxation. 7 Section 192.001(19)
states:
(19)"Computer software" means any information, program, or
routine, or any set of one or more programs, routines, or collec-
tions of information used or intended for use to convey informa-
tion or to cause one or more computers or pieces of computer-
related peripheral equipment, or any combination thereof, to per-
form a task or set of tasks. Without limiting the generality of the
definition provided in this subsection, the term includes operating
and applications programs and all related documentation. Com-
puter software does not include embedded software that resides
permanently in the internal memory of a computer or computer-
related peripheral equipment and that is not removable without
terminating the operation of the computer or equipment. Comput-
er software constitutes personal property only to the extent of the
value of the unmounted or uninstalled medium on or in which the
information, program, or routine is stored or transmitted, and, af-
ter installation or mounting by any person, computer software
does not increase the value of the computer or computer-related
peripheral equipment, or any combination thereof.18
14. Id. In Nikolits, the Fourth District described in greater detail the nature of the Wire-
less Service Software, stating that:
The Wireless Service Software itself consists of approximately 1000 separate programs. Ten
percent of these programs are needed for basic call processing. The other programs are used
for various diagnostic tools, various report generators, and as tools to verify that the software
has been installed properly. This means the Autoplex system will still process voice calls even
if up to ninety percent of the Wireless Services Software is uninstalled. If all of the Wireless
Services Software is uninstalled, the Autoplex processing system would still be up and run-
ning, and one could still read e-mail and do those kinds of things on those computers using the
tools that come with the operating system.
Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 692.
15. Id. (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (emphasis added).
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On appeal, the Fourth District, in spite of a strong argument to the con-
trary, affirmed the trial court. 9 It also held that the Wireless Services Soft-
ware "is intangible personal property and is therefore outside of the taxing
power of Palm Beach County. 2° In so holding, it cited to the Florida Consti-
tution, as well as to the Fifth District's decision in Gilreath, stating that:
Under the Florida Constitution, local governments and coun-
ties have the power "to levy and collect ad valorem taxes on real
property and tangible personal property. The power to tax intangi-
ble personal property, however, is reserved only to the State." As
such, "if the [computer] software is intangible personal property,
the County was without authority to assess or collect taxes on it."21
i. As INTENDED BY THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE,
"COMPUTER SOFTWARE" IS INTANGIBLE PERSONAL
PROPERTY AND NOT TAXABLE BY FLORIDA COUNTY
GOVERNMENTS
Section 196.001 states that "[a]ll real and personal property" is property
subject to taxation, unless expressly exempted. The Florida Constitution
provides that local governments and counties may assess ad valorem taxation
on tangible personal property, but not on intangible personal property, as
taxation on intangible property is reserved to the State.23 The Fourth District
Court of Appeal found that Palm Beach County could not tax the Wireless
Services Software because, as "computer software," it is intangible personal
property and "not taxable by Palm Beach County. 24 I agree with this hold-
ing, as the Florida Legislature intended that courts treat "computer software"
not as tangible personal property, but rather, as intangible personal proper-
ty. 25
This issue involves a matter of statutory interpretation, namely whether
the legislature, through section 192.001, intended to treat "computer soft-
ware" as tangible or intangible personal property. 6 As such, the de novo
19. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 694.
20. Id. at 693.
21. Id. (quoting Gilreath v. Gen. Elec. Co., 751 So. 2d 705, 707-08 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000)) (citations omitted) (alteration in original); see also FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1(a),
9(a).
22. FLA. STAT. § 196.001(1) (2009).
23. FLA. CONST. art. VII, §§ I(a), 9(a).
24. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 694.
25. See id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009).
26. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19).
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standard of review is applied by an appellate court,27 which "simply means
the appellate court is free to decide the question of law, without deference to
the trial judge, as if the appellate court had been deciding the question in the
first instance. 28
"'[L]egislative intent is the polestar' of statutory interpretation. 29 To
determine such intent, an appellate court must first look to a statute's plain
language.30 If "the statute is clear and unambiguous, 'there is no occasion for
resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute
must be given its plain and obvious meaning."''3' However, "[i]f the mean-
ing of a statutory provision is deemed ambiguous, it must be subject to judi-
cial construction. 32 The purpose of the rules of statutory construction "is to
discover the true intention of the law. But such rules are useful only in case
of doubt and should never be used to create doubt, only to remove it.
'33
Amongst the rules of construction used by courts to rectify an ambigui-
ty is that remedial statutes are "liberally construed to advance the intended
remedy. 34 A remedial statute is broadly defined as a statute "intended to fix
an existing problem. 35 Another principle of statutory construction is that
"tax laws are to be construed strongly in favor of the taxpayer and against the
government, and that all ambiguities or doubts are to be resolved in favor of
the taxpayer., 36 In construing statutes, appellate courts will also read "'all
parts of a statute ...together in order to achieve a consistent whole."'
37
"Further, in construing a statute that is susceptible to more than one interpre-
27. See Zingale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d 277, 280 (Fla. 2004) ("Although we take into con-
sideration the district court's analysis on the issue, constitutional interpretation, like statutory
interpretation, is performed de novo.").
28. 2 PHILIP J. PADOVANO, FLORIDA APPELLATE PRACTICE § 18:4, at 339-40 (West 2009).
29. Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078, 1082 (Fla. 2009) (per curiam)
(quoting Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam)).
30. Id. (citing McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., L.L.C. v. Betts, 928 So. 2d 1204, 1208
(Fla. 2006)).
31. Id. (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)).
32. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 (Fla.
2006).
33. State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
34. Educ. Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 751 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
35. RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 60 (2002).
36. Leadership Hous., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 336 So. 2d 1239, 1242 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (quoting Maas Bros., Inc. v. Dickinson, 195 So. 2d 193, 198 (Fla. 1967)).
37. Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Forsythe
v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452,455 (Fla. 1992)).
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tation, it is often helpful to refer to legislative history in order to ascertain the
Legislature's intent."38
As the Laws of Florida may impact an appellate court's analysis of a
statute, a discussion of its purpose and make-up is warranted. The Florida
Senate, in its Glossary of Terms, defines the Laws of Florida as:
A verbatim publication of the general and special laws enacted
by the Florida Legislature in a given year and published each year
following the regular session of the legislature. It presents the
laws in the order in which they are numbered by the Secretary of
State, as well as resolutions and memorials passed by the legisla-
ture.
39
The Florida Constitution also requires that every law has an "enacting
clause" that reads: "Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Flori-
da."40 Furthermore, although the Laws of Florida contain the provisions of a
bill, the legislature provided before the enacting clauses-i.e., the preamble
or prefatory language-of the Florida Statutes, as "official statute law of the
state immediately upon publication,"'" do not. This is because "[a] preamble
to a statute is an introductory or prefatory clause, preceding the enacting
clause, supplying the reasons and explanations for legislative enactments. It
is not part of a statute itself and has no substantive legal force and so cannot,
by itself, prescribe rights or establish duties. 42 As such, prefatory matters
stated before the enacting clause in the Laws of Florida are not included in
the Florida Statutes because they are not part of the official statutory law of
the state.43 Rather, this language may offer guidance for a court when a sta-
tute's plain meaning is ambiguous, as "preambles and findings and purposes
clauses can help resolve ambiguity" because they are relevant to a statute's
meaning.44
As stated in Nikolits, the Florida Statutes, via subsection 192.001(19),
provides a definition of "computer software. 45 In that definition, "computer
38. State v. Jefferson, 758 So. 2d 661, 665 (Fla. 2000).
39. The Florida Senate: Glossary of Terms, http://www.flsenate.gov/lnfoCenter/index.
cfm?Mode=Glossary&Submenu=3&Tab=infocenter&CFID=86199434&CFrOKEN=34982
315 (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
40. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
41. See FLA. STAT. § 11.2421 (2009).
42. 48A FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 57 (2007).
43. See id.
44. LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 125 (2008).
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software" is defined as "personal property," but not as either tangible or in-
tangible personal property. 46 In the same statutory section, the Florida Sta-
tutes define tangible and intangible personal property, whose definitions fail
to include "computer software. 47  The statute's wording is, accordingly,
ambiguous as to whether "computer software" is tangible or intangible per-
sonal property, and the canons of construction may be invoked.
It is feasible that because the legislature included a definition of "com-
puter software" and tangible or intangible personal property, neither of which
expressly defines "computer software" as intangible personal property, the
legislature did not intend for "computer software" to be categorized as in-
tangible personal property. "Computer software," however, is intangible
personal property because a close examination of legislative intent affords
this result.
48
In first turning to the plain language of section 192.001, one may de-
termine that the Florida Legislature intended that "computer software" is not
tangible personal property. 49 As articulated by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Nikolits:
A close examination of the definition of tangible personal
property contained in section 192.001 compels the same result [as
the Fifth District reached in Gilreath]. In particular, that definition
states that tangible personal property is "all goods, chattels, and
46. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009).
47. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(1 1)(b), (d). For purposes of taxation, the Florida Legislature
has provided the following definitions of tangible personal property and intangible personal
property:
(b) "Intangible personal property" means money, all evidences of debt owed to the taxpayer,
all evidences of ownership in a corporation or other business organization having multiple
owners, and all other forms of property where value is based upon that which the property
represents rather than its own intrinsic value.
(d) "Tangible personal property" means all goods, chattels, and other articles of value (but
does not include the vehicular items enumerated in s. l(b), Art. VII of the State Constitution
and elsewhere defined) capable of manual possession and whose chief value is intrinsic to the
article itself. "Construction work in progress" consists of those items of tangible personal
property commonly known as fixtures, machinery, and equipment when in the process of being
installed in new or expanded improvements to real property and whose value is materially en-
hanced upon connection or use with a preexisting, taxable, operational system or facility.
Construction work in progress shall be deemed substantially completed when connected with
the preexisting, taxable, operational system or facility. Inventory and household goods are ex-
pressly excluded from this definition.
Id.
48. See FLA. H.R. COMM. ON CMTY. AFFAIRS, HB 1723 (1997) BILL ANALYSIS &
ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT I (Apr. 15, 1997) [hereinafter HB 1723 BILL ANALYSIS &
ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT].
49. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(1 1)(d).
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other articles of value.., capable of manual possession and whose
chief value is intrinsic to the article itself." § 192.001(1 1)(d). Al-
though computer software's value is intrinsic in and of itself, as
the "essence of the property is the software itself, and not the tang-
ible medium on which the software might be stored," Gilreath,
751 So. 2d at 708, it is property incapable of manual possession.
This is because, software, itself, is "not capable of being 'seen,
weighed, measured, felt or otherwise perceived by the senses."'
Id. (quoting Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Tech Data Corp., 930
S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. App. 1996)). Rather, the tangible medium
on which it is transported and transmitted is the means by which
the property is manually possessed.
Therefore, we ... hold that "computer software" is intangible
personal property. As such, we affirm the trial court's decision
that the Wireless Services Software is not taxable by Palm Beach
County, as it is intangible personal property, which is property
outside a county's taxing authority.
50
Furthermore, in examining the prefatory language of the 1997 Laws of
Florida, one can discern the legislative intent to treat "computer software" as
intangible personal property. 1 Specifically, although this provision was not
included in the subsequent Florida Statutes because it appeared before the
enacting clause, the 1997 Laws of Florida state that it is "the intent of the
Legislature to clarify that computer software, as defined in this act, is not
tangible personal property under the ad valorem tax laws of this state. 52 In
using this language as guidance, one can logically conclude that because the
legislature stated that "computer software" is not tangible, it intended it to be
categorized as intangible. This is because "[flor purposes of ad valorem tax-
ation, personal property is divided into" intangible personal property or tang-
ible personal property. 53 As such, if computer software is not tangible it
must logically be intangible.
The prefatory language in the Laws of Florida also states that it is the
"intent of the Legislature that the provisions of this act are remedial. ' '54 An
interpretation of "computer software" as intangible personal property adheres
to the rule of construction for remedial statutes because, to do so, is to liber-
ally construe the statute to achieve its perceived remedial purpose of tax re-
50. Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 694.
51. See Act effective June 1, 1997, ch. 97-294, 1997 Fla. Laws 5333, 5333 (codified at
FLA. STAT. §§ 192.001, 196.012, .195-.196 (2009)).
52. Ch. 97-294, 1997 Fla. Laws at 5333.
53. 50 FLA. JUR. 2D Taxation § 80 (2006).
54. Ch. 97-294 1997 Fla. Laws at 5333.
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lief.55  The legislature's intent to provide tax relief by way of section
192.001(19) is embodied in a 1997 Florida House of Representative's Com-
mittee Report for House Bill 1723, which states that section 192.001(19)'s
definition of "computer software" was designed to "effectively remove[] the
value of software, except for the value of the diskette or other medium on
which the information is stored, from ad valorem taxation. 56 Moreover, an
interpretation of "computer software" as intangible personal property is in
accordance with the rule of construction that tax statutes are interpreted in
favor of the taxpayer, as such an interpretation grants the taxpayer relief."
Additionally, this interpretation is in accord with the Fifth District Court
of Appeal's decision in Gilreath v. General Electric Co.58 In Gilreath, the
Fifth District rendered a decision on the same question discussed in this is-
sue, i.e., whether computer software under section 192.001(19) is tangible or
intangible personal property.59 In that case, the court examined section
192.001(19), noting that the definition
made a sharp distinction between the information, program or rou-
tine (the "imperceptible binary impulses"), and the medium on
which the information, program or routine is carried. That is to
say, as the court interprets this amendment, the Legislature deter-
mined that the disk or tape itself was tangible personal property,
but the information, program or routine was not. The remainder of
the statute clearly indicates that the information, program or rou-
tine is not subject to local taxation, because it "does not increase
the value of the computer or computer-related peripheral equip-
ment, or any combination thereof.",
6
More importantly, the court also held that "'the fact that tangible prop-
erty is used to store or transmit the software's binary instructions does not
change the character of what is fundamentally a classic form of intellectual
property"' that is, in fact, "intangible property."'6 As such, "computer soft-
ware" is, itself, intangible property, regardless of its present status under the
Florida Statutes and, therefore, is subject to taxation as intangible personal
55. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 35, at 59.
56. HB 1723 BILL ANALYSIS & EcONOMIC STATEMENT, supra note 48, at I (emphasis
added).
57. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 35, at 59-60.
58. See Gilreath v. Gen. Elec. Co., 751 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
59. Id. at 707.
60. Id. at 708-09.
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property by the State of Florida-not Florida county governments-if the
legislature so provides.62
Thus, in accordance with the intent of the Florida Legislature, the
Fourth District's holding in Nikolits was correct in its finding that "computer
software" was not taxable by Palm Beach County because it was not tangible
personal property, but rather intangible personal property.63
IV. THE FOURTH DISTRICT'S DECISION WAS CORRECT GIVEN
THE DEFINITION OF A COMPUTER AND THE FACT THAT A
PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS WAS NOT APPLICABLE
TO THE PROPERTY APPRAISER'S FINDINGS
Another compelling question is whether the Fourth District Court of
Appeal acted improperly by not interpreting the word "computer" in favor of
the taxing authority and not giving a presumption of correctness to the Prop-
erty Appraiser's findings.64 As in Issue III, whether the trial court properly
interpreted the word computer in section 192.001(19) is a matter of statutory
interpretation that an appellate court reviews de novo.
65
A rule of statutory construction is that "'[w]hile doubtful language in
taxing statutes should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer, the reverse is
applicable in the construction of exceptions and exemptions from taxa-
tion."'66 This, however, is a rule of construction, which is not applicable if a
term is unambiguous. 67 As such, it "is inapplicable to construe language of a
statute that is not doubtful. 68 This is in accordance with the principle that,
absent an ambiguity or a statutory definition, the wording of a statute is giv-
en its plain and ordinary meaning.69 It is also assumed that a legislative body
knows the plain and ordinary meanings of the words it uses. 70 A word's
plain meaning is "'ascertained by reference to a dictionary. ' ' '7
62. Id.
63. See Nikolits v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc'ns L.P., 9 So. 3d 690, 693 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
64. See id.
65. Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Cerasani, 955 So. 2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2007) (emphasis add-
ed).
66. Markham v. PPI, Inc., 843 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting
Robbins v. Yusem, 559 So. 2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2000).
70. Hankey v. Yarian, 755 So. 2d 93, 96 (Fla. 2000).
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It is feasible to argue that the meaning of the word "computer" used in
the definition of "computer software" is ambiguous, and because section
192.001(19) is a tax exemption, it should have been translated in favor of the
taxing authority.72 However, the Florida Legislature provided a definition of
the term "computer software"-not "computer. 7 3 The meaning of the term
computer, itself, is accordingly unambiguous because it is a word with a
plain and ordinary meaning ascertainable by reference to a dictionary, i.e., "a
high-speed electronic device that processes, retrieves, and stores pro-
grammed information. 74 Hence, there is no doubt or ambiguity as to the
plain meaning of the term "computer," making the rules of construction in-
applicable.
If an appellate court, however, did find an ambiguity regarding the defi-
nition of the term "computer," it should still interpret it in favor of the tax-
payer. This is because the rule of construction requiring a court to strictly
construe a tax statute as against the taxpayer is "'applicable in the construc-
tion of exceptions and exemptions from taxation,' 7,15 but not tax exclusions,
with section 192.001(19) being a tax exclusion and not a tax exemption.76
An examination of the Second District's decision in Department of Revenue
v. GTE Mobilnet of Tampa Inc.,77 shows why section 192.001(19) is a tax
exclusion.78
In that case, at issue was whether certain language in the definition of
"telecommunication service" was a tax exemption or tax exclusion. 7'9 The
Second District held that because the wording was "part of the statutory de-
finitions that determine what comes within the tax imposition language," it
operates not as an exemption, but as an exclusion. 80 The court held that this
was because the tax definition operated to exclude "telecommunication ser-
vice" from taxation by placing it outside the tax statute.8'
72. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009).
73. See id.
74. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 231 (1995).
75. PPI, Inc., 843 So. 2d at 925 (quoting Robbins v. Yusem, 559 So. 2d 1185, 1187 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis omitted)).
76. See Dep't of Revenue v. GTE Mobilnet of Tampa Inc., 727 So. 2d 125, 1128 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). "A tax exemption, [generally] is a statute that carves out a statutory
exception for something that otherwise would be within the scope of the taxing statute." Id.
By contrast, a tax exclusion is property that is not taxable because it is excluded from the tax
statute. See id.
77. Id. at 1125.
78. See id. at 1128.
79. GTE Mobilnet of Tampa Inc., 727 So. 2d at 1127-28.
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Comparatively, the definition of "computer software" is a tax exclusion
because, like the definition of "telecommunication services" in GTE Mobil-
net of Tampa Inc., the definition of computer software is part of statutory
definitions that determine what comes within a tax statute.82 Also, like the
definition of "telecommunication service" in GTE Mobilnet of Tampa Inc.,
the definition of "computer software" excludes it from taxation by placing it
outside the taxing statute.83 In particular, section 192.001(19) states that if
software meets the definition of "computer software," and does not fit into
the "embedded software" exception, it is "personal property only to the ex-
tent of the value of the unmounted or uninstalled medium. 84 This places
computer software outside the tax statute because, as provided by the legisla-
ture, only "real and personal property" is subject to taxation,85 and "computer
software" is not personal property for the purposes of taxation.86
Therefore, even if a court finds that the term "computer" raises an am-
biguity, it is still correct in interpreting the statute in favor of the taxpayer
because section 192.001(19) is a tax exclusion-not a tax exemption.87
One may further argue that the Fourth District erred in its decision by
not cloaking with a presumption of correctness the Property Appraiser's
findings that the Wireless Services Software was taxable as tangible personal
property.88 I disagree, because Palm Beach County's Tax Appraiser misap-
plied the law by taxing intangible personal property as tangible personal
property.
It is a well-established rule that "[tiax assessors are constitutional offic-
ers and as such their actions are clothed with the presumption of correctness.
One asserting error on the part of the tax assessor must show by 'proof' that
every reasonable hypothesis has been excluded which would support the tax
assessor."89 If "the presumption of correctness should have been but was not
applied by the trial court," an appellate court may reverse the trial court's
findings.90 This presumption, however, does not apply if "the Property Ap-
praiser's assessment. . . was based on a misapplication of the law."'
82. Id. at 1126-27.
83. See id. at 1126-28.
84. FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009).
85. FLA. STAT. § 196.001(1) (2009).
86. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19).
87. See id; see also GTE Mobilnet of Tampa Inc., 727 So. 2d at 1128.
88. See Nikolits v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc'ns L.P., 9 So. 3d 690, 693 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
89. Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. 1977) (citing Powell v. Kelly, 223 So. 2d
305, 308 (Fla. 1969)).
90. See Markham v. June Rose, 495 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
91. See Wilkinson v. Kirby, 654 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
[Vol. 34
293
: Nova Law Review 34, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
UN-TAXABILITY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
In Nikolits, the presumption of correctness was not applicable.92 This is
because the Property Appraiser, by taxing intangible personal property as
tangible personal property, misapplied the tax statute.93 Accordingly, the
trial court did not err by not giving a presumption of correctness to the Prop-
erty Appraiser's findings. Therefore, because the trial court acted properly in
not construing section 192.001 against Verizon, and not cloaking the Proper-
ty Appraiser's findings with a presumption of correctness, the Fourth District
was correct in its holding. 94
V. CONCLUSION
Although a Florida county government would profit from taxing "com-
puter software" as tangible property-as exemplified in the one million dol-
lar loss to Palm Beach County due to the Nikolits decision 95-the Florida
Legislature has intended otherwise.96 Given Florida's strict separation of
powers scheme, 97 the Fourth District's decision correctly discerned and in-
terpreted the intent of the legislature. If it ruled to the contrary, it would
have encroached into the providence of the legislature by misconstruing and
misapplying the law in a way that the legislature did not intend.98
I do, however, recognize the importance and necessity of taxation to an
orderly form of government. Although "computer software" is not taxable as
tangible property, it may be taxable by the State as intangible personal prop-
erty. To do so, I recommend that the legislature expressly provide for this in
the definition of "computer software" by stating that "computer software" is
taxable as intangible personal property if it fits within the embedded software
exception. This will also definitively label section 192.001(19) a tax exemp-
tion by showing that computer software is in fact subject to taxation as per-
sonal property, but is otherwise exempt from taxation under section
192.001(19) unless it falls within that exemption's embedded software ex-
92. See Nikolits, 9 So. 3d at 693.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Billy Shields, Verizon Avoids $1 Million Palm Beach County Bill, BROWARD DAILY
Bus. REV., Apr. 16, 2009, at A3.
96. See id.
97. State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 353 (Fla. 2000) ("This Court, on the other hand, in
construing the Florida Constitution, has traditionally applied a strict separation of powers
doctrine.").
98. See FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 3 (enumerating Florida's strict separation of powers scheme
by stating: "The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive
and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers apper-
taining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.").
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ception.99 Furthermore, it will bring within the State's taxing power the deli-
neated ability to tax a form of intangible property that now lingers outside
Florida's Tax Code, helping generate revenue for the State from a viable tax
source.
99. See FLA. STAT. § 192.001(19) (2009).
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On May 8, 2009, the Florida Legislature approved Senate Bill 788.1
The bill would grant the Seminole Indian Tribe of Florida (Seminole Tribe)
the right to operate casino style gambling, in exchange for $2.2 billion paid
to the State of Florida over fifteen years.2 Faced with a rapidly approaching
deadline, the success of Senate Bill 788 remained unclear as of August 1,
2009, due to the various requirements the bill must satisfy.3 First, Florida
Governor, Charles Crist, has to negotiate the compact with the tribe.4 If ne-
gotiations are successful, the deal would still have to be approved by the
Florida Legislature and the federal government.5 Similar to the events that
took place during the failed compact of 2007,6 "[fiederal officials have
threatened to step in and set rules for the tribe if the state fails to act. In that
case, the state would get nothing from the tribe."7
The difficulty in having Senate Bill 788 enacted represents how com-
plex negotiating a gaming compact can be.8 In 1979, the first bingo parlor
operating on a reservation was opened by the Seminole Tribe. 9 The Semi-
nole Tribe first sought to negotiate a compact permitting Class Ell gaming
beginning in 1991.10 Seventeen years after the first compact negotiation and
after four different governors entered office in Florida, a compact allowing
Class El gaming still has not been solidified. 1
Reminiscent of the 2007 failed compact, it appears that the require-
ments that must be met to finalize Senate Bill 788 will once again result in a
substantial amount of litigation. 12 According to the Seminole Tribe's attor-
ney, the compact as currently written lacks the granting of exclusive gaming
1. Mary Ellen Klas, New Deal on Gambling OK'd, MIAMI HERALD, May 9, 2009, at B 1.
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Data Kam, Gaming Deal Needs Revise, Lawyer Says, PALM BEACH POST, June 13,
2009, at BI [hereinafter Kam, Gaming Deal].
5. Id.
6. Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 605 (Ha. 2008). The De-
partment "urged Governor Crist to negotiate a compact, warning that if a compact was not
signed by November 15, 2007, the Department would finally issue procedures." Id.
7. Kam, Gaming Deal, supra note 4.
8. See Ron M. Rosenberg, When Sovereigns Negotiate in the Shadow of the Law: The
1998 Arizona-Pima Maricopa Gaming Compact, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 283, 289 (1999).
9. Id. at 287.
10. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 605.
11. See id.
12. See Kam, Gaming Deal, supra note 4.
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rights to the Seminole Tribe as required by federal law.13 Considering the
complicated process which must be followed before a compact can be
reached, 14 this article will evaluate whether Senate Bill 788 satisfies the
compact requirements imposed by Florida and federal law.
Part I of this article will discuss the law that applies to the type of gam-
ing contained in Senate Bill 788. Part III is an analysis of the compact
process and the important issues which are raised when a tribe wants to con-
duct gaming that requires state approval. Part IV evaluates the failed 2007
compact, and applies the compact process to Senate Bill 788. Finally, part V
determines whether Senate Bill 788 satisfies the complex compact require-
ments.
II. INDIAN GAMING GENERALLY
Indian gaming produces over twenty-six billion dollars in revenues a
year. 15 Over 200 tribes operate the 400 Indian gaming establishments that
exist in the United States. 6 Considering the substantial potential for reve-
nue, it is not surprising that the process a tribe must go through in order to
receive gaming rights is competitive, highly politicized, and often vigorously
disputed. 17 Further complicating this procedure are jurisdictional and sove-
reignty issues. 8 The Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion specifies that only Congress can supersede Indian sovereignty on Indian
owned lands.' 9 Therefore, to determine whether an Indian tribe can conduct
gaming in a state, the rules promulgated by the federal government must be
examined.2°
13. Id.
14. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 289.
15. NAT'L INDIAN GAMING COMM'N, TRIBAL GAMING REVENUES 2007-2008, available
at http://64.38.12.138/docs/nigc/nigc060309.pdf.
16. Kathryn R.L. Rand, Caught in the Middle: How State Politics, State Law, and State
Courts Constrain Tribal Influence Over Indian Gaming, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 973 (2007)
[hereinafter Rand, Tribal Influence].
17. See id. at 972.
18. See Rebecca S. Lindner-Cornelius, Comment, The Secretary of the Interior as
Referee: The States, the Indian Nations, and How Gambling Lead to the Illegality of the
Secretary of the Interior's Regulations in 25 C.F.R. § 291, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 685, 685-86
(2001) ("Federal Indian law is one of the most complex and dynamic areas of law in the Unit-
ed States.").
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20. Lindner-Comelius, supra note 18, at 688 ("The states have a limited role in tribal
relationships. The federal government preempts state power in almost all situations.").
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A. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 1988,
which created a statutory framework for Indian gaming.2' The purpose of
IGRA is stated as "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments. 22 During the late 1980s, the vast
majority of Native Americans living on reservations faced extreme poverty. 23
Therefore, gaming was considered a method for allowing the tribes to be-
come less dependent on government funding, and promote economic self-
determination. 24 Because Congress was attempting to promote economic
independence among the tribes while also preserving the states' role regulat-
ing gaming, IGRA is "[w]idely regarded as a political compromise. ''  The
result is a complex procedure set forth to grant gaming rights to tribes, which
is limited by the states' right to control certain types of gaming. 26 The states
power to regulate gaming on Indian land is determined by the class of gam-
ing, because each class raises separate jurisdictional issues.27
B. Indian Gaming Jurisdiction
IGRA separates gaming into three categories.28 Class I gaming includes
social games that are played only for a prize of nominal value. 29 It also in-
cludes traditional tribal gambling, including celebrations and ceremonies.3 °
21. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2006).
22. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
23. Kathryn R.L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success of
Indian Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 47, 53 (2002) [hereinafter Rand, Pequots]. Native Americans
"were poor, unemployed, and living in overcrowded and inadequate housing in communities
with minimal government services." Id.
24. See Nicholas S. Goldin, Note, Casting a New Light on Tribal Casinos Gaming: Why
Congress Should Curtail the Scope of High Stakes Indian Gaming, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 798,
812-13 (1999).
25. Rand, Pequots, supra note 23, at 52.
26. See Eric Henderson, Indian Gaming: Social Consequences, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 205,
211 (1997). "The act explicitly views gaming 'as a means of promoting tribal economic de-
velopment, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.' Nevertheless, state interests in
Indian gaming received considerable deference in the drafting of the regulation." Id. (quoting
25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1994)).
27. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a), (d) (2006).
28. Id. § 2703(6)-(8).
29. Id. § 2703(6).
30. Id.; see also Henderson, supra note 26, at 205 ("American Indians, prior to European
contact, participated in a multitude of games and gaming activities. Gambling figured promi-
nently ... and was an important social activity.").
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Class I gaming cannot be controlled by federal or state government because
tribes have the exclusive right to regulate this form of gaming.3, Class H
gaming excludes games that are not banked, electronic, or slot machines.32
Therefore, Class II gaming predominately consists of bingo and card games
that are either, "explicitly authorized by the laws of the State, or are not ex-
plicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are played at any location in
the State. 33 Tribes maintain the jurisdiction to regulate Class II gaming,
subject to the federal government's approval.34 Finally, Class In gaming is
defined by exclusion as "all forms of gaming that are not [C]lass I gaming or
[C]lass II gaming. '35 Class III, which is the most profitable, consists of
"high stakes, casino-style gambling-slot machines, blackjack, craps, pari-
mutuel wagering and lotteries. '36 Before a tribe can conduct Class 1Il gam-
ing, there are several requirements which must be satisfied.37
Although a tribe must satisfy statutory requirements before it can con-
duct Class mI gaming, the state still does not have jurisdiction to enforce its
gaming laws on tribal land absent a compact. 38
It is true that, under § 1166(a), all state Class HI gambling laws
"apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State." But in the same
breadth, Congress granted the United States exclusive jurisdiction
to enforce those state laws.
39
Although the states do not have jurisdiction to enforce their gaming laws
absent a compact, their laws remain applicable because the act also acknowl-
edges state interests.40 Therefore, before a tribe can conduct Class I gam-
ing, the requirements set forth in IGRA must be satisfied.4 1
31. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).
32. Id. § 2703(7)(B).
33. Id. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(1)-(II).
34. id. § 2710(b)(1)(A).
35. Id. § 2703(8).
36. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 289.
37. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d).
38. See Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 54 F.3d 535, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding the state did not have jurisdiction to prosecute a tribe for conducting gaming on a
reservation).
39. Id. at 541 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (2006)).
40. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5).
41. See id. § 2710(d)(1)(A)-(B).
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C. Obtaining Class III Gaming
Because Class III gaming is the most profitable, it is the most disputed
form of gaming, and invokes a delicate balance between the state's power to
regulate, and the tribe's sovereign rights.42 Therefore, IGRA specifies three
requirements for Class I gaming to lawfully be conducted on Indian land.4
First, the gaming must be authorized by the tribe pursuant to an ordinance or
resolution."4 Second, the state the tribe wishes to conduct gaming in must
permit "such gaming for any purpose, by any person organization, or enti-
ty."'45 Third, the state and the Indian tribe must enter into a compact which
permits the gaming activity. 46 These complex set of rules were "the result of
a congressional compromise between the demands of state and tribal gov-
ernments., 47 While each of these requirements present their own issues, the
compact process is particularly complex.48
1. Prohibited Versus Permitted
A tribe's right to seek Class III gaming is contingent on the activity be-
ing "conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and
public policy, prohibit such gaming activity. '49 A state has the power to pro-
hibit Class I gaming on Indian land, but only if the same restriction applies
everywhere in the state without an exception.50 Therefore, a tribe's right to
pursue Class Iml gaming depends on whether or not the gaming is prohibited
in the state.5'
When looking to enforce the state gaming laws on tribal land, the feder-
al government will apply the law "in the same manner and to the same extent
as such laws [would] apply elsewhere in the [s]tate. '52 When the federal
government determines what type of gambling is legal in the state, it must
decide whether the state prohibits Class I gaming. 53 While a state can pro-
42. See Rand, Pequots, supra note 23, at 52.
43. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
44. Id. § 2710(d)(l)(A).
45. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
46. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
47. Joe Laxague, Note, Indian Gaming and Tribal-State Negotiations: Who Should
Decide the Issue of Bad Faith?, 25 J. LEGIS. 77, 80 (1999).
48. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 289-90.
49. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5).
50. See LAC du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State, 770 F.
Supp. 480,484-85 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
51. See Rand, Tribal Influence, supra note 16, at 983.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (2006).
53. N. Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming, 389 F.3d 1308, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004).
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hibit certain forms of gaming, it does not have jurisdiction to regulate gam-
ing.54 Therefore, whether a state can prevent a tribe from conducting Class
III gaming turns on whether the state is prohibiting or regulating the particu-
lar gaming.55 Currently, federal courts dispute when a state crosses the line
of prohibiting Class I gaming and begins regulating Class EI gaming.56
Courts use two tests to determine whether a state permits Class I gam-
ing as defined by IGRA.57 The first test used to determine whether a state
prohibits or permits a particular type of gaming is the game-specific ap-
proach.58 Under this approach a state does not permit a type of gaming un-
less the "state allows a particular game for any purpose."59 The second test
used by courts is the categorical approach. 6° The categorical approach holds
that a state must permit all forms of Class III gaming, if any form of Class InI
gaming is permitted in the state. 6' Consequently, whether a state is consi-
dered to permit a particular type of gaming depends on the test adopted by
the court of the jurisdiction.62
One way a state can avoid being forced to negotiate a compact is by ar-
guing that the type of gaming the tribe is seeking violates the state's public
policy. 63 For example, in Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indiana v.
Wilson,64 an Indian tribe filed suit to force the state to negotiate a gaming
compact.65 At the time of suit, California did not permit "banked or percen-
tage card games" to be conducted.66 The court held that when a state does
not permit the type of gaming that the tribe is requesting, the tribe does not
have a right to engage in the illegal gaming.67 Therefore, the court held that
the state did not have to negotiate with the tribe to grant it a form of gaming
54. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A).
55. Id. § 2710(d).
56. N. Arapaho Tribe, 389 F.3d at 1310-11.
57. Id.
58. N. Aprapaho Tribe, 389 F.3d at 1311; see Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun In-
dians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th Cir. 1994).
59. N. Arapaho Tribe, 389 F.3d at 1311.
60. Id. (citing Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Conn., 913 F.2d 1024, 1031-32 (2d Cir.
1990) (adopting the categorical approach)).
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 292.
64. 64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994).
65. Id. at 1255.
66. Id. at 1256.
67. Id. at 1258.
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that was otherwise not permitted.68 However, in LAC du Flambeau Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State,69 an Indian tribe brought an action
to force the state to negotiate a gaming compact.7" The court held that be-
cause the state permits Class Ell gaming, it must negotiate a compact with the
tribe that would grant the tribe permission to conduct Class m gaming.71
The dividing line between these two cases can be drawn at each state's pub-
lic policy.72 In Rumsey, the state's public policy towards gaming was prohi-
bitory, thus the state did not have to negotiate a compact for Class I gam-
ing.73 However, in Lac du Flambeau Band, the state's policy against gaming
was regulatory, resulting in the state being forced to negotiate a compact.74
III. GAMING COMPACT
If the type of gaming the tribe seeks to conduct is authorized by the
tribe's governing body, and the state does not prohibit the type of gaming,
next the tribe must enter a compact with the state to obtain Class III gam-
ing.75 IGRA provides that a tribe cannot operate Class III gaming unless
specifically permitted by a tribal-state compact signed by the tribe and the
state where the Class Il gaming is being conducted. 76 A compact is a cove-
nant or agreement between states or governments.77 Under the United States
Constitution, a state cannot enter into a compact with another state or foreign
power.78 IGRA, however, eliminates this restriction by setting forth the con-
sent of Congress to all gaming compacts to be executed, contingent on feder-
al approval making them effective.79 IGRA's requirements that a tribe
reaches a compact with the state before it can conduct Class III gaming has
important ramifications by making "the tribes' sovereign right to conduct
gaming dependent on state consent., 8' Therefore, the Act prevents a tribe
68. See id. The state did not allow banked card games. Rumsey Indian Rancheria of
Wintun Indians, 64 F.3d at 1256. The state did not have to give the tribe a form of gaming
that others could not have. Id. at 1258.
69. 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
70. Id. at481.
71. Id. at 488.
72. See id.
73. See Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians, 64 F.3d at 1259.
74. See LAC du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 770 F. Supp. at
488.
75. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2006).
76. See id.
77. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 298 (8th ed. 2004).
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
79. See 25 U.S.C. § 27 10(d).
80. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 288.
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from conducting profitable Class I gaming, without first obtaining a com-
pact signed by the state. 8'
A. Compact Process
The importance of the tribal-state compact to Indian gaming is clear.
"The essential feature of the Act is the tribal-state compact process, the
means Congress devised to balance the states' interest in regulating high
stakes gambling within their borders and the Indians' resistance to state in-
trusions on their sovereignty. '82 The process a tribe must follow to negotiate
a compact under IGRA can be summarized as follows. First, the tribe must
request that the state negotiate a compact that would permit Class InI gam-
ing.83 Once a request to negotiate is made by the tribe, IGRA requires that
the state "negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a
compact." ' If an agreement is not reached within 180 days of the tribes re-
quest to negotiate a compact, the tribe is permitted to sue the state in federal
court by alleging the state did not negotiate in good faith.85 If the federal
court finds that the state did not act in good faith, the state will be ordered to
reach a compact with the tribe within sixty days.86 Upon the expiration of
the sixty-day negotiation period, if a compact has not been reached, the court
will appoint a mediator.87 Both the tribe and the state are required to submit
proposed compacts to the mediator.88 Next, the mediator will select one of
the proposed compacts. 89 Once a proposal is selected by the mediator, the
proposal is presented to each party and the state must consent to the proposed
compact within sixty days.90 Once the compact is submitted to the Depart-
ment of the Interior, the compact will be approved or disapproved within
81. Id. at 288-89.
82. LAC du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State, 770 F. Supp.
480, 481 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
83. Laxague, supra note 47, at 80. The tribal-state "process begins when the Indian tribe
requests that the state enter into negotiations for creating a tribal-state compact that will go-
vern the Class II gaming operations planned by the tribe." Id.
84. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
85. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B); Laxague, supra note 47, at 80 (explaining that bad faith can be
based on criminality, financial integrity, public safety, and "economic impact on existing
gaming" facilities).
86. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
87. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
88. Id.
89. Id. When selecting one of the proposed compacts the mediator will choose "the
one which best comports with the terms of [IGRA] and any other applicable Federal law and
with the findings and order of the court." Id.
90. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(v)-(vii).
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forty-five days.9' The remainder of part III evaluates the most common is-
sues which arise during the compact process.
I. Indian Land Requirement
Whether a tribe is able to pursue the compact process is dependent on
the status of the tribe's land.92 IGRA defines Indian land as land located
within an Indian reservation, land that is held in trust by the United States, or
held in trust by someone else who is restricted by the United States.93 Fur-
thermore, for a tribe to have the right to conduct gaming on its land, the land
must have become Indian land before October 17, 1988. 94 Without the requi-
site land, a tribe cannot utilize IGRA to obtain gaming rights and would have
to argue that it qualifies for an exception.95 If the tribe does not qualify under
an exception, the last method of obtaining the requisite land is through the
federal government, "if the Secretary of the Interior determines . . . it would
be in the best interest of the tribe, would not be detrimental to surrounding
communities, and that state and local officials [would] agree. '96 With states
reluctant to approve gaming being conducted off of an Indian reservation, a
tribe faces a difficult task if the land was not recognized before 1988. 97 Ad-
ditionally, "it is clear that the [s]tate does not have an obligation to negotiate
with an Indian tribe until the tribe has Indian lands. 98 Therefore, without
land satisfying the requirements of IGRA, the tribe cannot pursue the com-
pact process to obtain gaming rights.99
Further restricting a tribe's ability to seek gaming rights is the Court's
recent decision in Carcieri v. Salazar.1°° In this case, the Department of the
Interior accepted land in trust to be used by an Indian tribe.' °' The Governor
of Rhode Island brought suit to have the Department of the Interior's deci-
sion to take the land in trust reviewed. 02 The Court addressed 25 U.S.C. §
91. See id. § 2710(d)(8)(C). If no action is taken, "the compact shall be considered to
have been approved by the Secretary." Id.
92. Alan E. Brown, Note, Ace in the Hole: Land's Key Role in Indian Gaming, 39
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 159, 161 (2005).
93. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a) (2006).
94. Id.
95. See id. § 2719(a)-(b).
96. Brown, supra note 92, at 168.
97. Id. at 166-68.
98. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616,
618 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A)).
99. See id.
100. 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009).
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465, which allows the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (Secretary)
to accept land in "trust only for 'the purpose of providing land for In-
dians. ' , 0 3 The Court held "that the term 'now under Federal jurisdiction' in
§ 479 unambiguously refers to those tribes that were under the federal juris-
diction of the United States when the IRA was enacted in 1934."'1 4 Al-
though the ramifications of the recent decision remain unclear, it appears that
the decision will limit the power of the Secretary.'05 Further, less tribes will
have the opportunity to acquire the land necessary to obtain gaming rights as
the Secretary lacks "authority to acquire land for a tribe recognized and com-
ing under federal jurisdiction after 1934.' ' °6
2. Negotiation
Once a tribe shows they have land eligible to conduct Class Ell gaming
on, the tribe must negotiate with the state to reach a compact.10 7 Once the
tribe requests that the state negotiate a compact, IGRA specifies that "the
[s]tate shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter" such a
compact.'0 8 If the tribe believes that the state did not conduct negotiations in
good faith, IGRA grants the tribe the power to sue the state in federal
court."°9 To determine whether the state negotiated in good faith, the court
will evaluate "the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integri-
ty, and adverse economic impacts on existing gaming activities." 10 If the
Court concludes that the state acted in good faith, the compact process
ends."' However, if the court finds that the state "failed to negotiate in good
faith," the compact process continues." 2 This provision of IGRA was se-
verely limited by the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flori-
da (Seminole Tribe I1).113 Seminole Tribe If held when a state asserts the
Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity, the state cannot be sued by the
103. Id. at 1064 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 465).
104. Id. at 1068.
105. G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, The Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri "Fix": Updating the Trust Land Acquisition
Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 593-94 (2009).
106. Id.
107. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2006).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
110. ld. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(1).
111. See id. § 271 0(d)(7)(B)(iii).
112. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
113. 517 U.S. 44,44 (1996).
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tribe in federal court.' 14 The Court's ruling limited the power a tribe has to
engage in Class III gaming.' 5 Therefore, Seminole Tribe II left the negotia-
tion process procedure unclear.' 16 "One possibility is that there is a right but
no remedy: a tribe can seek a compact, but cannot sue the state if it refuses
to negotiate."'"
17
a. Authority to Negotiate
Although IGRA sets forth the requirements a state must follow to enter
a compact with an Indian tribe, and even requires that the state negotiate in
good faith, IGRA does not specify the role of state legislatures.'1 8 In the
absence of guidelines, the governors of most states have exercised the au-
thority to negotiate tribal-state compacts with Indian tribes." 9 Therefore, due
to the lack of federal guidelines, the authority to negotiate is determined by
state law.2 °
Some courts have held that the state's governor has the authority to ne-
gotiate a gaming compact.' 2' Dewberry v. Kulongoski122 is an example of a
state that grants the governor authority to negotiate a compact with a tribe. 23
In Dewberry, opponents of gambling challenged the validity of a compact
that was signed by the Governor. 124 The plaintiff claimed that the compact
was invalid because "neither the Oregon Constitution nor Oregon statute
delegate the authority to execute gaming compacts with Indian tribes, and
thus the [g]overnor is without the power to do so without legislative approv-
al.' 25 The court disagreed, however, and held that the Oregon Constitution
granted the Governor the authority to negotiate a gaming compact. 126
114. Id.at72.
115. Steven A. Light, Kathryn R.L. Rand, & Alan P. Meister, Spreading the Wealth:
Indian Gaming and Revenue-Sharing Agreements, 80 N.D. L. REV. 657, 665 (2004). "In the
wake of the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, a state effectively could prevent a tribe from
engaging in Class III gaming simply by refusing to negotiate a tribal-state compact." Id.
116. See id.
117. ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., GAMING LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 493 n.3 (2003).
118. Rand, Tribal Influence, supra note 16, at 981.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 982.
121. See Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 719 N.W.2d 408, 443-44 (Wis. 2006)
(Compact entered into by the governor was valid even though it increased the amount of gam-
bling allowed in the state.).
122. 406 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Or. 2005).
123. Id. at 1157.
124. Id. at 1138.
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In contrast, the majority of state courts have held that, although the gov-
ernor has the authority to negotiate a compact, the governor lacks the au-
thority to bind the state to the compact without legislative approval. 27 While
the holdings are not identical, challenges to the governor's authority have a
common theme--questions regarding the state's constitution. 128 In line with
these state court decisions, federal courts have also held that the governor
lacks the power to bind the state to a gaming compact. 129 For example, in
Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 30 the court held that the governor entering into
a compact solely by himself was not enough to make the compact valid.,
3 1
Further, because "the [g]overnor lacked the authority to bind the state...
[t]he compact[] [provisions] were therefore never validly 'entered into' by
the state and, as a result, do not comply with IGRA."'' 3 2 While all of these
cases do not have the same outcome, they share in common the procedure of
turning to the state's constitution to determine if the governor's action were
valid. 1
33
It should also be noted that if a member of a tribe had an issue with a
compact that was entered into between the state and their tribe, he or she
would likely have no recourse. 14 In Langley v. Edwards,135 the court held
that a tribe member could not challenge the validity of a compact entered
into by a tribe and state. 36 The court explained that the tribe members' "dis-
satisfaction is with the Tribe's decision to permit gaming on tribal lands and
should be properly resolved within the tribal governmental and court struc-
ture." 37 Similarly, in Willis v. Fordice,138 an Indian tribe member brought an
action to have a tribal-state compact declared void. 139 The court ruled that
127. See Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 609 (Fla. 2008) (discuss-
ing states that have followed the majority rule that a governor lacks the "authority to bind a
state to an IGRA compact .... ).
128. See Rand, Tribal Influence, supra note 16, at 982-83.
129. See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1559 (1 0th Cir. 1997).
130. Id. at 1546.
131. Id. at 1559.
132. Id.
133. See Rand, Tribal Influence, supra note 16, at 982-83.
134. See Langley v. Edwards, 872 F. Supp. 1531, 1536 (W.D. La. 1995).
135. Id. at 1531.
136. Id. at 1536.
137. Id.
138. 850 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
139. Id. at 524-25.
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the tribe member did not have standing to bring the action and held that the
compact was valid under both state and federal law. 4°
3. Approval by the Department of the Interior
If the state and the Indian tribe enter into a compact, it then must be ap-
proved by the Secretary of the Department of the Interior. 4' Therefore, even
if the state and the tribe negotiate a compact, it will not take effect until ap-
proved by the Secretary who "is authorized to approve any Tribal-State com-
pact entered into between an Indian tribe and a State government gaming on
Indian lands of such Indian tribe."' 4 2 When reviewing the compact, the Sec-
retary can disapprove it if the compact violates "the trust obligations of the
United States to Indians.' 14' This authority to disapprove the compact has
been used to place restrictions on the compact that the Secretary is willing to
approve.144
a. Exclusivity Requirement
The Department of the Interior has used its statutory authority to require
that a gaming compact grant the tribe exclusive gaming rights. 145 Citing the
federal governments trust responsibility, the Department stresses it will only
approve "compacts that provide substantial exclusivity for Indian gaming in
the state."'146 Because of this substantial exclusivity requirement, a compact
is much more likely to be approved if the tribe is permitted to conduct gam-
ing that is prohibited everywhere else in the state. 147 Therefore, the exclusiv-
ity requirement can be summarized as:
[T]he Tribes enjoy the exclusive "right to operate" so long as the
Tribes are the only persons or entities who have and can exercise
the "right to operate" electronic games of chance in the State or, in
140. Id. at 528-29, 534 (The compact was valid because Mississippi allowed legalized
gambling as a matter of public policy, the governor held the power to negotiate with the tribe,
and the compact was approved by the Secretary.).
141. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B)(2006).
142. Id. § 2710 (d)(8)(A); see also id. §2710 (d)(3)(B).
143. ld. § 2710 (d)(8)(B)(iii).
144. See Eric S. Lent, Note, Are States Beating the House?: The Validity of Tribal-State
Revenue Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 GEo. L.J. 451, 469 (2003).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Katie Eidson, Note, Will States Continue to Provide Exclusivity in Tribal Gaming
Compacts or Will Tribes Bust on the Hand of the State in Order to Expand Indian Gaming,
29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319, 328 (2005).
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other words, as long as all others are prohibited or shut out from
the "right to operate" such games.
148
An example of the exclusivity requirement is present in Artichoke Joe's
California Grand Casino v. Norton,149 where a card club brought an action
on equal protection grounds challenging the validity of tribal-state compacts,
which were approved by IGRA. 5° The plaintiffs were prohibited from en-
gaging in casino-style gaming, but the compacts provided the Indian tribes
with the exclusive right to engage in Class I1 gaming.' 5 ' Despite the Indians
being granted the exclusive right to conduct Class III gaming in the state, the
court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the compact constituted a mono-
poly. 15 2 Therefore, the court held that the tribal-state compact was valid un-
der IGRA, and the compact did not violate the Plaintiff's right of equal pro-
tection. 153
b. Power to Unilaterally Grant Gaming
In response to Seminole Tribe H, the Secretary proposed and had ap-
proved rules that would permit the creation of Class III gaming without the
state entering a compact with the tribe. 154 As a result of the rules, a tribe can
now obtain gaming rights in a state that does not approve of a compact.
151
"In sum, these regulations allow the Secretary to approve a gaming compact
after a suit is brought under IGRA and the state has asserted its Eleventh
Amendment right against suit in federal court."' 15 6 Although the Secretary
has been granted such power, it remains unclear whether or not granting this
power is valid. 15
7
There have only been a few judicial opinions which address the issue of
whether the Secretary of the Interior has the authority to grant the tribe Class
148. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 93 F. Supp. 2d 850, 852 (W.D.
Mich. 2000) (citation omitted).
149. 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 815 (2004).
150. Id. at 714. The plaintiffs challenged the compact which was entered into "[p]ursuant
to an amendment to the California Constitution that permits casino-style gaming only on
Indian lands." Id.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 739 ("[Wie are unpersuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that allowing Cali-
fornia to grant to tribes a monopoly on [C]lass III gaming operations, restricted to Indian
lands, necessarily will lead to Indian monopolies on other forms of economic activity.").
153. Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino, 353 F.3d at 742.
154. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703-10 (2006).
155. Lindner-Cornelius, supra note 18, at 693.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 686.
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III gaming without a tribal-state compact.' 58 Possible support of the Secre-
tary's power can be found in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (Seminole
/),,59 where the Eleventh Circuit stated the Secretary, after the state asserts
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the case is dismissed, and the Secretary is
notified of the failed negotiation, "then may prescribe regulations governing
[C]lass I gaming on the tribe's lands."'"
In Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington,1 6' the Secretary's power
was explicitly rejected when the court stated, "[t]he Eleventh Circuit's solu-
tion would turn the Secretary of the Interior into a federal czar, contrary to
the congressional aim of state participation."'' 62  The court supported its
statement by arguing that under IGRA, the Secretary of the Interior should
only be consulted after a mediator is appointed by the court to direct negotia-
tions between the state and the tribe.163 Even after the negotiations occur, the
Ninth Circuit explained, "the Secretary of the Interior under the statute is to
act only as a matter of last resort." ' 64 Similarly, in Texas v. United States, 165
the court held that the Secretary did not have the authority to proscribe Class
HII gaming when the state does not consent to being sued."6 Although it re-
mains unclear whether the Secretary's power to grant gaming rights to the
tribe without the state's consent is valid, the severity of the threat itself is
enough for it to be taken seriously by a state. 67
IV. FLORIDA GAMING HISTORY
Originally the State of Florida was exceedingly opposed to any form of
gambling. 68 However, over time this immense opposition was gradually
158. Laxague, supra note 47, at 83.
159. l1 F.3d 1016 (1 lth Cir. 1994), affd on other grounds, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
160. Seminole Tribe!, 11 F.3d at 1029 (dictum). See Seminole Tribe H, 517 U.S. 44, 76
n. 18 (1996) (The court did not address the issue of whether the Secretary had the power to
proscribe Class III gaming without a compact.).
161. 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994).
162. Id. at 997.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007).
166. Id. at 512.
167. See Neil Scott Cohen, Note, In What Often Appears to Be a Crapshoot Legislative
Process, Congress Throws Snake Eyes When It Enacts the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 277, 301 (2001).
168. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7. "Lotteries, other than the types of pari-mutuel pools
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reduced as more forms of gaming became permitted in the state. 69 In the
1930s Florida permitted legal betting which included betting on jai alai,
horse races, and dog races. 70 "Beginning in 1978, Florida voters thrice re-
jected constitutional amendments that would have forced the state to allow
casino gambling. But Florida's political leaders have allowed legal gambling
to gradually increase throughout the state anyway."' 7' The first cruise ship
offering day cruises for gamblers set sail in the early 1980s, and in 1986
Florida voters approved the creation of a state-run lottery. 72 In addition, in
2004, a voter's petition amended the Florida Constitution to allow Class Ill
slots in both Broward and Miami-Dade Counties.173
A. Seminole Gaming
The first controversy surrounding Seminole gaming in Florida began in
1979 when the Tribe opened a bingo hall facility on the Seminole Reserva-
tion in Broward County. 74 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth,175
the Seminole Tribe requested that the court "enjoin permanently the Sheriff
of Broward County from enforcing Florida's bingo statute on Indian land.'
176
The court ruled in favor of the Tribe, holding that because of the Tribe's so-
vereignty, its bingo hall could not be regulated by the state. 77 Shortly after
the Seminole Tribe's favorable ruling in Butterworth, Congress enacted
IGRA, which afforded tribes the right to negotiate a compact with the
state. 178 Despite the adoption of the IGRA, the Seminole Tribe has not been
successful in negotiating a compact with the State of Florida.
179
169. See Charlie Patton, State Eyes Gambling on Casinos the House and Senate Are Try-




173. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 23.
174. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 287. "In 1979, the Seminole Tribe of Florida opened
the first reservation-based bingo parlor." Id.
175. 491 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
176. Id. at 1016. The statute provided that bingo could not be conducted more than twice
a week and limited the amount of money that could be won. Id. at 1016 n.l.
177. Id. at 1020.
178. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2006).
179. See Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008).
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The negotiation of a gaming compact often becomes a political affair,
and the State of Florida is no exception to this trend. 8° After the Seminole
Tribe's unsuccessful attempt to compel the State of Florida to negotiate a
compact, the Tribe continued to petition the Department of the Interior (De-
partment). 1 ' After several failed attempts, the Tribe convinced the Depart-
ment to take affirmative action in 2006, when the Department proclaimed
that if the State of Florida did not sign a compact with the Seminole Tribe
within sixty days, the Department would grant the Seminole Tribe Class MI
gaming. 82 However, the Seminole Tribe sued the Department after sixty
days had passed, because a compact was not reached and the Department
failed to initiate procedures allowing the Seminole Tribe to conduct Class I
gaming. 83 This suit prompted the Department to once again send a demand
to the State of Florida, and Governor Crist was advised to enter a compact.
184
November 15, 2007, was set as a deadline for the compact to be entered into
with the threat that if a compact was not reached, Class III gaming would be
granted to the Seminole Tribe unilaterally, and the state would miss its op-
portunity to share in the profits. 1
85
Seemingly compelled by the Department's threat, Governor Crist en-
tered into a compact with the Tribe. 8 6 To support his decision, "Crist argued
the deal was needed to ensure that Florida got a share of Indian gambling
revenues."'' 87 However, five days after Governor Crist signed the compact,
the Florida House of Representatives filed a petition that challenged the va-
lidity of the compact. 88 The petition challenged the "Governor's authority to
bind the [s]tate to the [C]ompact without legislative authorization or ratifica-
tion."'89 Despite the immediate challenge to the compact, it went into effect
on January 7, 2008, after it was approved by the Secretary.' 9°
180. See Rand, Pequots, supra note 23, at 52.




185. See Dara Kam, Fight Brewing over Feds' Vow to Expand Seminole Gambling, PALM
BEACH POST, Nov. 9, 2007, at A5. "Interior Department Assistant Secretary Carl Artman
has warned Crist that federal officials will establish Class 3 procedures for the Seminoles if a
compact is not signed by Nov. 15." Id.
186. See Crist, 999 So. 2d at 605-06.
187. Patton, supra note 169.
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The compact allowed Class I gaming to be conducted at seven casinos
in the State of Florida within the following counties: Okeechobee, Coconut
Creek, Clewiston, Immokalee, Tampa, and two in Hollywood. 91 The Class
III gaming that the Tribe was authorized to offer included: slot machines,
banked card games, high-stake poker games, and any other gaming autho-
rized in the State of Florida.192 Because the compact allowed the Seminole
Tribe to conduct some Class III gaming, such as banked card games which
are prohibited under state law, the Tribe was given an exclusive gaming
right. 93 The Seminole Tribe was not the only party that benefited from the
compact though; the State of Florida was set to receive fifty million dollars
once the compact became effective. 94 In addition to that sum, during the
first twenty-four months of the compact's operation, the State of Florida
would receive an additional $175 million, $150 million for the third twelve
months of operation, and $100 million for each additional twelve-month
cycle.
195
2. Failure of First Compact
The Florida House of Representatives challenged the validity of the
compact by arguing that the Governor acted outside the scope of his authori-
ty.196 The House argued that the Legislature was granted all law-making
power under the Florida Constitution. 97 Like cases in other jurisdictions,
which addressed a claim that the governor did not have authority to negotiate
a compact, the Court looked to the constitution. 198 While turning to the Flor-
ida Constitution, the court evaluated whether the Governor's actions violated
the separation of powers doctrine. 99 Article 1H, section 3 of the Florida Con-
stitution provides that "[n]o person belonging to one branch shall exercise
any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly pro-
vided herein. ''200 In Florida, the separation of powers doctrine has been
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 606.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 613.
197. See Steve Huettel, Gambling Interests: Where to Draw the Line on Gaming, Money,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at Pl. Rubio sued Crist "charging the governor over-
stepped his authority signing the Seminole compact without legislative approval." Id.
198. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 610.
199. Id. at 610-11.
200. FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
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strictly construed, thereby favoring a finding of one branch of government
usurping another branch's powers.2"'
The House argued that the power to enter into a compact belongs to the
legislative branch because of residual power.2 2 The basis for the House's
argument is represented by a Supreme Court of Florida decision where the
Court held, "[t]he legislative branch looks to the [c]onstitution not for
sources of power but for limitations upon power., 23 Consequently, its ar-
gument was that the legislature should receive a power when it is unclear
which branch of government it belongs to.2°4 By contrast, the Governor's
argument was based on article IW, section 1 of the Florida Constitution.2 5
Article IV, section 1 of the Florida Constitution grants the Governor the
",206power to "transact all necessary business with the officers of government.
Using this language, the Governor argued that he held the power to enter
negotiations with the Indian Tribe, and thereby enter into a compact.2 7
After reviewing both the House's and the Governor's arguments, the
Supreme Court of Florida determined that the Governor's actions violated
the separation of powers doctrine.20 8 The Court found that the Governor
exceeded his power by permitting Class III gaming, an act that was illegal in
the state.209 "The Governor does not have authority to agree to legalize in
some parts of the state, or for some persons, conduct that is otherwise illegal
throughout the state., 2 °10 The House relied on IGRA's requirement that for a
tribe to enter into a compact, the gaming must be "conducted within a State
which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such
gaming activity." 21 The Court cited cases which followed the categorical
approach, and determined that allowing some forms of Class Il gaming does
not mean that all forms are permitted.212 The Court stated that both the Sec-
retary's and federal courts' interpretations support the House's argument,
which followed the categorical approach to determine whether a particular
201. See Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 329 (Fla. 2004).
202. See Michael C. Bender, Rubio Seeks Halt to Crist-Seminoles Deal, PALM BEACH
POST, Nov. 20, 2007, at A4.
203. See State ex rel. Green v. Pearson, 14 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. 1943).
204. See id.
205. Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 612 (Fla. 2008).
206. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
207. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 612.
208. Id. at 613.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 25 U.S.C § 2701(5) (2006); see Crist, 999 So. 2d at 614-15.
212. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 615.
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form of gaming is prohibited by law.213 Therefore, because the compact au-
thorized a prohibited form of gaming, the Court held that the compact was a
violation of Florida law.2 14
The Supreme Court of Florida's decision represents the complex history
of Seminole gaming in Florida, as the negotiations that have been taking
place in some form or another since 1991 were again put to a halt.2 15 How-
ever, despite the Supreme Court of Florida's holding, not much has changed
for the Seminole Tribe as it continues to conduct business as though the
compact is valid. 16
B. Senate Bill 788
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled the first compact entered into be-
tween Governor Crist and the Seminole Tribe invalid on July 3, 2008.217 By
the next legislative session, in 2009, the framework for a new compact was
drafted by both the Florida House of Representatives and the Florida Se-
nate. 18 The House bill was drafted to make minor changes, and would re-
quire the Seminoles to stop offering games such as blackjack, but allow them
to continue to offer Las Vegas-style slot machines.219 Contrary to the House
bill, the Senate bill significantly increases the amount of gaming, by granting
the Seminole Tribe extensive Class I gaming including roulette, craps, slot
machines, blackjack, and other banked card games, in return for at least four
hundred million dollars annually through extensive revenue-sharing provi-
sions.221 In an effort likely to increase support from both parties, as well as
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Linda Kleindienst, State High Court Asked to Decide on Compact Legislators
Challenge Crist's Agreement with Seminoles, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 31, 2008, at B3.
216. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Seminole Indian Compact Review, HB 7129 (2009) Staff
Analysis 6 (Apr. 10, 2009) (on file with comm.), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/
Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=pcb0 I.SICR.doc&DocumentType=Analysis&
Committeeld=2527&Session=2009 [hereinafter HB 7129 Staff Analysis].
The Seminole Tribe was able to begin offering Class IlI slots and banked card games at several
of its locations in Florida .... The Tribe has been making revenue sharing payments to the
state consistent with their position the now-voided Compact is still valid. To date, the Tribe
has paid $100 million to the State. The Legislature has not appropriated those funds.
Id. at 5-6.
217. Id. at I.
218. See id.; Fla. S. Comm. on Regulated Indus., SB 788 (2009) Staff Analysis I (Apr. 9,
2009) (on file with comm.), available at http:llwww.flsenate.govldatalsessionl2009/Senatel
bills/analysis/pdf/2009s0788.wpsc.pdf [hereinafter SB 788 Staff Analysis].
219. See HB 7129 Staff Analysis, supra note 216, at ].
220. SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 218, at 1-2.
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the public at large, the bill mandates that all revenue payments given to the
state must be deposited in the Educational Enhancement Trust Fund.221
Florida's gradual approval of gambling came full circle when law mak-
ers approved Senate Bill 788 on May 8, 2009.222 One fan of the bill was
Governor Crist, who "thanked lawmakers for their vigilance in finding com-
mon ground. 223 Another initial fan was the Seminole Tribe who stated, the
Florida Legislature took a crucial step towards ending the nineteen years of
waiting for Las Vegas-style gambling. 224 In line with the history of the rela-
tionship between the Seminole Tribe of Florida and lawmakers, the initial
positive outlook for Senate Bill 788 quickly turned to similar talks of litiga-
tion that existed during the previous compact attempt.225 Faced with a dead-
line of August 31, 2009 to sign the compact with the Seminoles, the question
remains whether Senate Bill 788 should satisfy the procedures set forth by
226the compact process.
1. Applying the Compact Requirements to Senate Bill 788
Unlike the federal government, "Florida has no statutory framework for
establishing gaming compacts with Indian tribes." 227 Therefore, determining
whether Senate Bill 788 should satisfy the compact process requires applying
IGRA and the relevant case law discussed thus far. Furthermore, by compar-
ing the failed compact of 2008 with Senate Bill 788, the chance of success
for the new bill can be forecasted.
a. Indian Land Requirement
Before a tribe can benefit from the rights set forth in IGRA, and ulti-
mately engage in compact negotiations with the state, the tribe must have the
requisite land.228 Generally, the tribe must have acquired the land before
1988, the year IGRA was enacted, to become eligible to begin the Class III
gaming negotiation process. 229 However, a recent United States SupremeCourt decision appears to have changed this, increasing the difficulty in sa-
221. See id. at 2.
222. Klas, supra note 1. "The Senate voted, 31-9, for the bill (SB 788). In the more anti-
gambling House, the vote was 82-35." Id.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See Kam, Gaming Deal, supra note 4.
226. See id.
227. HB 7129 Staff Analysis, supra note 216, at 1.
228. See Brown, supra note 92, at 161.
229. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a) (2006).
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tisfying the land requirement, by holding that a tribe must have had the land
in its possession in 1934 in order to be eligible to conduct Class EI1 gam-
ing. 23  Fortunately, the Seminole Tribe "is a federally recognized Indian
tribe whose reservations and trust lands are located in the State" of Flori-
da. 23' Therefore, the Seminole Tribe appears to be unaffected by Carcieri,
and will likely be able to continue the negotiation process with the State of
Florida to acquire Class III gaming rights.232
b. Negotiation Process
IGRA does not specify who may represent the state when negotiating a
compact with a tribe. 33 Therefore, "[w]ithout prescribed authority in IGRA,
the state legislature's role in the compacting process is left to state law,
which may require legislative approval before a tribal-state compact takes
effect, or may relegate the legislature to political criticism or support of the
,,234meCutoFlrdmaeigovernor's compact negotiations. The Supreme Court of Florida made it
clear that the Governor does not have the authority to execute a compact that
authorizes gambling that is illegal.235
Senate Bill 788 allows the Seminole Tribe to conduct types of Class I
gaming, which is otherwise illegal in the state.236 Furthermore, Florida fol-
lows the game-specific approach, which "requires courts to review whether
state law permits the specific game at issue.''237 Under the game-specific
approach, the fact that certain types of Class II games are permitted in the
state, such as in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, is not determinative.238
Further, this approach holds that because the compact grants some form of
Class I gaming that is illegal in the state, the bill authorizes illegal Class HI
gaming.239 This means that under the holding of Crist, the Governor cannot
execute Senate Bill 788 without "the Legislature's prior authorization or, at
least, its subsequent ratification.'
230. See Rice, supra note 105, at 593-94; Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1068
(2009).
231. Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 605 (Fla. 2008).
232. See id.
233. See Rand, Tribal Influence, supra note 16, at 981.
234. Id. at 982.
235. Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008).
236. SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 217, at 1.
237. N. Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming, 389 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Coeur
d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 842 F. Supp. 1268, 1278 (D. Idaho 1994)).
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 616.
2009]
318
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss1/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Fortunately for the success of Senate Bill 788, it implements the holding
in Crist.24' Anticipating the same problem faced by the previous compact
the Legislature drafted a bill which:
authorizes the [glovernor to execute an agreement on behalf of the
state with the Indian tribes for the purpose of negotiating agree-
ments to develop and implement a fair and workable arrangement
regarding the application of state taxes on persons and transactions
on Indian Lands. It requires that such an agreement must be ap-
proved or ratified by the Legislature.
242
If followed, this provision of Senate Bill 788 will avoid the issues that
were fatal to the previous compact.243 This is because requiring Governor
Crist to have the bill ratified, if any changes are made, avoids violating the
separation of powers. 244 Although Senate Bill 788 was drafted to avoid the
compact from being held invalid due to lack of authority, the authority of
Governor Crist to negotiate "expires at the end of the day on August 31,
2009.",245 Therefore, if one issue arises in the compact process, it could be
detrimental to Senate Bill 788.246
c. Approval by the Department of the Interior
Before a tribal-state compact granting Class III rights becomes effec-
tive, it must be approved by the Department of the Interior.247 The Depart-
ment of the Interior has made clear its decision to only approve of compacts
that grant the Indian tribes substantially exclusive gaming rights.248 Rights
are deemed substantially exclusive when the tribe receives "the exclusive
authorization to operate Class MI gaming within the state's territory., 249
Therefore, before Senate Bill 788 can become effective, the Department of
the Interior must approve the compact.250 Additionally, the bill will not be
241. See SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 217, at 2.
242. Id.
243. See Crist, 999 So. 2d at 616.
244. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3. "The powers of the state government shall be divided
into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall
exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided
herein." Id.
245. SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 218, at 11.
246. See id.
247. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B) (2006).
248. See Lent, supra note 144, at 469.
249. Eidson, supra note 147, at 328.
250. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B).
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approved unless the Seminole Tribe is given substantially exclusive gaming
rights in the State of Florida.25'
Senate Bill 788 "provides the Tribe with partial but substantial exclusiv-
ity consistent with the goals of IGRA. Payments to the state will cease if any
Class I1 gaming is authorized in any area of the state, except Miami-Dade
and Broward Counties, that is not presently authorized. 252 This language
makes it apparent that the Florida Legislature contemplated the substantial
exclusivity requirement of IGRA.253 However, when the standard is applied
to the gaming granted to the Seminole Tribe, it seems likely that the Depart-
ment of the Interior will not consider the requirement to be satisfied.
Under the substantial exclusivity requirement, the State of Florida must
grant the Seminole Tribe the exclusive right to conduct a type of Class HI
gaming.254 However, Senate Bill 788 authorizes the tribe to conduct Class
III gaming, which is currently permitted in Miami-Dade and Broward Coun-
255ties.  Since the Seminole Tribe has a valid argument that it is not given
exclusive gaming rights, this step in the compact process is likely to lead to
difficulties in the negotiation. In fact, the lack of exclusivity in Senate Bill
25788 has already been an issue in the negotiation process. 56 Barry Richard,
the Seminole Tribe's attorney said, "[t]he legislature's proposal 'significantly
impairs the guarantee of exclusivity' and thus the profits that the tribe could
earn."2 57 Because of the issue with Senate Bill 788 not satisfying the sub-
stantial exclusivity requirement, as required by the federal government, there
could be more delay in the negotiation process, which ultimately could result
in a deal not being reached by the August 31, 2009 deadline.258
Whether the Department of Interior can unilaterally grant gaming rights
to a tribe without the state's consent is an issue which has not been resolved
in Florida.25 9 Despite the Department of the Interior successfully having
procedures passed that allow the unilateral granting of gaming rights to a
tribe, the validity of this power remains unclear.260 However, because of the
great loss a state could suffer, threats from the Department of the Interior
should be taken seriously.26' Similar to the previous compact, threats have
251. See Eidson, supra note 147, at 328; Lent, supra note 144, at 469.
252. SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 218, at 5.
253. See id.
254. See Eidson, supra note 147, at 328.
255. See SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 218, at 5.
256. Kam, Gaming Deal, supra note 4.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. See SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 217, at 8-9.
260. See generally Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007).
261. See Cohen, supra note 167, at 301.
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been made regarding the completion of Senate Bill 788.262 Once again,
while trying to negotiate the compact, Governor Crist is simultaneously be-
ing told by the Department of the Interior that the state's failure to act would
result in the federal government granting the Seminole Tribe gaming
rights.263 Reminiscent of the prior compact, it appears Governor Crist will be
forced to make "a 'battlefield decision' by negotiating the compact, knowing
that if he" does not act, the United States Department of Interior may allow
Class Ell gaming "at the tribal casinos anyway and Florida [will not get] a
dime from the deal."
V. CONCLUSION
When Senate Bill 788 was first signed in May 8, 2009, it appeared as
though the Seminole Tribe's seventeen years of negotiation attempts would
finally be successful. However, with less than a month before the August 31,
2009 deadline, it seems the State of Florida and the Seminole Tribe will be
unable to satisfy the complex compact process. The Florida Legislature
clearly drafted Senate Bill 788 to account for the failures of the previous
compact as addressed by the Supreme Court of Florida.265 However, the
Florida Legislature overlooked the significance of the substantial exclusivity
requirement imposed by the Department of the Interior. Considering the
potential for a loss of billions of dollars that could benefit the Educational
Enhancement Trust Fund of Florida, both Governor Crist and the Florida
Legislature should plan accordingly. Although this may require offering
more gaming rights to the Seminole Tribe, giving the Department of the Inte-
rior the chance to unilaterally issue procedures may be too much of a gam-
ble.
262. Kam, Gaming Deal, supra note 4.
263. See id.
264. Kleindienst, supra note 215.
265. See Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008).
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It is widely accepted that drugs lead to crime. Many crimes are drug-
motivated, even when the crime itself has nothing to do with drugs, because
the defendant either needs money for drugs or is in an altered state due to his
or her drug use or addiction.1 Furthermore, an increasing amount of crimes
occur because of the drug addict's continuous need for drug money that is
required to keep his or her body functioning.2 In Florida, drug offenders
account for more than twenty-nine percent of the total prison population3 and
cost Florida's taxpayers $20,108 a year per offender in order to provide
health treatment, educational services, and supervision while in prison.4 In a
struggling economy, prison alternatives, such as drug court and drug offend-
er probation, look more and more pleasing to the eye of legislators, especial-
ly in Florida where drug courts thrive.5 Such prison alternatives save money
in two ways: First, the state avoids sending another person to prison; second,
the low rate of recidivism indicates that successful completion of these pro-
grams prevents future crime and incarceration.6
Florida continued its efforts to rehabilitate rather than incarcerate drug
offenders when, on May 27, 2009, Governor Charlie Crist signed Senate Bill
1726 into law.7  The act amends various statutes, including section
921.0026(3) of Florida Statutes, which formerly read that a defendant's drug
addiction or dependency could not, under any circumstances, be a valid rea-
I. See OFFICE OF DRUG CONTROL, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, FLORIDA'S
DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 39 (2009), available at http://www.flgov.com/drugcontrol/pdfs/
DRUGCONTROLSTRATEGY.pdf [hereinafter FLORIDA'S DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY]. The
report further states that over "the past decade, the single largest category of prison admissions
has been drug offenders." Id. at 41.
2. See JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN Do
ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 29 (2001).
3. See 2007-2008 FLA. DEP'T OF CORR. ANN. REP. 33, available at http://www.dc.state.
fl.us/pub/annual/0708/pdfs/AnnualReportO708.pdf.
4. Id. at 16.
5. See FLORIDA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT-BASED DRUG COURTS,
REPORT ON FLORIDA'S DRUG COURTS 5 (2004), available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen-
public/family/drug-court/bin/taskforcereport.pdf [hereinafter REPORT ON FLORIDA'S DRUG
COURTS].
6. Id. at 11.
7. Act effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws 585 (codified as amended in
FLA. STAT. §§ 397.334, 921.0026, 948.06, .08, .16, .20, 985.345). While this bill is now cur-
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son for a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. 8 Therefore, if
an offender scored mandatory prison time, a judge was not permitted to con-
sider drug abuse or addiction and send the offender to drug court or drug
offender probation instead, even if the judge believed prison was not the best
answer for the offender.9 However, chapter 2009-64,Florida Laws, states
that a judge may now consider the defendant's substance abuse as a mitigat-
ing factor and depart from the minimum sentence accordingly, giving judges
more discretion in allowing those who require rehabilitation, rather than im-
prisonment, get the personalized attention they need. 10 The new law also
made changes to the qualifications of drug offender probation and postadju-
dicatory treatment-based drug court programs by adding that an offender
need not have been charged with possession or purchase of a controlled sub-
stance alone in order to qualify for drug offender probation or drug court.1
While the act clearly made strides in expanding judicial discretion over sen-
tencing, there are still certain parts of the amended laws which continue to
place undeserving addicts in jail rather than treatment centers.' 2
This article will discuss Florida's previous limitations on the court's
ability to sentence drug addicts to probation or treatment programs and how
Senate Bill 1726's amendments expanded judicial discretion in this area.
Part II provides background history on the drug war and the effects Nixon's
statement had on the courts' and lawmakers' approach to drug offenders and
addicts. Part II also discusses the two main problems with sentencing guide-
lines: mandatory minimums and downward departures. Part Il's case anal-
ysis sheds light on the problems with the statutes prior to the amendments. It
explains how Florida courts interpreted the statutes and how the statutes
treated defendants who were chronic drug abusers or had a history of drug
problems. The purpose of this section is to highlight the importance of the
new amendments. Part IV begins with an in-depth look at the effects that the
new law has on the statutes in place. Furthermore, Part IV explains the pur-
pose and requirements of drug courts, downward departures, and drug of-
fender probation. Part IV ends with a cultural and social look on the need for
a change and how society's view of drug addicts influences the legislature.
8. FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(3) (2008).
9. Id.; see Aaron M. Clemens & Hale R. Stancil, Unhandcuffing Justice: Proposals to
Return Rationality to Criminal Sentencing, 83 FLA. B.J. 54, 56 (Feb. 2009).
10. Ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws at 580 (reading that a departure based on a defendant's
substance abuse or addiction is permitted when the "defendant's offense is a nonviolent felony
... and the court determines that the defendant is amenable to the services of a postadjudica-
tory treatment-based drug court program").
11. See id. at 583.
12. Id. at 580-81, 583 (stating that in order to qualify for drug offender probation, the
defendant must not score over fifty-two points on the state scoresheet).
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Part V applies the new amendments to the cases discussed in Part III in order
to show how the changes will affect future defendants. Part VI asks if the
amendments are good enough to solve the problem of sending drug addicts
to jail rather than treatment centers. Finally, Part VII concludes this article.
II. THE COURT AND THE DRUG WAR
A. The "War on Drugs" and Mandatory Minimums
In 1971, President Nixon declared war on drugs and named drug abuse
"'public enemy number one in the United States.'"' 3 Eleven years later, citi-
zens in Miami lobbied the White House for help with the city's escalating
drug crisis. 4 President Reagan responded by creating the Vice President's
Task Force of South Florida, which was headed by then-Vice President
George Bush. 15 The Task Force combined efforts from different agencies,
such as the DEA and FBI, in order to guard against the increasing amount of
drug trafficking in the city.16 It was created in response to both Nixon's re-
marks and the increasing attention to the drug crisis in America. 17 In 1983,
the war on drugs thrived under Reagan's presidency and took a different
turn, focusing on the effects drugs were having on the workforce in Ameri-
ca.18 Florida followed suit in July 1983, when state troopers began surveil-
lance on the Florida Turnpike, "pull[ing] over and arrest[ing] sixty-four
people for drug-trafficking charges, four times as many as the month be-
fore."'9 The influx was a direct result of the new "drug courier profiles" used
by the Florida State Police which "included such characteristics as 'scrupul-
ous obedience to traffic laws,' 'wearing lots of gold,' and . . . 'ethnic groups
associated with the drug trade."' 20 The stops made by Florida State Police
also consisted of "circl[ing] the car with a drug-sniffing dog."'21 Of course,
13. Frontline: Drug Wars, Thirty Years of America's Drug War (PBS television broad-






18. DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF
FAILURE 187 (1996).
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the only reason for the increased vigilance of Florida's roads was Reagan's
aggressive war on drugs.22
Not surprisingly, United States legislators responded by proposing
mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes in accordance with the con-
tinuing war on drugs.23 It follows that, though the number of violent offend-
ers in the nation's prisons "has doubled since 1980, the number of drug pris-
oners has increased sevenfold. ' 24 Also, Florida currently enforces mandatory
minimum sentences for a variety of drug-related crimes, such as trafficking
or possession of large amounts of cannabis, cocaine, oxycodone, hydroco-
done, methamphetamine and others. 25  These statutes only concern them-
selves with the weight and the type of drug possessed or sold and do not take
into account any previous offenses.26 Other states, such as New York, have
similar harsh statutes.27 However, earlier this year, New York made strides
to eliminate "mandatory minimum sentences for first-time, nonviolent drug
offenders. 28 The Rockefeller Drug Laws were originally created in response
to the drug war declared in the 1970s and have not been changed since. 9
Lawrence Cipolione, Jr. provided a startling example of the effects of the
Rockefeller Drug Laws when he was "sentence[d] [to] fifteen years to life
for selling 2.34 ounces of cocaine to an undercover officer. Meanwhile, in
the same prison, Amy Fisher was to be released after serving only four years
and ten months for shooting a woman in the head. '30 The proposed reform in
New York would allow judges broader discretion over sentencing, "would
allow some among a group of 1500 prisoners to apply for release, if they are
nonviolent and have not been convicted of other crimes,' 3'3 and would curtail
harsh and inequitable sentences, like that handed down to Anthony Papa, a
twenty-six year old who was sentenced to fifteen years in prison in 1985 for
carrying an envelope which contained 4.5 ounces of cocaine.
32
22. See id.
23. Christopher Mascharka, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Exemplifying
the Law of Unintended Consequences, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 935, 936 n.3 (2001).
24. GRAY, supra note 2, at 29.
25. See Mascharka, supra note 23, at 937-38; FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (2008) (stating that
most drug trafficking violations carry a mandatory minimum sentence between three and
fifteen years).
26. See FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (2008).
27. Mascharka, supra note 23, at 937.
28. Keith B. Richburg, N. Y. Governor, Lawmakers Agree to Soften Drug Sentencing
Laws, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2009, at A2.
29. See id.
30. GRAY, supra note 2, at 32.
31. Richburg, supra note 28.
32. See id. The trial judge in Papa's case claimed he was "'handcuffed because of the
law"' and was forced to sentence Papa to prison, though the judge felt that he deserved proba-
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A downward departure occurs when a court imposes "a sentence more
lenient than the standard guidelines propose, as when the court concludes
that a criminal's history is less serious than it appears. 33  In Florida, a
downward departure from the lowest sentence, or mandatory minimum, a
defendant scores' is only permissible under certain "reasonably justified"
mitigating circumstances.35 After giving instances where a court would be
allowed to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence, the previous ver-
sion of the statute warned that under no circumstances should a defendant's
addiction to or abuse of drugs be considered cause to provide for a more le-
nient sentence, one which could include drug abuse treatment or drug of-
fender probation.36 While the statute left some room for interpretation,37 the
Legislature made sure that subsection (5) could not be left to the judge's dis-
cretion, as it singled out the one ground which can never be a "reasonably
justified" reason for departure. 38  Conversely, a judge had-and still has-
much more discretion to give a person more time in prison, even if the de-
fendant does not score prison time.3 9 For example, a judge may sentence a
person up to the maximum allowed by statute consecutively or concurrently,
tion as it was Papa's first offense. Id. Papa was eventually released early by Governor Pataki
after serving twelve years. Id.
33. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 502 (9th ed. 2009).
34. A defendant's score is based upon a scoresheet created by the legislature for the State
Attorney's use. See FLA. STAT. § 921.0014(I)(a) (2008). The scoresheet ranks crimes from
one to ten and allots points for each category of crime. FLA. STAT. § 921.0014(l)(b). Fur-
thermore, the scoresheet takes into account the defendant's prior crimes, primary offense for
the current charge, as well as additional offenses for the current charge. Id. The score may
also increase if there is restitution or victim injury as a result of the crime. See id. For exam-
ple, if there is slight physical injury, the score is increased by four points per slight injury. See
id. In addition to these points, the statute also assesses points for prior serious felonies (thirty
points for a level eight, nine, or ten felony) and possession of a firearm (eighteen sentence
points). Id. The statute also calls for "sentence multipliers" which also increase the score
depending on the type of primary offense committed. FLA. STAT. § 921.0014(1)(b).
35. FLA. STAT. §§ 921.0026, .0016(4) (2008).
36. FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(3) (2008); see FLA. STAT. § 948.20 (2009) (discussing drug
offender probation).
37. FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(1) (2008) ("Mitigating factors to be considered include, but
are not limited to ....").
38. See Clemens & Stancil, supra note 9, at 56 (addressing FLA. STAT. § 921.0016(5)
(2008)).
39. See id. at 55; see FLA. STAT. § 921.0014(2) (2008) (stating that where a defendant
scores less than or equal to forty points-which means the defendant does not score mandato-
ry prison time-"the court, in its discretion, may increase the total sentence points by up to,
and including, 15 percent").
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giving the judge more leeway and more ability to make the sentence as harsh
as possible if he deems the defendant worthy. n° However, under the old ver-
sion, if an addicted defendant committed a crime which-taken together with
his previous offenses or taken alone-scored him mandatory prison time, the
judge could not, even if the judge thought it best, send the defendant to a
drug treatment program.4' These laws prohibiting downward departures,
based on the defendant's addiction, lead to such instances where a forty-five
year-old father of three received a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-
five years in prison for drug trafficking because he purchased 1200 pills of
prescription painkillers. While the Defendant was eventually pardoned by
Governor Charlie Crist, the fact still remains that a judge is severely limited
by current downward departure and mandatory minimum laws in Florida.
4 3
With the new amendments, however, such events will be less likely to
occur since the Legislature added paragraph m of subsection 2 to section
921.0026 of the Florida Statutes.44 In this amended version, the statute now
allows the judge to depart from the lowest permissible prison sentence so
long as the offense is a nonviolent felony and the court finds that the defen-
dant is amenable to the drug treatment services available through drug courts
or drug offender probation.45
I. CASE LAW UNDER THE PREVIOUS VERSIONS
OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES
The amendments proposed by Senate Bill 1726 affected a number of
Florida statutes, all of which reference sentencing options for drug offend-
ers. 46  These former versions of the statutes created difficulties for trial
judges who could not sentence a particular offender to treatment rather than
prison.47 Because all of these statutes relate to how a judge chooses to sen-
40. See Clemens & Stancil, supra note 9, at 55 (giving an example of a judge who sen-
tenced a defendant to ten years in state prison for "a felony habitual driving while license
revoked ... possessing a small amount of cocaine." The sentence for each charge was five
years and the judge decided to run the sentence consecutively rather than concurrently).
41. Seeid.at56.
42. Id. at 57.
43. Id. (noting that a pardon like this is rare. and that there are not enough pardons to
"prevent the number of injustices that trial court judges could if they had retained traditional
sentencing discretion").
44. See Act effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws 580 (codified as
amended in FLA. STAT. §§ 397.334, 921.0026, 948.06, .08, .16, .20, 984.345).
45. Id. at 583.
46. CS for SB 1726, § 2, 2009 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009) (first engrossed).
47. See State v. Crews, 884 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that
the trial judge's only reason for giving the defendant probation, when the defendant scored
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tence drug offenders, judges must be careful to "'give full effect to all statu-
tory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with
one another.' ' 48 For this reason, the following cases point to these specific
statutes and indicate ways in which the courts decided to interpret them to-
gether. Furthermore, these cases illustrate the problems posed by former
subsection 3 of section 921.0026 of Florida Statutes, as well as the former
versions of sections 948.20 and 948.01.
A. Jones v. State
The Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Jones v. State 9 highlights
the positive effects of drug offender probation and other treatment-based
drug programs for offenders.5 ° However, the case is also proof that the court
splits in its interpretation of statutes concerning the sentencing guidelines for
drug offenders, as Jones was decided by a four-to-three majority, with the
Chief Justice at the time, Justice Wells, dissenting. 5' The case revolves
around an appeal from a defendant who was denied a downward departure
by the appellate court. 2 The defendant, a chronic drug abuser, was charged
with possession of crack cocaine.53 The Supreme Court of Florida reversed
the appellate court's ruling, finding that section 948.01(13) of the Florida
Statutes allowed the judge the discretion to "place the defendant on drug
offender probation [if] the defendant is a chronic [drug] abuser whose crimi-
nal conduct is in violation of chapter 893" of the Florida Statutes dealing
with drug crimes.54 The Court noted that the plain language of the statute
indicated that the legislature meant section 948.01(13) as "an alternative sen-
mandatory prison time, was because of the defendant's drug addiction. However, noting that
the statutes did not allow such a reason to be valid for the purposes of departures, the appellate
court overruled the trial court's sentencing).
48. State v. Langdon, 978 So. 2d 263, 264 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting For-
sythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).
49. 813 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2002).
50. See id. at 25-26.
51. Id. at 27 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 24 (majority opinion).
53. Id. at 23.
54. Jones, 813 So. 2d at 24. When Jones was decided in 2002, section 948.01 included
subsection 13, which concerned itself with drug offender probation. See Fla. Stat. §
948.01(13) (2002). However, in 2004, the Legislature renamed subsection 13 to section
948.20, and titled it "Drug Offender Probation." See FLA. STAT. § 948.20 (2009). In the new
section 948.20, a defendant may only qualify for drug offender probation if he or she violated
section 893.13(2)(a)-prohibiting the purchase of certain controlled substances--or section
893.13(6)(a)-prohibiting the possession of certain controlled substances. See State v. Roper,
915 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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tencing scheme for drug abusers that is outside the sentencing guidelines. 55
By implementing statutes such as section 948.01(13), the legislative intent
clearly supported policy favoring treatment over incarceration and the impor-
tance of "breaking the revolving door cycle of drugs and crime. 5 6 In his
dissent, Chief Justice Wells focused on section 921.0026(3) of the Florida
Statutes and its explicit bar on downward departures based on the defen-
dant's drug addiction.57 Wells argued "that the majority fail[ed] to recognize
and follow . . .existing precedent in which this Court made clear that sen-
tencing alternatives [such as drug offender probation] should not be used to
thwart sentencing guidelines. 5 8 The majority and minority opinions speak
to the difficulty present in determining legislative intent and interpreting
seemingly conflicting statutes regarding the appropriate sentencing of drug
abusers.59
B. State v. Crews
In State v. Crews,6 ° the defendant was charged and convicted of delivery
of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, which carried a mandatory minimum
sentence of three years in state prison, as well as one charge of possession of
cocaine. 61 However, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 18 months
imprisonment for the first charge, followed by 18 months of probation for the
second charge.62 While "section 893.13(l)(c)(1) provides that a person who
commits the crime of delivering cocaine within 1000 feet of a school 'must
be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 3 calendar years,"' the
trial court judge departed from the minimum sentence because of the defen-
dant's drug addiction.63 In this case, the appellate court focused on the appli-
cation of section 948.01 of the Florida Statutes to the defendant's circums-
tances.64 Section 948.01 states that a court may place a defendant on proba-
tion if the defendant is "not likely again to engage in a criminal course of
conduct and that the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require
55. Jones, 813 So. 2d at 24.
56. Id. at 27 n.5.
57. Id. at 28 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. See generally id.
60. 884 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
61. Id. at 1140.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 893.13(l)(c)(1) (2009)). "'The only reason I can give [the
departure] is the drug addiction."' Id.
64. Crews, 884 So. 2d at i 141-42.
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that the defendant presently suffer the penalty imposed by law . '...,5 The
appellate court found that the statute "appear[ed] to apply broadly to permit a
judge to withhold a sentence and impose a term of probation in lieu of impri-
sonment;" however, such an interpretation had been barred by the Supreme
Court of Florida.66 Basing its interpretation of the application of section
948.01 on previous rulings, the appellate court found that, since section
893.13(l)(c)(1) was enacted after section 948.01, the trial court was prohi-
bited from sentencing the defendant to probation despite his addiction.67 The
appellate court also noted that issuing probationary sentences when the sco-
resheet called for a minimum term of imprisonment was considered a down-
ward departure.68 The court finally noted that the trial court was further
barred from its downward departure due to section 921.0026(3) of the Flori-
da Statutes, which states that a defendant's addiction can never be consi-
dered as a valid reason for departure and reversed the trial court's ruling.69
C. State v. Roper
In State v. Roper,7 ° the appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling,
sentencing the Defendant to drug offender probation for five years-though
he scored a mandatory 17.925 months in state prison-because the trial court
found the Defendant to be a chronic drug user.71 In its analysis, the appellate
court noted that the Defendant wrongfully relied on the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision in Jones because that court concerned itself with the pre-
vious version of the drug offender statute.72 Because the new version of the
drug offender statute did not include the Defendant's offense of delivery and
possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, the trial court erred
65. Id. at 1141 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 948.01 (2008)).
66. Id. at 1141-42.
In McKendry, the [Siupreme [Clourt [of Florida] ... noted "accepted rules of statutory con-
struction" that "a specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a sta-
tute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms" and "when two statutes are in
conflict, the later promulgated statute should prevail as the last expression of legislative in-
tent."
Id. at 1142 (quoting McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994)).
67. Id. at 1143.
68. Crews, 884 So. 2d at 1143 (citing State v. VanBebber, 848 So. 2d 1046, 1053 (Fla.
2003) (per curiam); State v. Scott, 879 So. 2d 99, 100 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Brannum, 876 So. 2d 724, 725 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
69. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(3) (2002) (amended by Act effective July 1, 2009, ch.
2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws i, I (codified as amended in FLA. STAT. §§ 397.334, 921.0026,
948.06, .08,.16, .20, 985.345)).
70. 915 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
71. Id. at 623.
72. Id. at 624.
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when it sentenced the Defendant to drug offender probation.73 Though the
court realized that the Defendant was a good candidate for drug offender
probation given his addiction to drugs, the appellate court noted that the trial
court had no authority to depart from the mandatory minimum without a
valid reason.74 Unfortunately, though, there was a better alternative for the
Defendant, the court's hands were tied by the statute and mandatory sentenc-
ing guidelines.75
D. State v. Langdon
Finally, the appellate court in State v. Langdon76 reiterated that
"'[w]here possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and
construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.' ' '77 In
doing so, the court ruled that the lower court's decision to place the Defen-
dant, who was charged with "possession of cocaine with intent to sell or de-
liver," on drug offender probation was an impermissible downward depar-
ture.78 The court found that a close inspection of the relevant statutes re-
vealed that Florida Statutes section 948.034 did not permit a defendant to
enter into a community residential drug center if the defendant had previous
felony convictions which were not drug related. 79 Because the Defendant
had multiple prior possession of cocaine convictions and a prior conviction
for grand theft, the Defendant was not eligible for the "alternative to the sen-
tencing guidelines" offered by the trial court.80 The appellate court's inter-
pretation of the relevant statutes was contrary to how the trial court inter-
preted the statutes.8' The trial court did not read section 948.034 with sec-
tions 893.13 and 921.187 because section 948.034 did not reference the later
sections; however, the appellate court explained that it does not matter if the
statutes reference each other specifically. 82 Rather, it is enough that the sta-
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing State v. Tyrrell, 807 So. 2d 122, 125 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
75. Roper, 915 So. 2d at 624; see Clemens & Stancil, supra note 9, at 55.
76. 978 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
77. Id. at 264 (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.
2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).
78. Id. at 263.
79. Id. at 264; see FLA. STAT. § 948.034 (2009) (explaining the criteria for entering a
residential drug treatment center).
80. Langdon, 978 So. 2d at 264-65.
81. Id. at 265.
82. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 921.187(l)(a) (2009) (explaining that a defendant who commits
certain drug crimes may be required to serve a term of probation in light of serving time in
prison); FLA. STAT. § 893.13(10)-(11) (2009) (stating, in relevant part, that in order to qualify
for residential drug treatment or probation, the defendant must not have been convicted of any
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tutes "deal with sentencing combined with drug abuse control. 83 The policy
behind the interpretation, the court noted, was that sentencing alternatives in
criminal cases were to be "used in a manner that [would] best serve the needs
of society, punish criminal offenders, and provide the opportunity for reha-bilitation. ' '84
IV. WHAT CHANGED: SENATE BILL 1726's AMENDMENTS TO
FLORIDA'S STATUTES
In its analysis report on Senate Bill 1726, the Florida Senate explained
that the "bill expands the potential use of postadjudicatory treatment-based
drug court programs as a sentencing option for a limited, specified group of
nonviolent felony defendants. 85 The report also states that the bill will have
positive fiscal impacts, specifically that the changes will save approximately
$1 1.8 million in prison costs due to the reduced amount of offenders con-
victed.86 In addition to focusing on the statutes mentioned above, the bill
also makes changes to section 397.334 of the Florida Statutes, which deals
with Florida's drug courts. 87 Accordingly, the bill analysis repeatedly refer-
ences one legislative group's research regarding the state of drug courts in
Florida.88 For this reason, this section will begin with a brief description and
background on Florida's drug court system as it is explicitly connected with
downward departures and sentencing alternatives. The rest of this section
will focus on the various statutes affected by the bill and the positive changes
the bill makes to the previous legislation.
other felonies, other than those drug crimes listed, including possession, purchase, sell-
ing/delivering of certain drugs).
83. Langdon, 978 So. 2d at 265.
84. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 921.187(1)).
85. Fla. S. Comms. on Crim. and Civil Just. Appropriations, PCS for SB 1726 (2009)
Staff Analysis I (Mar. 27, 2009), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2009/
Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2009s I 726-pcs.ja.pdf [hereinafter SB 1726 Staff Analysis].
86. Id.
87. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 397.334 (2008).
88. See SB 1726 Staff Analysis, supra note 85, at 2 (citing FLA. LEGISLATURE, OFFICE OF
PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT No. 09-13, 2 (Mar. 2009),
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A. The Amendments' Impact on Drug Courts
1. Florida's Drug Court System
The drug court program started in Miami, Florida by then-Circuit Court
Judge Herbert Klein in 1989.89 Judge Klein believed that a specialized
treatment program like drug courts was the best way to handle the increase of
drug cases nation-wide.90 As one judge explained, "[b]asically, we have had
a revolving door phenomenon where we take an offender, lock him up for
whatever appropriate period of time, and have him back out in the communi-
ty without addressing the underlying source of his criminal behavior."9' This
"revolving door" refers directly to the high recidivism rates for drug offend-
ers which continues today.92 The national recidivism rate ranges from sixty-
five to eighty percent, meaning that between sixty-five and eighty percent of
drug "offenders continue to commit crimes after being released from custo-
dy."'93 Furthermore, the Bureau of Justice Assistance found that "only 28%
of prisons had substance abuse programs, and that only 7% of those pro-
grams provided a comprehensive level of services that included drug coun-
seling, treatment, and transitional planning." 94 Because of this information,
Florida's drug courts strive to provide rehabilitation and "proactive court
monitoring of offenders while in treatment" in order to reduce recidivism. 95
A drug offender placed in either the pretrial or postadjudicatory96 drug court
can expect to receive increased, personalized, and constant supervision pro-
vided in large part by the judge himself.97 Drug courts not only reduce reci-
89. REPORT ON FLORIDA'S DRUG COURTS, supra note 5, at 3.
90. Id.; see also Andrew Armstrong, Comment, Drug Courts and the De Facto Legaliza-
tion of Drug Use for Participants in Residential Treatment Facilities, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 133, 139-40 (2003).
91. Armstrong, supra, note 90 at 140 (quoting JAMES L. NOLAN, REMEMBERING JUSTICE:
AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 45 (2003).
92. Note, Winning the War on Drugs: A "Second Chance" for Nonviolent Drug Offend-
ers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1491 (2000).
93. Id. at 1491 n.52.
94. Id. at 1492.
95. REPORT ON FLORIDA'S DRUG COURTS, supra note 5, at 4.
96. OPPAGA, supra note 88, at 2 (noting that the pretrial division of the drug court pro-
gram is formatted for first-time drug offenders are placed in county probation rather than in
state prison. Usually, after the offender has successfully completed the program, his or her
charges are dropped. Postadjudicatory programs cater to "non-violent drug addicted offenders
who typically have prior convictions." After the offender completes the program, the conse-
quences of their charges are usually mitigated and adjudication withheld).
97. See REPORT ON FLORIDA'S DRUG COURTS, supra note 5, at 4 ("[J]udge[s] monitored
offenders through frequent court appearances to encourage good behavior and sanctioned non-
compliance in a more informal, stream-lined, and structured process.").
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divism by providing the treatment a prison cannot, they also reduce costs
substantially.98 The eligibility for drug courts depends on the criteria set by
the individual circuit drug court programs; however, most only service "of-
fenders who have non-violent felony drug or drug-related offenses and who
have no history of violence, drug trafficking, or drug sales." 99
2. Modifications to Florida Statutes Section 397.334
Section 397.334 of the Florida Statutes describes and allows for the
drug court system in Florida.'0° The Florida Legislature enacted section
397.334 in 2001 after the Supreme Court Task Force on Treatment-Based
Drug Courts proposed that the legislature take action and "require[] each
judicial circuit to establish a treatment-based drug court program."'0 ' In ad-
dition, section 397.334 calls on the drug courts to establish and adhere to ten
components of drug courts. 10 2 The rest of section 397.334 establishes admin-
istrative guidelines for drug courts. 0 3 The amendments passed in May 2009
add to section 397.334 by giving the judge certain qualifications for allowing
an offender to take advantage of the drug court program as a form of down-
ward departure.' °4 Furthermore, the amendments provide that offenders in
the drug court program who violate their probation solely based on a failed
98. Id. at 11-12. The National Association of Drug Court Professionals reported that
"incarceration of drug offenders costs [range] between $20,000 and $50,000 a year." Id. at
11. However, "participation in drug court costs" [only] $2500 to $4000 per person. Id.
99. OPPAGA, supra note 88, at 2.
100. FLA. STAT. § 397.334 (2009).
101. REPORT ON FLORIDA'S DRUG COURTS, supra note 5, at 8.
102. FLA. STAT. § 397.334(4)(a)-(j). These ten components are:
(a) Drug court programs integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice sys-
tem case processing; (b) Using a nonadversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel
promote public safety while protecting participants' due process rights; (c) Eligible partici-
pants are identified early and promptly placed in the drug court program; (d) Drug court pro-
grams provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, and other related treatment and rehabili-
tation services; (e) Abstinence is monitored by frequent testing for alcohol and other drugs; (f)
A coordinated strategy governs drug court programs responses to participants' compliance; (g)
Ongoing judicial interaction with each drug court program participant is essential; (h) Monitor-
ing and evaluation measure the achievement of program goals and gauge program effective-
ness; (i) Continuing interdisciplinary education promotes effective drug court program plan-
ning, implementation, and operations; (j) Forging partnerships among drug court programs,
public agencies, and community-based organizations generates local support and enhances
drug court program effectiveness.
Id.
103. See FLA. STAT. § 397.334.
104. See FLA. STAT. § 397.334(3)(a) (stating that entry into the program "as a condition of
probation or community control" by the sentencing judge "must be based upon the sentencing
court's assessment of the defendant's criminal history, substance abuse.... amenability to the
services of the program, [and] total sentence points").
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substance abuse test will have the violation dismissed. 1 5 These additions
stress the importance of the offender's need for treatment and rehabilitation
which the former version of the statute failed to do."° The former version of
section 397.334 explained that the purpose of drug courts in Florida was to
process offenders with substance abuse problems "in such a manner as to
appropriately address the severity of the identified substance abuse problem
through treatment services tailored to the individual needs of the partici-
pant."'' 0 7 However, the statute remained silent as to what specifically about
the offender's needs the judge should inquire about when considering wheth-
er the offender should be moved to the drug court program as a sentencing
alternative. 0 8  The additions, conversely, now require the judge to think
about the offender's personal criminal history along with his or her individu-
al substance abuse, which may lead to an increase of offenders who receive
treatment.'9 As more offenders enter drug court rather than prison, the reci-
divism rate will continue to decrease among offenders while public safety
and savings will increase."0 Additionally, the changes to section 397.334
make drug courts more forgiving as offenders begin weaning themselves off
drugs."' As previously noted, drug court judges now must dismiss violations
of the drug court's terms when those violations are due to failing drug tests,
recognizing that substance abusers have a difficult time resisting drugs dur-
ing the beginning stages of treatment." 2 Overall, the amendments to section
397.334 not only reinforce the individuality of drug courts and increase the
chances that an offender may be granted a downward departure to participate
in drug courts, but they also direct drug court judges and sentencing judges
towards treatment rather than punishment.'
105. FLA. STAT. § 397.334(3)(b).
An offender who is sentenced to a postadjudicatory drug court program and who.., is the sub-
ject of a violation of probation or community control ... based solely upon a failed or suspect
substance abuse test administered ... shall have the violation of probation or community con-
trol heard by the judge presiding over the postadjudicatory drug court program. The judge
shall dispose of any such violation, after a hearing on or admission of the violation ....
Id.
106. See FLA. STAT. § 397.334.
107. FLA. STAT. § 397.334(1) (2008).
108. See FLA. STAT. § 397.334.
109. See FLA. STAT. § 397.334(3)(a)(2009); see SB 1726 Staff Analysis, supra note 85.
110. See OPPAGA, supra note 88, at 4-5.
111. See id.
112. See FLA. STAT. § 397.334(3)(b).
113. See FLA. STAT. § 397.334.
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B. The Amendments' Impact on Downward Departures
While the change to section 921.0026(2) of the Florida Statutes is not
as extensive as the amendments to section 397.334, what the new act adds
will have a significant impact on sentencing in Florida." 4 As stated earlier,
section 921.0026(2) describes mitigating circumstances which could permit a
judge to give an offender a lesser sentence than the offender stands to receive
via the sentencing scoresheet." 15 Previously, subsection 3 indicated that an
offender's substance abuse or addiction could never be used as a mitigating
circumstance" 6 However, the new additions to section 921.0026 explicitly
allow for the sentencing court to take into consideration the defendant's sub-
stance abuse as long as the defendant scores fifty-two sentence points or
fewer, is amenable to treatment-based drug court, is eligible to participate in
the program, and was charged with a nonviolent felony."' This amendment
works in conjunction with the changes to drug courts and drug offender pro-
bation as it permits the sentencing judge to give a drug offender a chance to
complete one of these programs even though he or she may score mandatory
prison time.' 18 Allowing downward departures based on the defendant's
substance abuse or addiction indicates that the legislature realized that in
order to control the increased prison admission rates and expenses, it would
have to modify its blanket statement forbidding downward departures based
on substance abuse in every circumstance." 9 Savings to society, however,
also make the amendments to section 921.0026 worthwhile since "'hurt
people hurt people,"' meaning that by limiting drug treatment availability to
offenders, drug addicted offenders will likely commit violent crimes to oth-
ers.' 20 Other monetary and societal benefits include keeping prisons full of
actual violent-offenders rather than those who are drug-addicted. 2' By giv-
ing the judge additional discretion, the judge may place a defendant in drug
court or drug offender probation rather than sending him or her to jail, where
114. See FLA. STAT. § 921.0026 (2009).
115. FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(2) (2008).
116. FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(3) (2008).
117. FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(2)(m) (2009).
118. See id.
119. See SB 1726 Staff Analysis, supra note 85, at 1; see also 2007-2008 FLA. DEP'T OF
CORR. ANN. REP., supra note 3, at 16 (stating its expenditures for one prisoner per year totals
$20,108); GRAY, supra note 2, at 36 (stating that prison overcrowding, which drains state
budgets, is due in large part to mandatory minimums).
120. See GRAY, supra note 2, at 189.
121. See id. at 36 ("[W]ardens throughout the country are routinely forced to grant an
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the drug addict may end up taking a bed that a rapist or other violent offender
could have occupied.
22
C. The Amendments' Impact on Drug Offender Probation
1. Drug Offender Probation in Florida
Drug offender probation is a type of court ordered probation which "is a
more intensive form of supervision."'' 23 An offender may be put in drug of-
fender probation either as a condition of his or her deal with the State Attor-
ney, as a part of the judge's sentence, or through the Florida Parole Commis-
sion.' 24 Drug offender probation includes the standard supervisions of regu-
lar probation combined with special conditions tailored to the needs of the
offender.1 25 For example, a judge may require a drug offender to attend Nar-
cotics Anonymous meetings, keep a curfew, get drug tested regularly, or
attend an inpatient or outpatient drug treatment program. 26 Drug offender
probation, like any type of probation, constitutes a sentencing alternative and
downward departure since probation provides a way for an offender to avoid
spending his or her whole sentence in state prison, and, like drug courts, rein-
forces "rehabilitation rather than punishment."'' 27 Furthermore, judges view
drug offender probation as a privilege rather than a right and reserve the
broad discretion of determining what the individual offender deserves or
requires as conditions of probation. 28 However, just as a judge has the dis-
cretion to place an offender in drug offender probation, a judge is equally
given the discretion to determine whether the probation has been violated
and hand down a prison sentence.
29
122. See id.




127. Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222, 229 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Bernhardt v. State, 288 So.
2d 490, 495 (Fla. 1974)).
The underlying concept of probation is rehabilitation rather than punishment and presupposes
the fact that probationer is not in prison confinement. The purpose of the granting of probation
... is rehabilitation of one who has committed the crime charged without formally and judi-
cially branding the individual as a convicted criminal and without consequent loss of civil
rights and other damning consequences.
Bemhardt, 288 So. 2d at 495 (citations omitted).
128. Lawson, 969 So. 2d at 229.
129. See id.
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2. Modifications to Florida Statutes Section 948.20
The pre-amended version of section 948.20 of the Florida Statutes ex-
plains that, in order to qualify for drug offender probation, the defendant
must have been charged with either purchasing or possessing narcotics in
addition to being a chronic substance abuser. 130 The statute further provides
that the judge may "stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt [or] ... stay
and withhold the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on drug
offender probation" or into a postadjudicatory treatment-based drug court
program in lieu of a prison sentence. 13' The amended version of the statute
expands the eligibility requirements for drug offender probation by allowing
defendants who have committed a burglary, trespassing, or other nonviolent
felony to qualify for drug offender probation. 32 Additionally, the amend-
ment also states that no matter what nonviolent felony the defendant has
been charged with, the defendant's total sentence scoresheet points must not
exceed fifty-two. 133  The expanded qualifications only affect those who
committed crimes on or after July 1, 2009, however, preventing these
amendments from reaching back and affecting previous cases and rulings.' 34
Because drug offender probation is linked to drug courts, the changes to sec-
tion 948.20 will likely have the same positive fiscal and societal impacts as
the changes to section 397.334. 1
5
D. Why Change?
As noted before, the anti-drug sentiment created by Nixon's "War on
Drugs" influenced many legislatures to create harsh drug laws and strict sen-
tencing guidelines for drug offenders, which swiftly increased prison popula-
130. FLA. STAT. § 948.20 (2008) (explaining that the court must hold a hearing to deter-
mine that the defendant qualifies as a chronic substance abuser).
131. Id.
132. Act effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws 583 (codified as amended in
FLA. STAT. §§ 397.334, 921.0026, 948.06, .08, .16..20, 948.345).
"Forcible felony" means treason; murder; manslaughter; sexual battery; caijacking; home-
invasion robbery; robbery; burglary; arson; kidnapping; aggravated assault; aggravated battery;
aggravated stalking; aircraft piracy; unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb; and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or vi-
olence against any individual.
FLA. STAT. § 776.08 (2009).
133. Ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws at 583.
134. See id.
135. See Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222, 232 (Fla. 2007); SB 1726 STAFF ANALYSIS,
supra note 85, at 1.
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tions.136 The harsh drug laws translate into law enforcement officials who
focus their efforts on incarcerating drug addicts rather than violent crimi-
nals-which further reinforce a national "demonization" of drug addicted
criminals. 37 While changing, many Americans still believe drug addiction is
a choice and drug addicts should be jailed to keep them off the streets. 138 In
decades past, these feelings were steered towards alcoholics during the time
of prohibition; however, many realize today that alcoholism is a disease
which can-and should-be treated rather than punished.3 9 Unfortunately,
these feelings are not as widely applied to drug addicts, although there has
been increased education and awareness about drug addiction. 40 For exam-
ple, Florida's Office of Drug Control emphasizes that, while "[tihe initial
decision to take drugs is often voluntary," drug users crave drugs so much so
that their bodies cannot function without the drugs and drug addicts reach a
point where they can no longer exert self-control. 4 ' Further, "[b]ecause of
the way drug use alters the structure and function of the brain, drug addiction
is regarded as comparable to other diseases like heart disease."'142 Due to
reports like this and others which bring drug addiction into the medical, ra-
ther than the criminal arena, legislatures, like Florida, have amended their
harsh drug laws to accommodate for drug treatment. 43 Furthermore, the
changes reflect the increased attention on the constitutionality of strict drug
laws and make efforts to end the criminalization of drug addicts.'
44
136. See generally BAUM, supra note 18, at 259 (discussing an instance in 1988 where
Florida State University economists discovered that drug arrests in Florida doubled since
1982). Skeptical, the economists compared their statistics with those from Illinois. Id. They
found the same thing: "Drug arrests in Illinois rose 69 percent" in ten years. Id.
Florida and Illinois were typical in their zeal to send drug offenders to prison at the expense of
incarcerating other, perhaps more dangerous, criminals. The War on Drugs doubled the na-
tion's prison population during the Reagan administration. The portion of state prisoners in-
side for drugs went from one in fifteen to one in three, and 85 percent were in for mere posses-
sion.
Id.
137. See GRAY, supra note 2, at 123.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 124.
140. See id. at 123 (discussing one professor at the University of California at Irvine who
invites drug addicts from a local treatment center to his classroom to help students realize that
drug addicts are humans with "needs and desires, goals and failings, just like everyone else").
141. FLORIDA'S DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 68.
142. Id.
143. See Act effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws 578-85 (codified as
amended in FLA. STAT. §§ 397.334, 921.0026, 948.06, .08, .16..20, 948.345).
144. GRAY, supra note 2, at 124-25 (explaining that many current drug laws violate the
precedent set by the United States Supreme Court which held that punishing a person "for the
disease of drug addiction violated the Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment").
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V. THE CHANGES APPLIED TO EARLIER CASES
While the changes Senate Bill 1726 made to how drug offenders are
sentenced seem positive on paper, the actual effects of the act have not yet
been seen. However, this section attempts to predict how practical these
changes are by using the fact patterns from previous cases and applying the
new versions of the statutes to those defendants to determine if the defen-
dants would have had different outcomes. This section does not discuss
Jones since the amendments would not have changed the outcome of the
defendant's case.
In Crews, the Defendant was charged with delivery of cocaine within
1000 feet of a school and possession of cocaine. 145 The trial judge chose to
give the Defendant a downward departure based on his drug addiction, which
the appellate court found to be against the explicit language of section
921.0026 of the Florida Statutes.146 The appellate court's decision hinged on
sections 921.0026 and the 2004 version of 948.01, both of which were
changed by Senate Bill 1726.141 If the Defendant had been tried under the
new amendments, the appellate court may have found that the trial court
judge's downward departure was not an abuse of discretion, as the new laws
explicitly allow judges to consider substance abuse as the sole factor for de-
parture. 148 Furthermore, since Senate Bill 1726 stresses rehabilitation over
incarceration, the Defendant would have qualified for drug offender proba-
tion under revised section 948.20.149 The appellate court ruled that section
948.034 barred the Defendant from enrolling in probation because the statute
did not list the Defendant's charge as one which qualifies; however, section
948.20 indicates that a defendant qualifies for drug offender probation as
long as the court finds the defendant is a chronic substance abuser and has
committed any nonviolent felony.15° In Crews, the trial judge would have
been given more discretion in his sentencing and, while it could still be ap-
145. State v. Crews, 884 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Ha. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
146. Id. at 1140,1143.
147. See id. at 1142-43; CS for SB 1726, §2, 2009 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009) (first en-
grossed).
148. See ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws at 580. Departure from the lowest permissible
sentencing for substance abuse convictions is subject to the defendant's Criminal Punishment
Code scoresheet totaling less than fifty-two points and a court determination "that the defen-
dant is amenable to the services of a postadjudicatory treatment-based drug court program and
is otherwise qualified to participate in the program." Id.
149. See id.
150. See Crews, 884 So. 2d at 1140; ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws at 583.
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pealed, the appellate court would have likely upheld the trial court's sentenc-
ing based on the amendments the new law provides.'
In Roper, the Defendant was charged with delivery and possession of
cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. 52 The Defendant scored almost eigh-
teen months in state prison, yet the trial court found that he "was a chronic
drug user, and placed him on drug offender probation for five years.' 53 The
appellate court overruled that sentence finding that the statute did not allow
for the Defendant to enter drug offender probation. 5 4 Under the new ver-
sion, Mr. Roper would have been one of the many affected and spared prison
since the amendment includes all nonviolent felonies as qualified charges for
drug offender probation. 5  In this case, the appellate court fully relied on
section 948.20; therefore, Mr. Roper's fate certainly would have been differ-
ent. 56 The final paragraph of the appellate court's decision reinforces that
many courts are restricted to the statutes regardless of whether they believe
the sentence is appropriate for the defendant or not:
[w]e acknowledge the good intentions of the trial judge to offer
drug treatment to Mr. Roper .... [nievertheless .... [t]he Criminal
Punishment Code requires a sentencing court to impose not less
than the lowest permissible sentence calculated on the scoresheet,
unless there is evidence that supports a valid reason for a down-
ward departure.' 
5 7
It follows that this sentiment and similar rulings influenced the legislature to
amend the sentencing statutes.
58
Finally, in Langdon, the appellate court found that the trial court
granted the Defendant a downward departure for which she did not quali-
fy. 59 The appellate court revoked the defendant's sentence due to section
948.034's stipulation that the Defendant have no prior non-drug felony con-
victions.' 6° Again, the court's ruling would have been different if the
amendments were effective in 2008, as the Defendant would have been able
151. See ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws at 580, 583.
152. State v. Roper, 915 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 623-24. Again, note that the statute prior to the amendments only provided
drug offender probation to a defendant who was charged with possession or purchase of con-
trolled substances. See FLA. STAT. § 948.20 (2008).
155. See ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws at 583.
156. See Roper, 915 So. 2d at 624.
157. Id.
158. See SB 1726 STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 1-4.
159. State v. Langdon, 978 So. 2d 263, 263 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
160. Id. at 264.
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to receive a downward departure based on her substance addiction or, alter-
natively, she could have qualified for drug offender probation under Florida
Statutes section 948.20, despite her previous non-drug related felony
charge. 1' Because both sections 948.20 and 948.034 speak to the require-
ments of drug offender probation, the Langdon court would now be able to
use section 948.20's standards. 162 The court voiced the policy behind their
ruling, indicating that if the relevant statutes were read together, they would
show that the legislature intended the court to make their determinations of
the availability of sentencing alternatives based on the "'manner that will
best serve the needs of society, punish criminal offenders, and provide the
opportunity for rehabilitation.' ' 163 Had the revised version of section 948.20
been available to the court, application of this policy would have prevented
the Defendant from incarceration. 64
These cases merely provide a sampling of defendants whose fates
would have changed had the amendments been in effect when they were
tried. However, it is safe to assume that many more drug addicted offenders
would be out of jail and in treatment centers, or postadjudicatory treatment
programs, had the amendments been instituted earlier, specifically because of
the explicit nature of the former version of section 921.0026 subsection 3 of
the Florida Statutes. 165
VI. IS SENATE BILL 1726 MERELY A BAND-AID?
While the changes effectuated by Senate Bill 1726 certainly increase a
judge's discretion in sentencing drug offenders, the act does not reach a sub-
stantial amount of drug addicted offenders in need of treatment. For exam-
ple, in order to qualify for a downward departure based on substance abuse,
the offender must not be charged with a violent felony.166 Additionally, the
new version of the statute reads that the offender must not score above fifty-
two points on his or her scoresheet. 167 This poses a problem for offenders
who commit aggravated battery or assault on law enforcement officers, a
crime which is not only violent, but also carries a higher score than most
161. See id.; ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws at 580, 583.
162. See Langdon, 978 So. 2d at 264 (citing Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion
Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).
163. Id. at 265 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 921.187(1) (2008)).
164. See id.
165. See FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(3) (2002) ("[T]he defendant's substance abuse or addic-
tion ... is not a mitigating factor ... and does not, under any circumstances, justify a down-
ward departure from the permissible sentencing range." (emphasis added)).
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drug charges. 68  Such a violent crime may be one of the most common
among drug abusing offenders under the influence at the time of their arrest,
especially if they are taken by surprise or do not understand why they are
being arrested given their altered state of mind.'69 Furthermore, with the
sentencing points capped at fifty-two, an offender with an extensive record
may not qualify for a downward departure, drug offender probation, drug
court or regular probation, or community control.17° While the legislature
intended to create a bill that would alleviate the growing prison admission
rates and stress on taxpayer dollars, they failed to realize that their changes
would still leave judges scratching their heads when faced with a serious
drug abuser, who scores more than fifty-two points or is charged with a vio-
lent crime.717 By doing so, the legislature continues to leave judges and their
invaluable discretion out of the equation. 72
Moreover, Senate Bill 1726 proposes that, in order for the court to de-
termine whether the defendant qualifies for drug court or a downward depar-
ture, the sentencing court must conduct a substance abuse screening and de-
termine if the defendant is amenable to treatment. 73 However, the act does
not discuss the method of evaluating substance abuse or amenability. 74 Ad-
ditionally, revised section 948.20 of the Florida Statutes, calls for a hearing
to determine whether the defendant is a chronic substance abuser; yet again,
the statute fails to indicate what the hearing entails. 75  It does indicate,
168. See FLA. STAT. § 776.08 (2009) (stating that aggravated battery or assault is a violent
crime); FLA. STAT. § 921.0012 (2008) (listing aggravated battery and assault on a law en-
forcement officer as level six and seven offenses, respectively, as opposed to common drug
crimes which are a level four offense).
169. See FLORIDA'S DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 39.
The 2006 National Crime Victimization Survey asked victims of violent crimes [including as-
sault] . . . about their perceptions of the offender's use of ... drugs. In the 54% of violent
crimes in which the victim formed an opinion, 27% perceived the offender to be under the in-
fluence of alcohol or other drugs.
Id.
170. See ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws at 580-83.
171. See SB 1726 Staff Analysis, supra note 85, at 1, 3.
172. See Clemens & Stancil, supra note 9, at 54.
[Tihe Florida Legislature snatched discretion in criminal sentencing from the hands of judges..
.. Many judges are experienced former prosecutors or criminal defense lawyers who have been
handling cases for decades. More importantly, all trial judges must individually stand for elec-
tion . . . every six years, where any individual sentence perceived as too light could weigh
heavily in the electorate's mind. But still, the legislature removed sentencing discretionary to
nonelected assistant state attorneys, whose zeal may be untempered by experience or electorate
accountability.
Id.
173. See ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws at 579-80.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 583.
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though, that the "state attorney and victim, if any" may offer recommenda-
tions for the drug offender regarding their entry into a drug court program,
leading one to believe that the fate of drug offenders may be left in the hands
of a state attorney or victim rather than a judge. 76 Again, the act is vague as
to what kind of drug addicted offender may qualify for these treatment pro-
grams beyond the bare sentencing point score and the requirement that the
defendant be a chronic substance abuser. 77 While the purpose of the phrase
"amenable to treatment" is important as it may help prevent a decrease in
rates of drug court graduation, 178 it just creates more ambiguity as to the level
of discretion the judge actually has. 179 Does this mean that the judge deter-
mines if the defendant is amenable or should the state attorney come to this
conclusion? 80  Due to these unanswered questions, the court's discretion
may become limited by an adamant state attorney or victim who believes that
the defendant should not be rewarded by drug offender probation or drug
court treatment.1
81
As noted before, the act forges new paths to allow more drug addicted
offenders to enter into treatment-based programs. 182 However, the legislature
did not recognize that counties in Florida already have eligibility require-
ments in place; requirements which usually state that the defendant must
have no prior felony convictions or be charged with a non-drug offense.'83
The act lacks reference to these requirements set up by the counties and does
not mandate that the counties change them. 84 Because of this oversight, it is
possible for counties to retain their rules for an indeterminate amount of
time, until the legislature mandates that the rules change. In this sense, the
act, while very appealing on the surface, does not pack the power needed to
overhaul the state's current system of properly sentencing drug addicted de-
fendants.
176. See id. at 579.
177. See id. at 580, 583.
178. See OPPAGA, supra note 88, at 4 ("[W]hile drug court graduates have lower recidiv-
ism rates, only half of participants complete the program, and many non-completers are re-
arrested and subsequently sentenced to prison.").
179. See ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws at 579.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 579-83.
183. See REPORT ON FLORIDA'S DRUG COURTS, supra note 5, at app. B.
184. See ch. 2009-64, 2009 Fla. Laws at 579 (explaining that entrance into a drug court
program is pursuant to section 948.01 or 948.20). Section 948.01 states that a defendant is
eligible for drug court as long as the defendant is a nonviolent offender, scores fifty-two
points or below, and is amenable to treatment. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(7) (2009).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The new legislation enacted by the Florida Legislature on May 27, 2009
will greatly change how judges and both defense and state attorneys think
about sentencing drug addicted defendants. Thankfully, the time has finally
come in Florida for courts to treat drug addicts like they really are-
individuals in need of treatment, not incarceration. However, while the
change is noteworthy, the legislation is not nearly as revolutionary as the
times call for. With society becoming increasingly aware of the physical and
mental effects of drugs, legislatures must respond with stronger laws ensur-
ing drug addicts stay out of prisons and stay in treatment centers where they
can learn to become productive members of society. Furthermore, other
states with ancient laws regarding drug sentencing must follow in Florida
and New York's footsteps and create legislation which erases the signs of the
failed War on Drugs. The future of mandatory minimums and strict down-
ward departure guidelines look beautifully dim and the next decade promises
to show more of the support drug addicted defendants require.
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